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ABSTRACT
Adaptive Management of Complex Environmental Problems
- Comparison of National Nuclear Waste Management Policies -
by 
Carmel Létourneau
Dr. David M. Hassenzahl, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Environmental Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Many of today’s challenging environmental problems, to the point of manifesting
themselves on a scale that has global, political consequences, likely result from long-term
evolutionary developmental processes.  The degree to which humans can manage the
evolution of these  problems remains an open question.  Over the past several decades,
the dominant management approach in environmental policy has been standard setting. 
Managers relied primarily on command-and-control approaches for environmental
management.  This approach relies on regulations and policies, and it assumes a tightly
coupled response between human intervention and environmental improvement.  While
standard setting has been successful for certain environmental problems, some of the
more complicated ones, however, remain unresponsive to amelioration through
command-and-control approaches because of large or unsurmountable uncertainties. 
Examples of intractable environmental problems include cases of natural resource
mismanagement, for instance, fishery and forest depletion, anthropogenic climate change,
nitrate contamination of coastal waters, and the management of nuclear waste.  Faced
with such challenges, since the mid 1980s, an increasing number of scholars have
developed other forms of management, in particular, adaptive management.  Although a
iv
promising approach, adaptive management programs have performed unevenly.  The
reasons for their success or failure are the subject of increasing investigation.
Scholars suggest that improving the performance of adaptive management requires
that environmental problems be understood as ‘complex’, open, evolving systems of
interacting social and environmental subsystems.  As such, complexity science postulates
that system development may not be random. A few key system components, such as
adaptive capacities, may be particularly sensitive to changes and hence drive the system’s
response on the whole over time.  The task is then twofold: to identify key drivers of the
system in question (or project), and to use these drivers for ‘steering’ the system toward
some set management goal.
To date, narrative has been the primary approach used by researchers to study
complex social-environmental systems, including their developmental patterns and
underlying factors driving the system.  Although useful as an initial step, narratives may
be biased, misleading, or incomplete.  Other methods are needed to draw complementary
inferences between data and theory.  The absence of a more systematic method—for
example, one that combines qualitative and quantitative analyses—points to a critical gap
in the adaptive management literature.  In view of this gap, I undertook comparative
research that combines computer-assisted content analysis of national policy documents
with statistical exploratory multivariate analyses.
As a case study, I examine the development of national nuclear waste management
policies as a complex social-environmental system.  The development of nuclear waste
management policies in twenty-three (23) countries—from North America, Europe, Asia,
Africa, and South America—is compared through a multiple-case, retrospective, and 
varchival study.  First, I assess whether general patterns of broad system development,
namely, linear, periodic, or chaotic, exist.  I also examine how external or internal factors
influence the general development of the system.  Second, I assess the relative importance
of potential key system drivers—here, stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs)—when
sustainable development is a specific management goal.  Six SACs were selected:
learning by managers, social responsibility of managers, public participation in decision-
making, government oversight, formal project collaboration, and emergency
preparedness.
Study findings suggest that the development of national nuclear waste management
policies follows a non-random, possibly chaotic, pattern of development where
networking and learning SACs are key system drivers.  Once drivers are identified by
managers, they can be used to optimize system complexity under a strategy adaptive
management framework to maximize system adaptation over the long term.  Managers
would thus be able to 'steer' complex environmental problems toward a set goal.
The research design can open robust lines of inquiry on the development of a wide
range of complex environmental problems.  Both private and public managers are likely
to welcome the study findings, because they can to more effective allocation of resources
to adaptive management programs.  Governments, as influenced by the public, are also
likely to find the findings useful for the development of sound environmental
management policies in the interest of present and future generations.  
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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I introduce the dissertation by explaining why research is needed on
adaptive management of complex environmental problems.  From the literature, I develop
several outstanding research questions.  I then describe the research design that will be
used to answer these questions: a comparative case study on the development of national
nuclear waste management policies that mixes qualitative and quantitative approaches.  I
end with a broad outline of the dissertation.  
1.1 The Need for Research
Ring (1997) argues that many of today’s challenging environmental problems, to the
point of manifesting themselves on a scale that has global political consequences,
emerged from long-term evolutionary development processes.  The degree to which
humans can manage these problems remains an open question.  Over the past several
decades, the dominant management approach in environmental policy was setting
standards (Ring, 1997).  As such, managers  relied primarily on ‘command-and-control’1
approaches for environmental management.  Scholars characterize command-and-control
management as the application of regulations, standards and policies assuming a direct
response, or linear relationship, between human intervention and environmental
improvement (Miller & Page, 2007; Linkov et al., 2006; Funtowicz et al., 1999). 
2From an evolutionary perspective, Ring (1997) indicates that the command-and-
control approach was applied as early as the middle of the 20th century to respond to
local and regional environmental catastrophes.  During the 1960s, it was used to respond
to problems created by the increasing transfer of synthetic chemicals into nature. Scholars
agree that the command-and-control approach has been successful for some simple
environmental problems and even for more complicated ones (Miller & Page, 2007;
Linkov et al., 2006; Funtowicz et al., 1999).  For instance, command-and-control
measures have been applied with some success since the 1950s for the reduction of smog
along the southwest coast of the United States (AQMD, 1997).  
Other environmental problems, however, remain unresponsive to amelioration
through command-and-control approaches because of large or unsurmountable
uncertainties.  Examples of intractable problems include cases of natural resource
mismanagement, notably, fishery and forest depletion (Berkes et al., 2002a);
anthropogenic climate change (Arvai et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2006); nitrate
contamination of coastal waters (Bosselman, 2002); and nuclear waste management
(NEA, 2007).  Ring (1997) argues that some common properties of such intractable
problems include their initial slowly progressing character and their pervasiveness in
spatial terms.  Similarly, Funtowicz et al. (1999) argue that the intractableness of such
problems likely results from the presence of seemingly irreducible uncertainties over
time, the plurality of legitimate perspectives grounded in alternate values, and high
decision stakes.  
There is as yet no generally accepted definition of adaptive management.  For purposes of this paper, the2
definition of ‘adaptive management’ is taken from the work of scholars grounded is complexity science and
is management that considers environmental problems as complex, open systems and, as a consequence,
provides for a two-pronged management strategy: reducing uncertainties through adjustments in the light of
new information, while at the same time, addressing irreducible uncertainties by preparing for surprises
through building broad adaptive capacities.
3
 Faced with these management challenges, Ring (1997) reports that by the early to
mid 1980s environmental policy was being developed to move beyond addressing acute,
local, and relatively simple problems to more chronic, global and extremely complex
problems.  An increasing number of scholars explored new approaches to environmental
management.  Instead of focusing on exact standards, many of these scholars suggested
that environmental policy could aim at “giving continuous incentives to encourage
adaptation capacity for precautionary reasons” (Ring, 1997, p.248).  In particular,
‘adaptive management’  was developed to complement or even replace command-and-2
control management (e.g., Berkes et al., 2002a; Walters, 1986).  Scholars argue that,
broadly conceived, adaptive management would allow for program or policy adjustments
in response to short- and long-term changes.  Adaptive management was also starting to
be applied within other social science disciplines, including business administration,
organization science, psychology, and public administration (Stacey, 2007; Rhodes &
MacKechnie, 2003).
Within the discipline of environmental management, adaptive management has often
been applied to natural resource management (Berkes et al., 2002b; Christensen et al.,
1996).  Recently, adaptive management has been applied to a wider range of
environmental issues.  Such issues include the protection of public land resources across
many jurisdictions (Higgins & Duane, 2008), global responses to climate change (Arvai
Some authors refer to the interacting sub-systems as a ‘social-ecological system’ (e.g.,Walker & Salt,3
2006), an ecological-economical system (e.g., Janssen, 2002) or a human-environment systems (Lambin,
2005).  For this study, I use the expression ‘social-environmental system’ also used by some researchers
(e.g., Smit & Wandel, 2006; Peterson, 2000; Perrings, 1998).  The social sub-system includes all human
attempts to manage or intervene in the environment.  The environmental sub-system includes the impact of
human intervention not only on ecosystems, but also on the welfare of humans.
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et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2006), and the long-term management of nuclear waste
(NWMO, 2005).  Berkes et al. (2002b) argue that the experience gained so far from
attempts to apply adaptive management, however, indicate that its performance has been
uneven.  Given the promising uses of adaptive management, research continues into the
reasons for its success or failure (Berkes et al., 2002b).  
Gunderson et al. (2002) and Westley et al. (2002) argue that improving the
performance of adaptive management requires that environmental problems be
understood as ‘complex’, open, evolving, systems of interacting social and ecological
sub-systems .  Complexity science was developed as a field founded on the assumption3
that the apparently disorderly behavior of some systems over time may not be random and
contain hidden order.  A few system components may be sensitive to changes and ‘drive’,
that is, influence the system’s response on the whole over time.  Scholars refer to such
system components as ‘key system drivers’ (e.g., Walker et al., 2006; Bennett et al.,
2005; Allison & Hobbs, 2004; Sterman, 2001; Leoncini, 1998).  Kearney and Berkes
(2007) provide the following example of a key system driver: the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in 1999 that recognized the right of the Mi’kmaq people to a common
fishery.  This decision required major adjustments on the part of non aboriginal fishers to
accept a new stakeholder into the fishery.  In this case, the adaptive capacity was effective
government oversight.  Therefore,  Funtowicz et al. (1999) argue that faced with a
Another approach to understanding system behavior is through system dynamics modeling.  For a4
description of strengths and weaknesses and potential complementarity of both approaches, see Scholl
(2000), Phelan (1999), Funtowicz et al. (1999) and Ramussen et al. (1985).
Hogselius (2009) reports that “there has so far not been any systematic research on the evolution of spent5
nuclear fuel in globally comparative perspective”.  He argues that his study has the ambition to fill that gap. 
Although the study attempts to make comparisons based on a technical and political basis, it is nevertheless
a comparison based on, for the most part, qualitative information already available in documents published
by international organizations.
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complex problem where is it not feasible to know the dynamics of all interacting system
components of a system evolving over time, complexity science postulates that
identifying a handful of system drivers may provide valuable insight for understanding 
complex system development .4
To date, the identification of key system drivers within complex systems has been
attempted through the study of a case narrative.  Although useful as an initial step, some
scholars—for instance, Poole et al. (2000)—suggest that narratives may be misleading
because they are susceptible either to author bias and subjective rationalization, or to a
too narrow focus.  Poole et al. (2000) argue that “rigorously drawing inferential links
between data and theory requires methods that go beyond subjective eyeballing” (p.129). 
I find that the lack of a reliable method that combines qualitative and quantitative
analyses for identifying key system drivers, particularly for case comparisons, points to a
critical gap in the adaptive management literature .  This study fills that gap.5
1.2 Scope of the Study
In this section, I outline the scope of the study by outlining the selected case, the
period covered by the study, and the management goal selected for illustrative purposes.
6Case Study
In order to identify key system drivers, I examine a specific social-environmental
system—the development of national nuclear waste management policies in a wide range
of countries—as a case study.  When interpreting the study results, I do consider
contextual information including national histories of the path of nuclear operations, that
is, from mining uranium to the fabrication of fuel for the operation of nuclear reactors to
the eventual disposal of the nuclear fuel waste.  The path of the fuel from the earth
(uranium mining) through its utilization in nuclear reactors and then back to the ground
(nuclear waste disposal) is called the nuclear fuel cycle.  As introductory background,
more detailed information on the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear waste follows.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Waste
 The back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle may be ‘open’, that is, some countries have
opted for an open cycle where the nuclear waste exiting the nuclear reactor is directly
deposited into a geological repository; this is the route adopted by, for instance, Canada,
Sweden and Finland.  Other countries have adopted a closed nuclear fuel cycle policy,
because there is still a significant amount of energy left in the nuclear waste, about 25%
more, that could be retrieved through recycling in specialized facilities (WNA, 2009;
Rogner & McDonald, 2007).  Countries have or are considering the recycling (or
‘reprocessing’) of this waste so that fresh fuel can be made to generate more electricity. 
This recycling activity ‘closes’ the nuclear fuel cycle.  Countries who currently reprocess
their nuclear waste domestically include China, Russia, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom.  Other countries have exported, or continue to export, their waste for
7reprocessing.  These countries include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan.  Finally,
some countries have yet to formulate nuclear fuel cycle policies.
Figure 1 illustrates the open and closed nuclear fuel cycles.  In countries that have
adopted an open cycle, the solid nuclear fuel waste exiting the nuclear reactor will likely
go into storage for a while (to allow some radioactive decay, heat dissipation, or for other
reasons).  Thereafter, the waste would go directly into a deep geological repository
(DGR).  In countries that have adopted a closed cycle, the spent fuel emanating from
conventional nuclear reactors will be first stored, then recycled (reprocessing, further
treatment, and new fuel fabrication) for further use in more advanced nuclear reactors. 
The high-level waste from recycling is liquified waste that will be vitrified and eventually
deposited into a deep geological repository.  Although there is no commercial DGR  in
operation, Rogner and McDonald (2007) report that approximately one third of the
world’s discharged spent fuel has been reprocessed.
Most of this spent fuel is currently in interim storage.  As a result of more than 50
years of experience with safely and effectively storing spent fuel  (either within the open
or closed cycles), there is a high level of confidence in storage technologies and their
ability to cope with rising volumes pending implementation of final repositories for
nuclear waste (WNA, 2009).  Interim storage in direct disposal countries is ongoing and
awaits the siting of a deep geological repository based on technical and social criteria.
In the case of reprocessing countries, interim storage is also required, because of the
additional reprocessing step that may include as yet unbuilt reprocessing facilities, as in
the case of China.  And the WNA (2009) notes that in many countries, the decision to
8Figure 1.  Open and Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycles
 adopt an open or closed nuclear fuel cycle includes many technical and economic
considerations while in other countries, the decision is more likely to be influenced by
strategic national energy and defense policies (discussed further in Chapter 5).  
For purposes of this study, I define ‘nuclear waste’ as the 'used', 'irradiated', 'spent',
high-level radioactive fuel exiting nuclear reactors.  Thus, the study does not include
other radioactive waste associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, namely, radioactive
effluent emissions, low-level radioactive waste, uranium waste, or radioactive sources
used for commercial, research or medical purposes.  The study considers commercial
nuclear operations that began in some countries as early as the 1950s, although most
commercial programs started in the mid 1970s.  Rosen (1998) estimates that by 2010 the
On its own, this number is meaningless.  If we compare it to other fuels used to generate electricity, the6
energy produced from an equal amount of fuel is significantly lower for fossil fuel than for nuclear fuel. 
Rosen (1998) estimates that the waste generated from one 1000 MW coal plant produces per year 320 000
tonnes of ash plus 44 000 tonnes of sulphur oxides and 22 000 tonnes of nitrous oxides.  If this number is
multiplied by the waste resulting from all coal plants worldwide from the beginning of operations, the total
amount would be much larger than the total amount of nuclear waste accumulated to date.
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total accumulated amount of spent fuel would be some 340 000 tonnes . 6
Period of Study Considerations
The period of study took into account three considerations: 1) nuclear fuel cycle
technology development; 2) stakeholder long-term interests; and, 3) other policy
considerations.
 With respect to technological considerations, as we have seen, due to their thermal
and radioactive properties, nuclear waste are first temporarily ‘stored’ (either in ‘wet’
pools or ‘dry’ canisters) mainly to allow for dissipation of heat and for some radioactive
decay.  There are other reasons for continuing to store the waste as opposed to developing
a permanent solution for their disposal.  For instance, since a final solution involves
placing the waste in a DGR at a specified site, the siting exercise would first require
lengthy technical and social studies by nuclear waste managers before regulatory
authorities would allow the waste to be removed from storage.  Another reason for
continuing storage is the development of a decision on their recycling that includes both
advantages and disadvantages.  Recycling begins with reprocessing the used fuel,
producing fresh new fuel and then burning it (WNA, 2009a; Stanford, 2001).  These
operations require separate specialized facilities.  In a reprocessing facility, the spent fuel
is treated chemically to produce new material for the fabrication of fresh fuel.  In another
facility the fuel is fabricated.  The fresh fuel is then shipped for consuming in more
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advanced reactors called ‘burners’.  Burners consume the fuel to produce electricity.  A
type of burner also produces more fuel; in that case, the burner is called a ‘breeder’.  The
technology for reprocessing and burning (with or without breeding) is often called
‘advanced nuclear cycle technology’.  
Historically, burners were built in France, Germany, Britain, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Japan, but no commercial burner is presently available (WNA, 2009a;
Cooke, 2009).  Past attempts to build and operate a burner in most of these countries have
failed due to security and safety concerns, economic constraints, public resistance, and
operational complexity (Cooke, 2009; NEA, 2008b).  The World Nuclear Association
reports that, with no burner operational in the near future, four countries are nevertheless
continuing to carry out reprocessing activities, namely, France, the United Kingdom,
Russia, and since 2009, Japan (WNA, 2009a).  Because of contract obligations and
storage limitations, countries still carried out reprocessing activities domestically (the
U.K., France, and Russia) or otherwise shipped their nuclear fuel waste to reprocessing
countries (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan).  Other countries, for
instance, China, are building reprocessing facilities in the hope of that burners will be
available in the future.  And research continues in a few countries on advanced nuclear
cycle technologies.  
Many research projects on advanced nuclear cycle technologies are international
collaborations.  The Generation IV International Forum (GIF ) was initiated in 2000 and
formally chartered in mid 2001.  It is an international collective representing governments
of 13 countries where nuclear energy is significant now and also seen as vital for the
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future.  Most are committed to joint research efforts for  the next generation of nuclear
technology.  Led by the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Japan,
Russia, South Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the UK are members.  In 2006, the
United States also initiated a new international program called the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP) (or as it is may be called in the future, the International Nuclear
Energy Framework) to better reflect the international mission to investigate and
ultimately develop safer, proliferation-resistant, environmentally-friendly advanced
nuclear cycle technologies.  The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 2008a) is also examining
the advantages and disadvantages of advanced nuclear cycle technology, the latter
including risks of illegal proliferation of radioactive materials and large economic costs. 
Ultimately, the NEA indicates that at the end of the reprocessing and burning operations,
there will still be resulting radioactive waste that needs to be disposed of.  In the United
States, the Obama Administration instructed the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to set
up a Blue Ribbon panel that would review various alternatives for the back-end of the
nuclear fuel cycle.  In November 2009, at the request of U.S. senators, the U.S.
Government Accounting Office (GAO) submitted its report on the Yucca Mountain
Project.  The GAO identified two potential alternatives, namely, storage of the nuclear
waste at two central locations, or continued storage at reactor sites (USGAO, 2009).  The
report lists the advantages and disadvantages of the two alternatives, but makes no
recommendations.  On January 29, 2010, the U.S. DOE Secretary announced the creation
of the Blue Ribbon Commission to make recommendations on the back-end of the
nuclear fuel cycle, excluding the Yucca Mountain Project. 
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In addition to time required for research on technical advancement, other reasons may
contribute to long periods of storage, including addressing various stakeholders interests,
which pose some unique challenges.  For instance, the NEA (2007b) reports that although
the toxic properties of some other chemical waste present many management challenges,
the degree of effort to address those challenges is smaller than efforts to address the
public concerns on nuclear waste problems, even though they may be at a lesser risk from
them.  All the countries selected for the study have indicated within NEA fora that these
public concerns need to be addressed more democratically than in the past, and that takes
time (NEA, 2007).
Changes to national existing policies can also delay a decision on the eventual
disposal of nuclear waste, thereby requiring additional storage time.  An example of such
a policy change was the idea initially raised by Sweden in the early 1980s that nuclear
waste in a deep geological repository ought to be retrievable by future generations.  The
idea slowly gained momentum and eventually reached international support manifested
by the proceedings of an IAEA seminar on retrievability of nuclear waste in 2000 (IAEA,
2000).  Reasons to ensure that the waste could be retrieved after many decades, if not
centuries, ranged from massive technical difficulties (say, from an unforseen major
earthquake) to a renewed economic value of the waste.  Retrievability implies that a
disposal program be implemented in stages to keep several choices open to future
generations; although a staged approach allows for policy flexibility over the long term,
such an approach does require sufficient time (NEA, 2008a).  But as the submission of
safety applications for repositories is nearing in some countries, lately, there has been
Active management includes surveillance and monitoring activities as opposed to simply relying on, for7
instance, the geological barriers of a waste facility.
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some rethinking on the issue of retrievability (USNWTRB, 2009).  For example, in 2008,
Finland, which had previously adopted this new policy in the form of a regulation,
decided to eliminate the regulation because of safety concerns over the long term
(USNWTRB, 2009).
For all the above reasons, the active  management of nuclear waste is likely to be7
carried out over a lengthy period of time which presents unique management and
administrative challenges, though opportunities as well.  With respect to opportunities,
the NEA (2008) argues that “the long implementation times afford opportunities for
program adaptation and enhancement.  The related challenge is to maintain the support at
both local and national levels, the necessary infrastructure, and human resources for
knowledge preservation and transfer” (p.9) and that  “Besides allowing for continued
research and learning, [it] provides the opportunity to build broad societal
confidence...and to develop constructive relationships with the most affected regions”
(p.10).  It is because of the long lead times characterizing the management of nuclear fuel
waste that this study is able to examine past developments of nuclear waste management
policies occurring over several decades.
Management Goal Context
This study does not evaluate existing or proposed national policies on the use of
nuclear electricity generation.  Nor does it arrive at any conclusions on the performance
of national energy or waste policies as to their consistency with, for example, the
By ‘sustainable development’, I mean the well-known definition crafted in 1987 by the World Commission8
on Environment and Development, a.k.a. the Bruntland Commission:  “development that meets the needs of
the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.  In
part due to the vagueness of this definition and lip-service commitment by some managers, the concept has
been controversial.  Nevertheless, since 1987, the concept has continued to be refined and there is work
toward a general agreement among managers and stakeholders that it should be based on three pillar of
sustainability: economic, environmental and social, and thus within multiple temporal and spatial scales
(Blackburn, 2007; Milman & Short, 2008).  Davy (1997) considers this principle as an umbrella for all
kinds of approaches that account for technological and social aspects of environmental policy.  Later, the
concept expressed within the 1992 Rio Declaration would also emphasize justice, fairness and equity.  The
difficulty with the principle of sustainable development is not within the general concept but in its specific
application.  Balancing all stakeholders interests, priorities and values over the short and long terms has not
been quite demanding of resources and goodwill (Davy, 1997).
Sustainable development is a goal of several international government organizations dealing with9
radioactive waste, e.g., the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2001) and the
Organisation for  Economic Co-operation and Development’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA, 2000), and
national nuclear waste management organizations, e.g., Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organisation
(Runnalls, 2003).  In 2007, the European Union launched its Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology
Platform emphasizing elements of sustainable development such as learning and transparency (EURATOM,
2009).  Generally, even if adaptive management programs for environmental problems are not all
necessarily designed with sustainable development as the ultimate goal, I have adopted this goal to assist in
the a priori selection of stakeholder adaptive capacities as potential key system drivers for study in view of
its adoption by the nuclear sector.  This study, however, does not conclude on whether the practice of using
nuclear energy for electricity production is sustainable or not.
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principle of ‘sustainable development’  or any other principle or goal of environmental8
management.  The objective here is simply to examine past historical activities without
evaluation and even without making any predictions.  On the other hand, I do
acknowledge the stated intent  of selected countries to adopt the principle of sustainable9
development.
Management of such complex systems will likely need to be flexible and adaptive
over many generations.  For example, such management is consistent with the principle
of sustainable development leading to the development of sustainability science (Lambin,
2005; Clark & Dickson, 2003).  Clark and Dickson (2003) argue that sustainability
science recognizes the challenge of sustainable development as the reconciliation of
society’s development goals (and not necessarily a given manager’s goal) with the
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planet’s environmental limits over the long term.  Clark and Dickson (2003) argue that
the relatively new sustainability science aims to address the complexity of interactions
between this coupling, that is, “how are long-term trends in environment and
development reshaping nature-society interactions in ways related to sustainability”
(p.8060).
In this vein, Levin argues that Norberg and Cumming (2000a) have provided “the first
complete effort to build a bridge between complexity theory and the theory to acheive a
sustainable future” (p.xi) through their compilation and analysis of articles from leading
experts.  These experts include Brian Walker, Elinor Ostrom, Cark Folke, Per Olsson,
John Anderies, William Brock, Marten Scheffer, Stephen Carpenter, Lance Gundersen,
Garry Peterson, and C.S. Holling.  According Norberg and Cumming (2008b), Levin
argues that ‘adaptive management’ and management for sustainable development may be
compatible in the case the long-term management of environmental problems.
Although complexity theory and sustainability sciences inform on the coupling
between nature and society, that is, on social-environmental systems, Norberg and
Cumming (2008b) conclude that, while much remains to be studied about natural sub-
systems, it is abundantly clear that failures in addressing many environmental problems
often originate with a lack of understanding of the social sub-system.  This seems
particularly evident in the case of nuclear waste management.  There is therefore a
rationale in linking adaptive management programs to the goal of sustainable
development.  Whether the goal of sustainable development is feasible or not for certain
projects, including the operation of nuclear energy power plants, is another matter, and
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may depend on three components of human-environment interactions as argued by
Lambin (2005): 1) information on the state of the environment; 2) motivation to manage
sustainably the environment; and 3) capacity to implement sustainable management of the
environment.  Lambin (2005) goes on to argue that these components resemble the core
of policymaking in the public sector or strategic planning in the private sector.  As
mentioned, the goal of sustainable development is considered in this study for illustrative
purposes to select reasonable variables for the comparative analyses.
Complexity science emerged in the 1930s through physical science researchers, for
instance, Henri Poincaré, who examined some of the thermodynamic properties of micro-
physical phenomena (Heylighen, 1999).  These scholars elaborated general principles of
complex system development.  Merry (1995) indicates that later, in the 1970s, scholars in
other disciplines suggested that complexity principles could be applied to the
management of macro-phenomena, for instance, the development of social-environmental
systems.  So rather than adopting controlling procedures, managers could develop and
apply more flexible and adaptive practices.
The study focuses on nuclear waste management mostly in so-called developed 
countries.  Even so, I designed the research, as described in Chapter 3, so that findings
may be relevant to a wider range of complex environmental problems as managed by
countries characterized by different developmental regimes.  Consequently, private and
public managers in various fields of endeavor are likely to find value in the findings. 
More specifically, private-sector managers may be interested in any conclusions on the
identification of key stakeholder adaptive capacities that allows adaptive management
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resources to be better focused (Miller & Page, 2007).  Public-sector managers, as
influenced by the public, may also find such identification useful for developing sound
environmental management policies in the best interest of present and future generations.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides an overview of the literature referring to
environmental problems as possible complex social-environmental systems, on their
evolution or ‘development’, and on the management of such systems.  The literature
review includes studies that ground the management of such systems in ‘complexity
science’ for greater understanding of the problems and possible redress.  The review
concludes that the literature that explores alternate ways to approach the management of
complex environmental problems is mostly built upon qualitative conceptual or empirical
information.  Although useful as an initial step, narratives may be biased, misleading, or
incomplete, and other methods are needed to draw complementary inferences between
data and theory.  The absence of a more systematic method that combines qualitative and
quantitative analyses for identifying key system drivers points to a critical gap in the
adaptive management literature.  Finding this endpoint unsatisfactory, I explore whether
quantitative information could provide additional insight on complex system
development.  
In Chapter 3, I outline two hypotheses for this study: the first supposes the presence of
a chaotic pattern of system development, while the second supposes the relative
importance of possible key system drivers.  In the chapter, I outline the general research
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design used for evaluating the two hypotheses.  The research was designed to build a
comparative case study of the development of national nuclear waste management
policies and possible system key drivers.  It combines both qualitative (interpretation of
information in policy documents) and quantitative (statistical time series and multivariate
analyses) methodologies.  Chapter 2 ends with reliability issues with the original data and
methods, namely, the content analysis and statistical methods.  
In Chapter 4, I present the study results, and in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I discuss
them, also making use of broader country contextual information.  More specifically in
Chapter 5, I discuss possible broad patterns of the development of nuclear waste
management policies that developed over several decades in the selected countries. 
Patterns of system development, periods of increased frequency of policy events, and
possible explanatory external and internal factors affecting system development are
addressed.  In Chapter 6, I discuss the influence of system variables selected for the study,
that is, ‘stakeholder adaptive capacities’ as possible key system drivers of broad system
development.  Comments are provided with respect to evaluating the hypothesis on the
influence of stakeholder adaptive capacities on system development.  Chapter 7 presents
the main findings of the study and ends with a discussion on the generalization of the
findings to other complex environmental problems.
The main objective of the study is the identification of stakeholder adaptive capacities
as potential key system drivers, not only for nuclear waste management but for other
similar types of social-environmental systems.  Chapter 8 extends this objective by
discussing a suggested strategic framework for adaptive management that can be applied
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once potential key system drivers, possibly including stakeholder adaptive capacities,
have been identified.  The chapter begins with some theoretical background on
management grounded in complexity science principles, including the diagnosis of
metaphoric path pathologies and suggested ways to realign the system on the desired path
course.  I then suggest a comprehensive strategic framework for adaptive management
and conclude the chapter by providing an example of its application to nuclear waste
disposal.  Chapter 9 ends the body of the dissertation by concluding on main findings and
making recommendations for future work with respect to generalization of findings, their
application, and more research on specific study components.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Young et al. (2006) argue that the study of environmental problems that span multiple
spatial and temporal scales is likely to be inherently interdisciplinary because insight is
required from both the natural and social sciences.  They argue that no discipline alone
can address all of the facets of the sources of the problems, their development and their
impacts.  Nevertheless, Gilbert (1998) reports that, as of the turn of the century,
interdisciplinary endeavors had been given very little attention.  Since then, Davies and
Devlin (2007) report a remarkable expansion of interdisciplinary investigation attempts in
a diverse range of traditionally academic domains (e.g., health sciences, engineering,
management, and environmental studies).  
Observing this trend, these scholars and others argue that interdisciplinary study is not
the same as multidisciplinary study.  Multidisciplinary study assembles, in additive
fashion, knowledge from more than one discipline, and it implies that connections among
the disciplines are far from dominant.  Interdisciplinary study produces knowledge that
integrates over more than one discipline, and explores overlaps, feedbacks, and
interconnections among the results of a range of more traditional disciplinary
explorations.  Davies and Devlin (2007) break down interdisciplinarity into five variants
that can be understood as located on a continuum of increasing integration: 1) relational
interdisciplinarity (i.e., various disciplines inform on broad topics, for instance, women’s
studies); 2) exchange interdisciplinarity (i.e., breaking traditional boundaries for instance
between the natural and social sciences); 3) pluridisciplinarity (i.e., combining expertise
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to jointly address an area of common concern where the topic of study is too complex for
a single discipline to address, for example, the AIDS pandemic and climate change); 4)
modification interdisciplinarity (i.e., separate disciplines are changed as the
interdisciplinary investigation proceeds); and 5) transdisciplinarity (i.e., process to
collapse disciplinary borders resulting in the emergence of a new discipline).  
Interdisciplinary study can be carried out when there is general agreement on the
integration of a common vocabulary, methods, theories, and conceptual frames developed
from a common underlying principle or idea for a more holistic approach (Davies & 
Devlin, 2007; Gilbert, 1998).  There are, however, challenges to interdisciplinary inquiry. 
Kotchen and Young (2007) report that breadth with integration of several disciplines and
depth with disciplinary reduction are desirable but challenging in that they usually require
some tradeoff depending on available resources.   
While some progress is being made by scholars within multiple knowledge centers,
Young et al. (2006) report that most universities and other research agencies still continue
to cling to the separation of disciplines.  Educational programs that organize research,
teaching, and outreach—particularly on global processes—are still primarily organized
along unconnected streams of specialization.  And although the value of interdisciplinary
study is increasingly and widely acknowledged, scholars report that the methods of
interdisciplinary integration are still not well described (Davies & Devlin, 2007;
Robertson et al., 2003; Gilbert, 1998).  As a possible result, academicians from one
discipline may not be familiar with the terminology, theories, and methods of another
discipline.  In addition, academicians may question the acceptability of work that is more
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horizontal, that is, covers many disciplines, versus work that is more in-depth within only
one discipline; as a consequence, one may question the validity of such interdisciplinary
research.  
This study attempts to be interdisciplinary in perspective.  I approach it with the
principal idea of the management of challenging (environmental) problems as ‘complex’
systems evolving over time.  Thus, the literature review is grounded in the scientific field
of system evolution, more precisely complexity science with its vocabulary, methods, and
theoretical concepts.  The literature review indicates that scholars from many disciplines
have used the concepts of system evolution, including complexity principles within their
investigations on the management of problems.  In using these concepts, they have
adopted related vocabulary and methods.  Main disciplines include policy science,
environmental management, and organization behavior as applied to public
administration, political science, and business studies.
I divide the literature review into three parts.  In the first part, I outline the features
that may lead certain environmental problems to behave and evolve as complex social-
environmental systems, including the possible presence of a few key system drivers.  In
the second part, I provide an overview on general system development focusing on broad
patterns of development.  I explore whether system ‘evolution’ even exists at all, since
some scholars claim that randomness dominates.  In the third part, I outline various
management approaches that are, or could be, used by managers to ‘steer’ (or manage) the
‘evolution’ (or development) of social-environmental systems.  
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2.1 Environmental Problems as Social-Environmental Systems
Rather than simple or more complicated systems with linear or periodic patterns of
development, an increasing number of scholars consider certain contemporary
environmental problems as 'complex', because they include many distinct components
(cf., distinction dimension) that interact non-linearly and more or less tightly with each
other over time (cf., connectedness dimension) (Bar-Yam, 2007, 2007a; Heylighen, 1999;
Funtowicz et al., 1999).  They note the impact of a large number of factors on these
environmental problems.  These factors can include social values, technology
development, ecological responses, management practices, stakeholder involvement,
financial resources and government policies, all possibly interacting differently over time. 
Homer-Dixon (2000) claims that many organizations increasingly encounter difficulties
in managing all these factors, and organizations will need to become more adept at
dealing with complexity.  Similarly, Sterman (2001) argues that difficulties in solving
some environmental problems result from a lack of system-thinking capacity, including
the capacity of managers to learn about system complexity.  
Sterman (2001) and, as we will see, many other scholars argue that such learning
capacity is crucial for environmental managers to reduce the uncertainty of outcomes of
their interactions in the environment and to prepare for inevitable surprises over the long
term.  This learning begins by viewing the problem in question as a system.  The
modeling of the dynamics of the system will depend on one’s worldview of human
interaction with the environment.  In the next section, we will see that these worldviews
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have been perceived differently over the course of history starting, here, in the 19th
century.
2.1.1 Historical Perspective of Social-Environmental Systems
Holling et al. (2002) and other researchers (e.g., Haines, 1998; Wiener, 1996; Bohm,
1971) suggest that a root cause of some environmental management difficulties may
reside in the 19  century Newtonian mechanistic worldview of human-natureth
relationships.  That worldview is characterized by a human-nature bond that is perceived
to be a closed system maintained in a steady state, like a machine.  In other words, there is
a direct linear response of the system to any change originating from external sources.  As
a result, the system returns to a predetermined, fixed, predictable, equilibrium point. 
Because this worldview considers human-nature interactions to be linear, controlling
system responses was assumed to be a straightforward practice.
When societies or individuals perceive nature as a machine that can be manipulated at
will, they often adopt command-and-control management practices (Keller, 2005). 
Susskind and Secunda (1998) define such management as an approach to commanding
and controlling some aspect of a community’s conduct by specifying prescriptive
behavioral or technical requirements.  These scholars note that, within these societies,
command-and-control instruments are particularly attractive to bureaucrats and
lawmakers because they are relatively easy to enforce.  Thus, until the second half of the
20  century, most studies in natural and social sciences generally assumed deterministicth
laws of nature, whereby all uncertainties could ultimately be eliminated (Susskind and
Secunda, 1998).
As opposed to quantum chaos theory.  Classic chaos theory is assumed to be deterministic in the10
framework of classic mechanics.  Quantum chaos theory seeks to show how classical chaotic systems can be
shown to be limited as quantum-mechanical systems (Huajie, 1999).  The phenomena covered by quantum
chaos so far mainly relates to wave theory.  My research remains within the context of classic mechanics.
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Challenges to this mechanistic worldview, however, were raised as early at the second
half of the 19  century with the development of classic chaos  theory when someth 10
scientists were grappling with randomness uncertainty (Huajie, 1999).  In 1903,  Huajie
(1999) reports that Henri Poincaré suggested that nonlinear mathematical equations could
explain the apparent randomness, or ‘chaos’, of some physical and biological systems. 
Development of this theory, however, was slow since it seemed to contradict newly
emerging thermodynamic laws, particularly the notion of a system’s tendency to evolve
toward minimum energy (or order) for maximum entropy (or disorder).  
 Scientific developments over the 20  century helped in proposing a change to theth
existing worldview of mechanistic human-nature relationships.  Johnson (2001) argues
that with new thinking and the development of statistics and quantum physics in the first
half of the century, it became possible to argue that order could emerge from disorder or
apparent randomness.  After the Second World War, he reports that scientists took a
second look at Poincaré’s work on the emergence of order from apparent randomness or
disorder. 
Huajie (1999) reports that the first scientist to tag the term ‘chaos’ to nonlinear system
development, at first random in appearance, was likely the American physicist and
biologist Robert May who adopted the term in the early 1970s (Huajie argues that the use
of the term chaos is somewhat unfortunate because it was used in Ancient times to reflect
Some mathematicians believe that future mathematical advances assisted by greater computer power may11
be able one day to explain all nonlinear system relationships, thereby eliminating all uncertainties (Huajie,
1999).
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the absence of order, a notion that still endures in common usage).  The study of where
and how order emerges (i.e., at the ‘edge of chaos’) is addressed by complexity science, a
discipline that develops pattern-seeking algorithms or differential equations (Kauffman,
1993).  Huajie (1999) notes that because modern mathematics is still unable to explain
some nonlinear dynamics, complexity science remains a young field, and many
uncertainties that seam irreducible remain .  Nevertheless, he and other scholars (e.g.,11
Kauffman, 1995; Merry, 1995) argue that the general principles of complexity science
can be used to gain greater insights into system development.  
By the 1980s, natural and social science scholars were actively developing a new
more ‘organic’ worldview of human-nature interactions  (Tetenbaum, 1998; Christensen
et al., 1989; Mosekilde et al., 1988; Holling, 1973, 1978).  Instead of a closed steady-
state system, these scholars argued that human-nature interactions could be represented as
a complex, open, system capable of shifting to new equilibrium states though nonlinear
feedback loops in response to change.  While these scholars were developing their
theories, they noted that managers and analysts were increasingly reporting failed
command-and-control environmental management attempts within both so-called
developed and developing countries.  
A notable failure within developed countries is the depletion of North American and
European forests and fisheries due, in large part, to scientific and social uncertainties in
the development and maintenance of these resources (Berkes et al., 2002a; Christensen et
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al., 1996).  In developing countries, the human impacts from management practices were
often greater than in developed countries, one reason being that a failure often led to
greater impacts, for example, the dislocation of people and subsequently to an increase in
poverty (Holling, 2002).  For another example, in Tanzania, modern urban village
governments ignored traditional agricultural practices that eventually led to impoverished
soils (Tengo & Hammer, 2002).  As another example, in Brazil, a lagoon fishery of
remote villages was depleted because of federal-state budgetary rearrangements that
caused a lack of local enforcement inspectors (Seixas & Berkes, 2002).  
Failed responses expressed as apparent randomness of outcomes of command-and-
control management was unexpected by managers and some scholars.  Bohm (1971),
however, had already cautioned that the worldview of the human-nature relationship had
to go beyond the simple, mechanistic worldview in order to better understand
environmental responses.  Although Bohm (1971) doubted that the determination of all
causes of change could be absolute, he took up the challenge along with other scientists.
They began searching for underlying patterns under the apparent superficial randomness
of environmental responses to human interventions.  
2.1.2 Recent Model of Social-Environmental Systems
As mentioned, by the 1980s, scholars began to explore whether the principles of
complexity science explaining apparent randomness could be applied to environmental
management.  They considered that nature could be viewed as an open system, and that
human enterprises could be best understood as interacting with nature within a complex,
dynamic system (Gunderson, 2002; Holling, 1973).  Hence, by the 1990s, many scholars
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agreed that the understanding of environmental problems would likely be enhanced by
considering them as interacting social and environmental subsystems (Smit & Wandel,
2006; Walker & Salt, 2006; Lambin, 2005; Janssen, 2002; Peterson, 2000; Perrings,
1998).
These subsystems are considered to be interdependent, and the nature of this
interdependency can vary (Merry, 1995).  In some instances, the environmental
subsystem is presumed to play a more important role in driving the whole social-
environmental system, for example, hurricanes impacting on coastal communities 
(Plummer & Armitage, 2007; Janssen et al., 2006).  In other instances, the social
subsystem is presumed to play a more important role, for instance, within climate change
caused by human activity (Walker & Salt, 2006; Arvai et al., 2006; Peterson, 2000).  And
finally, there are instances where the social and environmental subsystems co-evolve by
matching temporal and spatial scales through ongoing adjustments leading to a balance
between both sub-systems.  For instance, this is the case for hunting practices (if properly
managed) and resources use by some aboriginal communities (Cumming et al., 2006;
Gunderson et al., 2002; Young et al., 2006).
Funtowicz et al. (1999) argue that how sub-systems interact to affect the development
of the whole system is still not clear.  It is evident that system development is considered
either to be random or to follow some pattern of development (directional).  If system
development is random, there is no consistent relationship among subsystem components,
and future system development is not predictable.  If system development is directional,
some scholars, including Funtowicz et al. (1999), are prepared to accept that simple or
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more complicated systems could consist of linear or nonlinear/periodic relationships
among subsystem components, and in this event, future system development can be
predicted with some certainty.
With progress in conceptual theories and the accumulation of empirical data, scholars
supposed that some systems are neither completely random nor clearly directional
(Heylighen, 1999; Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Merry, 1995).  They argue that systems can be
complex and consist of chaotic relationships among system components, that is, a play
between positive and negative feedback loops among components.  Predicting the
development of complex systems may be possible in the short term, but remains difficult,
if not impossible, to predict over the long term.  Even if complexity science attempts to
reveal hidden order, mathematics still cannot predict all future scenarios; consequently,
surprises are inevitable (Huajie, 1999).  
To deal with these surprises, scholars suggest that complexity science principles
provide a rationale for reducing uncertainties through learning, while at the same time,
building and maintaining adaptive capacities.  These scholars postulate that complexity
science principles, which were initially developed within the physical sciences, could be
applied to macro phenomena.  One of these principles was that a few key system
components are more sensitive to change, therefore, can theoretically drive system
evolution.  In the next section, we will see how scholars attempt to explain the
development of systems within an organic worldview of human-nature relationships that
are constantly responding to change.  
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2.2 Change and System Evolution or ‘Development’
Some social science scholars—for instance, Harrison (2003)—consider the unfolding
of environmental problems as a mass of random occurrences.  Hence, they question the
existence of evolutionary patterns within social systems for lack of clear validation by
empirical data to support ‘evolutionary’ theories.  Many more scholars have argued that it
is reasonable to posit that social-environmental systems develop with some order in
response to change (Innes & Booher, 1999; Hwang, 1996; Kiel, 1996; Kauffman, 1995;). 
System response to change may be considered as system ‘evolution’, or development. 
The latter term is perhaps more appropriate in that it lessens the notion of any teleological
goal.  Ring (1997) argues that development aspects and the explanation of changing
reality in response to change are at the center of system development theories.
Marshak (1993) reports that one development theory is that change may be random
within a specific phase of development but is linear between fixed, sequential, ordered,
phases.  He reports that another theory is that social system development generally
mimics non linear natural evolutionary patterns.  The next chapter expands on these
theories of system development patterns in response to change.  
2.2.1 Patterns of Development in Response to Change
As we will see, many scholars suggest that to begin understanding system
development, the nature and sources of change need to be understood.  Scholars have
devised various typologies of change that are based on various attributes such as their
speed, magnitude, intention, and the location of their origin, that is, either internal or
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external to the system.  The work of these scholars on the types of change is the subject of
this section.
First, many organization behavior scholars (e.g., Eisenhardt & Brown, 2004;
Tushman et al., 2004) argue that change can be gradual, incremental, and slowly
accumulative.  Reaction to this type of change can usually be controlled if discernable. 
These scholars argue that sometimes such change can be predicted, and, hence, responses
can be properly planned.  They note that change can also be abrupt, discontinuous or
radical.  It can suddenly emerge seemingly out of nowhere.  Such changes are often
unpredictable.  The magnitude of abrupt change is usually larger than for incremental
change, but it is often small enough to enable adequate response of the system.  
 Some scholars—notably, Heylighten (1999)—as inspired by the physical sciences,
argue that change can also be revolutionary or transformational, that is, the change is so
large that the system  has to either transform itself entirely into a new system, or
otherwise disintegrate.  They observe that changes can occur abruptly or as a result of the
long accumulation of incremental change.  Silverberg (2002) argues that all major
changes are decomposable into smaller, almost microscopic, elemental steps, but this
does not yet have groundswell support from many scholars.  Woods and Grant (2003)
postulate that qualitative transformational changes can only emerge as a result of an
accumulation of quantitative changes.  This conclusion also seems tentative.  But most
scholars who study transformational change agree that it can be either predictable or
unpredictable.
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Scholars observe that, within social systems (or sub-systems), changes can be pro-
actively intentional, initiated, and controlled within the organization, that is, with
endogenous resources to build capacity or diminish vulnerability (Anderies et al., 2007;
Turner et al., 2003).  For example,  managers can plan thoughtful experiments within an
adaptive management program for reducing uncertainties that either converge on the
reference path or diverge to explore other paths.  Experimentation can also be carried out
on multiple scales: research initiatives can be local or carried out through collaborations
with a few partners at a national or international level.  With respect to the extent of
research initiatives, several small experiments can be carried out along with a few larger
ones.  Sometimes, intended change is hard to bring about.  For instance, Rose (1990)
argues that politicians can find it very hard to make rapid changes based on their own
personal preferences.  Changes can only reflect the evolving values of their constituents
and that takes time.  Rose (1990) reports that from 1946 to 1990 in the United Kingdom,
two thirds of the agenda of the government of the day dealt with inherited policies.  
The more complicated situation is that of unintended changes, often caused by
exogenous sources or signals where speed and magnitude of the changes are difficult to
predict (Anderies et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 2006).  Palmer et al. (2006) report that such
sources include political influences, cultural shifts, and industry trends.  Scholars, for
instance Smith (2004) and Mitleton-Kelly (2001), argue that planning may be useful for
the short term, but the complexity of change over the long term can make plans obsolete
rather quickly.  In this event, these scholars suggest that building and maintaining broad
adaptive and transformational capacities is the better long-term strategy.
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Scholars—notably, Simon (1993)—suggest that the management of a system could
take into account past characteristics of a system response to change over time.  History
counts.  Simon (1993) argues that it is reasonable to view strategic questions within the
framework of noted past patterns of development.  Many organization behavior scholars
have therefore studied past patterns of development and have generally noted three broad
patterns: linear, periodic, and chaotic.  These patterns and their proponents are outlined in
the rest of this section.
Patterns of Development
Some scholars argue for specific linear evolution that unfolds within repeated
sequences.  A sequence includes sequential, fixed, and ordered phases, and the sequence
repeats itself over time (Palmer et al., 2006; Proctor & Larson, 2005; Morgan, 1998;
Namenwirth & Weber, 1987).  A phase is characterized by a particular evolutionary
function within the sequence.  Some scholars argue that the order of phases is essential
for problem-solving (e.g.,Yin, 2003; Namenwirth & Weber, 1987).
System metaphors developed by scholars from various disciplines represent
sequences of four functional phases of linear development respectively covering
evolutionary growth, exploitation, decline and reorganization (Bosselman, 2001; Gilkalp,
1992; Greiner, 1972; Clemence, 1951).  Other scholars argue against such linear,
sequential, fixed, ordering of phases (e.g., Abbott, 1996; Pettigrew, 1990).  Yet other
scholars suppose that sequential phases may exist, but they remain difficult to explain. 
As such, they caution their specific consideration for developing management strategies
(Ven & Poole, 1995).  More simply, many scholars argue for some general linear system
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development until breaks or discontinuities are encountered (Tushman et al., 2004). 
During these breaks, there may be a flurry of  policymaking or development of strategies
possibly resulting in redirection or reorganization after which linear evolution resumes
(Kingdon, 2003).
Other scholars have also argued that systems develop with repeated cycles or periodic
trends.  Periodic patterns have long been discussed, notably in the field of economics,
starting with Schumpeter in the 1940s (Clemence, 1951), then with Nelson and Wright in
the 1980s, and Freeman in the early 1990s (Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2002). These
scholars observed cycles or periods that may or may not have a fix duration.  If not fixed,
the length of these cycles can be either somewhat random (or not yet explained) or getting
smaller and smaller as system development accelerates.
In the absence of clear linear or periodic patterns of evolution or order, scholars have
supposed that even if systems seem random, they could contain some hidden order in
their development (Levin, 2005, 2002, 1999, 1998; Kauffman, 1995).  In this case, the
system is said to be ‘complex’ and is characterized by ‘chaotic’ patterns of development
Bar-Yam (2007, 2007a).  Heylighen (1999) starts defining a complex system by the
extent of two dimensions.  The first dimension is that of ‘distinction’: the increasing
number of different distinct units increases diversity, differentiation, variety,
heterogeneity, and disorder.  The second dimension is that of ‘connectedness’:  the more
or less tight feedback loops in a system increase integration, dependency, constraint, and
order.  The connectedness of complex systems involves weblike nonlinear interactions)
as opposed to linear or periodic interactions within simpler systems)following some
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complex pattern, or ‘strange attractor’.  Units are loosely or tightly interconnected. 
Intuitively, these systems appear messy or ‘chaotic’, but mathematical theories suggest
that there may be some order to noted changes and responses (Simon, 1962).
 Several  scholars have outlined the history of complexity science, for instance, Merry
(1995), Horgan (1995), and Kauffman (1995).  In the 1960s and 1970s, Belgian
thermodynamist and chemist Illya Prigogine showed how order could arise suddenly from
apparent disorder.  He postulated that a system, at a point of bifurcation (‘heteresis’ or
‘edge of chaos’) could ‘leap across chaos’ to a higher level of ordered complexity by
receiving energy from the external environment and dissipating it internally through a few
rules of self-organization.  Prigogine argued that while the universe, if a closed system, 
may move toward entropy, open systems may not only resist entropy but grow ever more
structured.  It is at the edge of chaos where systems show optimum complex behavior,
that is, orderly enough, yet full of flexibility, following rules of self-organization. 
Systems that exhibit chaotic behavior follow five rules or ‘complexity principles’:
1) They do not exhibit linear or periodic behavior (they cannot exactly repeat their
history);
2) They follow equations that do not contain any random factors, but a few key
driving factors;
3) These equations are based on nonlinear and apparently random (or ‘chaotic’)
relationships with positive and negative feedback loops among components;
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4)  Their evolution is highly dependent on initial conditions, that is, small variations
of the initial state of two similar systems can produce very different systems over
the long term; 
5) Major changes can emerge suddenly and are inevitable over long periods 
(surprises); and,
6) They are ‘loosely stable’ at the edge of chaos (i.e., the point of optimum
complexity) where they can adapt to changes without any other external direction
through ‘self-organization’ (adaptation).
Following Prigogine’s work, complex systems where self-organization is presumed to
occur were called ‘complex adaptive systems’.  Examples of natural complex adaptive
systems are cells, organisms, ecosystems, and the universe.  Examples of social complex
adaptive systems are families, communities, organizations, institutions, and nations.  
A system receives inputs of energy that is dissipated throughout the system with three
possible outcomes depending on the system’s history of perturbations (Levin, 1999).  One
outcome may be that the system returns to its previous state.  Another outcome, as
expressed by Kauffman (1995), is that the system finds a new optimal state within
possible, available adaptations, that is, “takes an adaptive walk through the fitness
landscape” (p.166).  And a possible third outcome may be that the system is completely
transformed into a new more structured system of higher complexity, or, otherwise,
entirely disintegrates.  
Complex adaptive systems are less susceptible to direct control than simple or merely
complicated systems (Funtowicz et al., 1999).  Hence, many scholars argue that
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adaptation is a key strategy for managing certain social-environmental systems (Miller &
Page, 2007; Smit & Wandel, 2006; Smit et al., 1999).  As previously mentioned, not all
researchers, however, are convinced that social-environmental systems exhibit complex
adaptive behavior.  Harrison (2003) argues that no social system can be perceived as a
complex adaptive system because they are not ‘self-organizing’ for four reasons:  
1) Some social problems are not ‘complex’ (though maybe ‘complicated’) because
they are based on linear or periodic relationships between components;
2) Social problems are controlled by desirable outcomes therefore directional and
predictable; 
3) Social problems are controlled by politics, that is, by a central dominant force,
therefore not ‘self-organizing’; and,
4) Social problems may not be mitigated by learning and adaptation.
While not negating the usefulness of complexity theory for natural systems, Haekael
(1999) also argues that social systems are not self-organizing.  He prefers considering
societal intentionality and purposefulness through a sense-and-response (linear) to
external change model for adaptation.  But he also reports that this point may be moot
since theorists postulate that complex human systems ‘naturally’ tend toward order rather
than randomness.  Some social systems may be qualified as simple or complicated
(linear), but many social systems may indeed be complex, particularly those in
democracies with pluralistic stakeholders sharing decentralized power to manage
controversial issues (Davy, 1997).  More generally, Tainter (2006) defines some social
systems as complex when certain conditions are met.  These conditions include an
Clary concludes that the nuclear industry’s influence over the U.S.  Congress was key in creating the12
controversies on social equity associated with the Yucca Mountain Project.
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increase in population and technical abilities; hierarchy, differentiation and specialization
in social roles; scales of integration of production; and intricate flows of information.
2.2.2 Metaphors of System Development
Three broad patterns of evolutionary development are evident within the literature: 
linear, periodic and chaotic.  Variations on these patterns are numerous, and scholars have
developed metaphors of system evolution explaining driving forces (or system ‘motor’)
for gaining greater insight into the system under study.  The driving force of the system is
the primary, functional, evolutionary process (John, 2003).  Each metaphor can be
valuable in itself or in combination with other metaphors for greater understanding of the
system dynamics being examined  (Poole et al., 2000).
The simultaneous use of multiple distinct metaphors of system development can assist
in identifying different key drivers that may steer the development of the system under
study (Poole et al., 2000; Morgan, 1998).  For example, such a multi-perspective study
was carried out by Clary (1992) to examine the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act in the United States through three metaphors (or 'thematic lens'): rational actor,
organizational processes, and governmental politics .  The application of metaphors12
helps to determine a priori the selection of possible drivers of the system.
System development metaphors can also reflect change theories.  They have been 
developed by scholars mostly working on organizational behavior.  Ven and Poole (1995)
and Poole et al. (2000) have provided a good summary of many of these metaphors. 
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From their literature review, they draw a list of sixteen (16) change theories.  Table 1 is a
simplified form of Ven and Poole’s table listing the change theories.  On the left-hand
side of Table 1, the change theories are grouped by the number of system motors
characterizing the theories.  Under their framework, the authors explain that there are
basically four driving forces to a change theory (life cycle, teleology, dialectics, and
evolution).  These four ideal driving forces are not likely to be present in pure form for
two reasons: 1) motors may change over space and time, and 2) the ideal types are
incomplete.  Three- and four-motor theories are rare and are less frequently found in the
literature.  Table 1 also highlights the two general motor types characterizing the change
theories.  'Prescribed motors' amount to inherent driving forces, while 'constructive
motors' are driving forces that can be manipulated.  Prescribed or constructive motors can
be dominant within system entities or between system entities. 
Ven and Poole (1995) explain the benefits of using their framework.  First, it provides
a comprehensive overview of organizational change theories and allows the researchers to
best situate their case.  Second, it stimulates the researcher to think about relationships
affecting the system under study.  Third, it points out gaps based on expected composites
of the four ideal types.  And finally, it provides a foundation for empirical work.  The
framework is mainly a research tool, and cannot be considered as a true and complete
representation of reality.
Selection of the Three Metaphors for the Study
Here, the use of metaphors can help to understand possible patterns of change in
system development.  From Ven and Poole’s (1995) compilation of sixteen change 
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Table 1.  Logically Possible Organizational Change Theories
 (simplified from Ven and Poole, 1995)
Change Theory by Metaphoric
System Motor
 (Ven and Poole, 1995) 
Prescribed
Motor
Within
Entity
Constructive
Motor
Within
Entity
Prescribed
Motor Between
Entities
Constructive
Motor
Between
Entities
Single Motor Theories (ideal types in pure form)
1.  Life cycle yes no no no
2.  Teleology no yes no no
3.  Dialectics no no yes no
4.  Evolution no no no yes
Dual-Motor Theories (composite of two ideal types)
5.  Design Hierarchic Theory
(Life cycle and Teleology)
yes yes no no
6.  Group Conflict
(Dialectics and Teleology)
no yes yes no
7.  Community Ecology
(Evolution and Dialectics)
no no YES
(collaborating)
yes
8.  Adaptation-select model
(Evolution and Life Cycle)
YES
(learning)
no no yes
9.  Organic Growth and Crisis-Stages
(Life cycle and Dialectics)
yes no yes no
10.  Organic Punctuated Equilibrium
(Evolution and Teleology)
no YES
(control)
no yes
Tri-Motor Theories (composite of three ideal types)
11.  Partisan mutual adjustment 
(Dialectics, Teleology,
Evolution)
yes yes yes no
12.  (Expected but not yet found) no yes yes yes
13  (Expected but not yet found) yes no yes yes
14.  Social Psychology of organizing
(Life cycle, Teleology, Evolution)
yes yes no yes
Quad-Motor theories (composite of the four ideal types)
15.  Human Development Progression yes yes yes yes
16.  Garbage Can no no no no
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theories, I selected change theories that could reflect the types of patterns reported in the
literature that is, linear, cyclic, and chaotic.  Hence, I applied three metaphors, one for
each type of pattern.  First I selected change theories based on dual-motor theories to keep
the analysis simple yet potentially still insightful.  I posit that the ‘ideal’ motor for all 
three motors could be the ‘Evolution’ motor (read natural evolution for survival), because
complex social-environment systems develop through cumulative change by acquiring
knowledge.  The second motor, however, had to be different to explain the three patterns. 
The three dual-motor theories including the ‘Evolution’ ideal type are namely, Evolution
and Teleology, Evolution and Life Cycle, and Evolution and Dialectics change theories.  
The Evolution and Teleology combination contained an element of control, or at least
perceived control of change, but certainly not absolute control, which characterizes the
command-and-control approaches still often applied in natural resources management as
we have seen.  The Organic Punctuated theory is listed under this dual-motor
combination:  this theory examines linear incremental development punctuated on
occasion by significant changes.  Secondly, the ‘Adaptation-select’ theory is listed under
the Evolution and Life Cycle dual-motor metaphor.  This theory resembles the Resilience
theory initially developed by Holling in 1978 for natural resource management and
refined over the following decades (Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  Holling and
Gunderson (2002) and others—for instance, Brock and Carpenter (2007)—conclude that
the driving force for this theory is cyclical feedback, that is, adaptation through learning. 
And thirdly, the combination of Evolution and Dialectics motors is based on mutually
beneficial interactions between similar entities; it is based on networks of collaboration. 
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The Community Ecology theory is listed under this dual-motor metaphor and can
represent patterns that are neither linear nor cyclic, but perhaps chaotic. 
To recap, Metaphor 1 is based on Punctuated Equilibrium theory where the social
sub-system attempts to control the system; development is linear with discontinuities. 
Metaphor 2 is based on Resilience or Adaptation theory where subsystems co-evolve and
are relatively tightly coupled; development proceeds following a figure-eight looped
pattern of repeatable cycles.  Metaphor 3 is based on Community Ecology theory where
the external environment exerts a large influence over the social subsystem in a weblike
or networked pattern of development.  The rest of this section provides more details on
each of the metaphors.
Metaphor 1 [Punctuated Equilibrium theory] is based on Neo-Darwinian theory that
argues that species do not evolve at a slow constant rate, but major speciation occurs in
times of great external turbulence (Gould & Eldredge, 1993).  This theory, or Punctuated
Equilibrium theory as it is more generally known, has had important echoes in
organization science (Cattani & Levinthal, 2005; Tushman et al., 2004; Tushman &
O’Reilly III, 2004; Gersick, 1991; Singh & Lumsden, 1990) and history of science (Kuhn,
1996).  
As applied to organizations, Punctuated Equilibrium assumes that initially the
organization develops deep structures, routines, procedures and core values leading to
stability.  With increasing stability, organizations gain more resources and slack reserves. 
It can encourage creativity and innovation.  This second phase of organizational stability
is also resilient to relatively small external changes.  When the external environment
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becomes more turbulent, the organization concentrates all its efforts on survival, ideally
using the fruits of explorations and slack reserves accumulated over the previous phase of
stability.  When external turbulence requires major reorientations, organization leadership
controls the development of new deep structures such as goals, strategies and capital.
Overall, the organization is on a linear incremental track interrupted from time to time
by crises where radical response is required  (Nadler & Tushman, 2004; Ocasio, 2002;
Geels, 2002).  System evolution under this metaphor is mainly fueled by stakeholders
having control over incremental, radical and transformational changes (Ocasio, 2002).  
Metaphor 2 [Resilience theory] was initially developed for understanding changes
from the perspective of natural resource managers in the late 1970s and later refined
(Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  The resilient system follows a figure-eight looped
evolutionary course of four phases fueled by feedback mechanisms.  The first phase is a
time of increasing growth until a threshold beyond which the second phase of exploitation
begins in earnest.  After a while a tension develops between exploitation and
environmental response.  Depending on the degree of tension, the system either moves to
a new equilibrium state (i.e., resilience) or transforms itself into a new system (i.e.,
transformation).  A release of tension or decline occurs and leads to system
reorganization.
This looping of phases is reminiscent of business and technology cycles as suggested
by Schumpeter (Clemence, 1951).  Under this metaphor, stakeholder learning is the major
moving force (or motor).  Learning considerations include sources (internal and external),
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forms (tacit or explicit), and loci (processes and outcomes) (Schusler et al., 2003; Stacey,
2001; Zach, 1999; Nonada, 1994).
Metaphor 3 [Community Ecology theory] is based on ecological and evolutionary
biology concepts and convergence evolution.  Since the late 1970s, scholars have
developed two closely related ecology metaphors:  ‘Population Ecology’ and ‘Community
Ecology’ metaphors (Geels, 2002; McLaughlin, 2001; Doz, 1996; Singh & Lumsden,
1990; Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983; Trist, 1983, 1977;
Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  The Population Ecology metaphor is a reverse image of
management omnipotence (i.e., Metaphor 2).  The Community Ecology theory metaphor,
however, allows for some internal control of organizational change, although the external
environment remains the major force constraining organization behavior.  The
Community Ecology theory metaphor focuses on countering this force, which causes
homogeneity and inertia, through acquiring heterogeneity and diversity or ‘variations’.
This metaphor considers the interactions between the community (or collectivity) and
the individual (or a single entity, or, as in our case, one country versus international
groups of countries) (Johnson & Stinchcombe, 2007).  The metaphor considers evolution
based on mutual variations: a variation within a single entity may affect a change in the
collectivity and vice versa.  The metaphor generally reflects a staged process of
convergence through the evolutionary, functional  triad of variation-selection-retention
for continued organizational survival.  If its survival is at stake in external turbulent times
and if it has sufficient resources, a single organization seeks variations through
collaborations with similar organizations.  Collaboration is an evolutionary strategy to
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insure fitness via reciprocal altruism as argued by Trivers (Fennell et al., 2008). 
Selection (or integration, Namenwirth & Weber, 1987) occurs, and the last stage of
‘retention’ enables structural stability for resisting chronic external turbulence.  When
turbulence increases beyond a threshold, it is time again to seek out advantageous
variations (Wood & Gray, 1991).
The evolutionary pattern of toward convergence is neither linear nor periodic
(Cantner & Pyka, 1999).  It could be said to be chaotic converging to a ‘strange attractor’
(McLaughlin & Khawaja, 2000).  The convergence is fueled by managers’ ability to enter
into collaborative initiatives that form networks, spread risks, and increase public
confidence.  This metaphor is particularly applicable to large technology-dependent
national monopolies where there is little competition with other organizations in other
jurisdictions (Gilkalp, 1992; Hughes, 1989).
Summary: The Three Metaphors
The three metaphors are grounded in natural evolution theories.  They are often
applied within the disciplines of organizational behavior.  The aim of their application is
not to accurately follow natural evolution theories but to be inspired by the metaphors
when studying the development of the social, or social-environmental systems of interest.
 Each of the three metaphors has a distinct ‘motor' or driving force.  The essence of
the evolutionary force under Metaphor 1 is the capacity to learn and to be flexible.  Under
Metaphor 2, the driving force is the capacity to control with clear objectives in mind as
well as the capacity to resume control after major impacts from the external environment. 
Metaphor 3 is based on the capacity to interact with others on a mutually beneficial basis. 
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The application of these metaphors is not exclusive.  They overlap and are
complimentary.  Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of social-environmental systems
under each of the three metaphors, perhaps more simply than warranted.
In general, Orthony (1993) argues that metaphors are not to be considered as
necessarily reflecting any reality.  They are simplified ways at looking at reality from
different angles or vantage points based on conceptual theories.  He reports that much has
been written on the application of metaphors for research purposes by two scholarly
opposing camps.  At one end, some insist that metaphors are only good for rhetoric and
for understanding scientific theories, but are dangerous for developing new theories.  At
the other end, some scholars treat the use of metaphors as a creative endeavor that
stimulates thought and new ways of viewing the world by examining similarities and
differences leading to new theories.  Orthony (1993) concludes that both camps agree that
metaphors provide a metaview and should not be taken as representing precise
mechanisms of the theories on which the metaphors are based.
I repeat here that there is yet no conclusive evidence in the literature on whether
evolutionary system development actually exists, let alone whether it is teleological and
tends toward positive or negative futures (Poole et al., 2000; Pettigrew, 1990).  Despite
the absence of certainty on system evolution, the literature reports that many scholars
assume such evolution and offer possible key factors that can drive the development of a
system.  At its simplest from a broad perspective, the literature reports such factors based
on their origin. They may be 'external' in that they originate outside the system being
examined (exogenous), or they may be  'internal' in that they originate within the system
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(endogenous).  The literature also indicates that much study is carried out to determine
the relative influence of external and internal factors, and how they interact with each
other to move the system along.  The next section addresses this literature, particular
taken from the policy science literature.  
2.2.3 External and Internal Factors Driving System Development
If the development of a system is not totally random, then this must be due to some
external or internal factors.  Turner et al. (2003) report that systems are affected by both
Table 2.  Summary of Some Characteristics of Social-Environmental Systems
(SES) under Metaphors of System Development
Some SES
characteristi
cs 
METAPHOR 2 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
METAPHOR 1 
Theory Resilience Theory
METAPHOR 3
Community Ecology
Theory
SES
evolutionary
trajectory
Linear trajectory (continuous
or discontinuous)
Toward a goal through
incremental changes
punctuated intermittently by
radical change
 Figure-eight loop trajectory
(periodic)
No progression to only one fixed
equilibrium state; several
equilibrium states exist
Irregular/chaotic (but
not random) trajectory
Progression through
variation-selection-
retention for survival 
SES
dynamics of
sub-systems
Greater influence of the
social subsystem through 
Sub-systems co-evolve with
matching temporal and spatial
scales
Greater influence of the
environmental
subsystem
System
Dual- Motor
Metaphor
Controlling 
(Evolution and Teleological
change theories)
Learning (with feedback
mechanisms)
(Evolution and Life  Cycle
change theories) 
Networking 
(Evolution and Dialectic
change theories)
Consecutive
phases
function
within a
sequence
Phase of deep structure
Phase of stability
Phase of turbulence
Phase of reorientation
Phase of growth
Phase of exploitation
Phase of Release/decline
Phase of Reorganization
Phase of resource
acquisition
Phase of seeking
variations
Phase of variation
selection
Phase of variation
retention
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external perturbations and stresses (both disturbances) and by internal factors that
influence their sensitivity to the external environment through, for example, adaptive
capacity.  Turner et al. (2003) define a perturbation as a major spike in pressure beyond
the normal range of variability in which the system operates; perturbations commonly
originate outside the system (exogenous).  Whereas stress, as argued by Turner et al. 
(2003), often emerges from a continuous or slowly increasing pressure commonly within
the range of normal variability.  Stress often originates within the system (endogenous). 
These scholars argue that the coping responses to these changes, whether exogenous or
endogenous, will determine overall system evolution.  These responses can be
autonomous action or planned, public or private, individual or institutional, tactical or
strategic, short- or long-term, anticipatory or reactive.  
Due to confounding factors and non-linear relationships among system components,
Turner et al. (2003) argue that it is difficult to identify cause-effect links of potential
system drivers.  Making the issue even more difficult, Chen (1988) argues that to
determine the relative influence of internal and external influence on a system, the natural
rate of development needs to be understood as the ‘reference’ situation.  Relatively few
social-environmental system studies have tacked this question rigorously.  In contrast, the
relative influence of internal and external factors on system development has been the
focus of many studies within the policymaking science literature since the 1960s. 
Notwithstanding this research activity, conclusions of the relative influence of external
and internal factors are still wanting.  An overview of the general policymaking literature
on this specific issue follows.  
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Policy Literature on the Relative Influence of External and Internal Factors
Anderson (2006) reports that although modern policy studies have developed since
after the Second World War, policy science, more specifically policymaking, is still a
relatively young discipline.  Theory building is still at rudimentary stages.  More
specifically, Anderson (2006) argues that the study of the relative importance of internal
and external factors on system development has been difficult, and this topic is still not
well understood.  Despite calling for more work on specific relative influences, he and
other scholars (e.g., Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Sabatier, 2007) report that policy studies have
generally found that, under external stable conditions, the development of policy systems
proceeds incrementally and is seemingly mostly influenced by internal factors.  When the
external environment presents increasing perturbations, internal factors may be able to
resist change.  When the external perturbations go beyond a certain threshold, internal
factors may no longer be able to resist change, and the system is less resilient.  In this
case, the system will have to either adapt itself to the new environment, disintegrate, or
transform itself.  Therefore, policy studies must consider the degree as well as the nature
of factors.
External factors include major socio-economic and technological developments,
regime changes, disasters, and key new ideas, values, and knowledge (Adam & Kriesi,
2007; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  Scholars, according to Adam & Kriesi (2007), specify
that the same external factor may affect different systems differently, indicating that some
internal factors are acting differently to determine the sensitivity of the system to the
50
external change.  Adam & Kriesi (2007) call for more research on how to deal with these
complex interactions to examine the combined impact of different types of determinants.  
Topical policy research distinguishes between two levels for study: 1) micropolicies
geared to preferences of specific individuals or organizations; and, 2) macropolicies
requiring action by top-level or national bureaucrats and politicians when changes to
political culture and major socio-economic conditions are dominant (Anderson, 2006). 
The relative impact of socio-economic conditions and political variables have been
studied but their interaction is complex (Blomquist, 2007).  Blomquist (2007) notes that
socio-economic variables have an effect on system development, but only up to a point. 
Political variables make a difference under some socio-economic conditions, but not
always.  For instance, wealthier democracies and dictatorships withstood occasional
economic downturns and incidents of political instability, but poor democracies
withstood them less well.
According to Anderson (2006), the development of policies within micropolitics
proceeds incrementally for relatively long periods of time with involvement of
macropolitics when significant external events occur that often involve some existing or
looming crisis.  Therefore, system autonomy in policymaking is a conditional
phenomenon.  It may last only so long as system actions are routine, conventionally
accepted, and low profile.  
Many scholars still struggle with the relative influence of internal and external factors
(Howlett et al., 2009; Sabatier, 2007; John, 2003).  They argue that the boundary line
between the system driving force of internal and external factors is not distinctive and, in
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practice, is difficult to delimit.  Various models or conceptual frames of system
development of policies have been developed as inspired by those within the discipline of
organization behavior and by natural evolutionary theories (Sabatier, 2007; John, 2003). 
They include: the Network Approach, which focuses on collaboration among like-minded
parties; the Punctuated Equilibrium Framework, which focuses on incremental
development with intermittent discontinuities; and, the Advocacy Coalition Framework,
which focuses on competition among stakeholders.  
These frameworks are similar to those developed within the organization behavior
literature described above.  Each framework focuses on one driving force and more than
one framework can be applied.  In his review of the policy literature, John (2003) notes
that most of the frames contain, at least in part, some reference to evolutionary theory. 
He argues that the next step could be to develop one or more frames that more closely
resembles natural evolutionary theories, similarly to the three metaphors selected for the
study.  
Turner et al. (2003) conclude that, while understanding the nature of change (external
or internal) is important, it is not sufficient to understand system evolution.  How systems
react to these disturbances is equally important, and Turner et al. (2003) among many
other scholars call for more research in this area.  For the most part, the development of
narratives built by using the frames has characterized policy research, and statistically
rigorous controlled experimentation is rare (Armitage et al., 2008).  Quantitative analysis
has not yet been as frequently utilized in studying policies as would be possible or
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desirable, although there are notable exceptions—for instance, Dye’s work on the relative
influence of socio-economic and political factors (Howlett et al., 2009).
2.2.4 Adaptive Capacity as System Driver
Many researchers agree that an important internal driver of development of complex
social-environmental systems is their ‘adaptive capacity’, which is defined as capacities:
1) Enabling natural systems to adapt to changes through seeking other equilibrium
states (Walker & Lawson, 2006; Anderies et al., 2006; Folke, 2006; Kinzig et al.,
2006; Walker et al., 2004; Holling, 1973); and,
2) Enabling ‘human adaptation’, that is, “a response to social-environmental change,
whether anticipatory or reactive, that enables humans to cope by altering social,
ecological, or economical variables” (see the glossary found in Armitage et al.,
2007b, p.328).  
To ‘cope’ implies a goal, an intended social objective.  When examining adaptive
capacity, Smit et al. (1999) emphasize that the answer to 'adaptation to what' must be
clear.  In other words, management goals for adaptive management programs must be
coherent with the overall goals of project management.  Tol and Yohe (1996) suggest a
set of objectives, namely, economic viability, environmental sustainability, public
acceptance, and behavior flexibility.  Taken together, these objectives may amount to the
broad principle of sustainable development.  Smit and Wandel (2006) report that adaptive
capacity initiatives within social-environmental systems are mostly integrated into
resources management, disaster preparedness, and sustainable development programs.
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The principle of sustainable development was formulated in 1987 by the Bruntland
Commission formed by the United Nations Environment Programme.  Later, the principle
was formally included in the 1992 UNEP Rio Declaration signed by many countries.  By
recognizing that both development and sustainability are important, the principle has not
received unanimous support, particularly from those who do not support increasing
economic development (Charles, 2007).  Therefore the principle of sustainable
development is controversial because of conflicting values and interests.  In this regard,
Charles (2007) argues that adaptive management through the building collaboration or
cooperative efforts over the long term among stakeholders may be useful.  
Holling argues that sustainable development “requires flexible, diverse, and
redundant regulation, early signals of error built into incentives for corrective action, and
continuous experimental probing of the changes in the external world” (Bosselman, 2001,
p.325).  Mog (2006) adds that such development is assisted by learning to ensure “a
social, economic and ecological durability that relies on successful adaptation to changing
conditions over time, location and context” (p.532).  Some researchers, Janssen (2002)
for instance, state that it is not yet clear whether sustainable development policies should
be preventive, reactive, or adaptive.  Simon (1993) argues that the most important
policies required for survival in an uncertain, fast-evolving, external context are
preventive and adaptive.  He suggests that such policies include those that can encourage
measures for anticipating the shape of uncertain futures, for generating alternatives, and
for implementing new plans rapidly and efficiently.  
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In addition, Holling et al. (2002a) argue that influential adaptive capacities are those
that can presumably act with relatively slow speed at several temporal and spatial scales. 
These scholars assume that slow variables are expected to eventually become key system
drivers because they have time to expand their sphere of influence throughout increasing
spatial and temporal scales.  As such, faster variables, like some political variables, have
limited influence, because they do not have sufficient time to expand their influence
before they disappear.  Yaffee (1997) also encourages examining slow, long-term
activities, such as building cooperation among stakeholders.  Smits and Wandel (2006)
argue that some determinants of adaptive capacity are local (e.g., public partnerships
which will absorb stress) while others act on a broader spatial scale (e.g., compliance
with national regulatory oversight).
Freudenburg and Gramling (1992) caution that building adaptive capacities should
not be too specific in order to prevent ‘overadaptation’.  Overadaptation may lead to mal-
adaptation when unexpected changes occur.  Instead, these scholars encourage the
building of broad adaptive capacities that considers large space and time scales.  For
example, suppose a company invests in having many of its staffs learn Chinese in view of
China’s phenomenal economic market.  Suddenly, a major external event slows China’s
growth and instead favors that of India.  It might have been a better strategy to have
trained the same number of staff but together learning a few different languages (broader
capacity).  
 Freudenburg and Gramling (1992) and other scholars consider that adaptive
capacities are usually developed through internal factors, but external socio-economic and
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political factors (e.g., war, the collapse of economic institutions) may lead to a narrower
coping capacity.  In general, adaptive capacity is considered a system motor fueled by the
three general driving forces previously outlined in Section 2.2.2, namely, controlling,
learning, and networking.  The building and maintenance of adaptive capacity can be
developed by several parties interested in a project that are commonly known as
'stakeholders'. 
Stakeholders
In social-environmental systems, adaptive capacities are closely linked to the type of
stakeholders, particularly in those systems where the social sub-system is more dominant
in driving the system.  Kasperson (2006) argues that as a result of increasing
democratization, there is a call by many national and international governments and
academic institutions for stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes.  He
further suggests that efforts to obtain views from all affected stakeholders be carried out
on an ongoing basis within adaptive management programs.
Kasperson (2006) also reports that ‘stakeholder’ was initially defined as “the neutral
party who holds the stakes of the wager and has no particular interest in the outcome”
(p.321).  Today, the classic definition of stakeholders developed by scholars means all
parties that can affect or are affected by the achievements of an organization’s objective
(Kasperson, 2006).  Under this definition, stakeholders can include a wide range of
parties, for example, policymakers, regulators, scientific experts, consultants,
implementing organizations, potential host communities, elected local or regional
representatives, and project managers (NEA, 2007; Kasperson, 2006).  
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The literature review indicated that, initially in the 1960s and 1980s, stakeholders
included parties without which the organization could not survive (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
In 1984, Freeman’s seminal work led him to develop a stakeholder theory on
identification, categorization, and influence based on a broader definition of stakeholder,
that is, parties “who can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who are
affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (p.854, Mitchell et al.,
1997).  Fassin (2009) reports that many studies on the influence of stakeholders occurred
in the late 1990s.  He claims that the objective of this work was to develop a stakeholder
theory and eventually broaden managers’ vision to influential participants.  The theory
was later refined in the 2000s, but in his review of the literature, Fassin (2009) found
much confusion around the relative importance or influence of stakeholders. 
As a result of this confusion, Fassin (2009) reports that there were many scholarly
attempts to clarify stakeholder influence by developing typologies based on various
criteria.  Criteria are characterized as either being primary versus secondary, direct versus
indirect, generic versus specific, normative (or legitimate responsibility) versus derivative
(no responsibility), legal interpretation (rights, obligation) or managerial (relational). 
Mitchell et al. (1997) also argue that stakeholder power (formal, economic, or political)
and urgency of pressure are also distinguishing criteria.  Analyzing stakeholders based on
these criteria provides an indication of the amount of attention management needs to give
to a stakeholder (Frooman, 1999).  A managerial interpretation could include many
stakeholders.  However, in view of constraints (time, resources, and cognitive capacity), a
simplification is often required.  In most cases, the range of stakeholders will include
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those with a legal tie and a few other relational ones.  Once groups of stakeholders are
determined, Frooman (1999) argues that the underlying assumption of stakeholder theory
is about managing potential conflict stemming from divergent interests among
stakeholder groups.  
Fassin (2009) suggests distinguishing stakeholders into three groups: internal
constituents of the organizations (e.g., affect on, managers, employees, communities,
legal), pressure groups (affect by, nonlegal), and regulators (affect by, legal).  The first
and third groups derive their power from legitimacy and can call firms to account.  Based
on this grouping, Fassin (2009) suggests that managers could develop a strategy of wide-
ranging actions, that is, from partnering, collaborating, or negotiating with certain
stakeholders to manipulating or resisting pressures of other stakeholders.
But before taking action, managers should know how the stakeholders are going to
exercise pressure, that is, stakeholder dynamics (Frooman, 1999).  In his literature review,
Frooman (1999) notes that network theory and agency theory have been used to study
such dynamics. He prefers, however, the resource dependence theory (capacity), because
his premise is that organizations are not self-contained nor self-sufficient.  Resource
capacity may enhance power (control) or interdependence (learning and collaboration)
(Mitchell et al., 1997).  The magnitude and extent of these capacities will determine
dynamic strategies of the organization (Frooman, 1999).  And this magnitude and extent
of capacities are variable over time (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
There is a general consensus in the literature that the stakeholder concept has the
potential to deliver a theory of the organization with practical usefulness to management. 
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However, there is also a general call for more empirical work to be carried out to evaluate
the theory (Fassin, 2009; Mitchell et al., 1997).  For present purposes, I have adopted
Fassin’s (2009) three stakeholder categories, because they were formulated pragmatically
with a focus on managerial and organizational perspectives based on responsibility and
power (normative/legal or derivative/managerial).  Hence, the main stakeholders for the
study are: 1) managers (fulfilment of legal and other responsibilities); 2) policymakers,
including regulators (legitimate responsibility and power); and 3) the public, including
local communities and public interests groups.  
Five stakeholder adaptive capacities for sustainable development through adaptive
management were selected a priori, that is, based on their frequent reference in the
literature as being influential for sustainable development.  A sixth stakeholder adaptive
capacity, emergency preparedness, was selected a posteriori, that is, when its significance
presence was noted after reviewing the policy documents submitted by national
governments under the Joint Convention.  The selected stakeholder adaptive capacities
follow: 1) learning by managers; 2) social responsibility of managers; 3) public
participation in decision-making processes; 4) formal project collaboration; 5)
government oversight; and, 6) emergency preparedness.  The following review on each of
the six stakeholders adaptive capacities is provided to give a general sense of the work of
key scholars.  The point of the review is not necessarily to be exhaustive review but to
provide sufficient background information that will be useful for interpreting research
results.
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1) Learning by Managers
Armitage et al. (2007) note that much normative emphasis has been placed on the
importance of learning to acheive sustainability under conditions of social-environmental
change.  Learning capacity aims to reduce technical and social uncertainties associated
with their project.  Such learning can be carried out through various means, for example,
national and international R&D programs, upgrading skills of employees, forming special
task forces or organizational units focusing on innovation.  Efforts needed to learn can be
challenging, because learning to innovate requires significant investments, international
collaboration, good implementation models, a sensitivity to public demands, and a safe
haven for experimentation (Armitage et al., 2007).
The topic of learning as a tool for organizational development has been the focus of
many studies in organization science that have normative goals.  From empirical data
examined through the lens of adaptive management, scholars suggest general learning
processes.  First, executive leadership ought to encourage the learning capacity of
managers by providing them with the necessary safe space to do so on an ongoing basis
(Fernandez & Pitts, 2006; Heijden, 2005; Eisenhardt & Brown, 2004).  Executives should
make clear that learning also considers failures as well as successes (Levinthal & March,
1993).  Sterman (2001) argues that learning is not an acute task, and managers need to
continue to learn as the project is being implemented.  
Through R&D&D activities (research, development, and demonstration), managers
need to rethink ideas, revisit technologies and policies, and generally be aware of
changing social values.  Sterman (2001) argues that managers also ought to learn to
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recognize and avoid 'pathologies' or 'path traps' through knowledge and experience
(Chapter 8 elaborates further on these traps).  Within democracies, managers might have
to accept project delays so that learning can be optimized (Joppke, 1993).  Learning
should be included in project programs so that learning occurs at different times (over
short and long terms) and space scales (local, regional international levels) (Flynn &
Chapman, 2004; Wolfe et al., 2002; Beinhocker, 1999; Stacey, 1995).  Therefore,
scholars recommend that managers ought to incorporate flexibility in their schedules and
perhaps make greater use of the approach ‘design as you go’ or ‘muddling through’
(Flynn et al., 1992; Lindblom, 1979).
More strategically, scholars suggest that managers understand four rationalities within
their learning programs, namely: 1) market characteristics; 2) government actions; 3)
political pluralism considerations; and 4) communitarian participation habits.  Managers
need to know how to either influence, or adapt to, these rationalities (Higgins & Duane,
2008).  The paths taken by organizations over time need to be harmonized with the
changing nature of these external rationalities over the long term.  Managers, therefore,
should be able to suggest alternative paths as required.
Scholars argue that executive leadership is essential, because learning programs can
be resource intensive and extensive in the short term—although likely effective over the
long term.  Managers will be expected to budget well to acquire the necessary financial
resources (Armitage, 2007).  Furthermore, they will be expected to justify proposed
resources for their adaptive management programs (Mog 2006, 2004; Schreiber et al.,
2004; Harrison, 2003; Geus, 1997; Quinn & Cameron, 1983).  For example, managers
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may need to discuss expected results from R&D&D plans (Baker et al., 2006; Berkhout
et al., 2006; Carlisle & McMillan, 2006; Mog, 2006; Zach, 1999).  Typically, scholars
report that managers invest in large R&D&D exploitive activities when new technologies
or other solutions are needed for quick and dramatic effects; they invest in smaller
exploratory R&D&D activities when the external context is stable (Zach, 1999; Quinn &
Cameron, 1983).  Instead, Redman and Kinzig (2003) suggest that a more promising
investment scheme would be ongoing medium-size investments to maintain adaptive
capacity in key areas that would offset greater costs for addressing future surprises.
Despite many studies that develop normative guidance, Armitage et al. (2008)
observe ongoing struggle to learn from experience for responding to complex conditions. 
Learning can often be slow and inconsistent.  To optimize learning, Armitage et al. 
(2008) suggest that general normative goals need to be followed by more specificity with
respect to the following dimensions: 1) what type of learning is required (experiential,
transformative and/or social learning through single-, double-, or triple-loop feedback
mechanisms); 2) what is the goal of learning and how do we evaluate the attainment of
that goal; 3) what mechanisms to use for learning (e.g., simulation modeling, field
experimentation, learning-by-doing); 4) determine who is involved in the learning process
(is learning to be carried collaboratively with like-minded organization; if so, learning is
said to be ‘horizontal’; or, is learning to be carried out cooperatively with organizations at
different scale, for example, local, regional, national); and, 5) what are the risks of
learning, for example, in terms of costs and stirring up conflicts among stakeholders.  
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 More fundamentally, Armitage et al. (2008) highlight barriers to learning by
stakeholders.  These include lack of public interest, unequal public participation due to
more capable stakeholders, lack of education or expertise, lack of goodwill, lack of
human, financial or temporal resources, hidden agendas or lack of transparence.  In view
these potential barriers to learning, Armitage et al. (2008) recommend the following
actions: 1) encourage capacity building for learning; 2) give attention to incentives
structures and safety nets; 3) build relationships among stakeholders that encourage
transparency; and, 4) design a strategic learning program that will guide further learning
activities over the long term.  According to Armitage et al. (2008), more research is
required on each of the four recommendations. 
2) Responsibility of Managers
One main goal of managers—public and private alike—is the ability to proceed
responsibly with their project, and this may mean putting in place procedures for
sustainability over the long term (Collins & Porras, 1997).  One concept that may increase
manager performance over the long term is corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Scholars (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2008; Whitehouse, 2003) report that there are many
definitions of corporate responsibility, but the most straightforward and accepted one is
corporate responsibility that consists of three pillars: economic prosperity, environmental
quality, and social justice (including being a good corporate citizen).  These three pillars
taken together are consistent with the goal of sustainable development.  More specifically,
the three pillars include the following tasks:
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1) Economic prosperity:  Ensure that operations proceed smoothly; make a
reasonable profit for owners and shareholders; ensure product quality, and provide
jobs; the ultimate goal is both individual and general welfare;
2) Environmental quality:  Go further than just complying with all health, safety, and
environmental laws (because ethics lags behind laws); garner community support
in assessing these risks; and,
3) Social justice:  Treat the labor force ethically; be a good corporate citizen by
interacting responsibly with the local communities and other stakeholders.  Good
corporate citizenship involves the accumulation of ‘social capital’ (see below for
definition).
Weisband (2009) argues that it is the third pillar that makes corporate responsibility
unique.  Good corporate citizenship is a crucial state assisted by the accumulation of
social capital.  Once enough social capital has accumulated, it can assist in developing
collaborations with various stakeholders.  In theory, scholars argue that good corporate
citizenship can increase social capital and provide business benefits in the following
areas: reputation management; risk assessment and management; employee recruitment,
motivation, respect, and retention; investor relations to get access to greater economic
capital; leaning and innovation; competitiveness and market positioning; and, operational
efficiency, including acquiring and maintaining any required operational project licences
(Porter & Kramer, 2006; Whitehouse, 2003; Roberts et al., 2002).
Pretty and Ward (2001) carried out a literature on social capital.  They report that the
notion of social capital received increased attention by scholars from the mid 1980s to the
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late 1990s.  The definition of 'social capital' varies widely, that is, from worth acquired
through social connections or through higher levels of education (an elitist concept) to a
wider, less offensive definition developed by Putnam in 1995 as worth acquired  more
democratically that enhances features of common social life (networks, norms and trust)
by enabling project stakeholders to act together more effectively while pursuing shared
objectives.  
More practically, the Civic Practice Network (CPN, 1999) and the OECD (Plummer
& FitzGibbon, 2007) characterize ‘social capital’ as stakeholder networks communicating
on norms, values, and understandings, all of which facilitate cooperation within groups. 
Effective communications enhance capacity building to empower communities to
participate in public-problem solving.  Ostrom (2000) argues that the development of
social capital should aim to empower all stakeholders as entrepreneurial citizens rather
than dependent citizens.  
From their literature review, Pretty and Ward (2001) note that the accumulation of
social capital evolves toward complexity and can focus on group life cycles, phases of
learning, or types of participatory relationships.  Pretty and Ward (2001) suggest that all
these focuses can be combined, and, as such, they suggest an evolution of cooperation
through three phases: 1) reactive-dependence (in response to an external hazard,
unorganized cooperation looking outward for solutions); 2) realization-independence
(cooperation looks inward to build potential for empowerment); and 3) awareness-
interdependence (cooperation tends to build respectful internal-external partnerships to
develop forward-looking solutions).  
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Weisband (2009) reports that the concept of corporate responsibility is a concept that
continues to involve much controversy for several reasons.  For example, although
supporting the concept, because it diminishes the economic capital of rampant capitalism
in favor of increasing social capital, environmental groups deplore its implementation
since they see managers providing only lip service to the concept.  Another example is
that some managers are often not enamored with the concept of social capital, because
they do not see it increasing their financial performance; on the contrary, it is an extra
cost of doing business.
Adding to the controversy, according to Windsor (2006), Friedman argues that the
social responsibility of business is to increase profits for economic wealth creation as the
best contribution of business to the general welfare.  Notwithstanding his own view,
Freidman advocates for prudent altruism to avoid the expansion of public policy.  In the
same vein, Vogel (2005) found that social responsibility is irrelevant to financial
performance, and that the most effective way for reconciling private business goals and
public social purposes is effective specific government regulation.  Furthermore, Windsor
(2006) reminds us that ‘economic’ man is not completely rational or selfish.  Ethical
considerations are necessary to compensate for this 'imperfection'.  
Notwithstanding the lack of clear research results, the literature review indicates that   
corporate responsibility is gaining acceptability largely for three reasons:  
1) The theoretical expectation that companies are social creations of a society and
hence, they—particularly, large companies—have certain social responsibilities
(Whitehouse, 2003); 
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2) There is some evidence that meeting these expectations is apt to increase the
organization’s performance, particularly over the long term.  Although Wood and
Jones (1995) do not see strong evidence that there is a positive relationship
between social and financial performances, they do see a negative relationship,
that is, that bad social performance hurts the company financially.  However,
other scholars)for example, Zadek (2004))note that companies with a bad
reputation can thrive  (Zadek, 2004).  Scholars continue to search for a clear and
positive relationship between increasing social capital and project performance;
and,
3) Some governments have indicated their expectations either through informal or
formal direction that managers will fulfill all of their ‘responsibilities’.  Where
such government direction is lacking, managers often do not incorporate the
concept beyond brief triple bottom line reporting (Mitchell et al., 2008; Porter &
Kramer, 2006).  Yet, some scholars—for example, Thomson & Bebbington
(2005) and Weisband (2009)—argue that such reporting is not to be disregarded
offhand: they see the reporting process as a learning and transparent process
through which hidden assumptions may be revealed and questioned if need be.  
Throughout the literature review, it was apparent that measuring compliance with
corporate responsibility continues to be a challenge.  The World Business Council for
Sustainable Development (Hohnen, 2007) argues that corporate social responsibility
(CSR) builds not only on a base of compliance with legislation and regulations, but
typically includes 'beyond law' commitments and activities.  Such commitments and
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activities include employee and stakeholder relations, community involvement, customer
satisfaction, and transparency, all of which can be difficult to measure.  The International
Institute of Sustainable Development argues that CSR is an entry point for understanding
sustainable development issues and for attempting to respond to them either in a firm’s
business strategy or in an organization’s mission strategy (Hohnen, 2007).  Although
performance measures are not yet refined, businesses are recognizing that effective CSR
activities can reduce the risk of business disruptions, avoid slowing down the creation of
well-being for themselves and society, open up new opportunities, drive innovation,
enhance company reputation, and even improve efficiency over the long term (Hohnen,
2007).
Hohnen (2007) argues that CSR activities are essentially for firms and other
organizations to anticipate and address issues associated with their interactions with
others and, through those interactions, succeed in their endeavors.  Therefore, managers
need adaptive capacities that will enable them to do so over the long term.  For instance,
capacity to fulfilling all their financial responsibilities is essential, and capacity to build
and maintain social informal networking for cooperation among stakeholders is often
desirable for the economic bottom line. 
Porter and Kramer (2003) argue that there is much more work to be done if there is to
be widespread support for the concept of corporate responsibility.  They suggest that the
current focus on conflict between business and society could be transformed into
mutually beneficial interdependence.  This would require additional work on the
integration of the three current pillars of corporate responsibility into a comprehensive
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strategic plan, and entail identifying points of intersection and choosing which social
issues to address (no company can solve all of society’s problems).
Building social capital is a useful adaptive capacity for complex long-term
environmental problems, for example, climate change (Pelling & High, 2005).  It focuses
mainly on bonding of multiple informal relationships (vertical and horizontal) with trust
and reciprocity.  Pelling and High (2005) argue that it may well be that these interactions
form the social raw material that shapes capacity to identify new information, learn, and
cope with change.
Of trust and reciprocity, Pelling and High (2005) report that Putnam has shifted
emphasis from unilateral trust to pre-existing and reciprocal trust.  Trust only reinforces
norms of generalized reciprocity.  There are two kinds of reciprocity: balanced and
generalized.  Balanced reciprocity is a direct, simultaneous exchange of similar benefits
whereas generalized reciprocity is less direct, involves multiple parties at different time,
and cements a larger network over time. 
 Dawson and Darst (2006) argue that widespread pre-existing and reciprocal trust
between society and government/industry is one of the three conditions for successfully
siting a project, the other two being an open and adequately lengthy process for public
consultations, and resilient democratic institutions (including transparency, and possibly
veto rights) that can channel public opinion, but resist being overwhelmed by it.  For
example, Dawson and Darst (2006) report that meeting these three conditions resulted in
successful nuclear waste management facility siting in Sweden and Finland, whereas their
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absence resulted in failure of similar siting exercises in the Czech Republic, France, and
the United Kingdom.  
Social capital can be built within ‘communities’ for vertical collaboration (among
hierarchal organizations), or for horizontal collaboration (like-minded organizations). 
According to Pelling and High (2005), it is not yet clear how the building of social capital
works to better adapt to social change.  They suggest that maintaining multilane and
multifaceted social ties of everyday social interactions may be the best resource for
maintaining a capacity to change collective direction.  And since it is generally agreed
that there is an optimal level of social capital, several scholars—who study the
advantages and disadvantages of social capital (e.g., Pelling & High, 2005; Adler &
Kwon, 2002)—call for more research in this area so that social capital is not inadvertently
misused and contribute to maladaptations. 
3) Public Participation in Decision-Making
Pellizoni (2003) reports that a variety of reasons define the entitlement of the public
to participate in project decision-making processes: 1) rights (citizens); 2) spatial location
(residents); 3) knowledge (experts); 4) owners; 5) stakes (project benefits or risks); 6)
interests; and, 7) status (representatives).  Therefore, there are two broad reasons:
cognitive (learning) and normative (controlling).  However, even participants who invoke
normative reasons are expected to bring something to the table and learn.  Thus, public
participation has a substantial learning function (Pellizoni, 2003).
Increased public participation has resulted from a decentralization tendency of
governance and an increase in environmental governance since the 1960s (Bulkely &
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Mol, 2003).  Ansell and Gingrich (2003) argue that decentralizing reforms have a
potential for increasing new points of public access, and accountability and transparency
of governments, which in turn, increases public participation in decision-making
analyses.  These scholars, however, caution that full decentralization may have the
reverse effect: increase inefficiencies of public access, diffusion of accountability, and
increased complexity that can diminish transparency.  
Growing globalization began to erode the traditional basis of power of democratic
institutions of the nation-state, because of the emergence of knowledge of alternative
policy arrangements.  In the 1960s, activists were not only discontent with increasing
pollution, but also rejected the way government decisions were made (Tatenhove &
Leroy, 2003).  Initially the public was mostly involved in setting the political agenda
(from the 1960s and the 1980s), and was quite successful, particularly with the use of
‘symbols’ (Albrecht et al., 1996).  Since the 1990s, the public has not only wanted to set
the agenda, but also participate in all factors of governance, and thus from the very early
stages of policymaking to the long-term monitoring of project effects (Bulkely & Mol,
2003).  
Scholars have argued that society has become too complex to be steered in a
centralized, unified manner, and hence, no single project stakeholder, no matter how
powerful and technically competent, is able to handle its dynamic in a traditional top-
down style (Pellizoni, 2003).  However, scholars report that the fragmentation of
centralization does have some challenges.  These challenges include the following list:
1) Lack of expertise to make sound decisions;
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2) The public’s problem-solving capacity with appropriate and substantial means of
experimentation and analysis (Jackson, 2005; Aberbach &  Christensen, 2001),
enabling it to form ‘partnerships’ that are formed with or without delegation of
legal power (Fennell et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2005);
3) Emergence of social conflicts; 
4) Downsizing the scope of discussions could lead to abstraction and generalization 
(Pellizoni, 2003);
5) The need for a third-party negotiator for public consultations with volunteer 
communities on the location of sensitive facilities (Flynn et al., 1992); and,
6) Paralyzing policymaking and project management (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003).  
Bulkeley and Mol (2003) report that two general forms of public participation models
have emerged.  The first is called the ‘Information Deficit model’ which perceives public
education on facts as improving participation.  The second, the ‘Civic model'  argues for
more inclusive and deliberative modes of decision.  The first model is likely useful in the
early stages of public participation.  This model, however, is not comprehensive, because
public values are not considered.  The second model is more comprehensive, but requires
more resources for deliberative groups and fora, such as, consensus conferences, citizen
juries, round tables, and focus groups.  Hence, public participation not only covers access
to public information, but also includes public consultation that is respectful of all
perspectives, ideas, concerns, and proposed solutions (Olsson et al., 2003; Hanson,
2001).  Bulkeley and Mol (2003), however, argue that any enthusiasm for the second
model needs to be tempered by the recognition of the complex and fundamental nature of
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deliberative processes (e.g., were they fair?) and by the difficulty in incorporating all
views into policymaking.  The building of public confidence is considered a ‘slow
variable’ that can quietly gain momentum until a critical mass is achieved that can be
either favorable or unfavorable (NEA, 2008a)
There appears to be general agreement in the literature that adaptive capacity of public
participation assists in enabling the public to better assess project benefits and risks, and
to act as an influential stakeholder throughout decision-making processes.  Enabling the
public within political democracies entails not only the right to information, but also the
capacity to assess whether it generally supports a project or not (Kaiser, 1997).  To do so,
it can be enabled to evaluate all opportunities (benefits) and challenges (risks) of the
project (Albrecht et al., 1996).  The public can be enabled either by using its own
resources or by being empowered to do so through governmental or other funding.  This
may or may not involve a sharing of legal authority for direct democracy.  For instance, in
Switzerland, the public is often empowered in decision-making process through referenda
and legal vetoes (Ruppen, 2004).  In the United States, legal propositions, initiatives, and
referenda can be effective tools for empowering the public to voice their views on
specific topics of societal concern (Matsusaka, 2005). 
The public can generally include all citizens or refer to more specific interested
entities, for example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Cheap new
communications technologies are empowering and increasing the effectiveness of small
NGOs and even of single individuals (Seo et al., 2009; Bach & Stark, 2004).  Thus
empowered, community representatives can negotiate an appropriate compensation
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package from a knowledgeable position.  Hanson (2001) indicates that the issue of 
'compensation' is a sensitive subject, because a community would want to avoid the
actuality or perception of ‘bribery’. In this event, Hanson (2001) suggests that if a
community is seeking economic development, it could generally confirm their social
values before promoters enter their community.  This would determine whether
community members would accept projects such as waste management facilities under
certain conditions (Hanson, 2001).
Scholars also report that public participation can go beyond educating itself and
deliberating policies and programs.  It can participate in the management of the project. 
In this instance, scholars refer to project ‘co-management’ (or to similar terms).  This
particular form of public participation is more formal and included in the formal project
collaboration stakeholder adaptive capacity described below.
4) Government Oversight by Policymakers including Regulators
The literature from various disciplines that relate to adaptive management covers four
main themes of government oversight: A) clarity of the regulatory framework; B)
appropriate degree of centralization and decentralization (controls and incentives);  C)
transparency; and, D) flexibility for adaptability. 
 A) The establishment of clear regulatory structures enables government oversight for
public confidence (Tushman et al., 2004).  Initially, public trust in governments often
depends on the extent of regulations that they develop to restrict the behavior of
managers.  A sound regulatory framework is an essential component of sustainable
development.  (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  Government overseers need to influence
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manager behavior through either restrictions (command-and-control) or incentives (e.g.,
market-based approach) by responsive regulation (Sparrow, 2000; Ring, 1997; Ayres &
Braithwaite, 1992).  An effective regulatory regime, including well-balanced regulations
and adequate enforcement measures, enhances public confidence in project management. 
Avoiding 'regulatory capture' of government authorities by project managers is also
crucial for public confidence (Holland, 2002).  
B) The degree of centralization or decentralization is a common and difficult theme of
government oversight.  Difficult because the government is vested with regulatory power
routed in the rationality of control in the interests of the collectivity, sometimes at the
expense of individual freedoms (Davy, 1997).  According to Derthick (1987), on the one
hand, in countries where there are historic tensions among important groups, there is a
need for a strong central government to unite them; on the other hand, each group or local
entity will want to be able to control its destiny without interference from a central
government.  Indeed, Derthick (1987) reports that the first federation, the United States,
built the notion of federalism on the primacy of individual liberty and collective
democracy that require both decentralization of national power and centralization for
national strength, unity, and cohesiveness.
   Keese and Argudo (2006) argue that builders of the United States Constitution
supposed that this struggle between decentralization and centralization would finally end
up in a fixed permanent equilibrium.  After more than two hundred years, the struggle
remains. Decentralization—or the transfer of decision-making power and funds by the
central government to lower levels of government—is still one of the most important
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government reforms in many countries.  In considering reforms, both extremes are
problematic.  Regulations and rules should achieve a sustainable balance between
centralized and decentralized governance (Folke et al., 2005; Harrison, 2003).  
Some scholars argue that decentralization, in addition to increasing freedoms, can
increase equity and make good practical use of democracy principles.  This idea has led to
the evolving concept of extending government oversight with proactive governance
networking among stakeholders (Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003).  For example, lay citizens
can partner with more organized public groups and networks.  Governance turns to such
networks when market principles and the social hierarchy prove increasingly ineffective. 
Such governance rests on horizontal forms of interaction between public actors who have
conflicting objectives, but who are sufficiently independent from each other.  No public
actor can impose a solution on another, and yet public actors are sufficiently
interdependent so that all could lose if no solution is found.
  Tatenhove and Leroy (2003) observe a further phenomenon of governance
networking, that is, a shift in the locale of democratic politics.  Instead of national
governments providing project oversight, governance shifts from the national level to the
subnational level (local and regional governments) as well as to the supranational level
(international governmental organizations) are becoming more frequent.  Other scholars
(e.g., Holland, 2002; Grabosky, 1995) point to a form of ‘hybrid governance’, that is, a
vertical cooperative project between a local community and a higher government or a
project manager.  For example, project monitoring programs could be delegated to third
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parties within the public.  This form of governance is further discussed below under the
formal project collaboration adaptive capacity.
C) Democratic government institutions are expected to be transparent and disclose all
relevant information (Gosseries, 2006; Davy, 1997).  In response to public demand or
cultural shifts, modern democratic governments must also ensure the transparency of
project plans and operations as well as their own oversight activities for public
accountability (Gosseries, 2006; Holland, 2002).  In this event, Gosseries (2006) defines
transparency  the way such institutions operate under public scrutiny.  This notably
involves ‘sunshine’ laws enabling access to information or documents produced by
representatives or civil servants, anti-corruption laws, voting laws, and the possibility of
witnessing deliberative processes in action.  Gosseries (2006) argues that the public
generally tends to consider transparency as having globally positive effects on
democracies 
Although the benefits of transparency seemed to be espoused by various stakeholders,
many scholars caution that transparency requirements by themselves are not sufficient
(Gupta, 2008; Gosseries, 2006).  Gupta (2008) argues that the benefit of transparency is
premised on the notion that information matters and that information can empower. 
Gupta (2008) calls for greater scrutiny of this notion.  Transparency requirements and
reporting must be publicized to ensure that meaningful information can be accessed by
citizens.  Such access requires three enabling prerequisites: 1) a certain level of education
or funds to engage consultants; 2) an adequate process to easily obtain the information;
and 3) an effective network of media sources. 
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 Gosseries (2006) also notes that even when transparency is possible, it may not
always be desirable.  For instance, if the justification of government decisions involves
difficult tradeoffs, publicizing these tradeoffs may engender further controversy. 
Gosseries (2006) argues that the prospect of controversy where decision transparency is
required may introduce a strong bias in favor of government decisions that are more
palatable; in this case, the decisions are not necessarily the best ones.  As another
downside to transparency, Gosseries (2006) suggests that once people have defended one
view in public deliberations, it is hard for them to publicly revise this view at a later
stage, especially if there is a prominent figure taking part in the debate.  Here again, the
issue may be to optimize the level of transparency, not necessarily maximize it,
depending on the situation. 
D) Lastly, for example, sustainable development within adaptive management
programs requires new flexible approaches to government oversight.  Grabosky (1995)
argues that rather than merely implementing their own surveillance programs, regulatory
agencies, under complex conditions, could also become facilitators or brokers by
empowering surveillance programs by third-party stakeholders.  Another example of
government oversight flexibilty are laws that allow change for future adaptation. 
Bosselman (2001) argues that laws should not focus on finalities but rather on long-term
processes.  Regulations should not impede managers’ flexibility to innovate; on the
contrary, government needs to encourage innovation and create opportunities for
continuous improvement (Ring, 1997).  
78
Many scholars suggest that regulations could create incentives to establish slack
resources, that is, resources in excess of what are required for the organization in the short
term (Siggelkow, 2004; Young, 2002; Miner et al., 1990; Singh,1986).  They report that
some managers have established such resources for social prominence, public prestige
and political power vis-a-vis other firms in the marketplace.  Establishing slack resources
for planning purposes is perhaps one of the greatest challenges for organizations; in this
event, regulatory action would be required if project managers do not do so voluntarily
(Awh & Primeaux, 1985).
Scholars have reported four waves of (environmental) governance (Gupta, 2008). 
The first wave of governance used a command-and-control approach.  The second wave
added market-based instruments providing incentives.  Gupta (2008) reports that the third
wave was termed “regulation by revelation” by Florini in 1998 characterized by
information disclosure and transparency.  And other scholars—for instance, Brock and
Carpenter (2007) and Barthes (2009)—suggest a fourth wave, that is, governance that
encourage flexibility for adaptability.  For instance, Barthes (2009) suggests that
governments need to find ways to decide without making any definite or irreversible
decision so that future governments are not trapped by history.  It is not clear whether
these waves can be considered complementary, evolutionary, or revolutionary
Lastly, there is general agreement that the legitimacy of any democratic form of
government oversight is likely to be enhanced if there is clear separation and autonomy of
government oversight agencies from industry and undue political pressures (Mackerron
and Berkhout, 2006; IAEA, 2001).  Moreover, there should be a diverse membership of
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regulatory and oversight bodies.  With respect to the latter condition, Mackerron and
Berkhout (2006) specify that diversity within this context relates to any dimensions
including expertise, sector, region, gender, and race.
5) Formal Project Collaboration (co-management)
Project collaboration among stakeholders is more formal than general public
participation in decision-making processes, and it often involves the sharing of
responsibility in the long-term management of a project (Davy, 1997).  For instance,
governments and managers can enable co-management with citizens of project
surveillance and enforcement activities (Grabosky, 1995).  This form of collaboration is
increasingly being applied under various names, including collaborative management,
community management, participatory management, joint management, decentralized
management, indigenous management, user-participation, and co-management (Pretty &
Ward, 2001).  
Davy (1997) suggests that in some challenging instances, a lack of such collaboration
among stakeholders will prevent a project from going ahead.  But he cautions that
developing such cooperation is not easy and recommends the following components for
building and maintaining collaborative capacity: setting large rewards for mutual
cooperation, establishing enormous penalties for mutual defection, encouraging an
unlimited numbers of transactions, building a history of long-standing cooperation and
reliability, and ensuring that all relevant information is available.  To emphasize the
difference from simple public participation within adaptive management programs,
Armitage et al. (2007a) have coined this process as ‘co-management’.  They define the
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concept as a long-term management structure that permits stakeholders to share
management responsibility within a specific system (project) that enhances mutual
learning. 
 Armitage et al. (2007a) argue that the characteristics that make co-management
‘adaptive’ include increased communications, perspective sharing, trust building, and
mutual learning focusing on human relationships and institutional arrangements.  Within
project management, formal agreements, collective understandings and activities are
increasingly being used to build cooperation or confidence among formal stakeholders
(Armitage et al., 2007a; Berkes, 2007; NEA, 2007).  Such stakeholders may include
community representatives, various layers of public administrations, specific non-
governmental organizations, public associations, and international associations.  
According to Armitage et al. (2007), centralized top-down management is ill-suited
for managing complex environmental problems in any sustainable way, because it creates
public resistance, cannot deal effectively with changing conditions—including values and
priorities—and may not have access to important pools of knowledge.  Collaboration
encourages governance synergies, effective redundancies, and increased information
networks (Olsson et al., 2003; Kettl, 2000; Agranoff & McGuire, 1999).  Berkes (2000c)
argues that co-management can have many objectives.  It can be a form of self-defense
against the centralized power, an effective response to complexity, an efficient means for
problem solving, a sign of respect and equity to build trust, a mechanism for negotiations,
and a needed social institution.  Lastly, scholars—for instance, Armitage et al. (2007) and
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Lyall and Tait (2004)—categorize project collaboration based on whether it is carried out
through institutional arrangements that may be ‘vertical’ or ‘horizontal'.  
Vertical Collaboration: By-Passing Hierarchies
Vertical collaboration means voluntarily bypassing legitimate hierarchal power to
favor a more collaborative approach.  It depends mainly on the ability to communicate
effectively across various levels of institutional structures, for example, among different
levels of government or between the community and the project manager.  Horizontal
collaboration means the partnering of organizations that are independent of each other,
thus, have no official control of each other.
In the case of vertical intergovernmental collaboration, coherent partnerships assist in
developing more stability especially within volatile political contexts (Kingdon, 2003). 
Harmonious interactions among local, regional, national, and international public
administrations instill public confidence, because they balance developmental and safety
needs of affected populations (NEA, 2007).  Intergovernmental collaboration can clarify
legal jurisdictions and the sharing of power irrespective of those jurisdictions (Fennell et
al., 2008; Yoo and Koester, 2004; Holland et al., 1996).  Supporting flexible multilevel
governance through adaptive co-management increases the likelihood of project success
over the long term (Hahn et al., 2008).  Creating coordinating mechanisms can help to
bridge fragmented authorities that might diminish conflicts, for instance,
intergovernmental task forces (Yaffee, 1997).
Other scholars and managers, however, indicate that vertical collaboration is not
necessarily a panacea.  For instance, informal redistribution of powers between levels of
82
governments can lead to a loss of policy coherence, over-regulation, and too much
duplication and redundancy (NEA, 2009a).  As another example, Lyall and Tait (2004)
caution that there is some legitimate resistance to vertical collaboration as always
desirable, because there may be major consequences when things go wrong, for instance,
general deterioration of intergovernmental relations possibly ending up in litigation. 
 Therefore, successful intergovernmental collaboration occurs when there are clear
needs, processes, and goals, for example, a clear need to collaborate, a clear intention to
pay attention to all concerns, and a clear willingness to make changes for a win-win
solution, a compromise, or a consensus (AGO, 2000).  In many instances, vertical
collaboration with informal delegation of responsibilities may often be a better approach
for complex systems.  In the end though, the party that possesses overarching authority
may render any decision at any time. 
A special form of vertical collaboration among intergovernmental levels is
federalism.  Federalism is adopted in countries where there are clear and distinct regional
cultural differences within the country (Anderson, 2007).  To maintain some national
unity among these regions, federalist states formally share jurisdiction and power that are
described in the national constitution mostly between the central and regional
governments.  Although in some instances, powers are also given to local governments,
classically confrontational of federalism is direct consideration of this third party (Herzik,
1992).  Schultz (1979) argues that these government levels are theoretically separate, but,
in practice, an attempt is made to coordinate activities and reach understandings.
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 Since the Second World War, this view of federalism in many federal states has been
transformed (Schutlz, 1979).  Although the division of prescribed powers is still of great
relevance (particularly when they are challenged), there is increasingly more informal
sharing of powers and responsibilities.  As reported by Schultz (1979), Pierre E. Trudeau,
a former Prime Minister of Canada, argues that regions and the central government “must
not stand apart; they must work together and know each other’s problems and intentions
in order to make the practical decisions and choices required within their own
jurisdictions” (p.23).  However, this is easier said than done.  Schultz (1979) posits that
mere coordination of the diverse, often conflicting, goals and programs of constitutionally
independent, but practically interdependent, governments is an ongoing problem in many
federal systems.  
 Holland et al. (1996) highlight that where environment jurisdiction is shared among
levels of governments in a federation, collaboration is almost a necessity among various
layers of governments.  Nevertheless, maneuvering within this shared jurisdiction,
however, can often be strategic.  For example, Holland et al. (1996) report that in the
United States, states prefer applying a stalling strategy rather than opting to outright
refuse a federal policy, because there is a good chance that the federal policy will change
in the near term through other forces.  On the flip side, the U.S. Congress’s lack of
intervention may force states to take some action.  It is this type of dialectic interaction
that leads to adjustments in policy expectations and outcomes (Hill & Weissert, 1995).  In
many federalist states, federalism has been useful in promoting the environmental agenda,
84
because project managers have been able to make use of multiple governmental access
points (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008; Joppke, 1993).
Of the 23 countries selected for the study, seven are now considered federal states. 
They are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the United States, Belgium, Russia, and South
Africa.  The other 16 countries are considered to be ‘unitary’ states.  Anderson (2007)
argues that federalism frequently complicates the development and implementation of
national policies.  Time and resources are required to develop sustainable policies,
therefore, I expect that formal project collaboration may be more difficult in the federal
states of the study's 23 countries. 
Horizontal Collaboration: Partnering among Organizations
Establishing horizontal institutional arrangements for collaboration means that no
party has authority over another and the organizations are not nested within each other as
in vertical collaboration.  Horizontal collaboration can involve like-minded organizations. 
It can also involve other organizations with less harmonious relationships which choose
to partner under certain circumstances; in this case, the challenge is to compose with
different individual worldviews to arrive at some sort of understanding or agreement. 
Since no party on its own can render a decision, the goal of consensus or compromise
may be difficult to reach.  Because of this, Lyall and Tait (2004) argue that horizontal
collaboration is more difficult to achieve than vertical collaboration because no one party
has more power over another party.  This is still arguable since, as we have seen, other
scholars report that vertical collaboration presents is own challenges.
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Not used efficiently in the past, horizontal collaborations are increasing. 
Collaborations among like-minded organizations include collaboration among NGOs,
among municipalities, and among native organizations.  Gulbrandsen and Andresen
(2004) distinguish between associations of activists NGOs and advisory NGOs.  With
increasing globalization, information sharing has become easier, more rapid and less
expensive for both of these types of NGOs (Seo et al., 2009).  When NGOs decide not
compete among themselves and instead decide to collaborate, they may take fuller
advantage of the media to attain their common goals (Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004).  
Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004), however, argue that this accumulation of
knowledge does not necessarily culminate in influence over the decision-making system. 
Apart from providing knowledge and expertise, advisory NGOs are relying on forming
strategic alliances with key 'insider' actors.  They can influence decisions as long as they
maintain good relationships with these insider actors.  Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004)
argue that advisory NGOs typically have policy solutions that are acceptable to
governments or closer to governments’ own solutions.  Activist NGOs, on the other hand,
typically pursue more radical and far reaching solutions while expanding much energy
and gaining little political clout.  Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004) conclude that
intellectual capacity of the advisory NGOs is more important than the expression of
activist NGOs in influencing decision-makers.  In addition, these scholars recommend
that associations of activist NGOs need further ’insider’ capacity to foster ways to work
closely and collaboratively with key decision-makers.  
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Another aspect of horizontal collaboration among NGOs, advisory or activist, is the
promotion of universal norms, because information and actions are often no longer
restricted by sovereign sanctity, and because some NGOs have the necessary resources,
power, and credibility to carry out global actions (Bach & Stark, 2004).  Examples
highlighted by Bach and Stark (2004) include the success of Doctors Without Borders
and the Campaign to Ban Land Mines.  Associations of business NGOs supporting
sustainable development—for instance, the International Chamber of Commerce and the
World Business Council on Sustainable Development—may also enter into useful
collaborations.  Horizontal collaboration can also occur among like-minded industry
organizations, particularly in industry sectors that can have global impacts.  
 Within the nuclear sector, one can encounter national organizations—for instance,
the Nuclear Energy Institute in the United States and the Canadian Nuclear
Association—as well as international organization—for instance, the World Association
of Nuclear Operations, the CANDU Owners Group, the International Nuclear Power
Organization, the International Association for the Environmentally Safe Disposal of
Radioactive Materials, and the World Nuclear Association.  
A form of horizontal collaboration that is increasing is the forming of municipality
federations (Chenier, 2009).  Municipal federations were not very active in the past,
because issues tended to be community-specific as related to regional development. 
Moreover, the allocation of often limited budgetary resources to such collaborations was
not popular with local politicians, including mayors.  Rather than collaboration,
competition among municipalities was the norm.  Particularly in view of globalization
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forces, although they are still challenging to run, associations of municipalities can be
effective means to highlight community views, including on issues of self-governance
and fiscal transfers from upper governments (Chenier, 2009).  Association of
municipalities can now be found in developing countries as well as developed countries 
(Keese & Argudo, 2006).  
Lastly, there can be horizontal collaboration among all types of non-governmental
groups with municipalities, particularly in developing countries (Keese & Ardugo, 2006). 
Some NGOs have accumulated considerable experience of working locally.  As such,
they can help municipalities with planning and capacity building through funding,
training and lobbying the central government.  Keese and Ardugo (2006) argue that
municipalities offer NGOs the legitimacy and local accountability they may lack, and the
means both to extend project activities beyond isolated communities and to maintain
results once the NGO assistance ends. 
 Before the 1990s, NGOs efforts were focused on capital-intensive projects, but since
then there have been increasing efforts placed on human development work.  However,
according to Keese and Ardugo (2006), the biggest challenge remains sustainability.  So
NGOs in cooperation with municipalities are expanding their projects to broader temporal
and spatial scales.  For example, more NGO projects include mechanisms to monitor
completed projects over the long term.  And many NGOs are increasingly directly
interacting with regional governments, as opposed to only interacting with local
governments.  Indeed, in recent years, scholars and other experts have argued that
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regional governments, sometimes even more so than local governments, hold the key to
sustainable development (Keese & Argudo, 2006; NEA, 2009).
Collaboration for Complexity
Within the context of complex systems and adaptive management, Wollenberg et al. 
(2007) argue that the emergent, spontaneous order of cooperation cannot be guided by a
single organization or hierarchal entity.  Instead, people pursue their own ends by
mutually adjusting to each other to form cooperative structures across the boundaries of
their usual activities.  Complexity theory indicates that spontaneous orders tend to be
dissipative structures that require great effort to retain their structure and relatively little
to change it.  Hence, scholars have suggested tactics for facilitating spontaneous order of
cooperation and maintaining it (Wollenberg et al., 2007).  These tactics include:
maintaining continuous physical presence; encouraging regular contact with people who
advise and are close to major decision-makers; maintaining of multiple, small programs
to fit the needs of different interests groups; and, incorporating flexible processes for
resource allocation and time management.  
Collaboration emerging from a strategy of 'muddling through', as opposed to more
restrictive frameworks, may allow for overall flexibility to encourage cooperation
(Wollenburg et al., 2007).  According to Wollenburg et al. (2007), this strategy is only
effective in unstable times where transparency and credibility are lacking.  If
collaboration is desirable in more stable times, these scholars suggest developing a
strategy based on more formal collaboration with set boundaries and on more intensively
sharing information.  With these scholarly views in mind, we can look at the few, recent, 
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landmark, formal agreements between communities, governments, and waste managers
on the siting of radioactive waste facilities.  Two notable ones are highlighted here: one is
in Canada, more specifically associated with the siting of a low level waste disposal
facility in the town of Port Hope in the province of Ontario; the other is in Finland,
associated with the siting of a deep geological permanent nuclear waste repository near
the town of Eurajoki.  In both cases, the formal agreements have recently encountered
some local challenges (NEA, 2008b), suggesting that the sustainability of these
agreements arguable. It may be that the development of such agreements are always held
initially within an unstable context where transparency and credibility are lacking.  In this
instance, it may have been a better strategy to muddle through for another couple of years
allowing greater flexibility to enhance transparency and credibility before proceeding to
more formal agreements as Wollenburg et al. (2007) suggest.
6) Emergency Preparedness
After reviewing the national reports submitted under the Joint Convention, it became
clear that an important adaptive capacity for nuclear waste managers is emergency
preparedness.  This capacity is a natural extension of the safety culture among nuclear
energy and waste managers that intensified after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 through
various means, including the adoption of a new international convention on nuclear safety
(IAEA, 1994).  Therefore I opted to add this adaptive capacity for present purposes,
because demonstrating that nuclear managers can respond effectively to emergencies can
contribute to sustainable development.  
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According to Pearson and Clair (1998), emergency preparedness has long been
considered an essential capacity in sectors where significant low probability accidents
with high impacts can occur.  These scholars evaluate the success of emergency responses
by examining two main components, namely, ad hoc and planned responses.  Within the
study of emergency responses, they suggest considering the following factors: signal
detection, incident containment, business resumption, effects on learning and on
reputation, resource availability, and decision-making processes.  The literature review,
however, indicates that after the failed emergency response to deal with the aftermath of
the passing of the Katrina Hurricane over New Orleans in 2005, managers needed to
rethink their approach of studying emergency 'response' and focus more on the interaction
between emergency 'preparedness' and 'response' (Farazmand, 2007). 
 Weick (1988) had already viewed emergency preparedness and response as forming a
complex system with many components tightly but unpredictably interacting with each
other.  As such, he argues that emergency response would be more effective through
building resilience for adaptative capacity within emergency preparedness programs. 
More recently, several scholars suggest that building adaptive capacity related to
emergency preparedness should be incorporated wherever potential crises are a low-
probability but with high impact (Somers, 2009; Weng, 2009; Coles and Duffy, 2004). 
Farazmand (2007) recommends building emergency preparedness grounded in a theory of
‘surprise management’ (or complexity theory) that is adaptive, collaborative, and citizen
(or client) engaging.  Somers (2009) reports that the ‘disaster’ literature suggests six
factors that managers could focus on within emergency preparedness programs that would
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positively affect organizational resilience.  These factors are: 1) the perception of
potential risks by managers; 2) the extent to which management seeks information about
risks; 3) the flexibility of organization structures; 4) the extent of participation in
community planning activities; 5) the level of compliance with continuity of operations
planning during unstable times; and 6) the extent of skills within the organization.  
Since surprises are inevitable, Somers (2009) suggests that rather than planning and
preparing for different types of events individually, an ‘all-hazards’ planning approach is
recommended  He suggests focusing on goal-directed seeking solutions, risk avoidance,
critical situation understanding, ability of team members to fulfill multiple roles, degree
of reliance on information sources, and access to resources.  He concludes that good crisis
planning is appropriate attention given to developing planning methods that create
processes and organizational structures that build latent resilience so that positive
adaptive behavior is likely under stress.  
Before the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005,  emergency preparedness
activities included learning from previous crises, training people to match specific
response to specific scenarios, and testing contingency plans as recommended by scholars
(Coutu, 2002).  After Katrina, however, scholars indicate that such activities are not
enough and call for emergency preparedness programs that are grounded in complexity
(Weng, 2009; Duffy, 2008; Farazmand, 2008).  As such, emergency preparedness should
continuously build general capacities for resilience.  In this vein, scholars recommend that
project managers increase the following two general abilities: 1) ability to learn about the
resilience of their organization; and 2) ability for surveillance and sense-making, the latter
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meaning the ability to improvise during a crisis through general experience and expertise 
(Weng, 2009; Weick 1988).  Although surveillance and sense-making was proposed by
Weick in 1988, building this capacity is often overlooked (McConnell & Drennan, 2006).
Wise (2006) argues that crises must be well managed so that interventions do not
inadvertently aggravate the current situation.  Adaptive management can provide a
framework integrating efforts for both emergency preparedness and response.  We have
already seen how adaptative management can be used for preparedness.  Wise (2006) as
well as Weick (1988) suggest that adaptive management for emergency response include
three rational processes: 1) risk assessment and management; 2) information feedback to
decision-makers; and, 3) adjustments of performance based on current information.
Weick (1988) argues that the basis for taking action during emergency response is
based on three dimensions: 1) 'commitment', that is, the justification to implement certain
emergency measures is clear and reasonable; 2) 'capacity', that is, there are sufficient
means and skills to manage the crisis; and, 3) 'expectations', that is, the assumptions on
the problem are sound and there is some evidence of the effectiveness of proposed
solutions.  The process leading to taking such actions, Weick (1988) calls ‘sense-
making’.  The three dimensions of sense-making can affect not only the response to a
crisis, but also to its aggravation.  To ensure that sense-making lead to effective responses
to crises, Weick (1988) recommends reducing tight couplings between complex system
components.  More practically, he recommends managing crises to lower levels of
intensity, increasing learning on the ways in which small interventions can lead to
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amplification of the problem, and being more aware of  'interests' that may bias
diagnoses.
Lastly, scholars recognise that emergency preparedness, including surprise
management, can be resource intensive with no guarantee that the preparedness will
ultimately be effective during times of crisis.  As such, extraordinary leadership is called
for strong advocacy in the face of passive resistance against resource allocation to
emergency preparedness programs for events of low probability but with high impacts in
the far future (Laporte, 2007; McConnell & Drennan, 2006).  In addition, and particularly
in the absence of such leadership, the window of opportunity open during a crisis should
be fully taken advantage of for ensuring that adequate resources are allocated to
emergency preparedness in more stable times (McConnell & Drennan, 2006). 
Conclusion: Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities and System Development Metaphors
 To be sure, the six stakeholder adaptive capacities described in this chapter are not
mutually exclusive, and they are not independent of each other.  For example, learning
can be part of public participation and emergency preparedness; governance can be
carried out solely by governments or collaboratively with other public stakeholders; and it
is likely that public participation, manager social responsibility, and formal project
collaboration will in many instances overlap.  Smit and Wandel (2006) report that such
overlap is generally the case within studies comparing social variables.  
If we go back to our description of the three system motor (driver) metaphors, we
could attempt to characterize each of the six stakeholder adaptive capacities.  The
Learning by Managers and Emergency Preparedness adaptive capacities would fall under
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the Resilience Theory metaphor where learning is the main motor.  The Government
Oversight adaptive capacity falls under the Punctuated Equilibrium metaphor where 
control is the main motor  The remaining three adaptive capacities—namely, public
participation, formal project collaboration, and manager social responsibility—would fall
under the Community Ecology metaphor, because these three adaptive capacities all
involve networking, the main motor of the metaphor.  
To note, Smith and Wandel (2006) explain that the relative influence of adaptive
capacities is likely not static: it may vary in space and over time.  For example, different
countries, regions, or even localities may place different importance on, say, public
participation in view of changing political regimes or cultural shifts, and thus may change
over time.  It is therefore important when examining adaptive capacities within any given
system to consider any variations over time or with other similar systems.
In this section, I provided an overview of the theoretical background to system
development mainly grounded in complexity principles.  Building on this theoretical
background, scholars have attempted to study the management of complex social-
environmental systems. This is the topic of the next section. 
2.3 Management of Complex Social-Environmental Systems
First and foremost, the management of complex social-environmental systems
requires identifying uncertainties, reducing them to the extent feasible, and coping with
remaining irreducible uncertainties.  To do so, conventional management approaches
based on control were often applied in the past.  In view of inefficiencies encountered
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using these approaches, new forms of management, such as adaptive management, were
developed that relied less on control and more on adaptive capacities.  This section
expands on these management approaches and ends with the current state of adaptive
management application.
2.3.1 Identifying, Reducing, and Coping with Uncertainty
Uncertainty is pervasive in many complex environmental decisions, and there is a
large literature on identifying, reducing, and , to a lesser extent, coping with uncertainty. 
This section explores the literature that covers different types and sources of uncertainty. 
It also covers the literatures that evaluate how uncertainty can be reduced, and what are
some options for coping with irreducible uncertainty.
Walker et al. (2003) observe that a universally generic typology of uncertainty
dimensions does not exist.  These scholars observe that several typologies have been
created, notably those of Funtowick and Ravetz, Van Asselt and Rotmans, Beck, Morgan
and Henrion, Rowe, Shrader-Frechette, Davis, and Hillestad.  In an attempt to create a
universally accepted typology, Walker et al. (2003) distinguish three dimensions of
uncertainty:  the location, the level, and the nature of uncertainties.  Of the three, the third
dimension, namely the nature of uncertainty, is of particular interest to the management
of complex systems.
Walker et al. (2003) propose that the nature of uncertainty be defined by two types of
origin: 1) the imperfection of our knowledge, or 'epistemic' uncertainty; and, 2) the
inherent variability of the phenomena being described, or 'ontological' uncertainty.  The
former type is reducible through additional investigation and research, modeling, and data
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gathering.  The latter type may be irreducible, because of the inherent complexity of
nature, technological development, human behavior, and social, economic and cultural
dynamics.  Walker et al. (2003) caution that it is difficult to identify what is reducible
through investigation and research, and what is irreducible because of an inherent
property of the phenomena under study.  Despite these difficulties, they recommend that
such an assessment be attempted to enlighten decision-making.
Gunderson (2002) argues that command-and-control system management is
consistent with reductionist science that focuses on parts of a system and aims to reduce
uncertainties.  However, after uncertainty analyses are completed and measures taken to
reduce uncertainties, large irreducible uncertainties may remain.  Therefore, beyond
reducing uncertainties, managers need to cope with irreducible uncertainties and develop
ways to consider inevitable surprises (or emerging order).  Surprises are considered
inevitable over the long term as complexity theory would indicate (Doak et al., 2008;
Gunderson, 2002; Gomory, 1995).  
Doak et al. (2008) stress that even the consideration of surprises entails some form of
preplanning.  Bier et al. (1999) suggest that some irreducible uncertainties may not lead
to significant impacts and thus are not worth managers spending much effort to prepare
for potential occurrences.  But some irreducible uncertainties may hide significant
impacts.  Faced with the the latter instance, managers have two options, as argued by Lee
(1993): 1) rethinking the entire project or even cancel it; or 2) proceed with the project
with the proviso that they will cope with irreducible uncertainties by preparing for
inevitable surprises through proactively building broad adaptive capacities. 
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Considering the many sources of uncertainty and limited resources, Anderies et al. 
(2007) argue that ultimately the manager, or even society, will need to balance efforts to
either reduce or cope with uncertainties.  Managers or society will decide which
uncertainties they will spend effort to reduce, and which uncertainties they can live with,
or be vulnerable to, while at the same time establishing coping measures in the event of
future negative impacts.
2.3.2 Conventional Management Approaches
To address both reducible and irreducible uncertainties and to harness, accommodate,
contain, overcome, or embrace the complexity of social-environmental systems, managers
have applied various forms of management to varying degrees of success.  These forms
include deterministic and probabilistic management (possibly including comparative risk
assessments or multi-criteria decision analyses), no-regrets management, systems
dynamic modeling (Vos et al., 2007), and 'just plain muddling through' (Lindblom, 1979). 
According to Charles (2007) and Christensen et al. (1989), managers and researchers
alike continue to strive to find better ways to manage complex systems.  Heijden (2005),
a leading scholar specializing in planning scenarios, states that “generally, managers do
not accept that all organizational behavior is emergent, they tend to believe in investing
energy in trying to make the organization more skillful in reacting to environmental
input” (p.343). 
Vos et al. (2007) group management approaches based on three contextual
conditions: 1) degree of ambivalence on reaching and maintaining sustainability as a goal;
2) the degree of uncertainty of knowledge; and, 3) the degree of centralization of
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stakeholder power.  Solving some contemporary complex environmental problems
involves many challenges.  These challenges include ambivalence on how to reach and
maintain the goal of sustainability, large reducible and irreducible uncertainties, and
multiple stakeholders each exercising some power or influence, that is, ‘governance’
[defined by Armitage et al. (2007) as the consideration of all public and private
interactions taken to generate social opportunities and address social challenges].  When
such challenges are present, Vos et al. (2007) suggest using ‘adaptive management’.
2.3.3 Adaptive Management using Key System Drivers
The concept of adaptive management within the field of environmental management
grew out of ecological impact assessments of forests and fisheries in northwest Canada
carried out in the 1970s by the biologist C.S. Holling and his colleagues (Holling, 1978). 
This group eventually included more North American and European scholars calling
themselves the Resilience Alliance.  These scholars worked to further develop the
concept through theoretical metaphors and empirically grounded narratives (Gunderson
and Holling, 2002).  
Some researchers define adaptive management as management that considers both
natural and social information to shape policy decisions that are continuously reexamined
and refined in light of experience.  This experience may be acquired pro-actively through
experimentation (i.e., ‘active’ adaptive management), or re-actively through observation
(i.e., ‘passive’ adaptive management) (Howarth, 2007).  Other researchers pushed further
the concept of adaptive management by grounding it in complexity principles (e.g.,
Levin, 2005, 2002, 1999, 1998; Heijden, 2005; Solé & Levin, 2002; Holling, 2001; Kay
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et al., 1999; Heylighen, 1999; Stacey, 1995; Schneider & Kay, 1994; Mosekilde et al.,
1988).  
These researchers and others first examine the nature of change affecting the
development of complex systems.  As we have seen, changes can be small and
incremental, large and abrupt, intentional or unintended, random, evolutionary, 
revolutionary, or transformative.  The management of responses to change considers that
complexity science postulates that complex systems exhibit chaotic patterns of evolution. 
We have seen that such evolution is highly dependent on initial conditions, and faced
with subsequent changes, complex systems are ‘adaptive’ or ‘self-organizing’ at points of
optimum complexity (or at ‘edge of chaos’).  
Following the lead of these researchers, notably Levin, the study adopts a
comprehensive definition of adaptive management grounded in complexity principles as
follows. 
‘Adaptive management’ is management that considers environmental problems as
complex open systems and, as a consequence, provides for a two-pronged strategy
for environmental management.  This strategy calls for reducing uncertainties by
making adjustments in the light of new information, while at the same time,
addressing irreducible uncertainties by preparing for surprises through building
and maintaining broad adaptive capacities.
Managers implement their adaptive management program in parallel to project
progress, making adjustments as indicated by the program results (Lee, 1993).  Through
proceeding in a phased and transparent manner, managers can enable the public to
participate effectively throughout decision-making processes on those adjustments. 
Therefore, adaptive management focuses less on controlling ultimate outcomes and more
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on establishing an ongoing process for managing change.  As such, Sharma and Norton
(2005) claim that environmental adaptive management can be both an analytical and a
decision-making tool for ongoing public debate.
2.3.4 Strategic Framework for Adaptive Management
Although many scholars and experts consider adaptive management as a promising
tool to help deal with complex environmental problems, they caution that the application
of this management approach is not necessarily a panacea (e.g., Higgins & Duane, 2008;
Charles, 2007; Linkov et al., 2006; Mog, 2006, 2004; Schreiber et al., 2004; Harrison,
2003; USGAO, 1994).  Notably, they report difficulties due to the lack of a strategic
adaptive management framework.  They specify that many adaptive management
programs are implemented ad hoc, because they often encounter site specific difficulties,
or because their application is not comprehensive.  Jackson (2005) groups these
challenges into three categories: logistical (e.g., lack of financial or human resources),
informational (e.g., lack of a capacity to learn at all relevant temporal and spatial scales),
and institutional challenges (e.g., difficulty in verifying regulatory compliance).  Gregory
et al. (2006) report that, as a result of these challenges, successful adaptive management
applications remain rare.  
To meet these challenges, Sterman (2001) states that the mere existence of an
adaptive management program may sometimes be sufficient.  The demonstration of such
a program may in itself offset any ongoing policy resistance by some stakeholders.  For
that reason alone, Lee (1993) suggests that some managers and politicians may accept the
challenges of adaptive management.  Notwithstanding this optimism on the adoption of
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adaptive management, a comprehensive strategic adaptive management framework is
more likely to overcome many logistical, informational, and institutional challenges.  
Charles (2007) and Ludwig (2001) position such strategic management frameworks
between two extreme approaches: at one extreme, strictly controlling complex systems
based on the illusion of certainty and, at the other extreme, not managing them at all
either because of the unpredictability of human interventions or because of trust in ‘the
invisible hand’.  Some middle ground is desirable.  The literature described in this chapter
suggests that identifying key system drivers (e.g., adaptive capacities) of  complex
systems could assist managers in developing a sound, comprehensive, strategic adaptive
management framework.  The study focuses on identifying key system drivers, but, in
Chapter 8, I extend the results to suggest a strategic framework for adaptive management
assembled from theoretical components found in the literature.
Conclusion of Literature Review
In this chapter, the literature review was addressed in three parts.  In the first part, I
describe how many scholars perceive many contemporary environmental problems as
social-environmental systems.  Those that are particularly intractable have been
characterized as ‘complex’ social-environmental systems.  We have seen that this
characterization is grounded in the principles of complexity science.  In the second part, I
describe how scholars have attempted to develop system development theories,
considering that such development is likely not completely random.  If not completely
random, then theories have been formulated describing possible patterns (linear, periodic
or chaotic), driving forces for social subsystems (learning, controlling and networking),
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and key factors or drivers of development (external or internal, the latter including
stakeholder adaptive capacities). 
 In the third part, given historic (i.e., mechanistic) and more recent (i.e., organic)
theories of system development, I outline various approaches that scholars and managers
have suggested or applied for managing environmental problems.  These approaches were
developed according to existing worldviews that affected the identification and reduction
of uncertainties of human interventions in nature.  Conventional approaches were
developed with some illusion of certainty while adaptive management recognizes that
some uncertainties are irreducible and need to be addressed by building and maintaining
system adaptive capacity.
 Although a promising approach, adaptive management programs have performed
unevenly.  The reasons for their success or failure of adaptive management continue to be
the subject of increasing investigation.  The literature review indicated that this
investigation is mostly carried out through building narratives of one or a few single-case
studies grounded in qualitative conceptual or empirical information.  Noting this gap in
the literature, I explore whether quantitative information derived from qualitative
conceptual or empirical information could provide additional insight on complex social-
environmental system development.  The subject for this exploration is the influence of
stakeholder adaptive capacities for the management of complex environmental problems. 
In Chapter 3, I outline my questions and hypotheses in this regard and describe how I
have designed the research to evaluate these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Recap of the Literature Review, Questions, and Hypotheses
Recapping the Results of the Literature Review
We saw in Chapter 2 that some social-environmental problems are difficult to manage
over the long term, because they often do not respond predictably to human intervention. 
No obvious order in their development over time is easily identified, and therefore human
intervention responding to change becomes difficult.  Studies have been carried to
decipher whether the development of seemingly intractable social-environmental
problems is truly random, or whether there is some hidden order below the apparent noise
of possible confounding factors or combination of key system drivers.
Several scholars argue for some hidden developmental order without necessarily
implying a teleological goal as an endpoint of the system.  In Chapter 2, I reported that
some scholars suppose a development characterized by sequential phases of development. 
Many researchers, however, are skeptical that such a neat unfolding characterizes system
development.  Instead, Kingdon (2003) and other policy scholars report policy systems
that appear to develop similarly to classic gradual natural selection as well as to the more
recent natural evolutionary theory of Punctuated Equilibrium.  And yet other authors, not
satisfied with these two evolutionary explanations, have theorized that systems develop
through evolution following complexity principles.  Although there may be various
theories of evolution, most scholars seem to agree that system development does not
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appear to be totally random.  And Kingdon (2003), among other researchers, suggests that
different evolutionary models can be applied to different parts, phases, or periods of
system development.
If systems do not develop randomly, can we picture the pattern of any order?  As we
saw in Chapter 2, some scholars suppose the presence of various patterns of system
development.  Patterns can appear to be either linear, periodic, or ‘complex’.  Scholars
have concluded that understanding these patterns and underlying driving factors is likely
to be useful for gaining insight into system development and therefore, possible system
management, more specifically here, the development of complex social-environmental
systems and adaptive management.  
Questions and Hypotheses
When setting out to study system development patterns, the general premise is to
suppose that the development of these systems is not totally random.  Many researchers
postulate that some systems, whether natural and/or social, follow specific patterns of
development as opposed to random chance development (Miller & Page, 2007;
Bosselman, 2002; Holling & Gunderson, 2002; Cheng & Ven, 1996).  These patterns—
namely, linear, periodic or chaotic—are characterized further here.
1) Linear Patterns: These patterns can be unidirectional, reversible, continuous or
discontinuous.  The development of systems characterized by these patterns is internally
fixed, and such systems do not respond quickly to exogenous changes unless these
changes are dramatic.  Therefore, the systems are not likely to be resilient in times of
major turbulent changes.  Care should be taken to ensure that any finding of linear
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development is not part of a larger nonlinear pattern.  Pettigrew (1990) cautions that “the
analyst of change has to recognise that activities at some level of context may be more
visible and rapid than at other levels, and thus, in the short-term, sources of change may
seem unidirectional, while in the longer term, a multidirectional [or nonlinear] pattern
may appear” (p.270). 
2) Periodic Patterns: These patterns of system development reflect nonlinear fixed or
non-fixed cycles, waves, or figure-eight loops.  Systems that exhibit such patterns of
inbuilt periodicity respond to both endogenous and exogenous changes.  The
development of such systems is likely to be resilient (to a point) in times of turbulent
changes.  Shifts within cycles occur when regime change occurs or when some recurring
threshold is surpassed (Brock et al., 2008).  While periodic patterns are nonlinear, they
are not considered to be ‘chaotic’.
3) Chaotic/Strange/Irregular Patterns: These patterns are nonlinear and random in
appearance. Yet scholars have detected the presence of a ‘strange attractor’, a sort of self-
organizing central force that can explain the shape of the observed patterns (the 'attractor'
of a linear pattern is a moving point directional point; the 'attractor' for a periodic pattern
is a central point).  These analyses have occurred in the biological, physical, chemical and
computer disciplines.  At the larger scales of social sciences—where variables are less
discrete, and available data points often less numerous—it is generally not feasible to
determine the exact pattern of a strange attractor.  Scholars, however, have argued that a
combination of a small number of factors (variables) may converge to drive the whole
system.  Such system developmental behavior may emerge at what is sometimes called
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‘the edge of chaos’ (Cheng and Ven, 1996).  The behavior of systems at this edge is said
to be ‘complex’.  The development of a system that exhibits chaotic patterns is more
stable than completely random systems.  Predictions may be carried out for the short term
but not likely for the long term.  For some studies, simple detection of possible chaotic
patterns is sufficient for management purposes as opposed to determining the exact
pattern of any strange attractor.
The above three broad patterns of development are not necessarily exclusive to one
system.  System development may consist of different broad patterns either over time, or
at the same time.  For example, Christensen and his colleagues (1989), after studying the
aftermath of fires in Yellowstone Park, concluded that ecological patterns are neither
perfectly cyclical nor perfectly linear and are affected by seemingly chance events (the
patterns may have been chaotic, but the scholars did not go as far as to make such a
conclusion).  Indeed, some scholars argue that chaotic patterns may sometimes be the
results of the simultaneous presence of periodic and linear patterns (Chen, 1988).
Whether developmental events are truly and completely random or are
deterministically chaotic is the subject of research on complex patterns of system
development, whether in natural, social, or artificial systems.  The goal of such research is
often to make system forecasts or predictions, because some scholars argue that trying to
decipher system complex patterns may help to predict global system behavior over time,
at least over the short term (e.g., Bosselman, 2002; Christensen et al., 1989).  While
evaluating the predictive capability of research results on future system behavior is
certainly of interest in many disciplines, the study only focuses on past system behavior.
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Given this goal of studying past system behavior, the task then becomes how to detect
broad patterns of system development over time and how to identify possible underlying
key system drivers.  The literature review indicates that, to date, many scholars have
explored these questions through qualitative analysis of histories or single-case narratives
of the development of social-environmental systems over a set time.  Though highly
useful as a first step, in view of some pitfalls of qualitative analysis raised in Chapter 2,
quantitative analyses are likely to open more robust lines of inquiry on the two-folded
question: 1) how to quantitatively detect chaotic patterns of system development; and 2)
how to quantitatively identify key system drivers underlying chaotic patterns, as
complexity theory postulates.  To address this two-folded question, I formulate two
hypotheses, of which the first one follows.
H1 The development of certain social-environmental systems exhibit chaotic patterns
of development (in this case, the systems are called 'complex').
To evaluate this hypothesis, I want to be able to distinguish among the three main
non-random patterns of system development raised in the interdisciplinary literature
outlined in Chapter 2, that is, linear, periodic, and chaotic system development.  Such
patterns are mostly qualitatively assessed in literatures referring to the social-
environmental systems.  However, the business studies and physical science literatures
refer to the use of Time Series Analysis to study general and broad system past and
potential future development of systems (Chatfield, 2004).
As the literature review indicated, scholars have used qualitative time analysis
through various means, for example, assessment of archival documents and surveys.  In
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this vein, as a more specific example, Barthes (2009, 2006) took the experimental and
qualitative approach to time series analysis.  He assumes that noted oscillations in time
represent to-and-fro punctuations between technical and political problematisation on
issues characterized by strong scientific uncertainty.  Barthes (2009, 2006), while
examining the historical development of nuclear waste management policies in France,
postulates that nuclear waste management policies develop on technical grounds and after
a period, technological lock-in develops.  This lock-in is eventually “reversed” through
public opposition resulting in politization of the issue culminating in policy change [not
as an extension of the issue, but as a reduction of the issue to its social dimension,
similarly to the Kasperson et al. (1992) concept of  ‘social amplification’.  Barthes (2009,
2006) suggests that once social conditions of the external environment become less
turbulent, then technically-driven development is revived.  
 Barthes’ (2009, 2006) goal was not necessarily to gain empirical evidence for the
presence of such an oscillation but to use this framework for greater insight into France’s
history on the development of nuclear waste management policies.  For this study, I do
not assume the same oscillation, instead, I explore whether histories are affected by
specific development patterns resulting from an interplay between key internal and
external factors, the focus being mainly on internal factors of adaptive capacities.  This,
as was in the case of Barthes (2009, 2006), is an experimental approach not to gain
empirical data to support a particular theory, but to gain greater insight into the
development of nuclear fuel waste management policies from a different perspective. 
While I take a similar experimental approach for the same purpose as Barthes (2006),  I
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differ from him by relying instead on quantifying time series analysis.  The time series
developed in this study consists of the yearly total number of country policies over several
decades; the range varies from the 1930s to 2008.  The method of time series analysis as
well as its specific application for this study will be covered later in this chapter (see
Section 3.4).
The other aspect of the two-folded question, which this study poses, refers to key
system drivers.  Complexity theory also postulates that a combination of only a few key
system factors explain chaotic patterns of system development.  I am therefore interested
in exploring and identifying what key factors could possibly influence the unfolding of
any broader patterns of system development.  If the relative influence of a few system
factors can be identified with some reasonable confidence, then a greater understanding
of the influence of key factors would not only provide greater insight into past system
development, but also might lead to improving management practices.  
I consider the definition of ‘factors’ based on their origin, that is, internal and external
to the system, as many scholars have.  For example, Barthes (2006) defines ‘external
factors’ as those originating outside of the nuclear sector and are exogenous to the history
of the nuclear issues themselves.  He reports that generally the focus of the study of
external factors is usually placed on contextual changes likely to explain the trajectory of
the subject issue.  Barthes (2006) defines ‘internal factors’ as those that can be managed
by the nuclear sector, that is, they are endogenous.  This distinction said, I opted to
approach the study by focusing on internal factors as opposed to external factors because
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they may be controlled to some extent by managers, private and public alike.  Hence the
second hypothesis for the study is as follows.
H2 The relative influence of factors, as key system drivers, underlying chaotic
developmental patterns of complex social-environmental systems, can be 
determined. 
To evaluate this hypothesis, as opposed to qualitative analysis, I apply multivariate
analyses using a selection of internal factors, or variables.  More specifically and
consistent with complexity theory, I examine those factors that involve building
capacities developed and maintained by managers to prepare for, and adapt to, unforseen
events over the long term.  To make this selection, it is necessary to select an endpoint or
overall management goal.  As an example, I selected the management goal of sustainable
development and selected six internal factors—that is, six stakeholder adaptive
capacities—that would likely have an impact on this goal.
As introduced in Chapter 2, the six selected stakeholder adaptive capacities are: 1)
learning by managers; 2) social responsibility of managers;  3) public participation in
decision-making; 4) government oversight; 5) formal project collaboration; and 6)
emergency preparedness.  Although other types of potential key system drivers may affect
developmental patterns, I examine only adaptive capacities since they are what makes
adaptive management unique compared to other management approaches.  The specific
application of multivariate analyses is described later in this chapter (see Section 3.5).
Interaction between the Two Hypotheses 
To recap, the two hypotheses for this study are as follows.
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H1 The development of certain social-environmental systems exhibits chaotic
patterns of development (in this case, these systems are called 'complex'); and,
H2 The relative influence of factors, as key system drivers, underlying chaotic
developmental patterns of complex social-environmental systems, can be
determined.
The first hypothesis pertains to the shape of any broad pattern of system development
over time.  The second hypothesis refers to possible underlying influence of key system
drivers within broad patterns of system development.  Thus, the second hypothesis is
nested within the first.  Evaluating the first hypothesis can be considered a macro-level
analysis while evaluating the second hypothesis is a micro-level analysis.  And while the
two levels are necessarily interrelated as complex theory postulates, their impact on each
other is often unclear in that it remains uncertain how exactly key system drivers
influence the general development of the whole system (Sterman, 2001; Leoncini, 1998).
3.2 General Research Approach: A Comparative Case Study
For the general evaluation of the two hypotheses, I opted to carry out comparative
research on the development of complex environmental problems in a number of
countries.  For comparative case research, scholars have made recommendations on an
optimal number of cases.  Eisenhardt (1999) suggests that 4 to 11 cases would be
manageable and insightful; Ragin (1987) recommends 6 to 10 cases; Lieberman (2005)
reports that it is rare to see quantitative analyses of fewer than 12 cases.  Pettigrew (1990)
argues for 4 to 6 cases if deep, rich, information will be gathered (over a three-year
period), but if the intention is only to collect and focus on comparable specific
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parameters, then he argues that the number of cases could be higher, particularly if
computerized tools are used.
Scholars, including system development scholars, have established conditions for
comparative case research.  After deciding to compare multiple cases, the following four
main conditions influence the selection of cases:
1) Each case is representative of the phenomenon under study;
2) All cases cover a sufficiently long enough period to include any potential
evolutionary processes (Poole et al., 2000);
3) Available information for each case is comparable (Pettigrew, 1990); and,
4) Cases area not only similar in general but also present distinguishing differences
(Yin, 2003).
For the study, I examine the social-environmental system of the development of
national nuclear waste management policies.  The basis for selecting this topic is
explained in the next two sections (Sections 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2).  
3.2.1 Selection of the General Topic: National Nuclear Waste Management Policies
In this section, I explain why the development of national nuclear waste management
policies was selected for a comparative case study.  First I provide an overview of the
literature review of studies carried out on radioactive and nuclear waste management
policies to highlight where the focus has been in the past.  Then I outline research design
conditions for comparative case study.  
Background on Radioactive or Nuclear Waste Management Policies
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In most countries, the ‘political problem’ of radioactive waste management arrived
relatively late in the development of national nuclear energy programs, and general issues
are similar in many countries (Berkhout, 1991; Blowers et al, 1991).  Nevertheless,
Parker et al. (1986) argue that the importance of issues and how they are resolved may
differ somewhat from country to country.  In general though, in the early days of nuclear
energy programs of most countries, radioactive waste management was not considered an
issue, at least not one that was urgent.  Rogers (2009) argues that after the first
commercial operations of nuclear power plants worldwide, the issue of radioactive waste
was still not a concern, because it was perceived to be a problem that did not require
immediate attention.  This mind-set delayed any real progress on developing a long-term
solution to cope with the increasing inventories of nuclear fuel waste.  According to
Rogers (2009), only when the waste started to accumulate did significant radioactive
waste research and application programs begin.  Then the issue of siting and building
radioactive waste facilities began to surface causing unexpected political concerns.  As a
result, scholars then focused on studies that could address these concerns or questions.
The literature review indicates that policy studies on nuclear or radioactive waste
management issues increased in frequency around the end of the 1980s and were carried
out by scholars mainly in countries with a major nuclear energy programs.  In the United
States, the increased frequency of these studies might be explained by the passing of the
1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act.  In 1987, an amendment to this act established the
operation of the Yucca Mountain Project in southern Nevada (the site that was to be the
national repository for U.S. civilian and military nuclear waste).  If not immediate, a
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further impetus for the development of nuclear waste policies was the 1986 Chernobyl
accident in the Ukraine.
Strandberg and Andren (2009) report that the lion’s share of the research on
radioactive waste policy extended across two lively foci: radiation risks and the siting of
radioactive waste management facilities.  At first, scholars focused on health radiation
risk perception and risk assessments policy determinants, including the NIMBY
syndrome (not-in-my-backyard) (e.g., Kraft, 2000; Barthes, 2000; Albrecht et al., 1996;
Hill & Weissert, 1995; Shrader-Frechette, 1996, 1994, 1993; Larsen, 1993; Slovic et al.,
1991; Slovic, 1987; Gervers, 1987).  With respect to risk assessment, Slovic (1987)
argues that “over recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear
technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic and long-lasting
damage to the earth.  The elusive and hard to manage qualities of today’s hazards have
forced the creation of a new intellectual discipline called risk assessment” (p.280).  
After the seminal American-based Politics of Nuclear Waste by Coldgazier (Ed.) in
1982, Strandberg and Andren (2009) claim that by the early 1990s, many scholars became
more interested in cross-national approaches concerning the general economic, juridical,
technical and political requirements for the management of nuclear waste.  In this vein,
Strandberg and Andren (2009) highlight two main academic publications: the English-
based International Politics of Nuclear Waste (Blowers et al., 1991) and Radioactive
Waste: Politics and Technology (Berkhout, 1991).  These publications were instrumental
in calling for more work on the social aspects of nuclear facilities if such facilities were to
be located successfully in the future.  These publications, however, are starting to be
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dated, because studies are currently being carried out that either provide more information
or actually contradict some of the conclusions made in these publications.  For instance,
both publications emphasize the importance of trust between local communities and
government/industry; newer studies put more emphasis on co-management recalling the
trust-but-verify edict.
With respect to the NIMBY syndrome, the literature review indicates that by the early
1990s, scholars were also interested in technical and social issues associated with the
siting of nuclear or radioactive facilities (Davy, 1997).  Notably, Kraft (1992) studies the
local and state resistance to the Yucca Mountain Project in the state of Nevada.  The 1982
Nuclear Waste Policy Act provided the legal framework for establishing a national
repository for military and civilian nuclear fuel waste.  Initially, the legislation required
investigating several locals across the United States, but an amendment to the legislation
in 1987 only targeted Yucca Mountain for future investigations.  Kraft (1992) argues that
the ensuing NIMBY syndrome in Nevada resulting from three main concerns: 1) the tight
deadline enshrined in legislation for submitting an application to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 2) the lack of waste management alternatives; and 3) the lack of credibility
of the proponent with the public, that is, the U.S. Department of Energy.  
More generally, around the same time, although waste management facilities could be
carried out in a functional, safe, and legal fashion, they were often obstructed by public
opposition (Davy, 1997).  It soon became obvious that siting exercises could eventually
lead to no site being found.  There was a particular concern with governmental decision-
making processes: first, the federal government would decide where a site would be
116
located; second, the government would announce its decision; and third, it would defend
its decision against mounting public criticism.  This is the decide-announce-defend
(DAD) approach and it was proving to be ineffective (Davy, 1997).   As a result, scholars
began investigating other ways to site controversial waste management facilities.
Davy (1997) reports that in the early 1990s, Kunreuther, Susskind, and Aarts
developed “The Facility Siting Credo” that focused on increasing transparency, public
participation, and facility host voluntarism.  Davy (1997) encourages building
cooperation and consensus, and paying more attention to social justice issues.  He
emphasizes that it remains crucial to find an acceptable site, because in the absence of
such a site, the probability of illegal actions increases.  Examples of illegal actions
include ‘midnight dumping’, ineffective storage, and illegal exports.  If even siting
exercises grounded in the Facility Siting Credo fail, some scholars then suggest—perhaps
with some frustration—that policy-makers could build a new town for the construction of
a radioactive waste management facility (like Los Alamos in New Mexico did for nuclear
weapons research) where the volunteer public would ensure the success of the facility
(Albrecht & Amey, 1999).
After siting studies based on radiation risks, ethical issues around the protection
future generations garnered more scholarly attention (Albrecht et al., 1996; Easterling &
Kunreuther, 1995; Shrader-Frechette, 1994 and 1993; Kasperson et al., 1992; Rabe,
1991).  Specific ethical issues that were studied included the idea of voluntarism, that is,
that a site would not be locate in a community that had not volunteered to host the waste
management facility (e.g., Hunold, 2002).  Other scholars focus on the ethics of
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protecting future generations (Shrader-Frechette, 2005).  The protection of future
generations was initially called for by the Bruntland Commission’s definition of
sustainable development published in 1987 under the auspices of the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and endorsed by numerous countries during the
adoption of the UNEP Rio Declaration in 1992.
By the late 1990s, risks other than risks to health and safety were being to be of more
interest to scholars.  For instance, Lidskog and Litmanen (1997) focused on the social
shaping of radioactive waste management policies in Sweden and Finland, and how they
affect the general culture in localities in these countries.  One issue that had seemingly
threatened local culture was the offer of compensation packages, less in Finland but more
so in Sweden.
In the 2000s, policy studies began positioning the risks from complex, often, global
environmental concerns.  For instance, Hadjillambrinos (2006) compared the risks of
radioactive waste to another long-term issue, climate change.  Such comparisons
appeared to have been revived with the advent of the so-called nuclear energy renaissance
in the mid-2000s (Shrader-Frechette, 2009), that is, after a period of worldwide inertia in
the 1990s caused by the Chernobyl accident.  
Currently, possibly in view of a nuclear energy renaissance, nuclear waste policy
research has tackled the issue of policy decisions for the back-end of the nuclear fuel
cycle (e.g., Rosenstein & Roy, 2009).  Academic and governmental organizations studies
are starting to focus their attention on nuclear fuel cycle policies.  As described in Chapter
2, the nuclear fuel cycle consists of many steps: uranium mining and milling, ore refining,
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enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor irradiation, storage, reprocessing, further new fuel
fabrication, treatment, burning, and waste disposal.  Not all countries practice each step,
and many countries are at an impasse on spent fuel management (Rosenstein & Roy,
2009; Hogselius, 2009; IAEA, 2002).  These countries, if not all, are now faced with
making a decision on which general strategy for nuclear waste management.  There are
currently three main strategies that are generally being considered: 
1) Adopt an Open Once-Through Cycle: This strategy requires sending the spent fuel
to a permanent deep burial facility after removal from storage at a nuclear reactor site. 
This is said to be ‘direct’ disposal of spent fuel (IAEA, 2002).  The approach may be
adopted for economic reasons or where a country decides to terminate the nuclear energy
option.  This, there is no waste recycling involved.  
2) Adopt a Closed Repeated Fuel Cycle:  There is still a large amount of energy that
remains in the spent fuel exiting conventional nuclear reactors.  In theory, repeated
recycling of the fissile materials in spent fuel can be exercised, eventually ending with the
disposal of the secondary fissile waste products as high-level radioactive waste.  This
strategy aims to ‘reprocess’ spent fuel and recycle the separated materials (plutonium and
uranium) into new fuel for use in burners for electricity production, or to reprocess spent
fuel promptly for the purpose of burning to reduce the volume of nuclear waste and
therefore the deep underground storage space required.  Rosenstein and Roy (2009) argue
that recycling can be advantageous for sustainable development, because of energy
efficiencies and resulting smaller amounts of radioactive waste.  As we have seen, other
experts have opposing arguments.
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3) Adopt Interim Storage: The interim storage of spent fuel is required by the so-
called 'wait-and-see' strategy adopted by many countries where a final decision on spent
fuel management has not yet been made.  There are still many concerns and uncertainties
linked to both direct disposal and reprocessing.  Some countries have therefore decided to
postpone the development of long-term policies.  Hogselius (2009) argues that these
countries are worried about the risk of becoming locked into sub-optimal technical
solutions.  This risk stands against the costs and risks of long-term interim storage of
spent nuclear fuel and against the ethical issue of passing the burden of decision and
implementation onto future generations.  Long-term interim storage requires that the
spent fuel be removed from storage pools and placed into dry cask storage until it
becomes clear whether reprocessing will precede permanent disposal.  
 Both the IAEA (2002) and the NEA (2008a) have argued that a wait-and-see strategy
may not be a viable option, because valuable time could be lost for engaging in R&D
activities and other regional/international collaborations.  Other groups within the NEA,
however, argue that the adoption of wait-and-see strategy may be reasonable, on an
interim basis, depending on country-specific conditions (NEA, 2007).  And lastly, the
three nuclear cycle strategies may not be mutually exclusive.  For instance, the U.S. 
nuclear industry supports an integrated spent fuel management strategy that considers, at
the same time, interim storage, R&D&D to close the nuclear fuel cycle, and permanent
disposal (NEI, 2009).  
I found no reference within the literature that refers to work on system development
of any radioactive or nuclear waste management policies (i.e., radiation risks, siting,
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ethics, local and global social considerations, and nuclear fuel cycle policies) over time
based on a dynamic system approach.  I did, however, note what may be the beginning of
such work on the broader issue of nuclear energy policy.  For example, the assessment of
the impact of nuclear accidents, namely the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents,
on the development of nuclear energy policy in Sweden using a system approach of the
policy process has been recently undertaken (Nohrstedt, 2008; Nohrstedt, 2005).  
By using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Nohrstedt (2008) suggest three factors
of stable conditions and learning capacity that could influence crisis-induced policy
formulation: ideology salience, level of conflict, and previous crisis experience.  As his
work is based on only one event—Sweden’s decision not to accelerate the nuclear power
phase out following the 1986 Chernobyl accident—Nohrstedt recommends future
research to explain crisis-induced policy formulation in other cases and political contexts. 
In this vein, I expect to bring a comparative conceptual approach to the development of
nuclear waste management policies with the intent of generalizing any findings to the
management of other complex social-environmental systems. 
Research Design Conditions for Comparative Case Study
The selection of the development of national nuclear waste management policies also
had to satisfy the following four conditions mentioned above for comparative case
research.
1) Case Representative of the Phenomenon Under Study: The phenomenon under
study is the behavior of complex systems.  I suppose that the disposal of nuclear waste
forms such a complex system with the nuclear fuel cycle.  International government
Ven and Poole (1990) suggest four types of breakpoints or discontinuities:  normal, delays, internal13
disruptions, and external interruptions.
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organizations, such as the Generation-IV International Forum (GIF, 2002), view the
nuclear fuel cycle as “a dynamic system that evolves with time in response to changes in
economic and social conditions...for evaluating paths for evolution toward alternative
nuclear futures, common issues arise that, in part, determine the feasibility and
desirability of cycle evolution” (p.4).  
Several sources have characterized the issue of nuclear waste management as
complex.  Notably, after carrying out an extensive study in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Office
of Technology Assessment (USOTA, 1985) concluded that “radioactive waste
management is a problem that is not quite like most others that have come within the
Government’s purview.  There are technical and institutional uncertainties associated
with this problem: some of them unknown, and possibly large; some of those
uncertainties are, in principle, unresolvable” (p.199).  The complexity of nuclear waste
management in the United States is repeated in many other countries (Flynn et al., 1992). 
This is not to say that the complexity of nuclear waste management is unique among
today’s complex environmental problems.  For example, the issue of climate change is as
complex if not more (Arvai et al., 2006; Nicolis & Nicolis, 1986).
2) Availability of Retrospective Data:  For the study of policy development over
time, the period of analysis would need to be long enough to allow for a few theoretical
recurrent evolutionary patterns, more commonly known as ‘sequences’ interspersed by
‘breakpoints’ .  Scholars have identified such sequences in the field of economics and13
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technology (Clemence, 1951), organization behavior (Pettigrew, 1997), and
environmental management (Olsson et al., 2006).  The duration of sequences varies
between 4 and 60 years.  
Data over the past 30 to 50 years on national nuclear waste management policies can
be found in the national reports required to be submitted every two or three years by
contracting country parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (henceforth, the Joint
Convention) under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA,
2010).  The Joint Convention entered into force on June 18, 2001 with 26 contracting
parties.  It now has more than 40 contracting parties (see Appendix 1 for a list of
contracting parties). 
The main objective of the Joint Convention is to “ensure that during nuclear waste
management there are effective defenses against potential hazards so that individuals,
society, and the environment are protected from harmful effects of ionizing radiation,
now and in the future, in such a way that the needs and aspirations of the present
generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs and aspirations" (IAEA, 2001).  This, in effect, enshrines the concept of sustainable
development in the nuclear waste management policies of all country contracting parties. 
The Joint Convention provides a common framework for countries to guide national
regulatory oversight and implementation of disposal.  
The Joint Convention consists of 44 articles and applies to spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste resulting from the operation of civilian nuclear reactors (and from
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military practices if the resulting spent fuel and radioactive waste are transported off-site
to civilian facilities).  Waste from uranium mining is also covered.  Articles cover
different phases of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management including the
siting, construction, operation and disposal of nuclear facilities.  Articles also cover
special themes including regulatory safety requirements, financial considerations, quality
assurance, transboundary movement of waste, and emergency preparedness.  Although
the Joint Convention covers many types of radioactive waste (e.g., nuclear fuel waste,
uranium mining waste, low-level radioactive waste from nuclear reactors, hospitals, and
other industries), the general management philosophy remains the same for all radioactive
waste.  
Contracting parties are to prepare national reports to provide information on nuclear
waste management policies and programs for learning purposes and for verifying
compliance with the Joint Convention.  A review exercise follows the submission of all
reports.  During these reviews, country comparisons are not carried out and verifying
compliance is a secondary motive.  The main purpose of the reviews is to encourage
countries to follow best practices (IAEA, 2003).  
The national reports are submitted every two or three years to the IAEA for review by
other contracting parties.  The first national reports were submitted at the end of  2003,
the second at the end of 2005, and the third in October 2008.  Each report submitted by a
contracting party is to be a stand-alone document.  As such, most countries simply update
their report for subsequent reviews and delete the previous version.  The submission of
124
the next national report is scheduled for the end of 2011.  The basis for the comparative
multiple-country case is the 2008 report.  
The national reports consist of about 200 pages on average.  Although including input
from many domestic stakeholders over the course of their preparation, the national reports
represent official government policy and are written in so-called ‘neutral’ language.  Most
national reports are made public by the IAEA on its website.  
3) Comparability of Cases: Pettigrew (1990) suggests choosing cases that have
similar experience with the phenomenon under study.  The development of nuclear waste
management policies of all the selected countries has been affected by adaptive
management in one form or another, either formally or informally.  For example, in June
2007, the Government of Canada announced that the nuclear industry is to officially
adopt adaptive management for nuclear waste disposal (NFWB, 2007; Lee, 2003). 
Canada is the first country to have done so formally.  However, the U.S. National
Research Council (USNRC, 2003) observed that countries with a substantive national
nuclear waste program have all informally practiced ‘adaptive staging’ in the past. 
Adaptive staging has many common features with adaptive management but has a slighter
tendency for ‘passive’ adaptive management, that is, adaptive staging provides enough
flexibility to react to change.
There is now a tendency, however, to consider ‘active’ adaptive management, not
only to integrate new knowledge, but also to pro-actively build adaptive capacity in
preparation of inevitable surprises.  The NEA (2008a) reports that where country
programs are most advanced, implementation of nuclear waste disposal builds on a
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“strategy that accommodates continuous learning and includes a willingness to
incorporate evolution in technical advances and societal requirements” (p.8).  One
important societal requirement is transparency of policies and programs, and meaningful
involvement of all stakeholders in decision-making processes (Gosseries, 2006). 
Continuous learning and flexibility are the hallmarks of an adaptable strategy or
management program.  
Most contracting parties to the Joint Convention follow the IAEA Guidelines on
Form and Structure for the national reports (IAEA, 2006).  This greatly enhances the
comparability of national reports for the purposes of the study.  These guidelines for the
preparation of the reports were prepared to facilitate the most efficient review of the
implementation by the contracting parties of their obligations under the Convention.  The
guidelines recommend that the reports provide information on each of the articles of the
Joint Convention, including information on institutional measures, policies and practices,
the legislative and regulatory system, and human and financial resources.  
4) General Similarity but Distinguishing Differences among Countries: While each
country case should be representative of the phenomenon under study, Yin (2003) argues
that case selection also takes into account the presence of distinguishing features.  In the
1950s, international agreement was achieved on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Strandberg and Andren (2009) report that between the 1950s to the 1970s, national
ideologies, technical know-how, and welfare objectives, all contributed to setting a
somewhat different course on nuclear energy and waste policy development in different
groups of countries. 
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 After the early 1970s, however, several scholars (e.g., Strandberg & Andren, 2009;
Rosen, 1992) report increasing international interactions, particularly on environmental
issues, global environmental policy, and sustainable development.  After the end of
1970s, countries tended to minimize their differences and converge toward a consensus
on nuclear waste management best practices (Strandberg and Andren, 2009; Hogselius,
2008; NEA, 2008).  Such convergence, however, is not absolute; differences among
countries still exist.  Indeed, the presence of both divergence and convergence is a
characteristic of a chaotic system (Gaunersdorfer et al., 2003; Chen, 1988; Rasmussen et
al., 1985).  This characteristic is associated with the dissipation of initial conditions of the
system countered by the attractive force of the strange attractor.  Geometrically, this
movement recalls the stretching and folding of the strange attractor of the chaotic pattern
model.  
Each country’s specific conditions are likely to influence the development of their
nuclear waste programs, at least at early stages, resulting in a variety of slightly different
paths toward disposal solutions.  These conditions are derived from national
characteristics (cultural, historical, societal, legal, and geographical distinguishing
features).  Scholars, however, argue that national policies show striking adaptability after
participating in international collaborations for seeking competitive advantages through
conformist behavior (for exploration) rather than through deviant behavior (for
exploitation) (Lemola, 2002).  Indeed, because of the tension between cooperation and
competition in any collaboration, internationalization or ‘globalization’ tends toward both
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convergence and divergence: usually there is macroeconomic and technological
convergence together with national or regional differentiation (Jacobs, 1998). 
The distinguishing impact of specific country conditions is not particular to nuclear
waste management.  Poloni-Staudinger (2008) reports that the same phenomenon is
generally seen with the management of many other issues.  Examples of specific country
conditions reported by Polini-Staudinger include the degree of social and technical
astuteness, types of democratic processes (from consensus to majoritarian), the presence
of veto players, and the degree of governance centralization.  
Furthermore, Frendreis (1983) cautions that, in terms of the generalization of
comparative results, the most-similar-cases strategy suffers, because it seeks to discover
relationships that are limited to the similar cases, thereby implying partial generalization. 
Because country contracting parties to the Joint Convention are in various stages of
economic development, have various forms of government and cultures, and because of
the selection of general, not too specific, stakeholder adaptive capacities (variables), it is
expected that any study findings can also be useful for greater insights into the
development of other complex social-environmental systems managed in other countries.
3.2.2 Selection of Countries
Considering the above four general selection conditions for comparative case study,
out of the total number of contracting parties to the Joint Convention, I selected for study
23 countries that have at least one operational nuclear power plant and that have made
their 2008 national report publicly and digitally available (as an unlocked pfd document
on the web).  Selected countries can be initially classified using the United Nations
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geographic groupings: two North American countries (the United States, Canada), two
South American countries (Brazil and Argentina), four Western European countries
(France, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands), four North European countries (Finland,
Sweden, Lithuania and the United Kingdom), six East European countries (Slovakia, the
Czech Republic, Russia, Romania, Slovakia and the Ukraine), one South European
country (Slovenia), three East Asian countries (Japan, the Republic of Korea or South
Korea—henceforth, Korea—and China) and one African country (South Africa).  
Policy science scholars)for instance, Blomquist (2007))consider than twenty cases or
more constitute a “large” comparative study.  For a brief backgrounder on the nuclear
power and nuclear waste programs of these countries, which I prepared from several
authoritative sources, see Appendix 2.  In the country backgrounders, I also include a
section on key nuclear energy and defense policies for each country assembled from a
number of sources.
There have been a few studies comparing qualitative histories (narratives) of a
handful of countries, but Strandberg and Andren (2009) report that no study has included
a comparison of both large and small countries, that represent different regions and
continents, or that capture the North-South dimension with the intent to decipher general
requirements for socially sustainable and legitimate management of nuclear waste.  This
study fills that gap.
3.2.3 Selection of Variables
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Once the country cases were selected, I proceeded to select variables to test the two
hypotheses.  Therefore variables for the study on broad developmental patterns and on the
relative importance of stakeholder adaptive capacities had to be selected.
Variable for the Study of Broad Developmental Patterns
With respect to evaluating whether broad developmental patterns of policy
development can be detected, I opted to simply count the number of policies reported per
year per country.  Anderson (2006) defines a policy as “a relatively stable, purposive
course of action to be followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or
matter of concern” (p.6).  A bit more broadly, the IAEA (2009a) defines [waste] policy as
goals and requirements.  Given these definitions, nuclear waste management policies can
be substantive or procedural and include a broad plate of events ranging from the
establishment of new legislation, institutions, guidelines, or principles to the provision of
funds.  Therefore, I have opted to define policy in its broadest sense and have considered
all events reported chronologically in each national report.
Anderson (2006) reports that his definition of policy has three implications: 1) policy
development is likely not random; 2) policies consist of patterns of action building over
time; and 3) policies emerge in response to significant demands (internal or external). 
Anderson (2006) argues that given the complexity of policy-making processes, the
development of some general theory that has broad explanatory power is an unrealistic
aspiration.  Instead, Anderson (2006) argues that some generalization through theory
building on parts of policymaking is plausible although still not simple.  In general, he
concludes that policy research is complex, conclusive data are scarce, motives are
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unclear, influence is often subtle, value-based information affects decisions, and policy
impacts are uncertain.
Given the difficulties raised by Anderson (2006), I opted for the simplest approach
that could provide valuable insight to the questions raised by the study.  Hence, I use the
measurement of yearly frequency of policy events to develop the time series.  This
measurement can provide valuable information on two characteristics of policy
development: 1) broad system developmental patterns; and, 2) the presence of possible
windows of opportunity.
For examining broad system developmental patterns, Blomquist (2007) considers that
counting ‘policy-adoption events’ (e.g., the passage of a law, the creation of an agency) is
appropriate for studies only under three conditions: 
1) The study includes no subjectivity in the selection of policy events.  As already
mentioned, I make no selection of policy events, because I capture all the events reported
and recorded chronologically in the national reports under the Joint Convention;
2) The study considers that all policies are policy 'additions'.  Policy changes that
terminate, reorient, reverse, or modify policies are all considered to be policy ‘additions’. 
Anderies et al. (2007) consider that no policy is perfect for all time, and policy
terminations, reorientations and reversals are simply the result of continuous policy
modification or addition through feedback from learning.  Rose (1990) argues that great
changes can only occur through many small incremental changes over time, which may
lead to Kingdon’s (2003) concept of windows of opportunity for policy change. 
Increased frequency of policies may be an indication of a system undergoing positive
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feedback by being on the macropolitical agenda as a result of a window of opportunity for
policy change  (True et al., 2007).  
True et al. (2007) explain that positive feedback occurs when a change, sometimes a
fairly modest one, causes future changes to be amplified.  The terms ‘feeding frenzy’ or
‘bandwagon effect’ is sometimes used to characterize this effect.  The measurement of
the number of policies is appropriate, because I consider all the policy events reported in
the IAEA national reports without any screening, give equal weight to each policy, and
consider them all as additive policies, that is, I make no positive or negative judgement as
to their possible success, failure, termination, or reorientation; 
3) The study is long enough to include normal expected times for policy ‘cycles’. 
Sabatier (2007a) considers that a case should cover a minimum period of 10 years while
recognizing that other scholars consider that a 20-  to 40- year period is required to obtain
a reasonable understanding of policy development.  Our study covers such a period, that
is, an average of some four decades.
All of the above three conditions for using the measurement of policy-event counts as
a dependable variable are met for the study on the development of broad developmental
patterns.  Therefore, measuring this variable is appropriate and is likely to lead to
interesting findings.  Counting the number of policy events per year per country cannot
only reveal broad developmental patterns over time, but it can also provide information
on the existence of  ‘windows of opportunity’ for policy change as initially defined by
Kingdon (2003). 
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 The concept of a window of opportunity can be compared to the concept of ‘the edge
of chaos’ that was previously raised (Kingdon was well aware of advances made in chaos
and complexity theory and looked forward to progress in those disciplines and
applications in policy research).  Kingdon (2003) defines a policy window as an
opportunity for action on any given initiatives that stays open only for a short while.  He
suggests that during such times, the window of opportunity is used to full advantage by
certain savvy stakeholders.  
Kingdon (2003) argues that a policy window is the convergent point of three streams: 
problems, proposals and political forces.  The convergent point is the outcome depending
on the mix of elements present and how the various elements are coupled (Kingdon,
2003).  If the opportunity is seized, there is often a flutter of activity that tends to move
normally inert or steady systems further along.  Therefore, the measurement of country
yearly policy frequencies could possibly pinpoint such periods of flutter of activities as
possible windows of opportunities that occurred in the past, through the detection of
periods of increasing yearly policy frequencies or frequency peaks.  
The principal use of counting the number of policies per year is the main focus of the
study with respect to historical characteristics of broad  policy development:  the
statistical relationship between policy frequencies in consecutive years (autocorrelation
analysis).  As we will see later (see Section 3.3.2), statistical analyses on time series can
reveal the presence of linear, periodic, or chaotic patterns.  
Variables for the Study of the Relative Importance of Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities
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With respect to evaluating the importance given to potential key system drivers by
each of the 23 countries, the variables are the six stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs). 
The measurement of the variables is the frequency of words encountered in the IAEA
Joint Convention 2008 national reports that relate back to the concept of each stakeholder
adaptive capacity (as described in Chapter 2).  In accordance with the premise of content
analysis, the frequency of words or groupings of words is positively correlated with the
intensity of attention focused on the concept (or ‘category’) they represent.  For the study,
this means that through content analysis, it may be possible to assess the relative global
importance given to individual stakeholder adaptive capacities by each of the 23
countries.  Thus, the nature of this analysis is mainly spatial, that is, it generates insights
into the relative importance of SACs given by each country generally over time.
A Temporal Case Study based on 2003, 2005, and 2008 Data
The intent of the study on SACs is to explore the relative importance given by each of
the 23 countries to each of the six SACs based on the Joint Convention 2008 national
reports.  Because such patterns can develop slowly over time, any study should cover the
longest period possible.  The study covers an average of some four decades for each
country.  In addition to this exploration, another type of temporal study was carried out.  
Because national reports submitted so far cover a period of about ten years, an
analysis of the possible evolution of contemporary thinking over this period was also
investigated.  This period, roughly from 1998 to 2008, covers the time of publication of a
fundamental precursor to the 2001 Joint Convention, namely the IAEA waste safety
fundamentals document (IAEA, 1995), entry into force of the Joint Convention, and the
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three Joint Convention national reports submitted in 2003, 2005, and 2008.  The temporal
study is not to be confused with the objective of the time series which cover some 30 to
50 years of policy development.  The intent of the temporal study on countries and
stakeholder adaptive capacities is to see whether the relative importance given to the
SACs can change notably over a decade.
This temporal analysis was done even if I thought it was unlikely that such evolution
would have occurred over such a short period.  The development of national nuclear
waste management policies tends to take into account international thinking and
collaborative efforts.  The development of international thinking usually proceeds slowly,
and 10 years may not be a sufficiently long period of time to see any notable or
conclusive influence of any key system drivers.  Nevertheless, this additional exploration
was thought worthwhile to either confirm expectations or lead to unexpected insights.
 In this vein, Doré et al. (1996) ask a similar question regarding similar changes over
a decade.  They apply multivariate analyses (i.e., correspondence analysis) to examine
publication patterns in various disciplines in 48 countries from 1981 to 1992.   The
variable was the number of publications published yearly in various disciplines in various
countries (i.e., grouped as 'advanced' of "outlying' countries).  The data used for the
multivariate analyses were pooled, thus, totals per year were not considered.  The scholars
acknowledged the merit of a temporal in-depth study and supposed that variations in time
could result from 'outlying' countries who would move toward the most ‘advanced’
countries either quickly and abruptly or slowly and gradually.  However, Doré et al.
(1996) concluded that their data set suggest stability over the decade.  They argue that out
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of the three independent variables—namely, country, disciplines, and time—time was the
least influential on the yearly number of publications (but some minimal influence was
noted).
Blomquist (2007) reports that policy researchers aim to study variances in policies,
and they mainly find it in spatial comparative studies rather than in temporal studies.  He
provides the following example:  “Welfare expenditures in Pennsylvania may not change
much from year to year, but they sure were different from West Virginia’s, which were
different from North Dakota’s, and so on.” (p.280).  Nevertheless, he concludes that
temporal dynamics are likely important over long enough periods.
For the study, confirmation of the influence of time, or lack thereof, over the decade
covered by the preparation of the national reports would be useful for the interpretation of
the results derived from the comparison of 23 countries based on their 2008 report.  The
selection of countries for the temporal study was constrained, because some of the 23
countries did not participate in the 2003 and/or the 2005 national reporting exercise.  The
selection was also limited by the fact that only a few countries had kept all of their three
yearly national reports publicly and digitally available as an unlocked pdf document
posted on either the IAEA website or their own national website.  The resulting country
list includes the following six countries: the United States, Japan, Canada, Argentina, the
Czech Republic and Slovenia.  I have selected all six countries for the temporal case
study.  
In conclusion, by applying the conceptual content analysis method to evaluate both of
the two hypotheses using appropriate variables, we can convert qualitative information
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into quantitative information.  More detailed information on the content analysis method
is provided in the next section.
3.3 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses
Berkes et al. (2002b) argue that research in system development differs fundamentally
from conventional science.  Familiar approaches to evaluating hypotheses are inadequate
because of non-linearity and long time lags between action and consequences.  Novel
methodologies may need to be developed: for instance, through combining qualitative
and quantitative analyses.  To evaluate the two hypotheses, I undertook a comparative
cross-case analysis that could improve our understanding of the influence of stakeholder
adaptive capacities on the long-term management of complex environmental problems. 
Such combination was generally suggested by Lijphart (1971) for improving the
robustness of multiple-case comparisons.  And such combination generally involves the
combining of the comparative and the statistical methods.
If the objective of a study is not the extensive development of narrative and analysis
of each country’s case—that is, a comparison of multiple in-depth single-case studies— 
but rather whether and to what extent countries, or group of countries, exhibit a certain
phenomenon of interest, then such a study is said to be a ‘cross-case’ study (Lieberman,
2005; Yin, 2003).  The nature of the cross-case analysis is similar to Pettigrew’s (1997)
meta-level cross-case, in that the goal is a specific thematic presentation linking the
theoretical and empirical findings across the cases.  Within political and social sciences,
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the ‘comparative method’ is often applied to compare multiple country cases (Lijphart,
1971).
The comparative method, however, has mostly involved qualitative information.  To
attempt to increase the usefulness of qualitative information, the comparative method
may devise ways of quantifying qualitative information with the ‘statistical method’. 
Combining the comparative and statistical methods was generally suggested by Lijphart
(1971) for improving the robustness of multiple-case comparisons, which, in turn, would
likely improve the prospect of presenting valid findings by drawing on distinct strengths
and minimizing weaknesses of each of the two methods.
3.3.1 Conceptual Computer-Assisted Content Analysis
Content analysis has a long history, and it was initially defined as a method enabling
the researcher to systematically identify main properties of a text and to describe and
make inferences about text messages (Krippendorff, 2004; Holsti, 1969).  The basic
premise of content analysis is the assumption that words and phrases mentioned most
often in a text are those reflecting important concerns (positive or negative)
(Krippendorff, 2004).  The relationship between the frequency of a word and the strength
of concern is assumed to be linear (Namenwirth &Weber, 1987).  See Appendix 3 for
detailed information on the general method of content analysis.  
‘Computer-assisted’ (CA) content analysis, which began in the 1960s, is a method
that allows greater ease in transforming qualitative information into quantitative data
(word frequencies).  Content analysis is particularly useful for comparing many cases
based on substantial policy documents.  This computation is based either on the ordinary
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sense of words, or on a list of keywords or ‘vocabulary lists’ or ‘dictionaries’ developed
by the researcher who is familiar with the typical jargon or vocabulary of the field of 
study (Namenwirth & Weber, 1987).  Krippendorff (2009) calls these two approaches
respectively ‘emic’ and ‘etic’.  The former approach is empirically grounded, and the
latter is theoretically grounded (I use both approaches for the present research).  
Once quantitative data are derived, statistical tests can be applied.  Popping (2000)
argues that CA content analysis enables researchers to more effectively make sense of
substantial texts by teasing out relationships, trends or patterns that are not at first
obvious through reading the text.  CA content analysis is particularly useful for analyzing
statistical trends and patterns over long periods of time from archival sources to reveal
aspects of change not easily detected by other methods, for instance, historical analysis,
interviews, and surveys (Bengston & Xu, 1995).
Both Popping (2000) and Namenwirth and Weber (1987) caution that CA content
analysis may not necessarily result in a perfect representation of reality.  When
interpreting results, the researcher needs to be cognizant of the software’s capabilities,
raw data availability and quality, accuracy in coding for meaning, and power of statistical
tests.  These limitations may be reduced by ensuring that any findings are firmly grounded
in the researcher’s own knowledge and expertise in the field of study.  For more detailed
information on CA content analysis, see Appendix 3.  
3.3.2 Statistical Analyses
Once quantitative data is retrieved from the computer-assisted content analysis that
from databases, statistics are applied.  In the case of the database on yearly policy event
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frequencies formed to examine broad developmental patterns, a time series for each of the
23 countries is plotted.  Chatfield (2004) introduced a time series as sequence of
observations that are presumed to be ordered in time.  Chatfield (2004) argues that it is
sensible to display the data in the order in which they arose, particularly since successive
observations may be dependent.  
The plots are analyzed descriptively (e.g., general trends, high frequency periods), and
the  relationship between consecutive points over time is examined through
autocorrelation analysis.  Autocorrelation analysis is a univariate analysis that calculates
the correlation between a point and a certain number of neighboring points.  The sooner
the relation peters out (i.e., the lag at which the autocorrelation coefficient is considered
to be zero), the more pronounced the unpredictability of the system (Nicolis & Nicolis,
1996).  The results of the autocorrelation analysis can indicate whether a time series is
random, or fully or partly linear or periodic, and may be a simple indicator of the possible
presence of chaotic patterns (Chatfield, 2004).
In the case of the database of word frequencies associated with each of the six
stakeholder adaptive capacities, I carried out multivariate analyses on word frequencies
associated with each of the stakeholder adaptive capacities (variables) for each of the
countries (cases).  Multivariate analyses are statistical analyses that consider several
related variables simultaneously with each one considered equally important, at least
initially (Manly, 2005).  There are several types of multivariate analyses, and two among
these will be used in the study.  They are cluster analysis and correspondence analysis.  
140
Cluster analysis carries out calculations resulting in the identification of groupings of
similar objects, here, countries giving similar importance to a particular stakeholder
adaptive capacity (SAC).  Cluster analysis is a numerical technique that divides the
objects of study into discrete groups.  These groups are based on the characteristics of the
objects (here, cases and SACs).  The task of the researcher then becomes to associate
meaning to the results of the cluster analysis by referring back to the research questions
(Kovach, 2007).  
Correspondence analysis involves Eigen value analysis.  Eigen value analysis is a
technique that, from the original data, provides a spatial geometric summary of data
planes represented by a symmetrical matrix obtained from a measure of distances
resulting in Eigen values (in the range 0 -1).  Each Eigen value is the amount of the
variance of a given factor (one or more variables) and is listed in the correspondence
analysis table.  There is one Eigen value for each dimension, and it reflects the
importance of that dimension (Garson, 2008).  The first dimension always explains the
largest part of the variance and has the largest Eigen values, the next, the second-most,
and so on.  Despite being less familiar than cluster analysis, correspondence analysis is
often applied in basic and applied sciences (notably in ecology), in the social sciences,
and in business marketing research (Doré et al., 1996).  With the social sciences, it has
been applied in organization science (e.g., Leoncini & Montresor (2004) and in
psychology (e.g., Ajdacic-Gross et al., 2008).  
These two types of multivariate analyses are both ordination methods, that is,
methods that reduce numerous data and relationships for more manageable analysis.  The
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multivariate analyses do not assume linear relationships among the variables and cases
and provide complementary insights.  Multivariate analyses are based on algebra and
algorithms that calculate distances of each object to all other objects.  Thus, various
degrees of association among cases and variables are determined (Manly, 2005).  
The two analyses are considered to be complementary in that they provide different
perspectives of the same core relationships, similarly to viewing a mobile from different
angles.  The complementary use of both cluster and correspondence analyses is not
unprecedented.  For instance, Doré et al. (1996) encouraged this combination.  They
suggest that the results of the cluster analysis can be used to help encircle or link together
variables and cases of the correspondence analysis joint plots.  The complimentary use of
both multivariate analyses adds strength to any drawn conclusions.  Unexpected
groupings or associations suggest relationships to be investigated further through more
confirmatory methods.  In the next two sections (3.4 and 3.5), we will see how combining
qualitative and quantitative information through computer-assisted content analysis is
specifically applied in our study.
3.4 Methods for Evaluating H1: CA Content Analysis and Time Series Analysis
To evaluate H1 (cf., national policies exhibit chaotic developmental patterns), I built a
database, including all policy events reported chronologically in  the IAEA Joint
Convention 2008 national report of each of the 23 countries.  The national reports were
downloaded in the QDA Miner software and transferred to the SimStat software to carry
out the time series analysis.  The objective was to note the yearly frequency of these
Chan and Tong (2001) report that there are two complementary approaches to studying chaotic patterns,14
namely the geometric approach and the statistical approach that inform on the stretching (dissipation
through sensitivity to initial conditions) and folding (attraction to the ‘attractor’) of chaotic patterns over
time.  In the geometrical approach, are analyzed through geometrical differential equation analysis of key
dimensions (key system drivers) that can be used to construct a visual representation of the attractor, that is,
a ‘phase  portrait’ in ‘phase space’ (or maps).  Geometric analysis requires thousands of data points (Poole
et al., 2000; Chen, 1988).  Alternatively, the statistical approach uses various numerical measures can be
used on typical regularities over the short term; results may be valid with fewer data points if the data has a
high degree of reliability.
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events over several decades since the beginning of the countries nuclear programs.  The
frequencies were  plotted as a time series, and associated statistical analyses were applied. 
The objective of evaluating H1 through time series analysis is to obtain a broad view on
any patterns of development of national nuclear waste management policies over time. 
For the study, the main objective is to explore whether there any notable broad patterns
developing over time)namely, linear, periodic, or chaotic)and possible discontinuities,
breakpoints or peaks in variation of change that characterize a country’s development of
national nuclear waste management policies.  To help answer this question, a time series
was plotted for each of the 23 countries and visually inspected.  No obvious fixed cycles
were observed on any of the times series of the 23 countries.  To detect linearity, I applied 
autocorrelation analysis (Chatfield, 2004).  
To decipher the presence and other characteristics of chaotic patterns, scholars within
the social sciences have proposed more elaborate diagnostic statistical  tests based on14
certain properties of complex systems (Chatfield, 2004; Chan & Tong, 2001; Poole et al.,
2000; Cheng & Ven, 1996; Chen, 1988):
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1) The first test calculates the sensitivity of the system to initial conditions (e.g., the
Lyapunov exponent which examines whether initial differences amplify
exponentially over time is based on the rate of separation of trajectories); and,
2) The second test calculates the attraction to a subset of data by calculating the
correlation between its dimensional vectors.  The larger the correlation dimension,
the longer we expect it takes for the dynamical process to revisit the generic state,
and the more complex is the attractor indicating a chaotic system
 (e.g.,Grassberger-Procaccia Estimator, Takens Estimator). 
Carrying out these two statistical tests has its limitations.  First, the two tests are not
yet available within the better known statistical software package such as SPSS, SAS or
SimStat.  The use of specialized software, such as Chaos Data Analyzer (Sprott &
Rowlands, 2010), would be required.  Moreover, a sufficient number of reliable data
points are needed to get any significant results from these two tests.  Where large
databases exist (thousands of observations), these tests for chaotic patterns have been
usefully applied, for instance, within the medical field, particularly related to heartbeat
rhythms, defibrillators, and pacemakers (Basu & Foufoula-Georgiou, 2002).  Poole et al.
(2000) report that typically event time series often consist of only 100 data points or less,
which is roughly the same order to policy events of our country time series.  
Verifying the presence and form of chaotic patterns with the two specialized
statistical analyses would be counterproductive because of the likely lack of sufficient
data points (policy events).  More generally, it is doubtful that these analyses could be
performed with much confidence on a time series derived from any pooling of policy
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documents.  It is in fact rare to find studies within the social sciences that do provide
sufficient data points not affected by noise for such statistical tests (Poole et al., 2000). 
 In view of these limitations, Basu and Foufoula-Georgiou (2002) report that several
scholars attempt the ‘mere’ determination of non-randomness and nonlinearity, instead of
the detailed characterization of chaos dynamics.  They argue that this may be sufficient to
suggestive the possible presence of a chaotic pattern.  Basu and Foufoula-Georgiou
(2002) found that when short-term correlation existed in systems, accurate short-term
predictions were possible.  Predictability, however, decreased exponentially with time
due to extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, thereby suggesting a chaotic pattern. 
 These scholars consider that the test of short-term correlation is a useful tool under
such circumstances to discriminate between chaotic patterns and randomness.  For
example, in examining the temporal dynamics of Tourette tics, Peterson and Leckman
(1998) conclude that when other features characterize the system under study—such as a
combination of apparent randomness, some order, and emergence—the presence of
chaotic patterns may be suggested.  These scholars, however, caution that these features
do not prove the presence of chaotic patterns.  Such proof , these scholars argue, would
require showing that observed data points can be described in mathematically simple
terms involving a few determinants, as May and Mandelbrot postulated in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. 
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3.5 Methods for Evaluating H2: CA Content Analysis and Multivariate Analyses
Following the evaluation of H1, that is, the determination of any broad patterns of
development, the objective of evaluating H2 (cf., relative influence of factors, as key
system drivers, underlying chaotic developmental patterns of complex social-
environmental systems can be robustly determined) is to assess the potential importance
of selected stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs) as key system drivers for the
development of national waste management policies.  The issue is to determine the
relative importance or attention given by each of the 23 countries to the stakeholder
adaptive capacities selected for the study.  The first step is to develop vocabulary lists for
the content analysis and then apply multivariate analyses to the word frequencies.  
3.5.1 Content Analysis: the Development of Vocabulary Lists
To recap, the six selected stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs) are learning by
managers, social responsibility of managers, public participation in decision-making,
government oversight, formal project collaboration, and emergency preparedness.  I
proceeded, through computer-assisted content analysis, using the WordStat software, to
retrieve all the ‘substantive’ words in each of the national reports reflecting the concept of
each of the six SACs.  Substantive words are those that carry higher semantic value than,
for instance, articles and prepositions.  WordStat includes a process for examining only
substantive words.  An exclusion list may be used to remove words that you do not want
to be included in the content analysis.  The WordStat software removes words with little
semantic value such as pronouns, articles, and conjunctions.  WordStat may also be used
to remove words used too frequently which have little discriminative value.  
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Another software process offered by WordStat and used in our study is
‘lemmatisation'.  Lemmatisation is the process of grouping together the different inflected
forms of a word, so they can be analyzed as a single item.  Here, for instance, all plurals
are transformed into singular forms, and past-tense verbs and participles are replaced with
present-tense versions.  The end-result of this word scanning by WordStat is the master
list of substantive words found in the document, here, the Joint Convention national
report.
After examination of all the substantive, unique, words (occurring more than one
time) retrieved by WordStat, I noted that many words were associated with emergency
preparedness.  Because emergency preparedness can be a useful stakeholder adaptive
capacity, I added this variable for a total of six SACs.  The use of a priori selected
variables and the allowance of a posteriori variables is a typical approach when using
computer-assisted content analysis (Budge et al., 2001).  
Next, I selected words from the master list to include under each ‘vocabulary list’ (or
‘dictionary’).  A vocabulary list is a list of words or expressions that represent  a
‘category’ or a concept considered as a variable for the research.  The selection process of
words for the vocabulary lists is based on a reflexive process requiring adequate
familiarity with the field of endeavor.  In our case, the researcher needs knowledge in
three general areas: 1) the general concept of stakeholder adaptive capacities; 2) the
selected six stakeholder adaptive capacities; and, 3) familiarity with the general sense of
the words used in the documents under study, here, the national reports required under the
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Joint Convention.  Maximizing the knowledge of the researcher enhances the likelihood
of obtaining results that make some sense grounded in theory (Krippendorff, 2004).
Words are selected by conceptual meaning, discarding those considered too
ambiguous, that is, words than may have more than one meaning.  The words were to be
representative of the stakeholder adaptive capacity category.  There is no guideline as to
an optimized total number of words for the vocabulary lists.  It depends on the documents
being analyzed.  The total number of words for each of the lists ideally should be of the
same order of magnitude to avoid possible skewness of derived results (Krippendorff,
2004).  Some scholars, however, note that if the total number of words varies
significantly among lists, this is usually not a problem because only the most frequently
used words have an impact on final results (Bengston & Xu, 1995).  
Ideally, words with no ambiguity should be attributed to each vocabulary list, that is,
there should be no doubt that the words selected belong to the category.  In practice,
however, absolutely any ambiguity is often not feasible and the placement of words will
depend on the knowledge of the researcher (Andsager & Powers, 1999).  Furthermore,
although the vocabulary lists are meant to be mutually exclusive, in practice, there may be
some unavoidable, implicit or hidden overlap among the six vocabulary lists.  As already
mentioned, it is rare to find studies where non-physical variables do not overlap.  For
instance, public participation (SAC3) can overlap with learning by managers (SAC1), and
in turn, learning by managers (SAC1) can overlap with manager social responsibility
(SAC2) through the accumulation of social capital (Miguelez et al., 2008; Plummer &
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FitzGibbon, 2007; Knack & Keefer, 1997).  Such overlap needs to be kept in mind when
discussing the results of the multivariate analyses.  
As for any study, the subjectivity that may be introduced by the researcher in
preparing the vocabulary lists needs to be minimized.  To keep this subjectivity in check,
it may be suggested that an independent party review the lists.  Finding experts with the
same three knowledge requisites mentioned above, however, would be difficult, if not
impossible.  Moreover, any selected expert could introduce another level of subjectivity
and uncertainty (Bengston & Xu, 1995).  In any event, the influence of potential
subjectivity may be less than initially thought.  Content analysis assumes that the
frequency of words in any document follows a normal distribution.  The words in
vocabulary lists are presented in order of decreasing frequency.  The frequency of words
diminishes quickly so that only the first words, taken together, have frequencies large
enough to influence the final results (Andsager & Powers, 1999; Bengston & Xu, 1995). 
Therefore, it is crucial that these first words accurately represent the category.  And
because the high-frequency words are apt not to be those that are the more ambiguous,
ambiguity overall may not be problematic.  Therefore,  not only could an independent
review be ineffective, it may not be needed as long as the vocabulary lists are made
transparent and explained (Andsager & Powers, 1999; Bengston & Xu, 1995).  In this
vein, I will now proceed with general comments on the development of the vocabulary
lists followed by more specific comments on each of the six lists.
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Comments on Each of the Six Vocabulary Lists
The words selected needed to generally represent each stakeholder adaptive capacity
and focus on some form of ‘capacity’.  In descending order, the total number of words on
each vocabulary list is 115 for SAC4 (government oversight), 107 for SAC1 (learning by
managers), 104 for SAC3 (public participation), 82 for SAC5 (project stakeholder
collaboration), 80 for SAC6 (emergency preparedness), and 76 for SAC2 (managers’
responsibility).  I am not surprised that the vocabulary list of the first three SACs consists
of more words.  These stakeholder adaptive capacities have long been applied in the
nuclear energy field.  The importance of formal project collaboration and (corporate)
social responsibility are newer concepts.  And perhaps the low number of words related to
emergency preparedness may be that there is a greater focus on preventing accidents than
on preparing for them. 
While examining the master list of words retrieved by WordStat for each of the
countries’ national report in preparation for drawing the vocabulary lists, it was obvious
that the jargon used was similar among all countries to a remarkable degree.  This jargon
covered technical words as well as words of common usage.  Such convergence may be
due to the language crystallized during the development of the reporting guidelines and of
precursor or foundation documents of the Joint Convention, such as the IAEA 
fundamental report on radioactive waste principles (IAEA, 1995) in which all 23
countries participated.  In selecting words for the vocabulary list, both American and
British forms of English were considered since both forms were used by contracting
parties to the Joint Convention.  
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Within the national reports, the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘flexibility’ are used to some
extent and refer to an intent to prepare and adapt to future surprises.  The frequency of use
of these words was unanticipated, but their presence is interesting.  In the national reports,
these two terms were used in association with all the stakeholder adaptive capacities. 
Therefore since they two terms do not possess any significant distinguishing power
among the SACs, I did not include them in any individual stakeholder adaptive capacity
vocabulary list.  
More specific background information on the development of each of the six
vocabulary lists follows.  The vocabulary lists themselves can be found in Appendix 4.
SAC1 Vocabulary List
• Words selected for the vocabulary list for the learning capacity of managers refer
to activities undertaken to find the best solutions for a defined practical problem. 
As such, learning is rarely about fundamental science but about scientific and
technical applications.
• A few words on the list are more ambiguous than the others.  For instance, I
include the word 'competence', even if there may be a few instances where the
word could be used to refer to a ‘competent’ authority (responsible authority).
• One expression, as opposed to a single word, appears on the list: quality
assurance.  Quality assurance is a term commonly used internationally to
designate a program of exercises implemented by a manager to verify, for
instance, possible errors in documentation, the execution of calibrations, and the
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consistency with best practices.  In that improvements are usually the result of
such programs, I consider them a form of learning.  
• Under this category, the following words are more frequently used by most
countries: research, analysis, experience, quality assurance, technology,
competence, alteration, examination, study, and university.  Additional words
within the highest frequencies in any one or few countries are: trial (Slovenia);
improve, exam, improvement, laboratory, capability, certificate, science, expert,
solution (France); and, check (Hungary).
SAC2 Vocabulary List
• Words selected for this list refer to fulfilling the manager’s social responsibilities. 
Main activities include those associated with the manager's mission (e.g., ‘power’,
‘electricity’).  The list also includes words with respect to the transparency of 
mission activities, financial planning, human resource organization, and
management.
• Under this category, the following words are more frequently used by most
countries: worker, financial, power, budget, documentation, personnel, workplace,
industry, business, commercial, maintenance, mission, staff, record, economy,
fund.  Additional words within the highest frequencies in one or a few countries
are: corporation (Russia); strategy, cost (Belgium); labor (Slovakia); and, fee
(Sweden).
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SAC3 Vocabulary List
• The words on the list refer to the participation of the general public—often in
local communities—related to nuclear waste management activities.  Topics of
public discussions usually include the protection of the environment, including
foodstuff (oddly, rain and rainfall appear frequently), the risks to affected
residents, the location of waste management facilities (‘siting’), and the
relationships between discussants (‘trust’, ‘confidence’, ‘democratic’).  One
acronym often used and appearing on this list is EIA, which stands for
Environment Impact Assessment.
• Under this category, the following words are more frequently used by most
countries:  environment, public, information, siting, environmental, person,
population, local, locate, and engage.  Additional words with the highest
frequencies in one or a few countries are: cleanup (U.S.); education, pollution
(China); social (the Netherlands); discuss (Finland); EIA (Lithuania); and, society
(Switzerland).
SAC4 Vocabulary List
• The words on the list refer to controlling activities by an authority.  This list was
fairly straightforward to develop.  The activities vary from ‘soft’ control, for
instance, establishing bodies for advice, to ‘hard’ control, for example, punishing
managers through imprisonment.  
• I included the misspelled word 'jugement' because it appears often in France’s
national report and is consistently misspelled.  
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• Under this category, the following words are more frequently used by most
countries: act, regulation, licence, regulatory, ensure, decree, requirement, limit,
law, body, standard, control, licence, and government.  Additional words within
the highest frequencies in one or a few countries are: obligation (Russia), order
(Romania), authority (Slovakia and Belgium), and guide (Finland).
SAC5 Vocabulary List
• The words on this list refer to formal project collaboration among stakeholders. 
As we have seen, this collaboration can be vertical or horizontal.  Vertical
collaboration occurs between organisations within a hierarchy.  An example of 
vertical collaboration is the mayor from a community that signs an agreement with
a manager trying to locate a waste facility within the municipality.  Another
example of vertical collaboration could be an agreement among several layers of
government in one country.  Horizontal collaboration occurs among independent
organizations, like-minded or not.  An example of horizontal collaboration is an
international organization that signs an agreement with a manager to provide
advice on the project's operational activities and plans (often called ‘peer review’). 
A variation of this example would be for a manager from several countries to
participate on an international task force to come up with a best practice.  An
example of horizontal collaboration among stakeholders who are not necessarily
like-minded is the partnership among native communities and NGOs.
• On this vocabulary list, there are six acronyms that are frequently used in the
national reports.  Four of them are international organizations, and the two others 
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refer to collaborative initiatives.  The organizations are: IAEA for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (not counted in headings or footers); NEA
for the Nuclear Energy Agency; GNEP for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership;
and, WANO for the World Association of Nuclear Operators.  WANO operates
regional centers in Atlanta, Moscow, Paris, and Tokyo, and operated a
coordination center in London.  As reported on its website (www.wano.org.uk),
WANO works to support its members “in their quest for operational excellence by
helping to prevent events, minimize downturns in performance and improve
overall plant operations, thereby fulfilling WANO’s mission of maximizing safety
and reliability.  It is recognized that safe, reliable operation will increase
productivity”.
• OSART stands for Operational Safety Review Team.  The team carries out peer
reviews under the auspices of the IAEA.  The sixth and last acronym, MOU,
means Memorandum of Understanding, which are' understandings' that are
usually signed by official parties, but are less formal than 'agreements'.  
• Under this category, the following words are frequently used by most countries:
international, agreement, IAEA, transboundary, regional, territory, cooperation,
foreign, provincial, role, region, assistance, and coordination.  Words within the
highest frequencies in one or a few countries are: consent (U.S. and Slovenia);
consultation (Canada, Sweden); share (Slovenia); jurisdiction (Argentina);
transboundary (Japan); interdependency (Finland); feedback (France and South
Africa); network (France); consortium (Lithuania); and, neighboring
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(Switzerland).  In addition, under this SAC, other high frequency words were used
in a few countries representing territorial divisions.  These words are municipality,
province, and county.
SAC6 Vocabulary List
• The words on this vocabulary list refer to acknowledgment of potential future
dangers and preparations that can either avoid them or diminish their negative
consequences.  Dangers include accidents at the facility, sabotage, terrorism and
trafficking of nuclear materials.  Included in preparation activities are those with
an ongoing surveillance function.  
• Two acronyms appear on the list: INES and LOCA.  INES is the acronym for the
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.  It is a scale managed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to characterize the severity of a nuclear
incident or event (IAEA, 2009).  It is scaled from 1 to 7, 7 being the worst kind of
accident.  For example, the Chernobyl accident was classified as a level-7
accident.  As another example, severe damage to the reactor core may or may not
have off-site consequences.  If there are no off-site consequences, then the
accident would be classified at a lower level of the INES scale.  For example, the
Three Mile Island accident in the United States was classified as a level-5
accident.  
• Under this category, the following words are more frequently used by most
countries: emergency, future, accident, event, exercise, damage, crisis, hazard,
prevent, risk, and hazardous.  Words with the highest frequencies in one or a few
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countries are: criticality (U.S.); surveillance (Canada and Lithuania); security
(Canada); scenario (the Czech Republic and Slovenia); liability (Belgium);
safeguard (Argentina); lightning (Brazil); disaster (Korea); shutdown (Canada and
France); and (Slovakia).
3.5.2 Multivariate Analyses of Stakeholder Adaptive Capacity Word Frequencies
The database of SAC frequency based on the vocabulary lists is used for the
multivariate analyses using the MVSP software.  Two multivariate analyses will be
carried out to depict country and SAC associations: cluster analysis and correspondence
analysis.  These analyses are based on calculating a ‘distance’ between objects (Fielding,
2009).  Distance is not related to rulers but to measures of similarity or dissimilarity.  
Both cluster and correspondence analyses are said to be ‘ordination’ methods. 
Ordination methods aim to reduce the dimensions of data to an m (cases) x n (variables)
matrix (relationships among original data are not necessarily linear) as opposed to
‘regression’ methods which aim to produce a single response variable as a function of a
set of predictor variables (relationships among original data are assumed to be linear).  
There are two general categories of ordination methods (Fielding, 2009): classification
and geometrical.  Classification methods, which include cluster analysis, reduce the
number of n to m by placing cases into m groups on the basis of similarities among
variable ‘scores’.  Geometrical methods, which include correspondence analysis, reduce
the number of variables or cases by creating a set of new variables or cases that are
combinations of the original data, and most of these methods are based on Eigen value
analysis methods (as described further in Chapter 4).  Both cluster analysis and
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correspondence analysis are descriptive and exploratory techniques, not confirmatory
techniques.  More detailed information on each of these two types of multivariate analysis
as applied in the study follows.
Cluster analysis can use an ‘agglomerative hierarchal’ cluster technique or a
partitioning technique (Manly, 2005).  The latter technique involves arbitrarily forming a
priori groups of objects (here, countries) and then making associations with the variables. 
Most researchers using cluster analysis do not want to form a priori groups, and, instead,
the most common approach is the agglomerative approach that looks at similarities
between objects by calculating a unit of distance between pairs of objects (Manly, 2005). 
As I do not want to form a priori groupings, I adopt the agglomerative approach for the
study.
There are many different types of units, and the researcher has to select the more
appropriate one for his research.  The selection may be based of many computer iterations
to see which measure of distance fits better with the data.  I carried out such iterations and
the Euclidean distance was retained for the final analysis (the type of unit is the most
common one selected when there are more than three variables).  Using the Euclidean
distance, pairs of objects are progressively combined into similar clusters until they form
a single, hierarchical group.  Most clusters tend to be nested within others, rather than
mutually exclusive.  
The dual clustering option was used, that is, the MVSP software automatically does
the clustering of both cases and variables.  The results of the hierarchal technique are
generally presented in a treelike diagram or ‘dendrogram’ (Kovach, 2007).  Two final
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dendrograms representing the Euclidean distances were produced, one for the countries
and one for the stakeholder adaptive capacities.  
For the correspondence analysis as applied in the study, I used the Jacobi cyclic
method to calculate Eigen values (the most common method).  The Jacobi cyclic
algorithm is a numerical, geometrical, differential procedure that repeatedly performs
ellipsoid rotations for the calculation of distances between points computing all Eigen
values and vectors.  The analysis produces a list of Eigen values and corresponding vector
(i.e., coordinate values that define the orientation of the axes whose lengths are given by
the Eigen values).  Results are graphically represented on axes of variability of Eigen
values.  The major axis of Eigen values passes along through the direction of greatest
variability, the second axis identifies the second greatest direction of variability, which is
uncorrelated (orthogonal) with the first, and so on.  
Correspondence analysis portrays the results of the simultaneous ordination of both
countries and stakeholder adaptive capacities.  Again, ordination simply means a method
to reduce data to its most important influences.  The results in both the columns and rows
of the matrix, that is, the scores of countries and SACs, can be plotted on the same graph
called a joint plot.  Scores represent distances from the average row (countries) and
column profile (SAC).  The unit of distance between any two points on the joint plot is
analogous to the Euclidean distance.  
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3.6 Reliability Issues
The combining of qualitative and quantitative analyses as carried out in this study is
expected to be a reasonable and practical way to produce robust findings.  There are,
however, certain reliability limitations of the original data and of methods used.  These
limitations could have an impact of the validity of any study findings.
3.6.1 Reliability of the Original Data
The original data for this research is the information contained in the national reports
submitted by contracting parties under the Joint Convention.  These reports tend to be the
results of consultations among many domestic stakeholders, but in the end they are
written by government officials.  Such documents tend to be written in a neutral and
bureaucratic language common to all countries.  For the more technical sections of the
national reports, the jargon used by various countries is similar.  
Generally, the terminology used in the national reports is influenced by that of the
Joint Convention and its supporting and precursor documents.  The common language in
the reports as well as the form and structure of the report dictated by consensus by the
Joint Convention contracting parties lead to high comparability of the national reports. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible that some national reports differ in amount of bias. 
Possible origins of this bias include the use of the national reports to send subtle
extraneous messages, the writing style of the person with the pen, and cultural differences
among the selected countries.  Any bias will need to be kept in mind when discussing the
results of the study.
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The total number of words in the IAEA national reports is around two million words. 
This quantity compares well with other studies using computer-assisted content analysis,
particularly in communication sciences (Danowski, 2009; Fan & McAvoy, 2009). 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that there will necessarily be a plethora of policy data
points for the time series analysis included in the study.  Therefore, particular attention
will have to be paid to uncertainty bands on the time series analysis, and gathering
adequate qualitative contextual information on both internal and external factors.  
3.6.2 Reliability of the Methods
Content Analysis
The method of content analysis often involves some errors when carried out
manually.  In order to reduce at least some of the errors for the study, I use computer-
assisted content analysis.  I initially selected software packages that were user-friendly,
operated within Microsoft Windows, and that included database management, content
analysis, and statistical analyses (see detailed results of the survey in Appendix 3).  Then
from a list of a dozen software packages, I considered two software solutions for the
study:
1) The NVIVO 8 database management and content analysis software with SAS or
SPSS for statistical analyses; and, 
2) The QDA Miner/WordStat database management and content analysis software
(Péladeau, 2007) with SimStat (Péladeau, 2007) and MVSP for statistical analyses
(Kovach, 2007).  
161
I selected the latter option because importing from the database software to the
statistical software was easier, and because reviews were more favorable to it overall. 
Computer analysis, however, does have its limitations, including the consideration of
misspelled words, non meaningful repetitions such as headings and footers, and different
meanings of the same word.  Researchers, however, can usually get around most of these
limitations by becoming very familiar with the original data.
 Computer-assisted content analysis easily allows for multiple iterations by varying
the words on a vocabulary list.  Sensitivity analysis can be carried out.  However, unless
the first half-dozen words with the highest frequencies are changed, varying other words
does not notably change the results of the multivariate analyses.  And it is not likely that
the words with the highest frequencies would be ambiguous, given that they are likely to
best represent the category of the vocabulary list. 
 Despite the low sensitivity of changing most words in the vocabulary lists, computer
iterations are useful because they result in the researcher becoming even more familiar
with the data sets.  This familiarity with the empirical data, along with the general
knowledge and expertise of the researcher in the field of study, can increase the
probability of discovering any deep-seated patterns (Popping, 2000).  For this type of
research that involves both quantitative and qualitative information, and that is
exploratory in nature, much room is left to the researcher in interpreting results.  
The subjectivity in interpretation, however, can be minimized.  As previously
mentioned, I consider all reported events in the national reports that were accompanied
with a date as a policy event and attach no positive or negative value to the policy events. 
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Since the contracting party thought it important enough to publicly report the policy event
to the international community, I apply no personal screening in selecting policy events.  
Statistical Analyses
There are also some subjectivity issues related to the statistical analyses.  Chatfield
(2004) cautions that statistical time series analysis can present practical difficulties, in
particular, the subjective decision of whether to transform and/or difference the data. 
Another example of residual subjectivity associated with time series analysis resides
within the meaning given to the autocorrelation coefficients and their correlogram.  
Although multivariate analyses can be very useful where complex relationships are
suspected, Manly (2005) cautions that they are mainly exploratory tools (no significant
statistical levels that would confirm inferences) and their results are highly subjected to
the researcher’s interpretation of the results.  To reduce some subjectivity in interpreting
results from multivariate analysis, scholars recommend the complementary combination
of multivariate analyses (for instance, Doré et al., 1996).  Lastly, the final country
groupings are reasonable not only because of the complementarity of the multivariate
analyses, but because country contextual information was also considered during the
interpretation of the results.
 Furthermore, the comparative nature of the study refers to relative differences among
countries, not to absolute results.  Any subjective bias influencing the interpretation of the
results is likely consistent among all countries.  Therefore, conclusions derived from
relative results should not be unduly affected by any subjectivity introduced by the
researcher. 
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
In this chapter, I present the results derived from analysing the time series of nuclear
waste management policy events for each of the 23 countries and from the multivariate
analyses on word count frequencies representing each of the six stakeholder adaptive
capacities.  First, I evaluate H1 (cf. national policies exhibit chaotic developmental
patterns) using a time series analysis.  Second, I evaluate H2 (cf. relative influence of
system drivers) using multivariate analyses.
The results of testing the first hypothesis show that there is some suggestion of
chaotic patterns characterizing the broad development of nuclear waste management
policies; hence, the development is not random.  The results of testing the second
hypothesis identify three internal factors underlying suggested chaotic patterns of the
development of nuclear waste management policies as key system drivers.  The chapter
ends with an assessment of the reliability of the results.  
4.1 Time Series Analyses of Policy Events for Evaluating H1
The first of the two hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 refers to broad system
developmental patterns.  I expect that the development of complex social-environmental
systems exhibits chaotic patterns of development.  To evaluate the hypothesis, I combine
qualitative and quantitative research in a comparative case study of national nuclear waste
management policies.  To that end, I prepared a time series of yearly nuclear waste
management policy events for each of the 23 countries.  The database and the time series
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plot for each of the countries can be found in Appendix 4.  The time series cover between
three and five decades, but most time series encompass four decades.  Information was
derived from the time series by plotting country graphs for descriptive and statistical
analyses.
4.1.1 Country Graphs of the Time Series
A database was produced that contains the frequency of policy events per year for
each country.  The database was used to create the country series.  Chatfield (2004)
argues three possible objectives of analysing time series that may be classified as
description, explanation, and prediction and control.  For the study, the aim of the time
series analyses focuses on the first two objectives.  
With respect to the first objective of description, Chatfield (2004) recommends as a
first important step the plotting of the observations against time.  Plots will show trends,
seasonal variations, outliers, sudden or gradual changes, turning points, and
discontinuities.  The next section will introduce the main diagnostic tool used to help
describe the evolution of a process through time (Chatfield, 2004).  The section on time
series will end with possible explanations of information derived form the time series
analyses.
The results from plotting the policy events for each country’s time series led to three
main observations.  First, most graph general profiles have compelling similarities. 
Second, on a more detailed level, the graph profiles show country differences on the
presence or absence of policy event high-frequency peaks.  Third, these peaks were
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situated amongst country contextual information to explore whether external factors
might explain them.  The following further describes these three observations.
Observation 1: Generality Similarity of Country Profiles: Highest Peak in the Later Years
Due to other operational priorities, nuclear utilities have not been aggressive in
developing a disposal plan for their waste, and have mostly managed their nuclear waste
by placing them in interim storage (NEA, 2008).  However, because of recent
developments as of the 1990s, countries are focusing more than in the past on the
development of nuclear waste management policies  (NEA, 2008a).  These developments
include the end of the life of reactors and their decommissioning, and increasing space
limitations for interim storage of nuclear waste at nuclear reactor sites. 
 Another reason for countries to now focus on the development of nuclear waste
management policies is the increasing recognition that, because many countries have
similar waste management challenges, solutions to these challenges can more easily and
coherently be developed through collaborative efforts at the international level.  These
international efforts were facilitated by the development of the 2001 Joint Convention
and subsequent regular mandatory national compliance reporting.  In view of these
reasons, I expect that the number of policy events would have gradually increased since
the operation of the first commercial nuclear power plant followed by a sharper rise
within a few years leading to the entry into force of the 2001 Joint Convention.
From the policy event calibrated database, and using the SimStat software, I plotted
times series graphs.  An example is shown in Figure 2 and represents Argentina’s time
series.  The time series plot for the other countries can be found in Appendix 4.  The
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dotted horizontal lines represent the mean and the upper limit of the 95% confidence
interval of the mean.  I assume that the time series is ‘stationary’, that is, I assume that
there is no change in mean over time in the system development model, at least not over
the several decades examined within a same country.  In addition to the time series curve,
a lower curve represents exponential smoothing of the time plot using an alpha
coefficient of 0.5.  The use of this coefficient means that I gave less weight to later
observations and more weight to the earlier years, because the reporting of events in the
later years may be biased in view of more available information.  
Figure 2. Example of a Typical Country Time Series 
(Argentina Time Series; the plot for the other countries can be found in Appendix 4.  The lower curve
represents exponential smoothing of the time plot at alpha=0.5.  The left vertical line represents the
time of operation of the first commercial nuclear power plant; the right vertical line represents entry
into force of the Joint Convention in 2001; the dotted horizontal lines represent the mean and upper
limit of the 95% confidence level of the mean). 
167
Within the time series graphs, the left vertical full line represents the first year of
operation of the first commercial nuclear power plant (varies with country), and the right
vertical full line represents the year of entry into force of the Joint Convention in 2001.  I
particularly focus on this time interval because this period may more likely provide
insight into country specific differences, that is, after a country has fully committed to the
nuclear energy option and before maximum convergence at the international level on
nuclear waste management best practices.  Examining this section of the graphs, I
conclude that most country time series show the same broad trend.  Initially, the yearly
frequency of policy events showed small increases from year to year probably reflecting
some national thinking on nuclear waste management policies.  Then, the graphs show a
slightly more abrupt increase in the later years (the mid-1990s) of the selected time
interval possibly caused by the impetus provided by the development the Joint
Convention.
Most countries followed this profile.  China and Romania are the exceptions. They
are the latest newcomers to nuclear power: China’s first nuclear power plant started in
1994 and that of Romania in 1996.  China focused on developing reprocessing facilities
even before operating a first commercial nuclear power plant.  By the time the country
operated its first commercial plant—perhaps due to new economic and defense
development policies of Xiaoping—it could immediately join international efforts toward
the development of the Joint Convention.  Romania's late arrival may be due to political
issue with the Ceausescu regime.  After his execution in 1989, the country started
rebuilding itself.  As in the case of China, by the time Romania’s first nuclear power plant
168
started to operate, it could join international efforts on the Joint Convention.  Therefore
the time plots of these two countries do not show the initial period of national thinking.
Observation 2: Characteristics of Frequency Peaks
Although the time series showed that most countries have the same general profile, I
anticipated that the time series could show differences among countries based on nuclear
waste management policy differences on the general strategy adopted for the back-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle.  We saw in Chapter 1 that three strategies are generally
encountered, namely, direct disposal of nuclear waste into a deep geological repository,
recycling the waste through reprocessing and burning, and a wait-and-see strategy.  
From the information in the Joint Convention national reports and from other sources
(see country backgrounders in Appendix 2), it is clear that some countries tend to forge
ahead by adopting state-of-the-art nuclear fuel cycle technology policies, whether in an ad
hoc way or based on a clear long-term strategy.  Others countries have formally stated
that they have adopted a wait-and-see strategy.  They may want to benefit from the
experience in forge-ahead countries or need to address specific contextual conditions
before adopting any general strategy for the back-end of their nuclear fuel cycle (NEA,
2008a). 
 The study does not attribute any value to forge-ahead countries as opposed to wait-
and-see countries.  Countries have their own reasons for policy development.  Despite
these reasons, Berry and Beer (2007) report that, based on the 'Leader-Laggard' model,
some states are more highly regarded than others, and policy-makers are more likely to
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turn to those states for cues.  The Leader-Laggard model assumes that states emulate each
other for learning purposes rather than competitive or political reasons.
Wait-and-see countries are currently delaying the ultimate disposal of nuclear waste
for several reasons, possibly including technical, political, economic reasons.  For
instance, they may be considering country collaborations or partnerships to spread the
financial risks.  Or they may want to consider the outcome of activities related to broader
national energy policies.  Delays in nuclear waste policy development, however, need to
be balanced with some risks.  
The Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC) of the NEA cautions that a
wait-and-see strategy requires more demanding care for the waste and its interim storage
facilities (NEA, 2008a).  For instance, over the long term, the waste stored at or near the
surface are more vulnerable to extreme natural events or terrorism than waste disposed
deep underground.  The RWMC (NEA, 2008) therefore recommends that existing
information is sufficient to “take the first steps and put a plan in place ......commensurate
with the current generations’ responsibility” (p.10).
I expect that the number of policy events would be different with each strategy: a
relatively lower number of policy events would be associated with a wait-and-see
strategy, and the highest number of policy events with the recycling strategy (which is a
much more complex strategy than the two others).  I consider that peaks falling above the
95% confidence interval of the mean of the time series to be high-frequency peaks and I
call them primary peaks.  
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The times series indicate that there are differences in the number of primary peaks. 
Table 3 lists the countries that have and do not have primary peaks (it is noteworthy to
indicate that if the exponential smoothing curve was considered, no country time series
except for South Africa would contain primary peaks in the period examined).
Table 3.  Countries by Primary Peak and Strategy for the Back-End of 
the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
NO. 
PRIMARY
PEAKS
COUNTRY AND ITS STRATEGY FOR THE BACK-END OF 
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
Wait-and-See Countries Direct Disposal 
Forge-Ahead Countries
Reprocessing and Burn 
Forge-Ahead Countries
0 Belgium  
Korea 
The Netherlands 
Slovakia 
Ukraine
Slovenia 
Romania
Canada 
Sweden 
United States 
Switzerland 
China 
France 
Japan 
The United Kingdom
1 or 2 Argentina (2)
Brazil (1)
Czech Republic (1) 
Hungary (1)
Lithuania (1)
South Africa (2)
Finland (1) Russia (1)
The grouping of countries by primary peaks, however, does not show a relationship
with the adopted general strategy for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.  For example,
the time series of all the major reprocessing countries except for Russia have no primary
peaks, and the time series of many wait-and-see countries have 1 or 2 primary peaks.  At
first glance, the wait-and-see countries that have 1 or 2 more primary peaks appear to be
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the more politically unstable over the past couple of decades or so.  This could also
explain why Russia is separated from the other reprocessing countries in Table 3.  So
rather than internal factors steadily forging or controlling the way ahead toward major
policy development exercises, perhaps the presence of primary peaks is an indicator is of
the influence of a country’s external contextual factors.  These external factors may
produce an unstable system leading in turn to the reactive development of nuclear waste
management policies.  This leads us to our third general observation.
Observation 3: Possible External or Internal Factors Leading to High-Frequency Peaks
From Table 3, one could speculate about factors possibly explaining the separation of 
countries into two, three, or six groups:
• The separation into two groups based on the presence of primary peaks could
perhaps be explained by factors causing general instability of the system;
•  The separation into three groups based on the general strategy for the back-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle could perhaps be explained by national defense, energy, and
environmental policies; and,
• The separation into six groups based on the presence of primary peaks and general
strategy could perhaps be explained by a combination of unstable country
contextual conditions and national defense, energy, and environmental policies.
 Given the results in Table 3 and country contextual information, I suspect that the
separation into six groups is more reasonable.  For example, Russia is the only country
separated from the reprocessing and burn country club, and that may be due to political
instability and financial crisis external factors.  For another example, Finland is the only
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country separated from the direct disposal country club, and this may be due to either
external financial crises or internal cultural factors. 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, scholars have long tried to distinguish among the influence
of internal and external factors with respect to system development.  By using the
Keyword-Within-Context (KWIC) function of the WordStat content analysis software to
investigate the main policy events forming high-frequency peaks and by consulting
contextual information from other sources, we can attempt to suggest factors leading to
the formation of primary peaks.
In Appendix 4, I annotated the time series with suggested explanations for primary
peaks and some secondary peaks.  Policy events contributing to the formation of primary
peaks cover many topical activities.  These topics include new legislation, major new
policies (for instance, a new strategy for the nuclear fuel cycle, and the establishment of
emergency plans), the creation of key new organizations, the construction of new waste
management facilities, and new practices (for instance, the return of spent fuel to Russia
by satellite countries after the fall of the USSR in 1989).  Possible factors leading to the
formation of primary and secondary peaks would appear to be both endogenous and
exogenous.  To illustrate this assumption, several examples follow.
The first example refers to the impact of political changes as external factors in Brazil
and Russia.  Change in the country’s constitution in Brazil may have had less direct
impact on nuclear waste management policies than the fall of the Soviet Union had in ex-
Soviet satellite countries.  In the case of the satellite countries, the waste was to be sent
back to Russia for mainly two reasons: 1) all the newly independent countries did not
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necessarily want to manage this waste over the long term; and, 2) Russia considers that it
owns the waste and some of this waste is still valuable (for possible extraction of more
energy).  In the case of Brazil, the new constitution of 1988 brought back democratic
institutions, but there appears to be no direct and immediate impact on Brazil’s nuclear
energy program from this political change (Almeida, 2000) [over a longer term, due to
more political stability, a return to economic growth policies by the mid-1990s in Brazil
sped up the completion of the Angra II nuclear power plant (Pike, 2009)].
The second example refers to the impact of economic changes as external factors in
China and Finland.  We note in its time series that China is relatively late in using nuclear
energy for the production of electricity (but was an early entrant in the development of
nuclear weapons).  The first operation of a commercial nuclear power plant occurred only
in 1994.  The year 1978, however, marks the point where the annual frequency of policy
events starts to increase.  This corresponds exactly to the time when Dung Xiaoping’s
thinking on economic development took off (as opposed to those of the era of Mao
Zedong) (Hammond, 2004).  Therefore, I suggest that changes in the economic status of
the country eventually had a major impact on the use of nuclear energy, and therefore the
development of nuclear waste management policies.  Contrary to China, the economic
crisis in Finland in the late 1990s possibly lead to more moderate impacts and only a
secondary peak is noted in Finland's time series at year 1999.  This suggests that
economic turning points in both countries may have led to different degrees of impact
(however, the secondary peak in Finland is close to being a primary peak).
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The third example refers to the impacts of  nuclear accidents as internal or external
factors in the Ukraine and in Brazil.  Such accidents can lead to responsive policy
development (e.g., emergency preparedness, interim storage for radioactive waste) either
by waste managers (internal factors) or, more exceptionally, by political directive in
unstable times.  Two such notable nuclear accidents have occurred in the Ukraine in 1986
*still within the Soviet Union) and in Brazil in 1987 (these accidents are further
elaborated on in Section 5.2.2).  No primary peaks or even clearly high secondary peaks
are noted in the time series of these two countries immediately following the accidents.  If
such peaks had occurred, it would be difficult to assess whether the rise in policy
development was due to the response by waste managers or due to political directives
during unstable times (e.g., a new constitution for Brazil resulting from politically
unstable times and the fall of the Soviet Union).
Moreover, a comparison between the policy response to these accidents in both
countries would be difficult for a few more reasons: 1) the accident in the Ukraine was
more severe than the one in Brazil (the first classified as a Level-7 accident on the INES
scale, the second, a Level-5 accident); and, 2) if an accident of the same level of intensity
occurred in these two countries, their response could be different since the Ukraine, as a
wealthier region than Brazil (as reported by the World Bank), could potentially better
cope with the aftermath of the accident. 
The above examples highlight that assessing the influence of internal and external
factors is not straightforward.  The same factor could have different effects in different
countries and at different times.  Despite this uncertainty, the few encountered primary
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peaks could  mostly be linked to major external factors.  Hence, the country time series
suggest that policy development has mostly been influenced by internal factors and
appear resilient to many external perturbations.  On occasion, an external factor may be of
sufficient magnitude to destabilize and disrupt an already weakened system (e.g., a
developing country or a 'fragile' state as defined by Marshall and Cole, 2008).  This
general conclusion on the relative influence of internal and external factors on the
development of nuclear waste policies is consistent with many theoretical and empirical
studies within the policy science literature (Anderson, 2006; Kingdon, 2003).
The analysis of the time series profiles can stimulate thinking on broad system
developmental patterns.  Findings may be possible on periods of change (evolutionary
breaks, discontinuities, reorientations, or transformations).  A certain period of change
might simply reflect a temporary break or discontinuity from a linear path (steady-state
system).  Or a period of change might represent a step toward another phase within a
cyclical pattern of evolution.  Or, as explained by complex theory, a period of change
could represent either a 'random walk' to another equilibrium point of the complex
system, or a 'point of bifurcation' leading to either system disintegration or system
transformation into a new system, or more pragmatically here, window of opportunity for
policy change.  To help characterize these periods of change, quantitative statistical
analysis of time series—for example, the calculation of autocorrelation coefficients—can
be useful, as explained in the next section.  
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4.1.2 Statistical Analysis of the Time Series: Autocorrelation
Time series analysis can also provide insight into underlying patterns of system
development over time, not through visual inspection as was the case in the previous
section, but from statistical analysis on the relationship between consecutive data points
over time.  More specifically, statistical analyses are carried out to see whether underlying
patterns are linear, periodic, or chaotic.  To determine this relationship or 'pattern',
autocorrelation coefficients are calculated.  As presented in Chapter 3, autocorrelation is
the serial correlation for a variable of a time series resulting from the fact that the value of
a datum at time t is dependent on the value of that datum at time t - (1 or higher time lag)
(Chatfield, 2004).  
As described by Garson (2008), when no autocorrelation exists, data points
representing actual values will be randomly scattered around the full length of the series. 
Negative autocorrelation exists when as one moves along the x axis, the next observation
tends to be lower than the previous one, then the next one higher, then lower, and so on,
indicating a negative or reactive dependency.  In some cases, this dependency could
possibly indicate a cyclical pattern involving feedback.  Positive autocorrelation exists
when as one moves along the x axis, there is a series of above-the-line observations, then
series of below-the-line observations, then more highs, etc., indicating a positive or
inertial dependency.  A long-term positive autocorrelation may indicate a linear pattern
(Chatfield, 2004).  Some scholars find all three types of autocorrelations within their field
of study, for example, scholars studying breathing patterns (Jubran et al., 1997).
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When plotted, the autocorrelation coefficients of a time series form a correlogram (or
an autocorrelation plot) as in Figure 3.  The correlogram is a commonly-used tool for
checking randomness in a time series data set (Chatfield, 2004).  A standard error is
attributed to each autocorrelation coefficient, and the correlogram shows the upper and
lower bounds.  If the autocorrelation is higher (lower) than this upper (lower) bound, then
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation at and beyond a given lag is rejected. 
Accompanying this analysis is the significance test for autocorrelation in a time series
(Garson, 2008).  This test evaluates the significance (P) of autocorrelation coefficient at
each lag at the level of 5% for rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no
autocorrelation.  P should be less than or equal to 0.05 in which case autocorrelation is
assumed (and not randomness).
Autocorrelation coefficients and corresponding correlograms for each of the 23
countries can be found in Appendix 5.  All countries show the same general correlogram
profile than the one shown in Figure 3 (U.S. example).  The first few autocorrelation
coefficients are positive (in Figure 3, the first four coefficients are positive), the first one
being relatively high (in Figure 3, it is 0.86).  Then the coefficients decrease rapidly
toward coefficients considered to be zero.  No coefficient is negative.  The general profile
of the correlogram in Figure 3 represents ‘short-term correlation’ (Chatfield, 2004).  Such
a profile consists of a few positive autocorrelation coefficients decreasing toward zero.
Coefficients at longer lags are considered to be zero.  Chatfield (2004) explains that “a
time series that gives rise to such a correlogram is one for which an observation above the
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 Lag   corr.   S.E.    P                             -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                                 +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .863   .101   .000                                                .    ****.*************   
     2    .680   .159   .000                                              .      ******.********      
     3    .519   .187   .006                                             .       *******.***          
     4    .399   .201   .050                                            .        ********.            
     5    .336   .209   .111                                             .       ********.            
     6    .262   .214   .224                                             .       ******  .            
     7    .171   .218   .433                                            .        ****     .           
     8    .099   .219   .653                                            .        ***      .           
     9    .053   .219   .811                                            .        **       .           
    10    .048   .220   .828                                           .        **       .           
    11    .032   .220   .883                                           .        **       .           
    12    .020   .220   .927                                           .        *        .           
    13    .002   .220   .994                                           .        *        .           
    14   -.015   .220   .945                                           .        *        .           
    15   -.002   .220   .993                                           .        *        .           
    16   -.009   .220   .966                                           .        *        .           
    17   -.020   .220   .929                                           .        *        .           
    18   -.001   .220   .997                                           .        *        .           
    19    .007   .220   .974                                            .        *        .           
    20    .026   .220   .905                                            .      **       .           
    21    .025   .220   .909                                            .      **       .           
    22    .022   .220   .921                                            .        *        .           
    23    .025   .220   .909                                            .      **       .           
    24    .017   .220   .939                                            .        *        .           
    25    .020   .220   .927                                            .        *        .           
    26    .018   .220   .934                                            .        *        .           
    27    .014   .220   .951                                            .        *        .           
    28    .012   .220   .957                                            .        *        .           
    29    .004   .220   .985                                            .        *        .           
    30    .007   .220   .974                                            .        *        .
Figure 3.  Example of a Typical Correlogram and Autocorrelation Coefficients 
(the United States Time Series; dotted line indicated 5 % confidence level)
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Table 4.  Country Autocorrelation Coefficients and Significant Lags
Country Autocorrelation Coefficient at Lag
1 (mostly moderately high)
Number of Lags Greater
than Zero (P < 0.05)
Argentina 0.453 4
Belgium 0.54 7
Brazil 0.8 3
Canada 0.685 3
China 0.612 4
The Czech Republic 0.691 5
Finland 0.642 2
France 0.671 1
Hungary 0.783 4
Japan 0.813 3
Korea 0.294 0
Lithuania 0.802 4
The Netherlands 0.857 3
Romania 0.583 4
The Russian Federation 0.604 3
Slovakia 0.648 2
Slovenia 0.582 3
South Africa 0.516 2
Sweden 0.678 3
Switzerland 0..719 4
The Ukraine 0.783 3
The United Kingdom 0.77 2
The United States 0.863 4
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mean tends to be followed by one or more further observation above the mean, and 
similarly for observations below the mean” (p.24).  As raised in Chapter 3, some scholars
suggest that the determination of short-term correlation may be sufficient to suggest the
presence of non-randomness, even possibly chaotic patterns (NIST, 2006; Basu &
Foufoula-Georgiou, 2002). Table 4 shows the autocorrelation coefficients for all the
countries as well as the significant lags.  For the first few years (from 1 to 7, but mostly 2,
3, or 4 years), the coefficients are positive and rapidly decrease to lower coefficients
considered to be zero.  The positive initial coefficient ranges from 0.45 (Argentina) to
0.86 (the Netherlands), but mostly approach 0.7 or 0.8.  An autocorrelation coefficient of
0.75 is considered to be a moderately high autocorrelation (NIST, 2006).  
None of the country correlograms show any alternating positive and negative
autocorrelation coefficients, therefore, there is no indication of any obvious pattern of
cycles over the period covered by the time series.  Instead, the correlograms consist of a
moderately high value of autocorrelation coefficient followed by a few coefficients,
which, while not considered to be zero, are successively smaller, and all subsequent
values tend to be zero.  Such a profile is said to exhibit short-term correlation (Chatfield,
2004)
Short-term correlation means that an observation above the mean tends to be followed
by one or more further observations above the mean, and similarly for observations below
the mean.  The presence of short-term correlation indicates linearity with some
randomness, and this pattern provides moderate predictability over the short-term (NIST,
2006).  The characteristic of alternating order and disorder is a theoretical hallmark of a
181
chaotic pattern (Kauffman, 1995).  There is one country that does not follow the broad
pattern just described for the other countries: Korea.  All autocorrelation coefficients for
Korea are considered to be zero.  The time series therefore suggests complete
randomness.  At first glance, there is no obvious reason why Korea is the only exception. 
However, I will offer some suggested explanations for Korea's unique situation in
Chapter 5.  
In conclusion, the time series analyses suggest that the development of nuclear fuel
waste management policies follows a chaotic pattern.  Therefore, there is supporting
quantitative evidence for the study’s first hypothesis (H1) that the development of certain
social-environmental systems exhibits chaotic patterns.  As such, the social-
environmental system can be considered as complex.  The results from the time series
analyses are further discussed in Chapter 5.
According to complexity theory, if a system is ‘complex’, then there are a few key
factors driving the whole system.  Key system drivers may be external or internal factors.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the study is mainly focused on internal key system drivers,
more specifically on stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs).  The results from statistical
analyses applied to the six SACs are reported in the next section.  
4.2 Multivariate Analyses of Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities for Evaluating H2
The time series analysis on the 23 countries suggests that social-environmental
problems may be complex.  Complexity theory postulates that only a handful (3) of key
factors are instrumental in driving the whole system.  This alleviates the need to focus on
many factors within project management programs.  The second hypothesis of the study
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is that key internal systems can be identified from a set of potential factors through
qualitative and quantitative research.
Six factors were selected as described in Chapter 3: learning by managers (SAC1);
social responsibility of manages (SAC2); public participation in decision-making
processes (SAC3); government oversight (SAC4); formal project collaboration (SAC5);
and, emergency preparedness (SAC6).  The factors were selected because of their
mention in the literature for being important for sustainable development.   For
illustrative purposes, sustainable development was selected as the management goal for
the development of nuclear waste management policies. 
I had no expectation as to the relative influence of the six selected factors on whole
system development.  I therefore carried out exploratory multivariate analyses (as
opposed to confirmatory analyses) on the results of a computer-assisted conceptual
content analysis of policy documents.  These policy documents selected were the 2008
IAEA Joint Conventional national policy document of each of the 23 countries.  I built a
database of SAC word frequency counts from the 2008 Joint Convention national reports. 
A vocabulary list for each of the six SACs was developed as described in Chapter 3.  The
WordStat software counted each word on the vocabulary list.  These frequencies were
added together to get the final count for that SAC for each country.  Therefore, a 6 x 23
database matrix was constructed.  
This database needed to be calibrated in view of the various lengths of the national
reports.  The lengths of the reports range from 30237 substantive words for Switzerland
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to 94480 substantive words for France.  A calibration to the mean was carried out on the
datum in each cell of the 6 x 23 database.  The calibrated database can be found in
Table 5.  Calibrated Country-SAC Frequency Database for the Multivariate Analyses
Country SAC1 SAC2 SAC3 SAC4 SAC5 SAC6
Argentina 590.8 547.4 347.4 2063.4 471.7 403
Belgium 505.7 480.4 385 1563 392.9 537.2
Brazil 578.8 470.3 523.3 1261 258.4 376
Canada 443.4 567.3 877.4 1852.3 484.7 450.9
China 594 374.8 752.7 2000.4 269.3 750
Czech 361 326.6 359.1 1912.9 225.4 430.7
Finland 558.1 479.8 462.7 1975.5 243.6 441.9
France 589.4 373.9 520.2 1694.7 316.3 462.6
Hungary 494.8 548.3 515.6 1845.6 286.8 540.9
Japan 679.6 736.3 478.3 2480.3 298.5 708.4
Korea 590.8 455.3 738.2 2241.7 285.1 588.6
Lithuania 370.9 363.3 656.1 1971.4 274.4 403.2
Netherlands 431.2 490.8 616.4 1771.6 242.2 611.2
Romania 529 368.2 423.2 1779.3 391.6 470
Russia 407.6 635.7 593.4 2416.9 334.4 540.8
Slovakia 416.6 775.5 474.2 2331.8 289.5 437.5
Slovenia 472.8 516.9 603.8 1617.4 326.3 462.1
South Africa 359.3 456.9 484.5 2221.1 310.6 583.7
Sweden 538.7 612.5 529.5 2465.1 287.2 389.3
Switzerland 343.8 394.2 457.2 2550.6 309.6 396
Ukraine 566.2 584.2 516.8 1703.2 376 465.9
U.K. 321.3 505 610.7 1806.9 256.5 442.2
United States 497.8 547.7 735.3 2464.2 380.3 562
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 Table 5.  This database is the basis for the multivariate analyses. Table 5 highlights the
following salient characteristics of SAC frequency:
• SAC4, that is, government oversight, presents the highest SAC word count
frequencies for each country.  The counts varied between 1000 and 2500.  This
was not surprising since the national reports focus on safety issues.
• SAC5, which focuses on project stakeholder collaboration, has the lowest
frequencies relative to all other SACs.  Word counts varied between 225 and 490. 
Suggested reasons for the low count will be discussed later in Chapter 6.
• The relative importance of the other four SACs varied widely from country to
country.  Frequencies range from the 300s up to the 700-800 word count range.
These observations relate to individual SACs of individual countries.  Through visual
inspection, it is more difficult to assess the relative importance given to each SAC by
each country as compared to the other countries.  In order to tease out such relationships
among the SACs and countries, two multivariate analyses were carried out: cluster
analysis and correspondence analysis.  The combination of cluster analysis and
correspondence analysis was found to be complementary and provided useful insight into
the relationships among countries and stakeholder adaptive capacities. 
4.2.1 Cluster Analysis Results
As raised in Chapter 3, I use the agglomerative hierarchal clustering technique.
‘Agglomerative’ is another word for clustering or grouping through pairings. 
‘Hierarchal’ means that the grouping is carried out in a sequential manner through
examining pairs of bigger and bigger groups.  Variants of agglomerative analyses have
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been developed that differ with respect to the method used to measure similarities or
dissimilarities between group pairs.  These variants are usually based on the selection of
different points between which distances are measured.  
The most common method for measuring distance is the Unweighted Pair-Group
Method using Averages (UPGMA).  The distance between two clusters is the average
distance between all inter-cluster pairs (Kovach, 2007).  ‘Unweighted’ means that equal
weight is given to each point within each cluster.  Scholars who have much experience in
using UPGMA observe that this clustering method is generally more ‘balanced’ than
other methods, for instance, the nearest or furthest neighbor methods (Kovach, 2007). 
‘Balanced’ means that UPGMA is generally preferred since it is based on information
about all inter-cluster pairs, not just the nearest or furthest neighbor.  
There are more than two dozen dissimilarity or similarity measures of ‘distance’
(Kovach, 2007).  Measures include Euclidean, metric, chord, and chi-square distances. 
The Euclidean measure is often used when more than three variables are being studied
(which is our case).  The Euclidean distance is the spatial distance among matrix
coordinates when plotted.  The Euclidean distance is the square root of the sum of the
square of the x distance plus the square of the y distance (this is the formula for the length
of the third side of a right triangle).  
Cluster analysis offers a mathematical approximation of similarity or dissimilarity
between component pairs to suggest various groupings.  It remains an exploratory tool
and is up to the researcher to decide if any of these groupings make sense.  Groupings
may be modified depending on information from other sources, for instance, other
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multivariate analyses on the same data set, knowledge derived from theoretical concepts,
empirical data or the researcher’s experience.
The MVSP software was used to apply the cluster analysis on the calibrated
databases.  It produced the dendrogram in Figure 4 and the cluster report in Table 6 for
the clustering of countries, and the dendrogram in Figure 5 and the cluster report in
Table 7 for the clustering of the SACs.  Before examining these results, a few guidelines
on how to read dendrograms may be useful for clarity.  “Dendros” in Latin means tree. 
The base of the tree is to the right of the graph (roots).  There is a scale at the bottom of
the graph that goes from the base of the tree upwards.  The larger the distance, the more
dissimilar the groups.
Nodes are the meeting point between pair of groups.  Their numbering increases from
right to left in the dendrogram.  The higher the node number, the less connected are the
components with the suggested cluster.  In Figure 4, the bottom scale represents the
Euclidean distance from 0 to 720.  There are 22 nodes.  The nodes closest to the base of
the tree (roots) represent the closest pairings (lower numbered nodes of Table 6).  The
nodes at the top of the tree loosely link paired groups.
In Figure 4 and Table 6, any parings over a distance of 360 are relatively more loosely
connected.  Countries are not closely linked to any of the other countries are South
Africa, Switzerland, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada.  The pairing of China and
Korea is loosely connected to all the other countries.  The dendrogram shows that the
remaining countries can be grouped into two or three groups. 
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Figure 5 and Table 7 show MVSP’s suggested groupings of stakeholder adaptive
capacities.  The Euclidean scale varies from 0 to 9600.  We first observe that five out of
the six stakeholder adaptive capacities are below 1600, and the distance between this
group and SAC4 is 8000.  That means that SAC4 has frequencies that are notably much
different from those of all the other SACs.  This difference is not too surprising and was
noted by simple visualization of the database.
Figure 4.  Dendrogram of Country Clusters
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Table 6.  Country Cluster Report
Node Group 1 Group 2 Dissimilarity (rounded) Objects in Group
1 France Romania 161 2
2 Hungary Netherlands 172 2
3 Slovenia Ukraine 175 2
4 USA Russia 202 2
5 Node 2 U.K. 218 3
6 Node 3 Belgium 245 3
7 Node 6 Node 1 250 5
8 Sweden Slovakia 254 2
9 Finland Czech Republic 278 2
10 Node 8 Node 4 289 4
11 Node 5 Lithuania 293 4
12 Korea China 300 2
13 Node 11 Node 9 315 6 
14 Node 13 Node 7 347 11
15 Node 10 South Africa 364 5
16 Node 15 Switzerland 380 6
17 Node 16 Japan 449 7 
18 Node 14 Argentina 481 12
19 Canada Node 18 489 13
20 Node 17 Node 12 517 9 
21 Node 19 Brazil 610 14
22 Node 21 Node 20 694 23
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Figure 5.  Dendrogram of SAC Clusters
Table 7.  SAC Cluster Report
Node Group 1 Group 2 Dissimilarity (rounded) Objects in Group
1 SAC1 SAC6 547 2
2 Node 1 SAC2 665 3
3 Node 2 SAC3 803 4
4 Node 3 SAC5 1100 5
5 Node 4 SAC4 7508 6
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More difficult to visualize perhaps from the database is the relationship among the
other SACs.  From Figure 5 and Table 7, we can see that SAC1 and SAC6 are the most
closely connected pair.  SAC1 refers to learning by managers and SAC^ to emergency
preparedness. It may not be so surprising that these two SAC2 are closely linked because
emergency preparedness involves exercises and drills that take into account lessons
learned from past events and the results of emergency exercises (Somers, 2009: Weng,
2009; Weick, 1988).  Lastly, SAC2, SAC3, and SAC5 are somewhat loosely connected
together.
The question could be asked as to whether cluster results are time dependent.  As
raised in Chapter 3, time may change the relative importance given by countries to
different stakeholder adaptive capacities.  Although the importance of, say public
participation, is likely to have changed over time, the question is how much time.  One
could say that the 2003, 2005, and 2008 national reports reflect thinking over a decade. 
To explore whether ten years is a sufficient amount of time to see any changes in varying
importance of the SACs, multivariate analyses were also carried out within a temporal
comparative case study. 
Cluster Analysis Results of the Temporal Case Study
Out of the 23 countries, six countries were examined within a temporal case study,
namely, the United States, Japan, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Canada, and Argentina. 
The selection of these countries was simply based on the availability of 2003 and 2005
national reports.  Not all of the 23 countries had ratified the Convention by 2003 or by
2005.  Some countries had simply deleted their 2003 and 2005 national reports from the
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public sphere.  Only 6 countries had 2003 and 2005 national reports publicly available for
the study.  
A database of stakeholder adaptive capacities for the six countries was built in the
same manner as the database for the 23 countries based on the 2008 national reports.  For
the content analysis, the WordStat software was applied to the 2003, 2005, and 2008
national reports of the six selected countries that retrieved all the unique words and
counted their frequency.  The resulting calibrated database is shown in Table 8 (the data
for 2008 in Table 8 is different than those in Table 5, because a different mean was used
for the calibration).
Through visual inspection of the time series profiles, the following few general
observations are made on the database:  
• SAC4, that is, government oversight, presents the highest frequencies for each
country generally of the same order of magnitude, between 1800 and 3300 word
counts;
• SAC5, which focuses on project stakeholder collaboration, has the lowest
frequencies compared to all other SACs.  Word counts generally fell between 230
and 650; and,
• All the other SACs varied widely from country to country.  Word frequencies
varied from the low 300s up to the 900-1000 range.
These observations are similar to those of the 23 country case study.
Similarly to the country calibrated database, cluster analysis was carried out on the
calibrated temporal database.  Results are shown in Figure 6 and Table 9 for the country-
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in-time clusters, and in Figure 7 and Table 10 for the SAC-in-time clusters.  With respect
to country-in-time clusters, results were examined to see if there were any major
difference in time for each country.  Seemingly, there are no major time difference for the
United States, Japan, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.  Both Argentina and Canada are
less loosely connected, but not drastically so.  With respect to the SAC-in-time clusters,
the results are similar than those outlined in the cluster analysis for the 23 countries.  
The results from the cluster analysis inform on associations among countries and
associations among SACs, but it is difficult to directly interpret the association between
countries and SACs.  The results of the cluster analysis provide one view of the
relationships.  Applying another multivariate analysis providing another view of the same
data set could make it easier to interpret relationships among countries and SACs.  In the
next section, the results from applying correspondence analysis to the same calibrated
databases will be examined.
4.2.2 Correspondence Analysis Results
Correspondence analysis simultaneously compresses rows and columns of a database 
to achieve a single, simultaneous geometrical representation of cases and variables by
calculating Eigen values (Fielding, 2009).  These values are the amount of the variance in
the geometric space of a 'factor', that is, one or more variables.  Eigen values are
calculated for both cases and variables.  The Eigen values can be thought of as indicators
of the relationships between rows and columns of a data table.
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Table 8.  Calibrated Database for the Multivariate Analyses on 
Countries-in-Time and SACs-in-Time 
(NB:  Calibrated to a different mean than in Table 5)
Country-Year
of the National
Report
SAC1 SAC2 SAC3 SAC4 SAC5 SAC6
Argentina-08 781.6 724.1 459.6 2729.4 623.9 533.1
Argentina-05 527.1 539 327.4 1839.4 423.2 456.5
Argentina-03 880.6 771.6 581 2034.7 411.7 831.3
Canada-08 586.2 750 1160 2448.7 640.8 596.1
Canada-05 524.5 638.5 858 2324.9 609.7 583.1
Canada-03 478.7 665.9 1158.2 2763.6 467.1 622.8
Czech-08 477.4 431.9 474.9 2529.8 298.1 569.6
Czech-05 471.1 550.7 545.5 2651 388.4 820.8
Czech-03 469.9 524.1 449.7 2417.6 290.5 696.5
Japan-08 898.1 973 632 3277.7 394.4 936.1
Japan-05 591.6 858.4 657.9 2897.7 233.8 682.1
Japan-03 659.1 1012.4 521.3 3295.6 301.6 772.6
Slovenia-08 624.9 714.6 798 2121.7 431.3 610.7
Slovenia-05 524.9 662.4 689.2 2000.7 375.6 548.4
Slovenia-03 472.7 752.3 714.7 2208 403.3 613.4
USA-08 658.8 725 973.2 3261.7 503.4 743.9
USA-05 709.1 704.6 942.5 2947.9 466.7 771.9
USA-03 601.4 870.7 880.7 3122.1 373.7 579.5
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Figure 6.  Dendrogram of Countries-in-Time Clusters
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Table 9.  Countries-in-Time Cluster Report
Node Group 1 Group 2 Dissimilarity
(rounded)
Objects in
Group
1 Czech-08 Czech-08 194 2
2 Slovenia-08 Slovenia-03 195 2
3 Node 2 Slovenia-05 227 3
4 USA-08 USA-03 311 2
5 Node 1 Czech-05 311 3
6 Japan-08 Japan-03 326 2
7 Node 4 USA-05 334 3
8 Node 3 Canada-05 350 4
9 Canada-08 Canada-03 386 2
10 Node 7 Japan-05 454 4
11 Node 8 Argentina-03 514 5
12 Node 10 Node 6 554 6
13 Node 5 Argentina-08 570 4
14 Node 11 Argentina-05 608 6
15 Node 14 Node-13 672 10
16 Node 12 Node 9 780 8
17 Node 16 Node 15 951 18
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Table 10.  SACs-in-Time Cluster Report
Node Group 1 Group 2 Dissimilarity
(rounded)
Objects in
Group
1 SAC1 SAC6 574 2
2 Node 1 SAC2 672 3
3 Node 2 SAC3 1155 4
4 Node 3 SAC5 1332 5
5 Node 4 SAC4 8595 6
Figure 7.  Dendrogram of SACs-in-Time Clusters 
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Eigen values range from 0 to 1.  An Eigen value of 1 implies that one sample (or
group of samples, here, variables and cases) shares no characteristics with other samples
and are totally distinct.  An Eigen value of 0 indicates that data points are completely
random.  As raised in Chapter 3, rarely do social science studies report Eigen values
higher than 0.5 (that would show clear separation between groups).  Even Eigen values
higher than 0.2 are rare and encountered only when there is almost no association
between variables, that is, non-overlapping, independent, discrete variables.  Doré et al. 
(2003) consider that an Eigen value of 0.02 is sufficiently different from 0 to indicate
non-randomness of the data points.  At such a low Eigen value, however, the drawing of
clearly separate groupings is difficult, and groups are likely to overlap significantly.
The results of the correspondence analysis applied to the 23 countries and 6
stakeholder adaptive capacities can be found in Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11, and in Table 11. 
The figures graphically plot distances among both countries and stakeholder adaptive
capacities, called joint plots.  Since correspondence analysis ordinates (i.e., reduces data
dimensions) the scores for variables and cases together, the two sets of scores have
equivalent scaling and can be plotted together on the same graph or joint plot.  With joint
plots, the investigator can begin to explore more easily the relationships among variables
and cases (Kovach, 2007).  
Figures 8, 9, and 10 are joint plots drawing the first three axes.  Figure 11 repeats
Figure 8 but in 3D (this 3D representation is not to be confused with plotting the three
correspondence analysis axes: because of how the joint plots are calculated they can only
plot two axes at a time.  The 3D feature simply repeats the best representation, which is
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the Axis 1 x Axis 2 joint plot, and applies a three-dimension box  for better
visualization).  Country and SAC joint plot points that are close together are expected to
point to some association, although caution should be applied by ensuring that two points
are indeed close together.  Indeed, Garson (2008) cautions that care should be taken to
examine more than one view, because, for instance, points close together in one joint plot
of two axes may be far apart in another joint plot combining different axes.  For example,
in the Axis 1 x Axis 2 joint plot (Figure 8), Canada and China are close together, but in
the Axis 1 x Axis 3 joint plot (Figure 10), these two countries are far apart.
Table 11 includes the percentage of variability explained by the axes, and lists the
country and SAC scores (i.e., graph coordinates).  Table 11 indicates that the first three
axes explain about 80% of the total variance, the first two accounting for almost two
thirds.  The Eigen values are low but not zero.  The low values were somewhat expected. 
As raised in Chapter 3, stakeholder adaptive capacities are not discrete, independent,
variables, and considerable overlap likely exists among them.  Clear separate distinctions
between country groups were also not expected since, as noted earlier in Chapter 3, 
scholars have noted that there is considerable increasing convergence of thinking on
nuclear energy and nuclear fuel waste management.
Examining numerical scores in Table 11 can make deciphering relationships between
countries and stakeholder adaptive capacities very difficult.  The joint plots help in this
regard.  Although all the joint plots need to be considered, the 3D version of Figure 11
provides the plot that explains most of the total variance (the 3D version simply makes
for easier visualization).  I attempted to form the most reasonable grouping coherent with
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all results from the correspondence analysis (all scores from the first three axes that are
the closest to each other), with those of the cluster analysis, as well as country contextual
qualitative information from other sources.  The result of this consideration is the
grouping drawn in Figure 11a.  Three main groups are drawn that form their own group,
because they are distinct enough from all the other countries.  I name them the Left
Group, the Middle Group, and the Right Group.  Five countries are isolated enough from
all the others.
In considering this final grouping, it is well to remember that many multivariate
analyses are exploratory tools that do not necessarily aim to give one neat answer and that
can be assisted in the interpretation of results with information from other sources to form
more coherent conclusions (Manly, 2005).  In our case, Figure 11a does not provide neat
answers for all associations. For example, does Romania belong to the Middle Group or
to the Left Group?  Does Sweden belong to the Right Group or the Middle Group?  Are
China and Canada similar or different?  The last question is the easiest: the third axis
makes it quite clear that China and Canada are very different from each other (and the
first two axes make them different from all other countries).  The cluster analysis makes
clear that Romania should be in the same group as France, so I put Romania in the Left
Group. 
Sweden's scores are more difficult to interpret.  It appears close to Slovakia.  Sweden
is also closely associated with Slovakia in the cluster analysis.  Therefore, Sweden could
be put into the Right Group that is characterized by government oversight (SAC4).
However, positioning Sweden thus is not coherent with country information and
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contextual data.  With respect to waste management, it is well known that the nuclear
manager in Sweden (SKB) is very progressive in meeting its responsibilities.  Sweden is
one of the two countries that have made the most progress toward developing a final
solution for the long-term management of their nuclear waste (the other being Finland, a
Middle Group country)
By looking again at the cluster analysis, we see that Sweden is also closely associated
with the United States, a Middle Group country.  I therefore put Sweden in the Middle
Group, and not in the Right Group.  The Middle Group is characterized by social
responsibility (SAC2) of managers and emergency preparedness (SAC6).  Sweden is
positioned closer to SAC2.  Therefore, the positioning of Sweden in the Middle Group
makes sense with respect to both country and SAC associations.  
Before elaborating further on the final grouping in Figure 11a, I will outline the
results of the correspondence analysis on the temporal study that compares the
importance of stakeholder adaptive capacities in the selected six countries to suggest
whether any changes in this relative importance occurred over the decade (roughly
between 1998 and 2008).  If no significant changes occurred over a period of ten years,
then the grouping in Figure 11a can be considered as a stable representation of
contemporary thinking.  If on the other hand, there are large differences in the relative
importance of  SACs over the ten-year period, then any conclusion on their relative
importance can only represent the thinking in 2008.  In this event, further work on
subsequent national reports under the Joint Convention would need to be carried out to
increase the robustness of the grouping derived from the 2008 national reports.
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Figure 8.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 -
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Figure 9.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs
- Axis 1 x Axis 3 -
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Figure 10.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs
- Axis 2 x Axis 3 - 
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Figure 11.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 in 3D -
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Table 11.  Correspondence Analysis (CA) Report for Countries and SACs
Eigen Values
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
Eigen values 0.01 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.002 0
Percentage 36.898 25.967 16.869 12.816 7.45 0
Cum.  Percentage 36.898 62.865 79.734 92.55 100 100
CA Variable Scores
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
SAC1 -1.364 -1.432 -1.085 0.289 -1.658 1
SAC2 -0.025 -1.17 1.59 -1.916 0.26 1
SAC3 -1.308 2.006 0.882 -0.04 -0.637 1
SAC4 1.009 0.168 -0.167 0.237 -0.221 1
SAC5 -0.811 -1.024 1.343 2.506 1.712 1
SAC6 -0.725 0.353 -1.706 -0.847 1.863 1
CA Case Scores
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
Canada -1.352 1.138 2.484 1.034 0.563 1
Sweden 1.127 -0.428 0.516 -0.233 -1.894 1
Hungary -0.305 -0.31 -0.205 -0.943 0.454 1
Brazil -2.054 -0.878 0.325 -0.641 -2.022 1
Finland 0.237 -0.568 -0.695 -0.302 -1.593 1
Czech Republic 1.319 0.216 -1.293 0.554 0.145 1
Slovakia 1.288 -0.783 1.444 -1.756 0.007 1
USA 0.23 0.809 0.346 0.416 0.006 1
Slovenia -1.065 0.093 0.836 -0.304 0.153 1
Japan 0.336 -1.168 -1.038 -1.611 0.171 1
Switzerland 2.208 0.587 -0.102 1.452 -0.28 1
France -0.969 -0.349 -0.9 1.026 -1.047 1
Belgium -0.892 -1.466 -0.377 0.499 2.174 1
Lithuania 0.258 1.672 0.389 0.85 -0.873 1
UK 0.119 1.155 1.08 -0.901 0.417 1
Ukraine -0.942 -1.133 0.703 -0.106 0.106 1
Russia 0.89 0.288 0.654 -0.612 0.724 1
Argentina 0.309 -2.167 0.465 1.724 0.227 1
Korea -0.373 0.984 -0.817 0.055 -1.127 1
China -1.176 1.41 -2.042 -0.237 0.239 1
South Africa 1.001 0.506 -0.64 0.076 1.78 1
Romania -0.381 -0.851 -0.722 1.914 0.59 1
Netherlands -0.632 0.909 -0.574 -1.389 0.995 1
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Figure 11a.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs
 with Suggested Grouping
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 in 3D -
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Correspondence Analysis Results for the Temporal Case Study
As described in Chapter 3, the same correspondence analysis done for the 23
countries was to be carried on six countries selected for the temporal comparative case
study based on their three national report reports (2008, 2005, and 2003).  The results of
the correspondence analysis are found in Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15.  Table 12 indicates
that the first three axes explains close to 90% of the variance.  The Eigen values are of the
same order of those calculated for the 23-country comparative case study.  This means
that all groups are not completely separated from each, but that neither are they
completely randomly positioned. 
 For instance, there is an Eigen value of 0.013 for Axis 1, and 0.007 for Axis 2
meaning that there is greater separation  among the countries, but not for data temporal
points within each country.  Hence, spatial differentiation is notable, and temporal
differentiation is less pronounced.  If there is no notable change over the decade in
relative importance given by a country and as compared to the other countries, one should
be able to easily form groups of the same countries.  The country-in-time members of a
group can be more or less connected to each other.  A quick examination of the Figures
12 through 15 and Table 12 indicate that groups can easily be drawn for all the six
countries, as shown in Figure 15a.  
Other observations derived from these figures and Table 12 are presented below.  
C Japan’s cluster does not indicate any apparent evolution in time.  The CA scores
for each year are similarly associated with SAC6.  SAC2 has some influence only
in year 2008.
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C Argentina’s cluster suggests a progression from 2003 to 2008 toward the centroid
of the graph.  The CA scores for Argentina, however, do not reflect this
progression, and scores are likely to be of the same order.  The three years for
Argentina are associated in the same manner to SAC1.  SAC2 is of influence but
to a lesser extent and is even virtually absent for the year 2003. 
C The United States cluster shows no obvious progression from year to year. 
However, the CA scores show some distinction between year 2003 (0.14) and
both 2005 (0.41) and 2008 (0.41).  The year 2003 is associated with SAC2, but
years 2005 and 2008 are even more closely associated with SAC2.  So rather than
a change in relative importance of stakeholder adaptive capacity, the association
with the same SAC (SAC2) appears to have intensified.  Some weaker association
with SAC6 is also present.  
C The Canada cluster shows an association among the three years that is looser with
no apparent progressive change in time.  The CA scores for Canada indeed show
no progression and even no notable change.  All three years are closely related to
SAC3.  Some weaker association with SAC1 and SAC2 is also present.
C The Slovenia cluster shows that there may be some progression away from the
centroid.  The CA scores do show some slight progression from 2003 to 2008
getting closer to SAC5.
C The Czech Republic cluster shows no notable progression or change.  The CA
scores are closely associated with SAC6.  Some weaker association with SAC4 is
also present. 
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Figure 12.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs-in-Time
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 -
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Figure 13.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries and SACs-in-Time
- Axis 1 x Axis 3 -
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Figure 14.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries-in-Time and SACs-in-Time
- Axis 2 x Axis 3 -
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Figure 15.  Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries-in-Time 
and SACs- in-Time
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 in 3D -
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Table 12.  Correspondence Analysis Report for Countries-in-Time
 and SACs-in-Time
Eigen Values
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
Eigen values 0.013 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.001 0
Percentage 48.983 25.221 13.379 9.219 3.197 0
Cum.  Percentage 48.983 74.205 87.584 96.803 100 100
CA Variable Scores (Graph Coordinates)
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
SAC1 -0.622 -1.838 -0.472 0.046 -2.106 1
SAC 2 -0.334 -0.49 -1.516 -1.63 1.305 1
SAC 3 2.301 0.679 -0.918 0.324 -0.585 1
SAC 4 -0.441 0.757 0.587 -0.224 -0.192 1
SAC 5 1.387 -1.97 2.245 -0.142 1.279 1
SAC 6 -0.694 -0.228 -0.687 2.331 1.084 1
CA Case Scores (Graph Coordinates)
Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 Axis 4 Axis 5 Axis 6
USA-08 0.416 0.708 0.554 0.279 -0.928 1
USA-05 0.401 0.233 -0.05 0.797 -1.33 1
USA-03 0.139 1.054 -0.357 -1.582 -0.729 1
Slovenia-08 0.697 -0.788 -0.97 0.024 -0.25 1
Slovenia-05 0.535 -0.434 -0.834 -0.233 0.322 1
Slovenia-03 0.436 -0.034 -0.77 -0.369 2.117 1
Japan-08 -1.191 -0.35 -0.731 0.144 -0.489 1
Japan-05 -0.829 1.051 -1.193 -0.846 -0.174 1
Japan-03 -1.478 0.682 -0.611 -1.307 1.13 1
Czech-08 -0.808 1.091 1.547 0.799 -1.46 1
Czech-05 -0.676 0.644 0.932 2.078 1.78 1
Czech-03 -1.034 0.711 0.557 1.453 0.639 1
Canada-08 2.031 -0.394 -0.03 -0.227 0.336 1
Canada-05 1.332 -0.584 0.992 0.049 1.178 1
Canada-03 1.605 1.195 -0.15 0.254 -0.416 1
Argentina-08 -0.559 -1.577 2.117 -1.544 -0.694 1
Argentina-05 -0.624 -1.632 1.41 -0.765 0.693 1
Argentina-03 -0.589 -2.33 -1.727 1.471 -0.889 1
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Figure 15a. Correspondence Analysis Joint Plot for Countries-in-Time
and SACs- in-Time with Suggested Grouping
- Axis 1 x Axis 2 in 3D -
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4.2.3 Combining Both Multivariate Analyses Results
To come to final results on potential associations among the 23 countries and six
stakeholder adaptive capacities, I consider the results from both the cluster analysis and
the correspondence analysis.  In addition, other country contextual data was considered
(see country backgrounders in Appendix 2).  As a consequence, my interpretation of
country and SAC groupings can be found in Figure 11a.  More explicitly this figure is
transformed in Table 13.  
Table 13.  Results of Cluster Analysis and Correspondence Analysis
for Countries and SACs
(also considering other qualitative information)
Group Grouping of Countries Dominant Stakeholder Adaptive
Capacities 
(N.B.  The accuracy of the study and
potential variation in time do not warrant
exactly weighing the country SACs)
Canada SAC3, SAC2
Brazil SAC3, SAC1, SAC5, SAC4
Switzerland SAC4, SAC6
China SAC1, SAC3, SAC6
Argentina SAC2, SAC1, SAC3
Left Group France, Slovenia, Belgium,
Romania, Ukraine
SAC5
Middle
Group 
Korea, Hungary, the U.K.,
Lithuania, Finland, Japan, the
U.S., Netherlands, and Sweden
SAC2 with pairing with one other
dominant SAC (except SAC1)
Right
Group
South Africa, Russia, Czech
Republic, Slovakia
SAC4 
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Before reviewing Table 13, there are three premises to keep in mind.  First, all six
stakeholder adaptive capacities (SAC) are important to some extent for all countries.  It is
the relative importance within a country and as compared to other countries that is the
focus of the study.  Second, the multivariate analyses applied are exploratory tools; as
such, there may not be one conclusive answer to the determination of groupings.
And third, the low Eigen value of the correspondence analysis indicates that there is
no one group that can be characterized as completely separate from the other countries. 
Except for the unique countries, it cannot be confirmed statistically that one group is
completely separate from any other group.  For example, Group II and Group III countries
may be linked by a connection between Russia and the United States.  The cluster
analysis shows a relatively strong connection between Russia and the United States, and
the correspondence analysis shows more of a distinction between these two countries.  I
opted to separate them because government oversight is more important in Russia, while
manager responsibility and public participation is more important in the United States
(Dawson and Darst, 2005).  Groups are therefore drawn taking into account all the results
from the multivariate analyses and information from other sources, such as country
contextual information.  These three premises noted, several observations can be made
from Table 13. 
C Nine out the 23 countries (about 40%) place much importance on only one
stakeholder adaptative capacity.
C Each stakeholder adaptive capacity is dominant in at least one country.
217
C Five countries are unique with respect to their associations with the SACs; this
number was higher than expected.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that you
can get relative extremes in each of the selected SACs.
C Unique countries and countries within the three groups include all three general
strategies for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (that is, direct disposal of
nuclear waste, reprocessing and burning, and the wait-and-see strategy).
C Unique countries and countries within the three groups come from various
economic development regimes, different geographic regions, largeness of their
nuclear energy program (in Chapter 6, we will discuss if there are any other
country attributes that may distinguish between the groups).
C All groups seem to polarize toward one SAC in particular.
C The Left Group places a lot of importance on only one SAC: formal project
collaboration (SAC5).
C Countries in the Middle Group place a lot of importance on manager
responsibility (SAC2), but also focus attention on another dominant SAC except
SAC1.
C To the Middle Group, I have added two countries that do not quite fit the general
profile of the group, namely, Sweden and the Netherlands.  These two countries
do not appear to be associated with either the Left Group or the Right Group
based on general country contextual information.  Such information would place
them in the Middle Group.  The Middle Group focuses on SAC2 with any other
SAC except SAC1.  In view of the countries in the Middle Group (e.g. the U.S.
218
and Japan),  it is unlikely that this exception means that learning by managers is
not important.  It may simply mean that learning programs are mature and
networking initiatives are of a higher priority.
C The Right Group countries place a lot of importance on government oversight
(SAC4), relative to efforts on other stakeholders adaptive capacities as exercised
in the country or as compared to other countries.
C The results from the temporal study suggest that the relative importance given by
a country does not vary much over a ten-year period, at least not from 1998 to
2008, although some variation was detected in a few countries.  This variation
suggests that there might be some notable change if major influencing factors
occurs over a decade.  For instance, I suspect that over the decade Argentina was
affected by serious financial difficulties that could have affected its learning
capacities.  The results of the temporal study lead me to be prudent with any
conclusions, because the relative importance given to SACs may fluctuate over
time, even as little as over a decade.
The results indicate the relative 'importance' given to SACs by countries based on
content analysis of Joint Convention 2008 national reports, multivariate analyses, and
consideration of country contextual information.  We can next ask whether the choice of
each country to focus on certain SACs was a good one for reaching the set management
goal, here, sustainable development.  In order to be able to assess the relative 'influence'
of the SACs for sustainable development, the above SAC results need to be compared to
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some measure of country sustainable development performance.  This along with further
implications of the SAC results will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.3 Validity of Results
For the most part, the results derived from the study were based on the information
provided by the Joint Convention national reports.  Countries closely followed the IAEA
guidelines on form and structure for the national reports, thus making the reports highly
comparable.  Since they were prepared by governments, the national reports are written in
neutral language.  Although information in these reports covers not only nuclear fuel
waste management, but also other forms of radioactive waste (e.g., uranium tailings, low-
level radioactive waste from nuclear reactor operations, medical radioactive sources),
stakeholder adaptive capacities are similar for all types of radioactive waste.  The only
concern is whether governments have provided a comprehensive, transparent, and
objective overview of their national waste management programs.  For instance, some
countries might have used the reports to subtly convey to the international community
some biased message on performance.  Considering the open and vast distribution of the
national reports, however, propaganda messages are unlikely.  
The application of computer-assisted (CA) content analysis and statistical analyses
did not present any unusual concerns as long as their limitations were understood.  With
respect to the CA content analysis, the appropriate creation of the vocabulary lists for
each of stakeholder adaptive capacities is key.  The number of words on these lists varied
from 76 to 115 words.  Changing these words produced little variation in the multivariate
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analysis results as long as the words changed were not the highest-frequency words. 
There was little cause, however, to change the highest frequency words because they were
usually the less ambiguous ones and best represented the category of the vocabulary list,
here, the type of stakeholder adaptive capacity.
Another issue with respect to the vocabulary lists was their exclusivity.  The selected
words, even the highest frequency ones, could  inherently be associated with more than
one stakeholder adaptive capacity.  Variables studied within the social sciences are often
interconnected and overlap somewhat, as opposed to discrete variables within the natural
and physical sciences.  Nevertheless, keeping this overlap in mind, the careful
interpretation of multivariate results can lead to interesting insights.  
The decision to apply both cluster analysis and correspondence analysis was a good
one.  Correspondence analysis produces various perspective of the same data set while
using the same algorithm.  Cluster analysis suggests clusters based on a different
algorithm for the same set of data.  There is no right answer because these statistical
analyses are used for exploring possible relationships.  By examining the results from
both multivariate analyses, along with other qualitative information, a reasonable
interpretation of the data can be developed.
Summary of Results
In this Chapter, the results from evaluating the study’s two hypotheses were
presented.  In general, the results provide evidence in support of both hypotheses.  This
evidence was derived from the combination of both qualitative and quantitative analytical
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methods.  Through content analysis of national policy reports and statistical analyses on
the results of the content analysis, reliable results were derived.
More specifically, with respect to the first hypothesis—that is, the development of
complex social-environmental system exhibits chaotic patterns of development— the
time series analysis suggests that chaotic patterns characterize the development of nuclear
waste management policies, which can then be considered as a complex social-
environmental system.  As such, according to complex theory, a few key factors drive the
development of the whole system.  The time series analysis also led to the suggestion of
possible external and internal factors that could affect system development. 
The second hypothesis addresses the relative importance of internal factors as key
system drivers.  The type of internal factor selected for study are stakeholder adaptive
capacities.  Through complementary multivariate analyses, namely, cluster analysis and
correspondence analysis, three SACs were identified as key system drivers.  They are
social responsibility of managers (SAC2), public participation in decision-making
processes (SAC3), and learning by managers (SAC1).  Although it is recognized that
these SACs overlap, they generally refer to networking and learning capacities, the first
capacity being relatively more important.  Therefore, there is evidence to support the
second hypothesis that key system drivers can be identified, and thus through quantitative
means.
In the next two chapters, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, I will discuss the results derived
from evaluating both hypotheses.  In Chapter 5, I will discuss main findings on observed
broad patterns of development.  The discussion will include the likely presence of chaotic
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patterns of development in most countries, and the randomness encountered in one
country, namely, Korea.  The presence of possible ‘windows of opportunities’ and 
relative influence of external and internal factors will also be discussed.  In Chapter 6, the
relative importance given to the six selected stakeholder adaptive capacities by each of
the 23 countries will be discussed.  The chapter will also discuss how the relative
importance given to the SACs by each countries can be evaluated given a selected long-
term management goal.  For illustrative purposes, the study focuses on the long-term
management goal of sustainable development.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION ON BROAD SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT:
POLICY EVENTS AND TIME SERIES
As presented in Chapter 2, one main objective of the study is to determine whether
broad patterns of the development of social-environmental systems can be determined
through combining qualitative and quantitative methods.  If there are indications of
chaotic patterns, then the system can be considered as ‘complex’.  In this event, according
to complexity theory, only a handful of key factors drives the system.  If key systems
drivers can be identified - the second objective of the study - then it might be possible to
manipulate these drivers in order to manage the development of complex social-
environmental systems.
In the next two chapters I will discuss the results obtained from the study by
emphasizing whether they meet the above two objectives.  This chapter will primarily
focus on the broad patterns of development observed from the time series of policy
events.  I will also explore the issue of whether external or internal factors could possibly
explain any of the observed patterns of the time series.  Later in Chapter 6, I will narrow
the focus to the relative importance of one type of internal factor, namely, stakeholder
adaptive capacities.
5.1 Patterns of System Development and Periods of Increased Policy Event Frequency
In this section, I discuss the broad patterns of developments that may exist within the
selected comparative case study, that is, the development of national nuclear waste
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management policies in 23 countries.  The results indicate that there are non-random
patterns for every country except for Korea.  Therefore, in this section, I will also look
more closely at possible reasons that might explain why Korea is so distinct.  And lastly, I
will discuss higher-frequency policy event periods or ‘peaks’, some of which may reflect
a ‘window of opportunity’ for policy development.
5.1.1 Broad Country Development Patterns
A visual inspection of the profile of all country time series in Appendix 4 shows that
the frequency of policies has increased steadily from the time of the first commercial
nuclear power plant until shortly after entry into force in 2001 of the Joint Convention. 
Then, some countries are characterized by a more abrupt rise a few years before 2001. 
The general profile of the time series suggests that the development of nuclear waste
management policies is highly influenced by international exchange of ideas and
collaborative learning.  Such an explanation of the typical time series profile could be
plausible only where there is sufficient time to allow diffusion of national ideas at the
international level.  
The visual inspection of the time series profiles shows that the development of
nuclear waste management policies is not totally random.  Indeed, the results of the
autocorrelation analysis on the country time series indicate the presence of short-term
correlation.  For all countries except one (Korea), the results of the autocorrelation
analysis on the country time series and corresponding correlograms show that the time
series are characterized by moderately high short-term correlation.  The short-term
correlation is characterized by relatively high correlation coefficients in the first few years
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of the time series followed by correlation coefficients that, while greater than zero, tend to
get successively smaller.  The first few autocorrelation coefficients of the typical
correlogram are positive and ranges from 0.45 to 0.86, but mostly approach 0.7 or 0.8.
In general, most countries are characterized by a lag of 2, 3 or 4 years.  This means
that the frequency of policies is time dependent over a few years, followed by some
randomness.  At the extremes, we have France at 1 year and Belgium at 7 years.  I suggest
that the policy development process in France is more active than in Belgium.  We can
speculate on why this difference may be so.  France, a forge-ahead country, tends to be
very proactive in enhancing the nuclear energy option, has a large R&D program, is a
unitary state with a strong central government but with a populace that can clearly voice
its opinion (Barthes, 2006).  All these traits could lead to new national policies fairly
frequently.  On the other hand, Belgium has adopted a wait-and-see strategy for the back-
end of its nuclear fuel cycle, has a long history of nuclear involvement but a much smaller
nuclear program than France (Govaerts et al., 1994), is a federation with a weaker central
government (Corner, 2008; Swenden & Jans, 2006; Winter et al., 2006).  These Belgian
characteristics could lead to a less active or successful policy development regime. 
Why Belgium should have a less active nuclear waste policy development regime
than other wait-and-see countries could be examined more closely.  Compared to most
wait-and-wee countries, Belgium has a combination of traits that make it unique.  It is a
federation within which it has developed sophisticated democratic institutions, and much
power is given to local and regional communities.  It generally possesses a relatively
healthy economy (the recent financial crisis notwithstanding).  Perhaps the country is less
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susceptible to political and economic pressures than in other wait-and-see countries.  Of
the wait-and-see countries, perhaps the Netherlands more closely resembles Belgium. 
But the reason why the Netherlands’ correlogram reflects more policy event activity (4
significant autocorrelation coefficients) than Belgium (7 significant autocorrelation
coefficients) is less obvious.  Considering that the difference of the first coefficient
between Belgium’ and the Netherlands’ correlograms is lesser than of Belgium’s with
other wait-and-see countries, and considering that the Netherlands is also democratic and
relatively well-off, the difference between the neighboring countries may be explained by
the fact that the Netherlands’ central government is more united and cohesive with a
lesser politicized bureaucracy than in Belgium (Beaumont & Loopmans, 2008).  Hence,
an external factor that could influence policy development is the strength or unity of the
central government.  This possibly speaks only to the power to establish new policies, not
necessarily to the quality of those policies.
5.1.2 The Exception of Korea’s Development Patterns: Randomness?
Why the time series for Korea presents no significant autocorrelation coefficients,
thereby indicating randomness, is not obvious and difficult to explain.  As Korea is the
only country out of the 23 countries that exhibits randomness, it would seem important to
explore why this country appears so different.  The apparent randomness may be caused
by some artefact in the national report, or something particular is happening in the
country.  I went back to the 2008 national report and did not notice anything unusual
problems with its organization, format, headers, or typography.  Finding no unusual
227
artefact in the construction of the report, I concentrated on studying Korea’s
contemporary history.  
With respect to Korea’s relatively recent growth—including the demand for
electricity through various energy sources including nuclear power—I raise the work of
two authorities that examine Korea’s history after World War II from two very different
perspectives.  The first study was carried out under the auspices of the University of
Delaware and of the Korean Council on Energy and the Environment (Byrne et al., 2004). 
The other study was carried out by a nuclear engineer and former Commissioner of the
South Korea Atomic Energy Commission (Lee, 2008).
Byrne et al. (2004) claim that electricity reform in South Korea is at a crossroads and
will continue to develop to meet the people’s needs only if social and environmental
concerns are addressed.  These authors begin by providing an overview of the growing
contradictions that have characterized South Korea’s electricity sector from about 1960
(i.e., from the Cold War and end of the Korean War to the mid-2000s).  The following
three phases are associated with the electric sector development: 1) rapid expansion from
1960 to 1980 (commercial nuclear operations began in 1978); 2) challenges to the state
monopoly in the 1980s and 1990s; and, 3) attempts to restructure the electricity market
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis that focuses on a more reasonable steady pace of
growth.
Byrne et al.  (2004) note Korea’s desire to escape the poverty of its pre-colonial status
(Korea was a colony of Japan from 1910 to 1945) and the devastation of its civil war
(with what is now North Korea).  This escape was led by experts on economic growth
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who considered the lack of indigenous natural resources, and by the military dictatorship
in close collaboration with the “chaebols” (merchant families).  As a result, according to
Byrne et al. (2004), Korea saw a phenomenal rapid shift from an Agrarian society to an
industrial society assisted by a doubling of electricity capacity every 10 years.  In
addition, the desire for economic growth was intertwined with serious national security
concerns in this volatile part of the world.  Byrne et al. (2004) claim that these security
concerns and the absence of natural resources eventually led to the birth of the nuclear
program in South Korea.  
Byrne et al. (2004) report that during this period of rapid growth, any resistance by
activist groups was suppressed by the military government.  That is until the early 1980s
when rapid growth led to overbuilt capacity.  This in turn caused the country to go into
unmanageable debt, and the military government tried, unsuccessfully, to slow energy
demand.  According to Byrne et al.  (2004), by 1987, noting the decline of the country,
activist groups became more vocal, and, in 1992, the country saw the election of its first
civilian president.  Notwithstanding this movement toward democracy, the economic
downturn was aggravated by the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  At that time, many
national experts considered that Korea’s only hope for redress was assistance by
international investors.  Again a massive effort toward economic growth ensued, this time
based on an open market (but with no safety nets) and streamlined regulations (to reduce
operational costs thereby enticing foreign investment).  Such growth was not particularly
attentive to the protection of workers, the public, and the environment and of other social
considerations. 
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Once again, as argued by Byrne et al. (2004), Korea’s destiny was in the hands of
foreign countries with motives not necessarily good for Korea.  But, by 2000, the World
Bank, under pressure to take into account sustainable development in its policies,
required that Korea establish governance changes.  Korea’s economic growth was now to
follow sustainable development principles. 
Public demonstrations against nuclear power resurfaced.  Notably, in the 1990s, local
public resistance to a national radioactive waste storage facility on a small Korean island
expanded national public resistance to such a facility anywhere in the country.  This
public resistance to the nuclear energy option was not only based on health and
environment issues; it also referred to such a facility as a symbol of past military
dictatorship.  Only 18 years later, in 2008, did the Government decide that the facility
would be located at the Wolsong nuclear power center.
Byrne et al. (2004) conclude that the renewed public activism in Korea is a good sign
for sustainable development, although some other signs from government are still
worrisome in this regard.  For example, in 2001, as part of the ongoing Kyoto efforts for
reducing climate change, the Korean government said that it is more interested in selling
its carbon credits rather than in reducing national emissions.  
Contrary to Byrne et al. (2004), Lee (2008) is more positive about the paths taken by
Korea.  He reports on Korea’s ongoing history after World War II to justify the country’s
adoption of the nuclear power option.  After World War II, the southern part of Korea)
which had embraced millions of refugees from the North, Japan, Manchuria, and China)
had only 11. 5% of the peninsula’s electricity facilities for a total of 4% of its power
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requirements.  So in essence, South Korea was at the total mercy of North Korea.  Under
the pretense of home reunification, in 1950, North Korea then cut off its supply to South
Korea, leading to the Korean War.  In this war, South Korea was assisted by western
countries.  In its victory, South Korea saw renewed recovery of economic growth initially
assisted by western states, but the goal was to finally become self-sufficient.  
Lee (2008) argues the beneficial contribution of nuclear energy with respect to
economic growth and national defense.  Because of North Korea’s ongoing military
threats (indeed North Korea committed actual acts of terrorism against South Korea in the
1970s and late1980s), South Korea desires to keep its options open with respect to the
nuclear fuel cycle, and also focuses to a large extent on emergency preparedness.  Lee
(2008) concludes that Korea has acted as the slow but steady turtle to the western
countries fast hare by continuously learning and desiring self-reliance.  He argues that
nuclear energy will ensure Korea’s status as a developed country, and will even enable
the country to surpass other ones (‘who won the race between the turtle and the hare?”).  
Both narratives developed by Byrne et al. (2004) and Lee (2008) suggest the relative
minimal importance given to public participation, a key aspect of sustainable
development.  In this regard, Lee (2008) refers to the 2008 government decision on the
siting of a radioactive waste storage facility at the Wolsong center as a “great collective
relief of the Korean nuclear community... after some 18 years of contentious bickering
over several possible locations” (p.33).  Some may argue that because of Korea’s
turbulent history, rapid growth had to be made at the expense of some democratic values.
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Korea’s turbulent past may be one reason for the random time series of Korea
resulting from the study.  Korean’s history after World War II has mainly been reactive to
drastic and unusual conditions.  This random reactivity also suggests randomness in
policy development.  Only in 1992, did Korea see a more democratic government
installed.  The next generation of nuclear engineers and administrators will perhaps be
imbued with new democratic values.  To wit, besides the focus on government oversight,
which is the greatest focus of all country national reports under the Joint Convention, and
if we recall Table 5 from Chapter 3 (cf., SAC word frequency database), the second
highest frequency of the six stakeholder adaptive capacities for Korea is public
participation.
Indeed, a means to enable future transparency and increased public participation is the
new Korean Radioactive Waste Management Corporation (KRMC) established by
legislation in January 2009.  KRMC is an independent company specializing in the
national management of radioactive waste.  Its mission includes the development of a
coherent strategy for the national management of radioactive waste and the establishment
and maintenance of the Government Fund for Radioactive Waste Management.  Given
this mission, KRMC manages the transport and disposal of low- and intermediate-level
wastes, the interim storage and disposal of spent fuel, siting exercises, the construction
and operation of radioactive waste management facilities, and R&D initiatives.
Another reason for Korea’s random series may be its relationship with foreigners, this
time not as dominators but as partners.  Hwang et al. (2003) argue that the country is still
in reactive mode by seeking partnership with other countries that can assist in the
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country’s development of its nuclear energy program, including the management of
radioactive waste.  Since a long-term management policy has not yet been developed on
whether to recycle spent fuel or to permanently dispose of it.  Korea is carrying out
research and development on nuclear waste management collaboratively with other
countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Sweden, China,
Taiwan, and Japan.  Hwang et al. (2003), who are affiliated with the Korean Atomic
Energy Agency, conclude their paper by indicating that Korea would like to extend even
further its efforts on international cooperation for the proper management of radioactive
waste.
General collaboration between Korea and partner countries has led Korea to develop
its own nuclear reactor technology in a very short period of time.  It is now marketing and
exporting its expertise worldwide.  For example, in December 2009, the Government of
the United Arab Emirates surprised the world when it announced that it selected South
Korea as the provider of first new nuclear energy reactors, thereby beating its rivals, the
giant French state-owned enterprise, AREVA and the American-Japanese consortium,
GE-Hitachi.  This ‘surprise’ may indicate that more research needs to be done to examine
whether some order is now being introduced into Korea’s development of its nuclear
waste management policies, or, whether it is repeating its past mistakes by once again
expanding too much too quickly for sustainable economic growth.
The example of Korea is an interesting one to examine the distinction between
randomness and non-random, possibly chaotic, patterns of system development, because
random systems are unmanageable and chaotic ones may be manageable, at least in the
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short term.  A chaotic pattern of development would indicate that the system is ‘complex’
and adaptive management is likely an appropriate management approach.  One of the
characteristics of complex system as translated to the policy arena is the emergence of
inevitable ‘surprises’, some of which may be considered as windows of opportunities
(Kingdon, 2003).  
5.1.3 Windows of Opportunity and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Time series primary peaks, which represent periods of increasing activity in policy
development, may point to the presence of ‘windows of opportunity’.  As argued more
broadly by Kingdon (2003), windows of opportunities may be the only instances for
policy revolution (drastic change) as opposed to policy evolution (incremental change) or
even policy inertia (no change) within large systems.  To take the latest example of a
potential window of opportunity, some analysts argue that we are now at a crossroad for
the nuclear energy option (Doern and Morrison, 2009; Ewing, 2009).  The way the
opportunity will be seized will affect the future development of nuclear waste
management policies. 
The Nuclear Energy Agency reports that the present window of opportunity for a
nuclear energy renaissance has been opened by the issue of climate change (NEA, 2009). 
The idea of using nuclear electricity to curb greenhouse gas emissions has become a
major driver of energy policy in many countries.  James Hansen (2008), a leading
American climatologist, suggests that more impetus should be given to the next
generation of nuclear reactors if the negative consequences of climate change are to be
avoided.  He argues that future nuclear energy will be safer while producing hardly any
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greenhouse gases in comparison to fossil-fuel forms of energy.  Therefore, the use of
nuclear energy for electricity generation can be seen as a way to reduce a country`s
overall emissions of greenhouse gases.  
Many NGOs, however, refute this argument indicating that nuclear energy is not the
solution to the climate change issue, particularly because of alleged negative economic,
safety, security, waste and timing concerns (Greenpeace, 2007; Vaughan, 2007).  With
respect to the last concern, the window of opportunity for increasing the role of nuclear
energy is quickly closing and will be shut within 20 years, when the emission of
greenhouses gases will have worsened to a point of no return if nothing is done now to
mitigate this environmental problem (Ewing, 2009).  Twenty years is a short period for
the construction and operation of advanced nuclear power plants.  Despite this short
period, the endeavor may be achievable with sufficient political backing.  And there is
already some indication of political support: for example, in his State of the Union
address in January 2010, U.S. President Obama called for greater innovation in clean
energy to combat climate change, including nuclear energy.  Later, in February 2010,
President Obama's budget included substantial reserves for loan guarantees for the
nuclear industry.
The twenty-year window is a consideration when selecting an open or closed nuclear
fuel cycle, particularly in the United States.  It is the only country with a major nuclear
energy program that currently is not conducting any commercial reprocessing.  Those in
favor of recycling (e.g., BCG, 2006) argue that this practice is interesting for three
reasons: it is economical, it helps non-proliferation efforts, it is good for the environment
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because it would result in a lesser amount of nuclear waste; moreover, it would stimulate
new builds of nuclear reactors worldwide thus reducing climate change.  Those against
recycling (e.g., Fetter et al., 2003) have arguments negating all these presumed benefits. 
But all agree that if recycling is desirable, it may take more than 20 years before any
benefits to climate change are seen from this practice.  If the impetus to expand the
nuclear energy option is tied solely to controlling the level of greenhouse gases, then it
may already be too late to justify its expansion.  
Instead, if the impetus of the expansion of nuclear energy is related to economic
growth, then recycling may be beneficial.  However, predicting economic growth is
currently difficult, and there is presently much uncertainty about future economic growth.
Many of those uncertainties are linked to the time of recovery of the present worldwide
economic crisis, political instability in many parts of the world, and even climate change
consequences.  Another impetus favoring the expansion of nuclear energy is political
instability in many regions of the world and national military defense.  Under the cover of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, some countries may acquire nuclear technology for
dubious purposes.  For example, the renewed interest by Middle East countries in
producing electricity with nuclear energy is being monitored closely by the IAEA,
including Iran’s quest to operate uranium enrichment facilities.  
Windows of opportunities, if seized one way or the other, may affect the development
of nuclear energy worldwide.  As we have seen, some experts are optimistic in visioning
a nuclear energy renaissance; some others experts—notably, Frechette and Trevor
(2010)— do not foresee any nuclear energy renaissance except perhaps in a few Asian
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countries.  The final decision on whether or not to pursue new nuclear energy would
impact on the development of nuclear waste management policies.  Both external or
internal factors are likely to impact on this development, and the next section addresses
their relative importance.
5.2 External and Internal Factors Affecting the Development of NWM Policies
 Based on the time series analyses, countries have generally paid greater attention to
nuclear waste management policies as of the late 1990s, sometimes two decades after the
start of operation of their nuclear power plants.  Indeed, the NEA and scholars report that
there are several reasons for this delay (Hogselius, 2009; NEA, 2008a): 1) most countries
were content to have their nuclear fuel waste remain in safe storage and attend to the
needs of the young and emerging nuclear industry; 2) research was still being carried out
within many countries on the best approach for dealing with nuclear fuel waste over the
long term; and, 3) some countries preferred to wait for an international consensus on best
practices.  Such a consensus started to develop only by the mid-1990s (NEA, 2008a).  
With respect to convergence toward a consensus on best radioactive waste
management practices developed within international organizations— for instance, the
IAEA and the NEA—fundamental documents on radioactive waste management emerged
in the mid 1990s that were supported by a wide range of countries.  This momentum
eventually culminated in the entry into force in 2001 of the Joint Convention.  According
to the NEA (2008a), several countries consider that the time is now ripe (or presents a
window of opportunity as mentioned above) to apply these internationally agreed-upon
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best practices and move more quickly in developing new domestic nuclear waste
management policies or reorient existing strategies.  Many countries believe that it is time
to deal head-on with the disposal of nuclear waste and develop long-term 'solutions' even
though, many would argue, there is no urgent safety issue justifying a change in the status
quo of the management of nuclear waste presently in storage (NEA, 2008a).  As a result,
policy development activities may intensify.  Within our study, such periods of activity
are represented by high-frequency peaks within country time series. 
If these high-frequency peaks did not occur randomly, we can try to determine what
factors influenced their development. As presented in Chapter 2, I define internal factors
as those controllable by the nuclear sector, and external factors as those originating
outside the nuclear sector.  Internal factors may include nuclear incidents, major
agreements between project stakeholders, new nuclear technologies and stakeholder
adaptive capacities.  External factors may include wars, market crashes, major social-
economic events, energy crises and national policies and the cultural and political context
of countries.  Scholars—for instance, Gilkap (1992)—argue that the direction and rate of
system evolution are influenced by the interaction between internal and external factors.
The interaction of external and internal factors was not the focus of the study's
research design.  Instead, the study was to focus on internal factors, here, stakeholder
adaptive capacities, because the ultimate purpose was to provide managers with some
management tools under their control within adaptive management programs. 
Nonetheless, because external factors may have overriding influence over system
development, I thought a discussion on external factors would be beneficial for ultimately
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understanding the influence of internal factors.  So I start this section of the chapter by
discussing external factors followed by a discussion on internal factors.  The section ends
with a discussion that attempts to explore possible interactions and respective influence
of external and internal factors.  
5.2.1 External Factors
In Chapter 4, Table 3 separates the countries by number of primary frequency peaks
of policy events occurring between the time of the first commercial operation of the first
nuclear power plant and entry into force in 2001 of the Joint Convention.  At first glance,
this numeric separation does not point to any particular country attribute.  Certainly, as
raised in Chapter 4, it is not tied to the adoption by a country of any of the three general
nuclear waste management strategies, that is, direct disposal, reprocessing and burning, or
the wait-and-see strategy.  Perhaps the grouping is reflective of a country’s contextual
external factor.  
Primary peaks, as defined in Chapter 3, were observed in 8 out of the 23 countries
(about a third).  Table 14 lists these countries, main contributing policy events associated
with primary and some secondary peaks (see Appendix 2), and possible driving external
factors.  Examples of contributing policy events include the creation of specific
government oversight institutions, the development of specific legal oversight
instruments, management of new radioactive waste facilities and activities.  Examples of
possible driving external factors include major political and financial events.  All the
countries listed in Table 14 can be considered as either slowly developing countries, or
countries developing more quickly within a relatively short period of instability.  All of
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the countries have encountered major political upheavals in the relatively recent past. 
Although the influence of external factors suggested in Table 14 is conjecture at the 
Table 14.  Possible External Factors Explaining Policy-Event Primary Peaks
 in the Country Time Series 
(between the 1  year of operation of the 1  nuclear power plant andst st
 entry into force in 2001 of the Joint Convention) 
(see annotated times series in Appendix 2)
Countries with at
Least One Primary
Peak
Main Contributing Policy Events of
the Primary Peaks
Possible Driving External Factors
Argentina (1997) Formation of NAEC, introduction of new safety
regulations.
New constitution in 1994 with greater
democratic institutions?
Argentina (2000) Clean-up of uranium mines, nuclear cooperation
agreements 
Looming economic crisis? 
Brazil (1997) New government institutions of radioactive waste Poor economic growth country?
Brazil (1988) (high
secondary peak)
Aftermath of the Goaina accident leads to the
creation of new radioactive waste facilities and
procedures.
New constitution?
The Czech Republic (1997) Creation of RAWRA Accession to international community after
independence?
Finland (1991) New package of safety regulations Rapid economic growing after deep financial
crisis in 1991?  (Honkapohja (2009)
Finland (1999) (high
secondary peak) 
Events leading to a final decision in 2001 on
technological concept for the deep geological
disposal of nuclear waste and on the site for the
repository 
Return to a healthy economy? (Honkapohja
(2009)
Hungary (1997) Creation of PURAM After independence:  newly formed
democratic governmental structures and
growing economy?
Lithuania (2000) Implementation of 1999 Law on Radioactive
Waste Management; new planning for RWM now
that return of SNF to Russia is complete.
Independence in 1990 but political
instabilities continued until 2000?
Russian Federation (1997)
(high secondary peak 
  Safety and siting guides Return to political stability after the fall of
the Soviet Union?
Russian Federation (2000) Draft law on the import of radioactive waste and
on the creation of a separate government waste
management organization 
Arrival of President Putin on the scene?
Maximization of energy sources to rebuild
Russia?
South Africa (1993)  Construction of a LLRWM facility End of Apartheid? End of Nuclear Weapons
Programs? 
South Africa (1999) Basic waste Act Strong recovery of capital flow? New
Constitution in 1996, Mandela passes
leadership to Mbeki in 1997?
(Fedderke and Simking, 2006)?
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moment (that is why they are all accented with a question mark), it is reasonable to
assume that external factors may play a more important role during political and
economic volatile times.  This is consistent with findings of policy scholars as described
in Chapter 2.
The determination of the influence of external factors would require in-depth
knowledge about the general context of each individual country over the period of time
covered by the study (e.g., political history and economic development).  For this study,
despite the absence of work that would amount to 23 single-case in-depth studies, and
although the study focuses on internal factors, I will suggest three categories of external
factors that could possibly impact the nuclear sector and nuclear waste management
policies.  They are from the general to the more specific: 1) a country`s general political
governance; 2) inclusion in a larger national technical system; and, 3) government
specific policies on national defense and energy policies.  These three categories of
external factors resemble the five suggested by Hogselius (2009) except that I do not
consider ‘geological conditions’ as an external factor (instead I consider that the nuclear
sector can deal with these conditions as an internal factor).  The rest of this section
discusses further the three suggested categories if external factors, that is, country
political governance, large national technical system, and national defense and energy
policies.
1) Country Political Governance
Most, if not all, countries consider that the nuclear sector operates in the interest of
the country as a whole, therefore, its general direction and oversight has historically been
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centralized within the national government (Stoett, 2003).  Kaiser (1997) argues that
decentralizing trends—generally seen as good for public participation in decision-making
processes—can result in changes to governance institutions.  According to Kaiser (1997,
major exogenous changes are required to combat institutional inertia.  In some instances,
however, less dramatic internal changes can lead to change in institutional governance
given sufficient time to slowly expand toward a critical point.  
Kaiser (1997) proposed the three following typical profiles for change in institutional
governance:
A) Institutional path-dependence, that is, only small, non-fundamental, incremental
steps toward significant changes are taken.  In this case, sequential institutional
changes vary little from the recent past in order to minimize uncertainty of their
outcome (possibly reflective of linear development) and are immune to most
external shocks.  The possibility of eventual lock-in is high;
B) Institutional conservatism, that is, institutions appear inert or frozen until the
advent of destabilizing political factors.  In this event, large institutional changes
may occur (possibly reflective of cyclic development or a window of opportunity
within a chaotic pattern); and,
C) Institutional learning, that is, learning that can be reformative through
fundamental institutional changes.  In this case, a critical mass of communication
emerges, and proposed reforms are widely supported (possibly reflective of
chaotic development).
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It is not particular easy to decide which one of these three profiles applies to a specific
case study.  Let’s take the example of South Africa, Romania, and Russia, where political
destabilizing events coincide with an increase in frequency of nuclear waste policy
events.  These political events likely had an impact on governance and may have led to
new decentralization policies.  Ansell and Gingrich (2003) argue that decentralization can
result from renewed populist policies emerging from periods of political instability.  In
turn, these scholars argue that decentralization can override previous institutional
conservatism and inertia of the bureaucratic system.  Consequently, new democratic
institutions and procedures are established that enable the public to increase its 
participation in decision-making processes.  
Decentralization trends in South Africa, Russia, and Romania allowed the more active
development of nuclear waste management policies.  This conclusion may seem contrary
to scholarly studies reporting that government centralization is more important for policy
development (Beaumont & Loopmans, 2008).  Therefore I suggest that an optimal
balance between decentralization and centralization needs to be achieved that, in turn,
favors policy development.  Therefore, perhaps there is too much decentralization in
Belgium and too much centralization in Russia that inhibits policy development.  
The above example could lead one to argue that institutional changes have occurred in
either a periodic or chaotic pattern.  A few dramatic changes occurred over this period,
but are they due to breaks in linear development or to changes in a phase within a cycle
(perhaps one regulating change between centralization and decentralization), or are they
due to a window of opportunity within a chaotic system.  In our case, I found no evidence
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of fully linear or periodic patterns.  Therefore, I suggest that any dramatic changes
occurred, because some critical mass of communication was gradually reached that led to
the sudden emergence of a window of opportunity (cf. Kaiser's third profile for 
institutional change, that is, institutional learning). 
2) Large National Technical Systems
Administratively, the nuclear waste management sector is integrated within the
nuclear energy sector that, in turn, is included in the larger technical system of a country. 
The management of nuclear waste is likely influenced by the extent of the nuclear energy
program and the general technological profile of a country, including national social
commitments.  For example, Walker (2000) examined the evolution of a reprocessing
plant in the United Kingdom, namely, THORP.  He argues that such large technical
systems are prone to path-dependence pathology through adherence to large commitments
that eventually result in inertia or technology lock-in.  Walker (2000) recommends that
much more attention be given within the political process to avoid lock-in by ensuring the
maintenance of reversibility and adaptability, particularly in any infrastructural
development.  Walker (2000) suggests that the challenges for the designer of policy
processes concentrate on the following three objectives: 1) set up a monitoring system to
provide a warning of potential undesirable entrapment, or lock-in; 2) institute regular and
effective reviews; and, 3) ensure that alternatives are developed and maintained over a
significant period of time.
Other scholars have also observed that the development of a large technical system is
highly influenced by past achievements or milestones.  For instance, Hughes (1989) states
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that modern large technological systems—particular those that are developed at the
national level—seem to evolve according to a loosely defined sequential pattern of the
following phases of development: invention, development, innovation, transfer, growth,
competition and consolidation.  Hughes (1989) argues, however, that these phases are not
necessarily sequential; they can overlap and backtrack.  He also argues that the
development of technical policies can also be influenced by entrainment effects.  As large
national technical systems mature, they acquire national style and momentum.  According
to Hughes (1989), national style is the result of cultural priorities, experiences,
importance given to academic work (e.g., France) versus pragmatic considerations (e.g.,
the United States) and can influence momentum.  Hughes (1989) claims that momentum
is gained by mature systems that have a mass of technical and organizational components,
and possess a rate of growth suggesting efficiency and velocity.  Some of these systems,
however, may have velocity but they also have vested interests, fixed assets and sunk
costs that may make it difficult for the system to adapt in the face of big surprises
(Hughes, 1989).
As an example of a large technical system imbued with vested interests, Hughes
(1989) reports that after WWI, during the interwar period and during WWII, power
systems acquired high momentum.  During WWI, internal dynamics overrode any
external influences because of the great need for energy and streamlining of bureaucratic
processes.  After the war, wartime measures, which allowed internal factors to absolutely
control the  development of power systems, could have been abandoned.  Influential
persons, however, questioned whether the efficiency achieved during the war could be
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useful for industrial recovery in peacetime, and indeed to a great extent it was.  The
situation after WWII, however, was different, and utility managers wrongly assumed that
internal forces could continue to override the external environment.  External factors—for
instance, the supply of oil, the rise of environmental protection groups increasing
liberalism, and the decreasing effectiveness of efficiency-raising technical devices for
generating equipment—challenged the utilities’ assumption on momentum.  
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, since the early 1990s, only now might there be
a renewed momentum or a ‘renaissance’ of the nuclear energy industry that appears to
have been triggered by the following three factors.  First, public concerns on global
climate change are increasing.  Second, several countries want to be energy self-sufficient
in view of instability in oil-producing countries and growing regional security concerns,
notably, in the Middle East.  And third, some countries located within politically unstable
regions (e.g., the Middle East) are considering nuclear energy, not only for peaceful
purposes but also for defense purposes.  These three factors are external factors as defined
in this study.
3) National Defense and Energy Policies
Volumes of nuclear fuel waste to manage will depend on the importance given by a
country to the generation of electricity using nuclear energy.  Therefore, nuclear waste
management is a “peripheral domain undermined by legitimacy of the core domain”
(Mackerron & Berkhout, 2006, p.1005).  In this case, the core domain is nuclear energy
policy that, in turn, is undermined by the legitimacy of national energy policies.  These
broader national energy policies take into account available resources and economic
246
growth, and increasingly so (as we have seen), national policies on sustainable
development, including environmental sustainability.  It also can be influenced by a
country's historical use of, or aspirations to use, nuclear energy for national defense
purposes.  This section addresses both of these two national interests.
National Defense Policies
For understandable reasons, it is quite obvious why the civil nuclear industry would
like to dissociate the generation of electricity with nuclear energy from its use to build
nuclear weapons (Cooke, 2009; Stoett, 2003).  These two uses of nuclear energy,
however, do share at least a common history through the same initial conditions.  There
are many references on the history of nuclear weapons, so I will refer the reader to only a
few of these here.  
After the Second World War, there was a push to use nuclear energy for both building
weapons for deterrence purposes during the Cold War and for generating electricity. 
Uranium being the preferred energy and defense fuel, there were two uranium mining
rushes on opposite sides of the Atlantic in the 1950s (Zoellner, 2008).  One rush was
carried out by the Soviet Union in two locals: in the then Czechoslovakia at the St.
Joachimsthal uranium mines and in East Germany at the Wismut mines.  The other rush
occurred in the United States, first in the Colorado Plateau and then in the Belgian Congo
at the Shinkolobwe uranium mines in Namibia.  The mining of uranium in these countries
during the Cold War explains in part their participation today in the nuclear fuel cycle.
In 1946, Oppenheimer and other like-minded leaders realized that there was a
scientific inevitability that nuclear weapons could be eventually developed by any state. 
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Already South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, South Korea were showing signs of
willing to build nuclear weapons.  In this regard, the first three countries were being
assisted by West Germany (Cooke, 2009).  Oppenheimer, supposedly showing a belated
guilty conscience, was active in pushing the idea that controlling the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons meant nuclear weapon countries would provide assistance to other
countries to enable them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, that is, mainly
the production of electricity, and in return, these countries would renounce their own
development of nuclear weapons (Cooke, 2009).  This amounted to a bargain between
Haves and Have-Not nuclear weapon states.
Consistent with this idea, Cooke (2009) reports that U.S. President Eisenhower
announced his Atoms for Peace Project in 1953, an initiative that built upon the bargain
that “generosity would yield obeisance” (p.222).  In 1957, the United Nations specialized
agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was created to assist in
implementing the bargain by promoting and facilitating the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes and by establishing safeguards and monitoring the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Although the work of the IAEA has been instrumental in enhancing
nuclear safety, its efforts on establishing safeguards have been less successful (Cooke,
2009).  Since the creation of the IAEA in 1958, another four countries are known to have
built nuclear weapons (China-1964, India-1977, Israel-1979, Pakistan-1998), and by 1976
others were suspected of secretly engaging in a nuclear weapon development program
(Iran, Iraq, Brazil, Spain, Taiwan, South Africa, Argentina, and Egypt) (Cooke, 2009).
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By 1966, the first generation of conventional nuclear fission reactors was rapidly
purchased worldwide (Cooke, 2009).  This lasted until 1974 (8 years).  Since then,
research has been carried out on a new type of reactor.  These reactors are called ‘burners’
(advanced nuclear reactors).  They consume reprocessed nuclear waste taken out of
conventional reactors to extract significant residual energies (some of these reactors also
produce additional fuel, they are called ‘breeders’).  The end result is electricity
generation with or without new fuel production. 
 Although the concept of recycling this waste is being reconsidered worldwide for
reasons of security of supply of energy sources, much public controversy is raised,
because recycling nuclear waste potentially makes available technology and components
for the development of nuclear weapons (Cooke, 2009; WNA, 2009a).  For whatever
purpose, several countries are currently considering whether to directly dispose of the
nuclear waste exiting nuclear reactors or ‘recycle’ it.  At first glance, the adoption of a
strategy for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle may appear to be an internal factor, but
in some countries (e.g., Iran), it is too closely linked with national defense policies to be
considered solely as such.
All the countries selected are official participants of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG).  As indicated on its website (www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org), the NSG is a
multinational body of now 46 nuclear supplier countries that seek to contribute to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for
nuclear exports and nuclear related exports (dual-use material).  The NSG was created
following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear weapon state
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(India), which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes
could be misused.  
Country participation in the NSG includes the following conditions: the ability to
supply nuclear and nuclear-related items, adherence to the NSG guidelines, enforcement
of a legally based domestic export control system, adherence to one or more international
nuclear non-proliferation agreements, and support of international efforts toward the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.  Initially the
NSG had seven members (Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). 
By the mid-2000s, in the face of increasing non-proliferation concerns, the United
States announced another nuclear non-proliferation initiative: the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GNEP).  One of the objectives of GNEP was to provide a new, perhaps a
less formal, vehicle for the old bargain, that is, assistance to countries to develop their
nuclear energy program as long as they do not develop nuclear weapons.  GNEP’s main
objective as stated on its website follows (www.GNEPpartnership.org): 
"The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership is a cooperation of those States that share
the common vision of the necessity of the expansion of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes worldwide in a safe and secure manner.  It aims to accelerate
development and deployment of advanced fuel cycle technologies to encourage
clean development and prosperity worldwide, improve the environment, and
reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation".
At present, GNEP wants to encourage the expansion of its membership (the new
name now being considered is ‘International Nuclear Energy Framework’ or INEF).  A
potentially significant segment of nuclear growth over the next half-century could occur
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in developing countries where big increases in electricity demand are forecasted (Cooke,
2009).  These countries include Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. 
None of these countries are members of GNEP, although Egypt, Nigeria, and Turkey are
GNEP ‘Observer Countries’.  With the possible establishment of INEF, observer
countries are expected to automatically become full members of the new organization.
National Energy Policies: Energy Security and Environment Sustainability
There are two other important considerations that are having an impact on the
development of the nuclear energy option: 1) energy security; and, 2) environmental
sustainability or sustainable development (depending on one’s argument for economic
growth).  The first consideration relates to future global energy demand and the desire for
energy self-reliance.  The second consideration relates to the increasing public concern
over the protection of local and global environments for present and future generations.  
Sound energy security policies are required in view of historic events, including the
increasing demand for energy from World War II onwards stimulated by a desire for
economic growth, the effect of oil embargos of the late 1970s, decreasing energy demand
in the mid-1980s, increasing energy demand of the 1990s and 2000s by China and India,
and more generally, the occurrence of global financial crises (IAEA, 2009; GIF, 2001). 
Climate change, the long-term impacts of nuclear waste, and economic growth in
developing countries, including China and India, are issues shining a spotlight on
sustainable development based on ‘clean’ electricity production. 
As population density increases in some countries, for instance, in China and India,
national energy needs are steadily increasing.  The Energy Information Administration at
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the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the net electricity generation worldwide
will be 31.8 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2030 (the reference case).  This is 77 percent higher
than the 2006 total of 18.0 trillion kilowatt-hours (EIA, 2009).  The electricity demand
almost doubled over 25 years.  The strongest growth in electricity generation is projected
for the non-OECD countries (mainly India and China).  Non-OECD electricity generation
increases by 3.5 percent per year to 2030 (the reference case), because of the expected call
for a rising standard of living that would increase demand for home appliances and the
expansion of commercial services, including hospitals, office buildings, and shopping
malls.  In comparison, in the OECD nations, where infrastructures are well established
and population growth is relatively slow, much slower growth in electricity generation is
expected, averaging 1.2 percent per year from 2006 to 2030.
The desire for energy security and energy independence has increased recently in view
of concerns on political instability in traditional energy supplier countries (e.g., Middle
East countries), on resource depletion (e.g., petroleum resources in some countries) or
resource unavailability due to economic considerations (e.g., tar sands in Alberta,
Canada), and on environmental impacts of various sources of energy.  In view of these
concerns, some countries are expecting to meet their energy needs, at least in part, with
additional nuclear energy.  The World Nuclear Association reports that 400 new reactors
worldwide are ‘planned’ over the next twenty years (WNA, 2007).  
The new generation of nuclear reactors, if they come to fruition, is likely to be even
safer and more cost-effective (GIF, 2002).  Historically, nuclear energy has developed
through four generations of nuclear reactor designs mostly to meet external factors (GIF,
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2002).  Initially, designs were based on what was technologically and economically
feasible.  Then, new designs were developed to meet changing societal values, including
inherent safety, greater security measures, proliferation resistance, growing consumption,
reducing waste volumes and recycling, increasing interest in renewable energy, climate
change and sustainable development.  Research and development activities are ongoing
on the latest generation of reactors that are expected to be deployed by 2030.
National energy policies, in turn, are affected by national environmental policies.  The
concept of sustainable development has raised awareness on potential impacts to future
generations and on the issue of desirability of economic growth.  Because impacts are no
longer local and over the short term, national environmental policies need to consider
broader time and spatial scales.  Broader time scales have an impact, for instance, on
mitigation measures of projects so that future generations are not unduly burdened. 
Broader spatial scales mean that environmental impacts can be global, for example,
climate change.  It also means that national environmental policies increasingly need to
take into account national policies in other countries thus requiring international
collaboration.  
To complicate matters, the distinction between local and global environments is not
always straightforward.  Many scholars (e.g., Owens, 2004; Sjoberg & Drottz-Sjoberg,
2001; Shrader-Frechette, 1993) report that siting large-scale facilities involves addressing
not only public concerns about impacts on the local environment but also public concerns
on possibly indirect international consequences.  For instance, Sjoberg and Drottz-
Sjoberg (2001), through an exhaustive mail-in survey, report that many local residents
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contemplating whether to accept a nuclear waste management facility within their
municipality are no longer only concerned with their own interests as the NIMBY
syndrome would suggest.  
These scholars report that many local residents are also concerned with the broader
issue of nuclear energy and whether this energy option is good for the planet and future
generations, for instance, by balancing nuclear energy risks with those of climate change. 
This balancing act is not straightforward and considers thorny issues such as fairness to
developing countries, economic growth and the degree of quality of life.  Sjoberg and
Drottz-Sjoberg (2001) conclude that, because these issues are debated in many public
fora, they ultimately could be reflected in national policies.
Relative Influence of National Defense and Energy Policies
Due to political priorities and sensitivities, the relative influence of national defense
and energy policies on a country’s adoption of the nuclear energy option is not always
transparent.  This decision is usually controlled by politicians, therefore is largely out of
the hands of nuclear waste managers.  Hence, I consider the decision on the nuclear
energy option in a country as an external factor.  
For the most part, external factors have not been discussed in the national reports
under the Joint Convention.  This is not surprisingly since it was not the intent of the
contracting parties to do so under requirements of the Joint Convention.  Instead the
national reports focus mostly on internal factors.  
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5.2.2 Internal Factors
I define internal factors as those types of actions or events that are under the direct
purview of the nuclear waste sector.  Internal factors can be acted upon to respond to a
particular management goal.  For instance, a nuclear waste manager may want to develop
a certain particular technology and draws up a plan to do so, including setting
management procedures in motion, hiring specialized staff, purchasing equipment, setting
a feasible schedule for milestones.  Such internal factors influence management
performance in the short term with some certainty.  Managers will want to reduce all
uncertainties, but in the past they have focused mainly on those associated with technical
considerations.  For irreducible uncertainties (mainly due to uncertainties from external
factors and some internal factors), coping mechanisms for dealing with emerging
surprises will need to be put into place. 
In the country time series, internal factors tend to be reflected in secondary high-
frequency peaks of policy events.  Examples of internal policy events contributing to
these peaks include the following list.
C Remediation of historic contamination (U.S., Canada, the Czech Republic);
C New topical concerns such as the transportation and transboundary movement of
waste including sealed sources (U.S., Belgium, Switzerland), financing of waste
disposal (France), and increased importance of public participation in decision-
making processes (Canada, Lithuania);
C Policy reversals or reorientations: moratoria on reprocessing (U.S.), ban on ocean
disposal of nuclear fuel waste (U.S.), and research on alternatives (Japan);
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C The release of new regulatory requirements (many countries);
C The establishment of treatment, storage or disposal waste facilities (many
countries);
C The establishment or restructuring of oversight organizations (many countries);
C Response to domestic or neighbor radioactive accidents (Brazil, Ukraine,
Sweden); and,
C Multilateral or bilateral international collaboration (between Russia with ex-soviet
satellite countries, between Balkan countries, between nuclear reactor suppliers
and receivers).
When projects need to be implemented over several decades or even a century (as in
the case of nuclear waste disposal), however, management faces the uncertainty of
inevitable surprises.  The study focuses on internal factors that build adaptive capacity to
respond to inevitable changes or surprises that can emerge over the long term.  Some
surprises are small and easily managed.  Other surprises can be catastrophic, such as
nuclear accidents and serious financial crises.  
Although managers can reduce the possibility of future negative events, they cannot
predict all negative events that could occur over several decades.  In this case, managers
need to build general procedures, skills, and resources that would enable the organization
to better adapt to suddenly emerging, negative events.  The following three examples are
ways to ensure flexibility for adaptive capacity that have been practice more or less
successfully by the nuclear sector in the past: 1) spreading risks often through
international collaborations; 2) allocating resources to emergency preparedness; and 3)
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facilitating meaningful public participation in decisions that affect it.  The rest of this
section provides a closer look at these three ways to increase flexibility.
1) International Collaboration and Convergence toward Best Practices
The highest frequency peak in the time series for all 23 countries occurs in the latest
years.  This profile suggests an international movement in the development of nuclear
waste management policies through the controlled and initial slow diffusion and
exchange of ideas eventually crystalizing in the Joint Convention.  The initially slow
diffusion is likely due to more complicated logistics, the time required to clearly
understand and accept new ideas, and national priorities, including the construction of
nuclear power plants and attention to the first decade of operations.  Then, the Chernobyl
accident occurred in 1986.  That accident led to international collaboration leading in turn
to the development and adoption of the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety under the
auspices of the IAEA, followed seven years later by the adoption of the 2001 Joint
Convention.
Tews et al. (2001) argue that the presence of a topical international platform helps to
create international convergence of related national policies.  This convergence is usually
slow, at least initially, because international agreements and guidance are often based on
lowest common denominators.  The capacity of nations to adopt international agreements
and guidance will depend on domestic political, economic, societal, and institutional 
factors.  Tews et al.  (2001) argue that the adoption of international guidance also
depends on specific characteristic of the new policies to adopt.  For example, can the new
policy be inserted into legislation within the portfolio of one minister, or are all ministers
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affected; is there general agreement on the new policy among national stakeholders; does
the new policy involve incremental or radical change.  On balance, the answers to these
considerations seem similar among the countries selected for the study, because there is
some indication of significant international convergence of national policies in the later
years.
2) Nuclear Accidents and Emergency Preparedness
Some of the smaller high-frequency peaks within the country time series represent a
response to a nuclear accident or incident.  Sometimes the advent of a nuclear accident or
incident eventually provides impetus to either the development of new waste policies or
the modification of existing ones.  After a post-mortem analysis of these events, new
policies can be developed, or existing ones reoriented or reinforced.  For instance, I will
point to only a few civil accidents occurring after 1970, that is, after the end of the initial
research phase on nuclear reactor designs and the initial phase of commercial operation of
nuclear power.  I will raise four examples of accidents that have had a large actual or
perceived impact on the environment.  
Before outlining these examples, it is worth referring to the IAEA International
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES).  This scale varies from 1 to 7 and
communicates the significance of nuclear events from a range of activities, including
industrial and medical uses of radiation sources, operations at nuclear facilities, and
transport of radioactive materials.  On this scale, events characterized by levels 1 to 3 are
called ‘incidents’, and events characterized by levels 4 to 7 are called ‘accidents’.  The
INES classification considers three areas of impact: 1) radiation doses to people and the
Some historians even pinpoint the accident as seriously forming Gorbachev’s view on glasnost (doctrine15
of government transparency) and thereby contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 (Cooke,
2009).
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environment (off-site consequences); 2) breach of radiological barriers and controls (on-
site consequences); and 3) problems with defense-in-depth measures.
The Three Mile Island Accident in the United States
I have already pointed to the 1979 Three Mile Island accident where there was severe
damage to the reactor core but with no significant environmental consequences
(excluding public controversy).  The event is classified on the INES scale as a 5-level
accident.  This accident may have provided an extra impetus eventually leading to the
1982 legislative package on nuclear waste disposal.
The Chernobyl Accident in the Former Soviet Union
Seven years later in 1986, the Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine occurred.  This event
is classified as a 7-level accident.  The accident led to several changes.  For instance,
international pressure forced the Soviet government under Gorbachev to be more
transparent about the accident and its consequences .  The fall of the Soviet Union led to15
economic turmoil, and, in 2001, former Russian President Putin signed legislative
changes to allow spent nuclear fuel from other countries into Russia for interim storage,
reprocessing, or possibly for permanent disposal, all for a fee (NTI, 2003).  
Initially, President Putin instructed that country collaboration was to be carrying out
on a bilateral basis, but he moved the proposal onto the global agenda by offering
Russia's national deep geological repository as a multinational site (Dawson & Darst,
2005).  Although the IAEA is not opposed to the idea per se, it considers that there are
259
many obstacles to surmount—notably, Russia’s credibility as a responsible host,
opposition by the Russian people, liability concerns, and transport issues (Dawson &
Darst, 2005).  Given all these concerns, the probability of accidents associated with the
Russian project needs to be carefully considered.  In July 2006, the Russian government
announced that it has abandoned the idea for now (INRC, 2009).
The Goiania Accident in Brazil
A year after the Chernobyl accident, in 1987, a radiation source accident occurred in
Goiania, Brazil, that would not only tighten radioactive waste regulations but instill a new
safety culture with respect to radioactive waste management in general (IAEA, 1988). 
The accident did not involve nuclear fuel waste, but rather radioactive waste from a used
medical source.  A radioactive source used in a cancer treatment machine was carelessly
disposed of in a scrap yard.  Brazilian children eventually got hold of the source and
played with it for a while, spreading radioactive contamination over a large area.  As a
result, four people died, and six others received high doses of radiation.  The event was
classified as a level-5 accident on the IAEA INES scale.
Once the problem was detected by the authorities two weeks after the unsealed source
was discovered by members of the public, and after immediate care was provided to the
affected people, a massive contamination soil clean-up had to be undertaken.  This
accident was analyzed not only by the national authorities but also by the IAEA who also
got involved in assessing the consequences of the accident.  The IAEA compiled lessons
learned and made recommendations for changes to national policies not only in Brazil but
in all IAEA member countries (IAEA, 1988).
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The Tokaimura Accident and other Incidents in Japan
About a decade later, on 30 September 1999, a criticality accident occurred at a
nuclear fuel chemical processing plant in Tokaimura, Japan (IAEA-Japan, 2009).  The
accident resulted in three workers suffering acute radiation syndrome, and a number of
workers and members of the public receiving radiation doses.  Some 161 resident people
were evacuated and some 310 000 were advised to stay indoors for about 18 hours as a
precautionary measure.  The accident was classified as a level-4 accident on the INES
scale.  Numerous reforms were made after the accident.  Reforms included means to
increase the safety culture and to strengthen the management and regulatory systems.  A
special law on Nuclear Emergency Response was enacted (in addition to making some
amendments to the existing basic law on emergency response).  
This accident was followed by minor ones, including those resulting from earthquakes
in 2005, 2006, and in 2007 that slightly affected nuclear power plant operations.  These
accidents contributed to raising public concerns.  Local communities are becoming more
vocal especially in regards to utility and government transparency (Mercier, 2009).  In
Japan, 25 years ago, NGOs and local citizens were very active in voicing their opposition
to nuclear power.  This was due in part to some degree of serenity brought on by local and
regional development associated with the now 55 nuclear power reactors, as reported by a
local NGO, namely, Green Action (Mercier, 2009).  Nuclear utilities had provided
millions of dollars for fisherman cooperatives, the building of roads, medical clinics, and
recreational centers.  This serenity, however, has now vanished (Mercier, 2009).  
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Newly faced with public resistance, the Japan government has attempted to respond to
public demands for transparency with the establishment of transparency instruments.  For
example, the Government supported utility and government websites (although the
completeness of the information provided on these sites could be improved).  And in
2000, the Government passed a law establishing, inter alia, a separate new organization
for the management of nuclear and radioactive waste management, namely NUMO. 
Although highly regrettable, Kingdon (2003) sees accidents as possible windows of
opportunity for action and change for better policies.  Accidents often reveal hidden
weaknesses of policies needing attention.  Nuclear accidents, however, have been
relatively infrequent across countries and across time.  
3) Public Participation Demands
Perhaps more important to system development than the impact of nuclear accidents, I
suggest that changes in nuclear waste policy have more often occurred as a result of
ongoing public demands to participate in project decision-making processes. Sometime
this demand is directed at ameliorating general management practices, for example, to
increase transparency (Barthes, 2009); sometimes it is aimed at one specific topic, for
example, the transportation of nuclear waste (WNTI, 2010). 
 Steady incremental public demands can, without any prompting from acute drastic
events, lead to change.  For example, Finland has made steady progress on nuclear waste
management without any serious nuclear accidents or major influential external factors
throughout the history of its nuclear energy program.  But the Finnish public has kept
well-informed on nuclear waste management developments and has developed good
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working relations with the nuclear sector even though developing these relations have not
always been an easy exercise (NEA, 2001).
 Finland is the first country where the Government has made a decision on the
technical concept of a deep geological repository and on its location, namely, the site
where two nuclear reactors are already located (on the island of Olkiluoto near the town
of Eurajoki).  Finland has encountered less opposition from local communities for three
reasons (Lewis, 2005; NEA, 2001): 1) local communities have already established a
generally good, longstanding, relationship with the operator of the reactors, TVO, and
with the nuclear waste management organization, Posiva Oy (although that may change at
any time in the future); 2) the Finnish people generally respect the safety pronouncements
of their government authorities; and, 3) Finland was hit hard in the early 1990s by a deep
economic recession caused by a miscalculated macroeconomic banking crisis, the
collapse of a primary trading partner (the Soviet Union), and the effect of the global
economic downturn.  Faced with a financial downturn, the affected local communities
were therefore more likely to negotiate a compensation package in exchange for hosting
the repository.
It remains surprising that Finland’s national waste programs developed differently
from all other countries examined in the study, in that, there was effective collaboration
among stakeholders that relatively rapidly led to a final solution for the long-term
management of nuclear fuel waste.  Lewis (2005) offers some clues that are culturally
based.  He argues that Finland is culturally different from any other country.  Though
surrounded by powerful neighbors throughout its history, Finland has managed to
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preserve its own identity.  The country has preserved its own unique language; and it
outranks many countries in literacy, education, government transparency, and
technological innovation. 
 Lewis (2005) claims that a particular national value resides at the root of Finland’s
uniqueness: ‘guts’.  He translates this value as courage to go at it alone and get things
done even faced with great challenges.  This trait may indeed explain the uniqueness of
the development of the Finnish nuclear waste program.  
'Controllable' internal factors, in the form of building stakeholder adaptive capacities,
have been selected as the focus of the study.  Their relative importance for each country
as compared to other countries will be discussed in Chapter 6.  The next section
summarize the possible relative influence of external and internal factors based on the
study findings.
5.2.3 Relative Influence of External and Internal Factors
As the results of the time series analyses would indicate, there is likely to be specific
country contextual factors, other external factors, and internal factors that influence the
development of nuclear waste management policies.  However, due to the nature of
nuclear fuel waste management, the development of nuclear waste management policies
seemed to be characterized by the slow diffusion and exchange of ideas at the
international level and by the steady ongoing influence of internal factors.  I suggest that
experience with internal factors tended to steadily and incrementally converge thinking
across most countries.  As a result, an agreement on best practices was achieved in the
form of the Joint Convention. 
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The few primary peaks found in the time series are likely due to the emergence of
overriding large external factors occurring during relatively short intense periods of
instability within the country.  But in other countries, no primary peaks occur.  For
example, if we take the case of the United States—a forge-ahead country—no primary
peaks are noted in its time series.  Fundamental institutional changes, for instance, the
termination of the Yucca Mountain Project in 2009, may fall within Kaiser’s third
principle.  This principle indicates that institutional learning can be reformative, because
of a critical mass of communication proceeding slowly through time was eventually
achieved.  In general though, system development of nuclear waste policies appears to be
mostly influenced by internal factors, and by resilience to most external perturbations. 
This finding on the relative influence of external and internal factors is consistent with
general conclusions of policy scholars.
For example, Anderson (2006) concludes that the development of policies within
subsystem politics proceeds usually incrementally for relatively long periods of time with
involvement of macropolitics when significant external events occur, often involving
some existing or looming crisis.  Therefore, Anderson (2006) argues that subsystem
autonomy in policy-making is a conditional phenomenon: it may last only so long as sub-
system actions are routine, conventionally accepted, and keep a low profile.
5.3 Chapter Summary and Conclusion on Evaluating Hypothesis 1
In this chapter, I explored patterns of system development of nuclear waste
management policies and periods of increased frequency of policy events (primary
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peaks).  As well, the possible influence of external and internal factors that could affect
broad system development was discussed.  The country time series suggest that both
internal and external factors influence the development of national waste management
policies, although internal factors may have been generally more important to system
development for many countries over the period covered by the study indicating resilience
to many external moderate perturbations. With respect to evaluating H1, the study
suggests that the development of nuclear waste policy system is non-random, and
possibly chaotic, therefore, the system is likely to be ‘complex’.  Consistent with
complexity theory, over the course of the unfolding of the system, the occurrence of
windows of opportunity is expected to emerge.  Internal factors, that is, factors within the
control of the nuclear sector, appear to steadily drive the system while absorbing most
shocks from external factors.  On occasion, external factors emerging within short intense
periods of instability can affect significant change through responsive policy additions.
Clearly distinguishing between the relative, specific influence of internal and external
factors in system development is not easy.  Many policy scholars continue to struggle
with this issue.  Specific respective influences are difficult to assess, but a general typical
profile of this interaction, however, can be outlined.  My description above on the general
profile of internal and external factors is consistent, as we have already seen, with the
conclusion of several policy scholars, including Anderson (2007).  The next chapter
leaves behind the question of external factors or their interaction with internal factors by
focusing on determining the influence of particular potential key driving internal factors. 
These factors are stakeholder adaptive capacities.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION ON THE INFLUENCE OF STAKEHOLDER ADAPTIVE
CAPACITIES ON BROAD SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
In Chapter 2, I described the general the nature of each of the six stakeholder adaptive
capacities (SACs) that I selected for the study.  In this chapter, I discuss the six SACs as
applied to the context of the development of the nuclear waste management policies.  I
will also discuss the relative importance of these SACs given by each of the 23 countries
for the development of nuclear waste management policies considering the selected
management goal of sustainable development.
Based on the results outlined in Chapter 3, the relative importance of stakeholder
adaptive capacities are discussed and the specific findings for each country is reported in
this chapter.  Moreover, not only are the dominant SACs identified for each country, but
the use of an aggregation of sustainable development national indicators is used to
suggest which SACs were likely to have influenced a country’s path toward sustainable
development.  I found that three SACs were particularly important for this management
goal, the first two being dominant: social responsibility of managers (SAC2), public
participation in decision-making processes (SAC3), and learning by managers (SAC1). 
These three SACs involve networking and learning capacities that are likely to be useful
within an adaptive management program for sustainable development.
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6.1 Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities for Nuclear Waste Disposal
As described in Chapter 2, the selection of stakeholder adaptive capacities (SAC) was
largely based on two general criteria.  The first criterion was that the SACs were to be
referenced in the literature as useful for meeting a set goal for an adaptive management
programs, here, sustainable development.  The second criterion was that the selected
SACs were to be broad enough so that any findings on nuclear waste management could
be generalized to other complex social-environmental problems.
With respect to the first criterion, the goal of sustainable development was chosen not
only as a possible endpoint for adaptive management programs, but also as a plausible
endpoint for the long-term management of nuclear fuel waste.  Indeed, sustainable
development is often referred to as a goal of radioactive waste management (IAEA, 2001;
NEA, 2000).  The NEA (2000) argues that the goal of sustainable development is
appropriate for the development of nuclear waste management policies, particularly in
view of the long periods of time into the future that radioactive waste and spent fuel will
have to be safely managed.  In addition, many national nuclear authorities have enshrined
the goal of sustainable development within policy documents or their website. 
With respect to the second criterion, the selected SACs needed to be broad enough so
that research findings could be generalized to other social-environmental problems in a
wide range of countries.  The disadvantage in selecting broad SACs is that there is likely
to be overlap between individual SACs.  Unlike in the physical sciences, variables in the
social sciences are often interconnected and overlap (Smith & Wandel, 2006; Andsager &
Powers, 1999; Doré et al., 1996).  Nevertheless, broad and highly referenced stakeholder
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adaptive capacities, which can be found to some extent in all countries, were selected
while acknowledging their potential interconnections.
I selected a priori five SACs, namely, learning by managers, social responsibility of
managers, public participation in decision-making, government oversight, and formal
project  collaboration.  Upon reviewing the Joint Convention national reports, a sixth
SAC was added a posteriori: emergency preparedness.  As described in Chapter 2, the
capacity of emergency preparedness  has been a natural extension of the safety culture
among nuclear energy managers since it is a sector where significant low probability
accidents with high impacts can occur (Pearson and Clair, 1998).  The importance of
building such capacity intensified after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 through various
means including the adoption of a new international nuclear safety convention (IAEA,
1994).  I have already provided a description of the six SACs as generally conceptualized
(Section 2.2.4); in the remaining part of this section, I focus on these SACs as applied to
nuclear waste management. 
Relative Importance of Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities
As described in Chapter 3, through visual inspection of Table 5 (cf. the calibrated
database of frequency counts for each SAC), a few general observations can be made. 
For example, SAC4 (government oversight) has the highest frequency count of all SACs
for all countries.  This suggests that all the countries follow the general anthem of  'Safety
First'.  This was expected, particularly since the Joint Convention national reports are
submitted for compliance under a safety convention.  What is less obvious is the relative
importance given to the other SACs by each of the 23 countries that appears to vary from
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country to country (and no doubt somewhat through the decades as indicated by the
complementary temporal study).  
To reduce the information in the database (Table 5), which may be helpful to reveal
hidden associations, I applied multivariate analyses, namely cluster analysis and
correspondence analysis.  The results of these analyses, which suggest the relative
importance given to the individual SACs by each country, is reported in Table 13.  But
before proceeding to discuss the results in Table 13, I outline here some discussion on
each of the SACs, not in general as was done in Chapter 2, but as applied more
specifically to the development of nuclear waste management policies.  I rely on the
information in both the national reports and in other governmental and scholarly
references.
1) SAC1: Learning by Managers
The results of the content analysis indicate that the learning capacity of managers
(public or private) is reflected in the national reports through the reporting of many
activities.  These activities include the undertaking of national and international research
programs, the openness to alternatives, the striving for competence and expertise, the
hiring of consultants, the transparency of errors and their correction, the modernizing and
updating of equipment and skills, the extent of quality assurance programs, the attention
paid to human and financial resources, and in planning and validating activities.
Figure 8, and Tables 11 and 13 show that, compared to other countries and to other
stakeholder adaptive capacities, China, Brazil, and Argentina—all considered developing
countries by the World Bank—place a lot of importance on learning.  This importance
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may be explained by likely the early stages of  development of many nuclear waste
management activities.  These countries may need to continue to learn unilaterally from
domestic investigations, bilaterally from progress made in other countries, and
multilaterally from international fora.  With respect to international fora working on
safety considerations, the NEA (2008a) indicates that they are effective for learning best
practices, because similarities and differences among countries are identified.  These fora
are also useful for suggesting overarching themes for future work and compiling lessons
to be learnt.  
However, with respect to international transfer of products, technology, specific
operational procedures, and local public policies, Perkins and Neumayer (2009) indicate
that there is still uncertainty on whether developing countries can benefit from, or be
harmed by, globalization learning processes.  These scholars’ investigations on
international trade transfer and inward foreign investment produced only mixed results.  
For example, Perkins and Neumayer (2009) found that the more environment-
efficient the countries from which a developing country imports manufactured goods and
technology, the higher domestic levels of greenhouse pollution efficiency.  However, if
the developing country exports its goods to more pollution-efficient countries, this has no
effect on the level of domestic greenhouse gases.  The scholars argue that a more
influential factor for increasing learning may be the volume of overall foreign direct
investment.  
Closer to the topic of our study, a current important area of research and innovation is
the development of strategies for closing the nuclear fuel cycle.  The IAEA (2002)
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suggests that sharing R&D&D efforts and risks through constructive collaborations
among countries having common concerns and interests should reduce the uncertainty at
the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.  The IAEA (2001) also reports that evolutionary
improvements are expected to continue on the nuclear fuel cycle consistent with
sustainable development.  The IAEA (2001), however, encourages more rapid innovation
and offers its services to facilitate new international collaborative programs.
The IAEA currently consists of 151 member states.  The multilateral use of IAEA by
countries for developing international best practices has been an important vehicle for
learning through collaboration since the early 1960s (Frechette & Trevor, 2010).  
Bilateral cooperation is also seen as highly desirable for some country partners.  It would
appear that, over time and taken together, these international, multilateral, regional, and
bilateral learning efforts converge many countries toward agreed-upon best practices.  
2) SAC2: Social Responsibility of Managers
In addition to learning, managers have many other responsibilities.  As described in
Chapter 2, these responsibilities include the following activities: effectively proceeding
with their project; assuming accountability of their actions; ensuring safety of their
operations; adherence to all legal and regulatory requirements; being a good corporate
citizen and a conscientious employer; and, providing leadership in outreaching to all
project stakeholders.  
In most countries the principle of national responsibility includes proceeding with
their mission in a responsible way.  Within the nuclear energy and waste sectors, this
responsibility often translates to the provision of safe, environmentally sound and
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economic electricity, including the proper management of nuclear fuel waste.  More
particularly to nuclear fuel waste management, national responsibility often requires
domestic radioactive or nuclear waste management as opposed to the export of this waste
to other countries whether importing countries are willing or not to accept this waste
(Darst and Dawson, 2008).
Results from the multivariate analyses shown in Table 13 indicate that, compared to
other countries and other SACs, the following countries focused more attention on SAC2: 
Canada, Middle Group countries, and Argentina.  Most of these countries have high
energy needs and have large resources to be able to meet these needs.  At first glance, the
inclusion of Argentina within these countries is curious.  It might be suggested, however,
that Argentina is a pioneer in nuclear power production in Latin America, including on
radiation safety (Valente, 2006).  But in the mid-1990s, the country encountered severe
financial difficulties that largely hampered its nuclear energy program.  Later, in 2006, the
Argentinian government announced a plan to revitalize the nuclear industry and the
public hopes with greater safety and transparency this time around (Valente, 2006).  
If the management goal of sustainable development is applied, a part of the manager’s
responsibility is to build social capital, including trust or public confidence.  For instance,
when asking a community to host a waste management facility, Sjoberg and Drottz-
Sjoberg (2001) report that many scholars (e.g., Slovic et al., 1991) suggest that the
manager work to build trust with local residents on the risks of the project.  Yet, Sjoberg
and Drottz-Sjoberg (2001) argue that there is little empirical data to support this view.  
Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg (2001) have found that people may well trust the technical
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expertise of industry or an agency, but they may have many other reasons to reject the
project.  They argue that there is also little empirical evidence that the following
individual attributes affect local acceptance of projects: belief in high probability of
positive outcomes (e.g., no accidents, leaks, or other negative consequences), political
and cultural orientations, and the state of the local economy.  Even the acknowledged
need for the project may not convince a community that it should bear the burden of a
national need, especially if it disagrees with the national policy in which the project is
grounded.  
Faced with the paucity of evidence, Sjoberg and Drottz-Sjoberg (2001) and Owens
(2004) have only hinted that managers may acheive their mission through building and
maintaining social capital on two fronts.  First, the public must be convinced of local and
global fairness considering the principle of sustainable development, and second,
compensation in the form of a community benefit (as opposed to individual benefits) can
be discussed under certain conditions.  For example, the local population must first be
convinced that there are no health, safety or environmental risks from the project. Then it
may enter into discussions with the waste manager on community benefits, sometimes
called 'good will gestures'.
 Ultimately, such interactions between the manager and the public may lead a
community to accept hosting a project.  It is interesting to note that a decision was made
in 2009 to locate a deep geological repository in a community in Sweden only after two
pre-conditions were met.  The community in Sweden eventually became confident that
such a facility would not pose undue risks to various stakeholders and then agreed to a
274
negotiated benefits package (SKB, 2009).  The same scenario occurred a few years earlier
in Finland (NEA, 2001).
3) SAC3: Public Participation in Decision-Making
This stakeholder adaptive capacity is expressed in the national reports in the
description of many activities.  These activities include providing information to the
public, increasing public confidence or trust, inviting public citizens to dialogue,
providing public compensation, interacting with the community, responding to the
public’s concerns on the environment as well as on ethical concerns (including the
responsibility to future generations), and enabling the public’s participation in decision-
making processes on projects through various means, for example, by either facilitating
information sessions or enabling the public with a legal veto right.
Table 13 in Chapter 4 shows that this stakeholder adaptive capacity (SAC3) is a
dominant capacity in many countries but never appears alone: this capacity is associated
with the Middle Group and the five unique countries.  SAC3 is not a dominant
stakeholder adaptive capacity for the Left and Right Group countries.  This may not be
too surprising as it is well known that many of these countries have strong centralist
governments, and some of these are only now improving democratic structures and
institutions.  
At first glance, it is odd that SAC3 is not a dominant stakeholder adaptive capacity for
Switzerland.  Upon reflection though, we see that Switzerland focuses on government
oversight (SAC4).  Government oversight in Switzerland is known to encourage direct
democracy by means of formal referenda and popular initiatives exercised by the
275
population on specific governance issues (and thus as early as 1841) (Ruppen, 2004). 
The presence of such means of direct democracy derives from the adopted principle that
citizen rights are introduced first at lower levels, and then move to the upper levels. 
Public participation, therefore, is an important component of the government oversight
stakeholder adaptive capacity for Switzerland.  This supports the earlier supposition that
there is a certain amount of overlap among the selected stakeholder adaptive capacities,
although, in general, they are presumed to be sufficiently distinct for the study's purposes. 
Berry (1999) argues that building capacity for public participation is often first
championed by NGOs, more specifically citizen groups.  He also argues that the success
of NGOs in advancing their concerns and putting them on the political agenda will
depend on contextual factors, including the political regime of the country.  As a vivid
example of this, Dawson and Darst (2005) report that activism against nuclear power was
one of the first forms of public protest to emerge when Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika to the USSR.  In the aftermath of the
Soviet Union’s dissolution, however, this movement has withered to a handful of weakly
supported NGOs and activists.  The Russian public has been quiet relative to western
countries from about 1995 onwards.  Dawson and Darst (2005) conclude that the Putin
regime has fallen back on old habits of prosecution of whistle blowers, secrecy, and
curtailment of the public voice.
4) SAC4: Government Oversight
In the national reports, government oversight activities take many forms.  They
include providing advice or incentives, establishing or amending legislation, setting-up
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new oversight organizations or re-organizing old ones, enforcing laws, developing
policies, appointing advisory experts, approving (or denying) operating licenses, carrying
out audits and inspections, requiring certifications, imposing directives and regulations,
imposing penalties, and providing ongoing supervisory activities.
Multivariate analyses show that this stakeholder adaptive capacity (SAC4) somewhat
distanced from all the other SACs, because it was clear that all countries focused a lot of
attention on this capacity,  This is not surprising considering the safety focus of the Joint
Convention national reports.  As outlined in Table 13, however, the Right Group
countries focus relatively more attention on SAC4, and thus almost exclusively.  These
countries are Russia, South Africa, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.  Except for South
Africa, which is a federation (albeit it a young one since the late 1990s), all these
countries are formed by unitary governments with centralizing tendencies.  The study
only focuses on past activities so future changes in types of governance are not
considered.
The NEA (2008a) concludes that government oversight "has been used effectively to
provide a basis for the management of radioactive waste...The issuance of policies,
legislation, regulations and a national plan for final management of all types of
radioactive waste, including nuclear waste, has been an important addition and basis for
discussion and public acceptance" (p.16).  In 2007, the European Union declared that
regulatory requirements are becoming ever more stringent within the nuclear energy
domain, particularly in the field of safety and environmental impact (EURATOM, 2009). 
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Managers will have to demonstrate how they can meet, or are meeting, these new
requirements.  
It may be commonly perceived that the nuclear energy enterprise tends to succeed, or
at least progress rapidly, only in governance systems characterized by centralized control,
most notably in France, Japan, and South Korea.  Indeed, the nuclear energy enterprise
can become embroiled in continuous controversy in more federal decentralized systems,
such as the United States, Germany, and even in the relatively young Russian federation. 
It is arguable whether the delays or slower progress toward project implementation are
controversial or indicate democratic success (Joppke, 1993).
5) SAC5: Formal Project Collaboration
As described in Chapter 2, this stakeholder adaptive capacity tries to move the system
along through formal project collaboration among specific stakeholders.  In the Joint
Convention national reports, collaborative activities are expressed as agreements or
understanding between central, regional, and local governments, bilaterally between
countries, and among several countries.  
True project collaboration can be very difficult and, within the field of nuclear waste
management,  this is sometime reflected in the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) syndrome. 
This syndrome is often encountered when attempting to site a waste management facility,
nuclear or otherwise.  However, with increasing efforts and good will, collaborative
efforts may lead to some success in siting activities, such as seen in Finland and in
Sweden.  Should there be failure in a number of countries to site a national nuclear waste
repository, then there might be success if we increase the spatial scale.  McCombie (2009)
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suggests that partnering among these countries to establish an international repository
may be easier in view of advantages including increased credibility and need.  
Such a project has been considered by small European countries (SAPIERR) and a
feasability report was submitted at the end of 2008.  As the next step required support at
the political level, a more political working group was formed (ERDO).  Over the next
two years of its mandate terminating at the end of 2010, ERDO will discuss issues such
as size, structure, work program, financial mechanisms, and liabilities linked to the
operation of a regional repository.
If successful, the same type of collaborative initiative could be repeated for other
smaller countries in Asia, the Middle-East and in Cental and South America.  As we have
seen, Russia’s recent proposal, now abandoned, was even more ambitious, in that it
offered its territory to both large and small countries across the globe, not only to
neighboring countries.  The idea is not new.  In the early 1980s, Austria negotiated with
China for the construction of deep geological storage sites in the country’s most remote
areas such as the Gobi desert, but to no fruition since Austria abandoned the nuclear
energy option (IAEA, 2004).  
Alternatively to the above forms of country collaboration, Strandberg and Andren
(2009) suggest that, as a result of a transformational process of the nuclear sector’s
political economy)privatization, concentration, and internationalization)a relatively
small number of financially robust multinational corporations may eventually be able to
take over the management of nuclear waste in many countries.  Strandberg and Andren
(2009), however, estimate that this form of collaboration could result in difficulties in
279
amalgamating possibly conflicting principles such as the polluter-pays principle and the
national responsibility principle.  These scholars report that the topic of a private sector
takeover has not been thoroughly studied yet.
The NEA (2008a) reports that “host and potential host community of leaders at waste
sites are increasingly becoming formal partners in negotiating for locally acceptable
solutions that help avoid or minimize potentially negative impacts and provide for local
development, participation in option identification and decision-making, and, ultimately,
the establishment of a lasting relationship between the facility and the community” (p.16). 
The NEA also recently argued that project collaboration with regional governments
(particularly on economic development), such as provinces, states, and cantons as key
players or stakeholders needs more attention (NEA, 2009).  The NEA concludes that
multi-partner development projects, such as those sponsored by the European
Commission, have made valuable progress toward the development of nuclear waste
disposal solutions (NEA, 2009a).
An interesting recent twist to formal project collaboration that may help to maintain
sustainable development over the long term is the partnering of communities with waste
managers to add value to waste management facilities.  The NEA (2007a) studied this
issue and reports examples of added value that include attractiveness of the site (e.g.,
artful designs, color, neatness) and a multi-functional mission (e.g., training center,
scientific park, recreational area).  Added value to waste management facilities could help
to avoid the problem of the stigma often attached to these facilities.  For example, in
September 2009, the nuclear regulatory agency in Canada went to Port Hope in southern
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Ontario for public hearings on a low level radioactive waste management facility.  The
large majority of comments refer to the stigma attached to the town as a result of the
presence of historically radioactive contaminated soils (CNSC, 2009).  Added value to
waste facility sites would also likely enhance the relationship the community has with the
site of the facility over the long term (NEA, 2007a).  The idea of added value, however, is
still in its infancy but rapidly becoming an important issue, particularly with local
communities, for example, in Belgium.  The issue of added value is not reflected in the
national reports.  
As another factor that might affect formal project collaboration, the NEA refers to the
rise of separately charted technical and social review groups as separate from the general
public (including NGOs), the regulator and policymakers, and the waste managers (NEA,
2008a).  The NEA, however, has not formulated any conclusions on the impact of these
groups on collaborative efforts within decision-making processes, and I have found no
scholarly studies on this topic.  The activities of such groups are not discussed in the
national reports.
Even if in principle formal project collaboration is desirable, its relative importance is
not consistently high in the Joint Convention national reports.  Indeed, Table 13 shows
that SAC5 is prominent only in the Left Group countries, namely, in France, Belgium,
Slovenia, Romania and the Ukraine.  With respect to the last three countries, this
collaboration merely takes the form of agreements to return spent fuel from former Soviet
Union satellite countries to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union (NTI, 2003).  Russia
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repatriated spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants that the Soviet Union helped to
construct in countries such as the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Finland. 
 It is unclear whether this form of collaboration with Russia is consistent with
sustainable development.  Russia is acquiring much collaborative experience through
establishing agreements with other countries to store or dispose of their waste on its
territory for a fee.  With respect to France and Belgium, reprocessing agreements are the
sources of project collaboration, again probably not the type of project collaboration
required for sustainable development.
From Table 13, one could conclude that formal project collaboration (SAC5) is much
less important for sustainable development than the other SACs.  This is doubtful.  More
likely, any lower importance of SAC5 may reveal a gap or an area of improvement.  It
may be that formal project collaboration, although desirable, may be difficult to carry out. 
The difficulty may reside in the degree of formality of the selected vehicle for project
collaboration.
Calton and Payne (2003) list three types of vehicles in order of decreasing formality: 
conventional negotiation, mediation, and ‘dialogue’.  The first two forms of collaboration
tend to be confrontational in nature.  The third type is ‘dialogue’: there are fewer
constraints associated with this more informal form of collaboration, but it may take
longer to make progress.  If practiced over the long term, dialogue may have a greater
chance of success for a durable plan than negotiation or mediation.  This form, however,
requires substantial resources in time, money, and personnel.  The notion of dialogue is
being slowly adopted by the nuclear sector.  For example, in 2003, the Nuclear Waste
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Management Organization in Canada officially adopted the practice of dialogue with the
general public and specific stakeholders that aims to build overall public confidence in its
plans and activities (NWMO, 2003).
Project collaboration involving different layers of government are particularly
difficult.  The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1985) concluded that “distrust
[between the federal government and the States] may, indeed, be the single most
complicating factor in the effort to develop a waste disposal system that is acceptable
technically, politically, and socially” (p.95).  Indeed, Kearney and Garey (1982) argue that
management of radioactive waste is a policy field in the United States that has perhaps
bred more federal-state conflicts than any other since the battle over desegregation in the
South.  Kearney and Garey (1982) claim that these conflicts in conjunction with other
controversial energy and environmental policy areas may force a re-conceptualization of
the federal system as ‘contentious federalism’.  In this event, Kearney and Garey (1982)
recommend the establishment of veto rights to return to 'cooperative federalism'.
In the case of the Yucca Mountain Project in the Unites States, while federal
legislation (the Nuclear Waste Policy Act) specifically sets out a role for the local
government, Herzik (1992) found that a coordinated system of intergovernmental
decision-making between the state and the federal government was lacking.  As
previously mentioned, there is some evidence that the interactions of regional
governments with upper and lower governments are the most influential  (NEA, 2009;
Keese & Argudo, 2006; Derthick, 1987).  As early as 1982, after the Nuclear Waste
Policy act was passed and before the targeting of Nevada in 1987, Downey (1985) had
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offered suggestions for interactions between the selected state and the federal government
based on the ‘new federalism’ that would facilitate intergovernmental relations.  One of
Downey’s objective was to get the state to increase public confidence in the federal
manager, namely, the Department of Energy (DOE).  This did not happen.  Nevada never
accepted the federal jurisdiction, and the DOE was incapable on its own to instill public
confidence.  
6) SAC6: Emergency Preparedness
In the Joint Convention national reports, emergency preparedness was expressed as
attention to accidents and their remediation, the identification of potential hazards,
monitoring and surveillance activities, conducting scenario planning (e.g., theft,
terrorism, trafficking of radioactive material, earthquakes), financial planning, assessing
cost implications of safety measures, the establishment of emergency response plans, the
development of insurance policies, ensuring proper security measures, and carrying out
emergency exercises.
Both multivariate analyses (cluster and correspondence analyses) suggest a strong
association between SAC1 and SAC6, that is, learning by managers and emergency
preparedness.  This association was unexpected but could likely be explained by lessons
learned from nuclear incidents and accidents.  For example, the NEA (2007c) has a long
tradition of fostering expertise that aims to improve nuclear emergency management
systems (planning, preparedness, response, recovery) within member states. 
 NEA member states participate in nuclear emergency preparedness and response
exercises, share information, data, knowledge and experiences to test emergency
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management systems and theories, identify gaps, and provide recommended strategies to
improve nuclear emergency management worldwide.  Time spent focusing on emergency
preparedness (before accidents occur) allows the learning of many aspects connected to
the project itself.  Many NEA member states have been active in participating in such
NEA learning exercises, in particular, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, France, and Canada
who have been reference cases for nuclear emergency table-top or real-time exercises
(NEA, 2007b).
Relative to other countries and other stakeholder adaptive capacities, Figure 11, and
Tables 11 and 14 point to the following six countries that focus relatively more attention
on SAC6: the Netherlands, China, Korea, the United States, and Switzerland.  Why these
countries would focus more on emergency preparedness is unclear.  Reasons may include
prior nuclear incidents or accidents, and concerns about potentials impacts from nuclear
facilities in neighboring countries.
Julio Rozental (2002) reports a fundamental lesson derived from the study of
radiological accidents occurring over two decades (1980s and 1990s): emergency
planning and preparedness is still in an incipient stage in developing countries with little
infrastructure.  For example, the unsealed radioactive source of the Goainia accident was
discovered only two weeks after the seal was broken.  By that time, a massive amount of
contaminated material and soils had accumulated that presented a clean-up and disposal
challenge to the Brazilian government considering available resources for the response
(Roper & Leite, 1988). 
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6.2 Stakeholder Adaptive Capacities and Sustainable Development
In Chapter 4, I suggest a grouping of countries and stakeholder adaptive capacities
(SACs) (Table 13).  Given this grouping, the next step would be to explore whether the
relative importance given to SACs by groups of countries has been, or could be, effective
in reaching the set management goal, here, sustainable development.  As explained in
Chapter 3, the end management goal of sustainable development (SD) was selected as a
plausible goal for the development of nuclear waste management policies.
Information on SD performance is not included in the Joint Convention national
reports.  Therefore, another way has to be found to evaluate this performance.  Within the
context of the study, it would not be feasible to evaluate each country`s nuclear waste
program with respect to its SD performance with specific empirical data.  Instead, we
could more generally refer to a country's relative general expected performance based on
SD indicators.  Work on developing  SD indicators began in earnest in the early 1990s
after the 1992 Earth Summit.  Although the creation of SD indicators is challenging and
is ongoing, some tentative indicators or aggregations of indicators (indices) have been
proposed by scholars and international organizations (Boulanger, 2008; Milman & Short,
2008; Pinter et al., 2005; Funtowicz et al., 1999).  
In this section, I will discuss some current work being done on SD indicators
nationally and internationally.  The first task is to select those indicators or indices that
are more likely to help determine what specific stakeholder adaptive capacity, or
combination of specific SACs, may be more useful for ensuring sustainable development. 
After that task is completed, I will discuss more generally —based on system
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development motor metaphors—what broad types of stakeholder adaptive capacities are
conducive to sustainable development.
6.2.1 Indicators of Sustainable Development
Boulanger (2008) argues that indicators are observable variables used to report on a
non-observable reality, and such indicators are often incorporated into policy and social
studies.  For broad concepts, such as sustainable development, one indicator is likely not
enough to adequately assess general performance.  Therefore, suggested combination or
aggregation of indicators, called an index (indices), have been developed by scholars and
experts attempting to measure national SD performance, including the ability of a system
to adapt to change in order to continue to function over the long term (Milman and Short,
2008). 
Such indices, however, have proven to be difficult to develop.  Funtowicz et al.
(1999) report a multitude of SD indices that have been developed, but none of them have
yet been widely accepted.  Pinter et al. (2005) report that the United Nations Commission
on Sustainable Development has drawn attention to the ongoing need for better SD
indices, nonetheless, trends in the use of such indices are emerging.
Emerging trends include the recognition that in developing any index, a balance must
always be struck between cost, availability of data, scope, complexity and accuracy
(Milman & Short, 2008).  With this recognition in mind, there is increasing interest in the
development of indices, because aggregation of indicators can compensate for, although
never perfectly, any weaknesses of any individual indicator.  Indeed, no single indicator
can capture the whole problem.  Although, as Funtowicz et al. (1999) argue, the use of
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indices can never be the sole basis on which policies are developed, it can stimulate
dialogue with stakeholders and serve as another piece of information within the
information gathering exercise of policy-makers.  
For study purposes, I find it reasonable to assess general adaptive capacity for SD
performance by focusing on an appropriate aggregation of indicators.  In such an
aggregation, I consider the three common-accepted pillars of SD: economic,
environmental, and social sustainability (recalling the triple bottom line often associated
with corporate social responsibility). 
 The United Nations Economic and Social Affairs department has published a report
on the aggregation of indices  to assess national performance on sustainable development
(UNECOMSOC, 2000).  This report provides a list of some indices presently in use. 
From this list, I selected two indices based on two considerations.  First, information had
to be available on the 23 countries selected for the study, and second, the final
aggregation of indices had to be tailored to the situation under consideration in the study.
With these considerations in mind, I first selected the following two indices: 1) the
World Bank country 'green' adjusted net saving index, or Genuine Savings Index (GSI)
considering the economic pillar (Hamilton, 2000); and 2) Yale University’s
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)  considering the environmental pillar (Esty et
al., 2008).  The complementarity of these two types of indices has been studied, and they
are supported by many scholars, notably, Funtowicz et al. (1999). 
 The World Bank considers the GSI as a sustainability index (Hamilton, 2000).  It
measures the true rate of savings in an economy after taking into account investments in
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human capital (education), depletion of natural resources (including energy) and damage
caused by pollution.  The greater the amount of genuine savings, the greater the country
can invest in activities allowing sustainable development (Hamilton, 2000).  Positive
savings is supposed to mean that current generations are not consuming an excessive
share of the national product and are transmitting a sufficient productive heritage for
future generations (Boulanger, 2008).  
The Yale University EPI is based on 25 indicators of environmental stresses to human
health and ecosystem vitality that are consistent with internationally supported goals (Esty
et al., 2008).  Together, the GSI and the EPI provide some indication of national SD
performance, but the aggregation is incomplete as they do not take into account social
indicators that I consider particularly important for sustainable development, especially
within the nuclear sector, namely, transparency by governments and managers, and social
well-being of the public.
 Given that transparency is an important attribute for democratic government
oversight (Gosseries, 2006), that trust is a pre-requisite for project co-management
(Berkes, 2007a; Pomeroy, 2007), and that government secrecy within the nuclear energy
and waste sectors continues in many countries due in large part to their military origin
(Cooke, 2009; Dawson & Darst, 2005), I include Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) (TI, 2008) as part of the aggregation of indices on sustainable
development.  And lastly, given that social well-being, including social learning and
safety, is also important considerations for adaptive capacity, I add the United Nations
Human Development Index (HDI) (UN, 2008) to the aggregation of indices.  
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The CPI examines the abuse of entrusted power within the public sector. 
Transparency International (TI) acts against such abuse, and it defines transparency as a
principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions, or
charitable works to know not only basic facts and figures, but also the mechanisms and
processes leading to project decisions.  TI (2008) argues that it is the duty of civil
servants, managers, and trustees to act visibly, predictably, and understandably. 
 TI (2008) perceives the cost of abuse as four-folded including economic,
environmental, social, and political impacts, all key considerations for sustainable
development.  On the political front, corruption constitutes a major obstacle to democracy
and the rule of law (TI, 2008).  Economically and environmentally, corruption leads to the
depletion of national wealth and resources, and it hinders the development of fair market
structures and distorts competition, thereby deterring investment.  And TI (2008) argues
that the effect of corruption on the social fabric of society is the most damaging of all.
The HDI is based on country information and data on social well-being, including life
expectancy, education attainment, and gross domestic product per capita (UN, 2008). 
These attributes increase the opportunities for higher education, better health care,
increased income and employment, greater public participation in decision-making, and
societal learning.  This indicator was developed by Sen, the Nobel economic prize
winner, and is a generally based on the capacity to act toward well-being (UN, 2008).
Not only can the construction of a sustainable development index be built from a
substantial definition as those just described, it can by based on a normative approach
including performance goals, for example, efficacy, efficiency, viability, prudence, and
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resilience (Boulanger, 2008).  Although universal in nature, Boulanger (2008) argues that
these types of indicators are difficult to apply and, in fact, they are rarely used.  Boulanger
(2008) does, however, report that an exception might be the sustainable development
index applied by Sweden based on four themes: efficiency, equality of participation,
adaptability, and values and resources for future generations (Nyman et al., 2005).  The
focus of the Swedish Index is on transition to, and not current state of, sustainable
development.  The Swedish performance index is interesting but it can be applied in
perhaps only a few countries.  This is mainly so because the index considers data not
usually collected (e.g., proportion of pupils not qualifying for upper secondary schools,
women’s salaries as percentage of men’s salaries, organic farming, quantities of
chemicals hazardous to health, prevalence of asthma, exploitation of Baltic herring). 
Nevertheless, the general approach of this index covers the three pillars of sustainable
development and may be tailored to conditions in other countries.
My aggregation of indices includes four indices that together could potentially be a
useful indicator of a country’s adaptive capacity for sustainable development.  To recap,
these indicators are the Genuine Savings Index, the Environmental Performance Index,
the Corruption Perceptions Index, and the Human Development Index.  Scholars
interested in adaptive capacity have used the aggregation of indices approach.  For
instance, Brooks et al. (2005) use an aggregation that focuses on vulnerability and
capacity of nations to adapt to climate variability (by not dying).  The aggregation
includes various indices of education (HDI), health status (UNEP, GRID, and HDI),
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governance conflict (international refugees World Bank data), and democratic governance
capacities (the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton Index).  
Although results from the Brooks et al. (2005) aggregation are consistent with
subjective expectations (e.g., sub-Sahara nations are vulnerable), the low vulnerability of
Bangladesh and the vulnerability of wealthier nations are counterintuitive.  Brooks et al.
(2005) conclude that either more research is required to explain these unexpected results
or the aggregation needs to be perfected by examining the influence of temporal and
spatial scales.  
6.2.2 Country Sustainable Development Performance and SACs
As mentioned, the four indices were selected, in part, because of the availability of
data for all of the 23 countries.  I do not apply a weighted formula for the summation of
the four indices of the aggregation.  Instead, qualitative observations are made on the
ratings as assessed by the authors of the four indices.  Table 15 outlines the country
ratings for the four indices along with the country groupings based on dominant
stakeholder adaptive capacities as presented in Table 13.
In Table 13, if we look at the unique countries, from a sustainable development
perspective based on the four indices, Canada and Switzerland have followed, and are
likely to follow, a sustainable development path.  Switzerland’s high rate of genuine
savings, good environmental performance, and high level of transparency are noted, while
Canada's particular strength lies with transparency and attention to human development. 
The other unique countries fall at the other end of spectrum due to poor environmental
performance, lack of transparency, and lowest attention to human development (this also
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Table 15.  Country Groupings, SACs, and Sustainable Development Indicators
Group Grouping of
Countries
(NE% of total
electricity -
rounded)
Dominant 
SAC (s) 
SDI I 
WB Adjusted
Net Saving
(2006)
% GNI
(economic) 
SDI II
Yale University
ER Rank and
Score Index 
(2008)
(environmental)
SDI III
TI CPI Rank
and Score
(2008)
(social)
SDI IV
UN Human
Development
Index, Rank
and Score
(2008)
(social)
Canada  (15%) SAC3,
SAC2 
5.41 12 (86.6) 9 (8.7) 3 (0.967)
Brazil (4%) SAC3,
SAC1,
SAC5,
SAC4 
3.48 35 (82.7) 80 (3.5) 70 (0.807)
Switzerland  (40%)
(Fed.)
SAC4,
SAC6 
24.46 (2005) 1 (95.5) 5 (9.0) 10 (0.955)
China (2.5%) SAC3,
SAC1,
SAC6 
35.06 105 (65.1) 72 (3.6) 94 (0.762)
Argentina (10%) SAC2,
SAC1,
SAC3
3.17 38 (81.8) 109 (2.9) 46 (0.860)
Right
Group
Russia (16%) SAC4 -13.81 28 (83.9) 147 (2.1) 73 (0.806)
South Africa  (5%)
(Fed.)
-0.27 97 (69.0) 54 (4.9) 125 (0.670)
Slovakia (50%) 2.24 17 (86.0) 52 (5.0) 41 (0.872)
Czech Rep.  (30%) 14.67 68 (76.8) 45 (5.2) 35 (0.897)
Middle 
Group
Finland (27%) SAC2, 
with pairing
with one
other
dominant
SAC
(except
SAC1)
16.3 4 (91.4) 5 (9.0) 12 (0.954)
Sweden  (50%) 19.38 2 (93.1) 1 (9.3) 7 (0.958)
Japan  (30%) 15.84 21 (84.5) 18 (7.3) 8 (0.956)
Hungary (30%) 10.32 23 (84.2) 47 (5.1) 38 (0.877)
USA (20%) 4.11 39 (81.0) 18 (7.3) 15 (0.950)
UK (20%) 6.89 14 (86.3) 16 (7.7) 21 (0.942)
Lithuania (70%) 5.59 16 (86.2) 58 (4.6) 43 (0.869)
Netherlands (4%) 16.05 55 (78.7) 7 (8.9) 6 (0.958)
Korea (40%) 20.04 51 (79.4) 40 (5.6) 26 (0.925)
Left
Group
Ukraine (50%) SAC5 4.08 75 (74.1) 134 (2.5) 82 (0.786)
Romania (20%) -1.19 83 (71.9) 70 (3.8) 62 (0.825)
Belgium (50%) 14.07 57 (78.4) 18 (7.3) 17 (0.948)
France  (75%) 11.4 10 (87.8) 23 (6.9) 11 (0.955)
Slovenia (42%) 12.5 15 (86.3) 26 (6.7) 26 (0.923)
293
applies to China, even though it has a high rate of genuine savings).   Next, we can
observe that, when the four selected indices are examined together, on balance and
relatively speaking, the Left Group and the Right Group do not fare well.  Negative
genuine savings rate, poorer environmental performance, lower rankings of transparency,
and lower human development performance are encountered in these countries (NB:
Slovenia is an exception). 
As Table 15 suggests, France may be in the Left Group because of its relatively lower
transparency rank.  Transparency is usually a prerequisite  for democracy, and in the
words of the contemporary French philosopher and economist, Guy Sorman, "the French
have seldom been enamored of democracy....but longed for enlighten despotism". 
Although a democracy, the French president has powers without equal in any other
western democracy since the De Gaulle era (Dorman, 2008).
 Indeed, Barthes (2006) reports that major technology government choices in France
have historically avoided official public debate.  In the nuclear energy sector, France’s
highly centralized nuclear energy operations, and strong government control of various
interests within one organization—namely, le Commissariat à l’Énergie atomique—led to
opacity of operations, even more so than in the other countries of the initial nuclear
weapons club (Revol & Sido, 2006; Le Déaut, 1998).  
Only after the 1986 Chernobyl accident 'media misinformation crisis' in France, did
the Government decide that it was time to be more transparent on nuclear energy issues. 
In the years following the accident, various studies and public information sessions led to
the Prime Minister of France asking the representative from Meurthe-et-Moselle (Jean-
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Yves Le Déaut) to prepare a report on transparency within the nuclear sector and make
recommendations for improvement.  Le Déault submitted his report in 1998.  After
various legal challenges concerning the French so-called media misinformation crisis
following the Chernobyl accident were settled in 2005, France quickly passed new
legislation on transparency specifically related to nuclear energy, including nuclear fuel
waste management (HCTISN, 2006).
It is possible that the form of government oversight exercised by the Right Group
countries (e.g., strict, prescriptive, and exclusive control), and the form of project
collaboration exercised by the Left Group countries (e.g., legal negotiations) are not
conducive to sustainable development.  On balance, the Middle Group fares better on all
four SD indices.  Hungary looks like an exception, because it does not seem to have a
particularly good performance on any of the four indices.  To explain this exception,
either there is another factor within the country that favors sustainable development
(more research would be needed to explore this supposition), either there is some artefact
of the original data or multivariate analyses (this was checked and no artefact was
obvious), or Hungary truly has a poorer SD performance and remains an exception within
the Middle Group countries. 
An additional information provided in Table 15 is the percentage of a country's total
electricity demand that is produced by nuclear energy.  This percentage is not a good
indicator of a country’s demand for electricity, nor does it seem related to a country`s
broader energy policies taking into account available energy resources.  Nor does this
percentage seem related to the issue of climate change, which in any case is a relatively
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recent issue (future percentages, however, may be related to this issue).  After all, this
percentage is unaffected by requirements for sustainable development. 
The most likely explanation for levels in this percentage of nuclear generated
electricity is a country's indirect historical interest in nuclear energy for defense purposes. 
This indirect interest is still encountered today, for instance, in Iran.  Also when
examining Table 15, we cannot link the sustainable development performance to
decentralization of states, that is, whether they are federal or unitary.  While Ansell and
Gingrich (2003) link the extent of public participation to the degree of decentralization
(that is, it is greater in federal states), no such link is noted in Table 15, implying that
more capacities (not only SAC3) are required for sustainable development.
Given the information on SD performance provided in Table 15, we note the higher
performing countries, that is, the Middle Group countries, Canada, and Switzerland.  We
see that SAC2 or SAC3 (remember that Switzerland’s SAC4 is likely heavily imbued
with SAC3) are dominant.  This may mean that for SD, networking (informal?) capacity
of managers, along with public capacity to participate in decision-making processes is
required.  To a lesser extent, SAC1 is also important for SD.
Table 15 suggests that poorer performers (Left Group and Right Group countries,
Brazil, China, and Argentina) may have focused too much on certain stakeholder adaptive
capacities, or have focused on too few or too many SACs.  For example, Brazil, China
and Argentina may have focused on too many SACs; the Left Group and Right Group, on
too few SACs.  The Left Group only focuses dominantly on formal project collaboration
(as described above, the type of formal project collaboration reported may not be a
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capacity related to SD), and the Right Group, only on government oversight (Right Group
countries).  And there is a tendency for poorer SD performers to lack in SAC2 whereas
SAC2 for higher SD performers is more important. 
To summarize, it would appear that greater SD performance depends on two
conditions: 1) the number of SACs to focus on within adaptive management programs;
and, 2) the type of SAC.  With respect to the former, the next section discusses related
categorization of SACs.
6.2.3 Performing SACs and System Motors
In Chapter 2, I referred to the metaphor of key system factors being driven by a
‘motor’.  Three motors were outlined, namely, learning, controlling and networking. 
Conceptually framing the stakeholder adaptive capacities within a smaller number of
system motor metaphors is useful if future studies focus on SACs other than those
selected for the study.  
We can associate the stakeholder adaptive capacities used by the higher performers
(as indicated in Table 15) with their corresponding motor metaphor of system
development.  As such, we can therefore determine the general system driving forces that
are potentially useful for sustainable development.  Results of this query are outlined in
Table 16.  From Table 16, networking with some learning appears to be the motors, or
system driving force to maintain the system on the path of sustainable development. 
Generally, SAC2 and SAC3 have a dominant effect with some importance given to
learning (SAC1 and SAC6).  SAC4 is of course always important, but on its own does not 
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Table 16.  Sustainable Development (SD) Higher Performing Countries, 
SACs, and System Motor Metaphors
SD Higher Performing
Country or Country
Group
SAC Combination Main System Motor
Metaphor
Canada SAC1, SAC3 Met 1 and Met 3
Switzerland SAC4 (but probably
SAC3), SAC6
Met 3 and Met 1
Middle Group SAC2 (with other
pairing, except SAC1)
Met 3
lead to sustainable development.  SAC5 is never dominant (even if the Left Group tends
to focus more on this SAC, its word frequency is still the lowest).  It is unclear, however,
whether this SAC is, in fact, less influential or has not been yet achieved because of
encountered difficulties.  This presents a significant knowledge gap.  Indeed, there is
some uncertainty and questioning in the literature on whether the degree of formality
affects the sustainability of project collaborations.
Networking (SAC2 and SAC3) appears to be a more dominant driver than learning
(SAC1 and SAC6).  SAC2 (social responsibility of managers) is dominant for the Middle
Group countries, that is, countries that are higher SD performers.  With this in mind, it is
interesting to note that Weisband (2009) argues that (corporate) social responsibility
should not be considered as a public relations exercise, nor as a duty or obligation.  He
calls for social responsibility (accountability) that is based on two principles, that is, 
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“eudaimonic principles of social capital and aretic principles of executive excellence
manifested by managerial learning” (p.905).  
The former principle refers to the voluntary creation of goodwill among all
stakeholders.  The latter principle refers to the voluntary ongoing goal of developing, 
implement, and improving best practices.  He characterizes this two-folded approach as
‘virtuous’ social responsibility.  Although Weisband does not highlight any downside in
requiring managers to meet their virtuous social responsibility, I suspect that corporate
social responsibility grounded in virtuous ethics would not come cheap.  Nevertheless,
the results of this study suggest that resources spent in this manner may be worthwhile
over the long term.
The study findings suggest that focusing on two appropriate stakeholder adaptive
capacities is sufficient.  When a manager has identified two SACs as likely or possible
key system drivers, the next step is use the drivers to optimize the complexity of the
whole system.  Complexity theory suggests that too little system complexity is no better
than too much complexity.  With this in mind, I suggest that a potential effective use of
SACs is to optimize complexity through the application of tactics under strategies of a
comprehensive adaptive management program.  In Chapter 8, I propose a strategic
adaptive management framework grounded in complexity theory that focuses on the
building and maintaining of stakeholder adaptive capacities.
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6.3 Chapter Summary and Conclusion on Evaluating Hypothesis 2
In this chapter, I outline the nature and potential relative effectiveness of key system
drivers (here, stakeholder adaptive capacities) for the development of a ‘complex’ social-
environmental system (here, the development of nuclear waste management policies). 
This description keeps in mind sustainable development as a management
goal—including processes and outcomes—for adaptive management programs.  As
suggested by complexity theory, once key SACs are identified, they can be effectively
used within adaptive management programs.
In the next chapter, information on broad system development (Chapter 5) and on the
importance and influence of stakeholder adaptive capacities (Chapter 6) will be pulled
together to draw a summary of main and other findings.  And a last word of caution. 
Content analysis that transforms qualitative information from policy documents into
quantitative results is not an exact scientific physical method.  Hence, in the next chapter,
I will also address the validity of the study findings.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY FINDINGS AND THEIR GENERALIZATION
In this chapter, I will summarize the main findings and outline other more specific
findings on the research design and the study results.  Afterwards, I will discuss the
validity of the findings.  The chapter ends with a discussion on whether the study finding
can be generalized to other social-environmental systems.
7.1 Summary of Main Findings
Questions that prompted this study originated with the difficulties in managing
contemporary social-environmental problems.  To meet the challenge of these difficulties,
scholars have developed a form of management that is grounded in complexity theory,
namely, adaptive management.  Despite the promise of adaptive management, improving
the performance of adaptive management programs is required. 
 Some scholars recommend focusing on a handful of potential key driving factors and
using them more strategically.  Subsequent work on such factors has been carried out
mainly in a qualitative manner.  This study furthers that work by combining qualitative
and quantitative findings on broad system developmental patterns and the relative
influence of key system drivers. 
The main general finding of the research is that at least some environmental problems
appear to develop following a non-random, possibly chaotic, pattern.  As such, a few key
factors are likely to influence system development.  Such factors can include stakeholder
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adaptive capacities that mainly focus on networking activities, but also, albeit to a lesser
extent, on learning activities.  
With respect to networking capacities, the study reveals that it is not clear whether all
forms of networking are effective.  Countries studied did not reveal any great importance
placed on building formal networking capacity with specific project stakeholders.  It may
be that formal networking among specific project stakeholders through written
agreements is less effective over the long term than more informal networking that
perhaps may be more flexible and inclusive.  Then again, it may be that formal project
collaboration is simply difficult to acheive; hence, to date there has been insufficient time
to have developed much experience on the sustainability of formal collaborations, let
alone success.  
Despite this uncertainty on formal project collaboration, the study finds that through
optimizing networking—and, to a lesser extent, learning—activities with the use of key
system drivers, the performance of adaptive management programs is likely to increase
over the long term.  I will process to outline more specific findings.  First I will present
specific findings on the general research approach and then outline specific findings on its
results.  
The findings on the results are separated into two parts.  First, findings on broad
system development are outlined.  These include findings on the development of nuclear
waste management policies over time across the selected countries, including patterns of
development.  Findings on the suggested relative influence of external and internal factors
are also reported.  Second, findings on the relative importance of one type of internal
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factor, here, stakeholder adaptive capacities, on the broad development of nuclear waste
management policies are also outlined.  I then conclude the chapter with some limitations
of the study.
7.1.1 Findings on the General Research Approach
I find that the general approach of applying computer-assisted (CA) content analysis
on national policy documents proved to be useful for relative international country
comparisons.  Although not a confirmatory approach, my explorations with CA content
analysis provided greater insight into the development of national nuclear waste
management policies.  The study generated the following specific findings on the research
design:
C For international comparisons, national policy documents need to be highly
comparable to the extent possible; similar reporting structures and jargon are
desirable;
C The ideal number of cases for such research by any one researcher over a
reasonable period of time is about 20 cases;
C This research was instrumental in producing the current version of the QDA
Miner (database), WordStat (content analysis), SimStat (time series analysis), and
MSVP (multivariate analyses) software package.  Some initial issues with the
software package included problems with the length of documents, connections
between components, graphic design, and undocumented instructions   The
current version of the software package performs relatively well, although the
graphics could be more sophisticated and clearer; 
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C Time series analysis using autocorrelation coefficients was useful for detecting the
presence of possible broad patterns of evolution (quantitatively), and the possible
influence of external and internal factors (qualitatively).  Confirmation of the
latter, however, is difficult through time series analysis and would require in-
depth single-case study;
C The development of vocabulary lists used for computer-assisted content analysis
needs careful attention with respect to two general tasks.  First, the words need to
be ‘cleaned up’ to consider, for example, spelling errors, redundancy of headings
and footnotes, different meanings for the same word.  Second, the words—
especially the highest-frequency words—placed under each vocabulary list needed
to reflect as much as possible the ‘category’ of the list;
C  The application of both cluster analysis and correspondence analysis in a
complementary manner was very useful in exploring different angles or views of
the relationships among the 23 countries and six stakeholder adaptive capacities. 
The results finally produced are considered more robust that would have been if
only one multivariate analysis was applied; and,
C There are a few considerations that help to assure that any subjectivity of the
researcher would not pose a significant problem.  For example, in the preparation
of the vocabulary lists, only a handful of words with the highest frequencies (out
of about 100 words) was influential in varying results through sensitivity analyses
(and only slightly for that matter).  Another consideration is the relative nature of
the international comparisons.  Absolute results were not required, hence, any
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subjectivity would have affected all countries, and thus would not have likely
changed any of the general conclusions.
7.1.2 Findings on Broad System Development derived from Time Series Analysis
Much can be gathered through visual inspection of the country time series plots of
policy events.  Principally, the plots show similar time profiles among countries.  As
complex social-environmental system, the development of nuclear waste management
policies for the most part developed steadily after the country's first operation of its first
commercial nuclear reactor.  This steady development of the system is influenced mostly
by internal factors, and the system seems resilient to many external perturbations.  
The time series plots also show, however, that the development of policies may have
been occasionally affected by sudden, emerging, major external factors.  This may have
produced ensuing windows of opportunity.  Through statistical analyses, results suggest
that the social-environmental system of the development of nuclear fuel waste policies is
likely to develop and unfold within a chaotic pattern.  
The study also generated the following more specific findings on broad system
developmental patterns:
C The development of national waste management policies is not completely
random.  In many countries, there seems to be a trend toward steadily and
incrementally increasing the number of policies through internal driving factors
from the start of operation of the first commercial operation of nuclear power
plants culminating shortly after the entry into force of the Joint Convention;
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C Across the countries examined, all the time series (except for Korea) are
characterized by short-term correlation, suggesting the presence of chaotic
patterns influenced by a few underlying key system drivers;
C Neither the year of the first commercial operation of nuclear power plants, nor the
percent electricity produced by nuclear energy affect the overall development of
nuclear waste management policies;
C  South Korea was atypical in the sense that its time series is completely random. 
This may suggest either a national report artefact (not found), or a sign of a too
aggressive nuclear energy program in response to major external perturbations,
and thus perhaps beyond the country’s capabilities.  This sort of aggressive
response has characterized recent developments in South Korea.  Sometimes the
response is effective, sometimes, not;
C On occasion, major factors (external or internal) have provided windows of
opportunity that have affected the development of nuclear waste management
policies.  For example, the arrival of Xiaoping on the political scene marked the
beginning of rapid economic development for China.  New national economic and
defense goals assisted in the emergence of the nuclear energy option, and hence
the need for the development of radioactive and nuclear waste management
strategies; 
C In view of its late start in operating commercial nuclear reactor (1994), China is
the only country to have proceeded actively for a considerable amount of time
before such operation with the development of nuclear waste management policy,
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and thus independently of international guidance.  By becoming a contracting
party to the Joint Convention in 2006, it will be able to benefit more easily from
international experience and likely participate in the international convergence
toward best practices;
C Significant influential external factors at certain points in time (possibly working
through a policy window) include state governance issues that affect oversight and
democratic institutions, economic health affecting the growth of the nuclear
sector, and general national defense, energy and environmental policies; and,
C Most of time, the development of nuclear waste management policies is driven by
internal factors.  The development unfolds steadily throughout the time series, and
it appears to be resilient to most external perturbations.  Even radiation events did
not have a great effect on this steady unfolding of nuclear waste policies.  An
exception may be in countries that are seriously not prepared for any accident due
too various reasons, for example, a lack of funds to invest into appropriate basic
infrastructures and in emergency response equipment and procedures.
7.1.3 Findings on the Importance of SACs derived from Multivariate Analyses
Results of the study indicate that networking stakeholder adaptive capacities,
including some learning, can potentially influence the development of nuclear waste
management policies to maintain a path consistent with sustainable development.  With
this goal in mind, adaptive management of the long-term management of nuclear waste is
likely to succeed if the following two conditions are met: 1) managers strike the right
balance between spending efforts on networking capacities and fulfilling their mission;
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and, 2) the public is empowered to effectively participate in decision-making processes. 
In this way, the system is mainly fueled by networking activities (and to a lesser extent by
overlapping leaning activities).
 The manager can optimize the complexity of the system by making adjustments to
two (or perhaps three) stakeholder adaptive capacities (SAC2).  In our case, these SACs
are primarily networking capacities, that is, manager social responsibility (SAC2) and
public participation in decision-making processes (SAC3), and possibly formal project
collaboration (SAC5).  Learning SACs are influential to some extent because they likely
overlap with networking capacities.
We can link the results from evaluating H1 to the results from evaluating H2, that is,
the influence of key system drivers on broad system development.  Study findings suggest
that a few stakeholder adaptive capacities can be used to ‘steer’ a system with a set goal
in mind if this system is determine to likely be 'complex‘.  This determination can be
made quantitatively by detecting the presence of chaotic patterns. 
 The study generated the following specific findings on the relative importance given
to stakeholder adaptive capacities by each of the countries:
C All six stakeholder adaptive capacities were considered important by at least a few 
countries;
C Government oversight (SAC4) is the first priority for all countries, but the priority
of the other SACs vary from country to country;
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C Although compliance with government requirements is a first priority, if it is the
only priority, nuclear waste programs are likely to encounter major difficulties
over time;
C Emergency preparedness (SAC6) is an important stakeholder adaptive capacity
within the nuclear sector.  It is closely linked to learning by managers (SAC1);
C Formal project collaboration  (SA5) was of least importance among the six SACs. 
However, the type of project collaboration reported in the national reports are not
necessarily conducive to sustainable development.  The reasons for the absence of
reporting on true formal project collaboration (SAC5) need to be investigated
further: perhaps this capacity is unimportant; perhaps there has not been enough
experience gathered to date; or, perhaps the degree of formality of project
collaboration has an impact on its sustainability; I suspect the last reason;
C Social responsibility of managers (SAC2), public participation in decision-making
(SAC3), and formal project collaboration (SAC5) were loosely linked together;
this likely points to the importance of networking capacity among all types of
stakeholders;
C SAC3, although very important, never acts on its own; other SACs need to also be
present. 
C Social responsibility of managers (SAC2) is one of two main distinguishing
factors for sustainable development, the other being public participation in
decision-making (SAC3); 
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C Five countries out of the 23 (about 20%) stood out by the unique importance they
placed on a combination of SACs.  They are Switzerland, Canada, China, Brazil,
and Argentina.  Therefore, although it was noted on the time series profiles,
international convergence is not complete because some countries may be more
influenced by country contextual conditions;
C Two broad groups of countries could be distinguished by the multivariate results
on stakeholder adaptive capacities with respect to their potential for sustainable
development.  Those countries with the most potential came from North America,
Northern Europe and South East Asia; those with the least, from Eastern Europe
and Latin America.  This demarcation between developed and developing
countries is not too surprising in that sustainable development practices require
maintaining an optimal level of complexity.  This may require significant
resources in the short term or sporadically, but most effective over the long term;
C The qualitative aggregation of four quantitative indices for evaluating the national
performance of sustainable development based environmental, economic, and
social indicators proved useful.  This method, though exploratory, was useful in
producing coherent results for the large majority of countries.  The most obvious
exception is Hungary: the multivariate analyses lump this country with high
sustainable development (SD) performers yet, based on the four indices, it is not a
high SD performer; 
C The drivers of the system are fueled mainly by networking capacities and to a
lesser extent by learning capacities.  The manager can optimize the complexity of
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the system by mainly adjusting the complexity within two stakeholder adaptive
capacities, here, SAC2 and SAC3 (an example of such application of optimization
is provided in Chapter 8); and,
C Focusing on only two stakeholder adaptive capacities when developing tactics
under a strategic framework for adaptive management seems effective in
maintaining optimum complexity of the system.  Focusing too much on one SAC
would as ineffective as focusing on more than two SACs.
7.2 Study Limitations
The main finding of the research is the primary influence of networking capacities for
sustainable development.  Acting on these capacities with the objective of maintaining
optimum complexity is likely to assist in building and maintaining sustainable
development within a complex-environmental system, a theoretical conclusion further
detailed in Chapter 8.  Given that this finding is valid—as previously explained—what
are the study limitations?
The general finding of the study was mainly arrived at by transforming qualitative
information in policy documents into quantitative data.  For its usefulness, Poole et al.
(2000) argue that some resulting imprecision is inevitable during such a transformation. 
These scholars, however, suggest that there are ways to minimize this imprecision.  For
instance, ordination statistics used in the study minimize this imprecision, because they
are not dependent on the distribution of the data so there is no need to assure normality,
as would be the case with most inferential statistics, for example, factor analysis.  Indeed,
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Poole et al. (2000) argue that ordination techniques are particularly useful in process
research, because data derived from event sequences are often ordinal due to processual,
or developmental, nonlinear characteristics.
The decision to study nuclear waste management policy by examining their
development over time was not only helpful in gaining further insight on the development
of policies, but also on the nature of policies that appear more effective—that is, related
to networking capacities—given the goal of sustainable development.  In this regard, the
inevitable imprecision that occurs during the transformation from qualitative information
to quantitative data was also generally minimized through two research design
characteristics.  First, the potential for comparability of the national policy documents
was quite exceptional: national policy documents are usually prepared without
comparability with other countries in mind.  Second, the impact of any imprecision is
likely diminished, because the study did not focus on absolute results, but instead aimed
to compare relative results among the 23 countries.  More specifically, however, the study
presented some limitations associated with the time series analyses and the multivariate
analyses.
With respect to the time series analysis on the number of policy events, the use of the
broadest definition of policy event was necessary in view of the limited number of policy
events reported in the national reports, about a couple hundred per country.  If the number
of policy events had been higher—perhaps closer to a thousand per country—then it
would have been interesting to categorize the policies.  For instance, policy changes could
have been grouped into the following categories: changes in guidelines, regulations and
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laws; changes in institutional organizational structures; changes in interactions between
waste organizations and their external environment; and changes in human and financial
resources.  The policy changes could have been characterized not only in number, but
also in some attribution of value, although such attribution is tricky to the extent that
policy changes are often considered to be additive.  Once this policy categorization is
made, then a mutivariate time series analysis could have been applied showing how each
category changes over time.  This information could then be comparted to the univariate
time series examining changes in the total number of policies per year over time. 
However, the difficulty in obtaining all this information for the 23 countries should
not be underestimated.  Even if the information was available in an acceptable
comparable form, a lot more research resources would have been required.   A narrower
study could be considered:  examine the annual budget of a handful of waste managers
over a few decades and determine the amount of financial resources devoted to categories
such as research, public relations, and planning activities.  I suspect, though, that even
these data would be difficult to obtain, and their comparability might pose some
additional problems, particularly for some developing countries.  Nevertheless, such
studies would be interesting in themselves not only to answer other questions, but if
enough comparable data could be obtained, more sophisticated statistical developmental
patterns analyses could also be applied, given the availability of adequate research
resources. 
With respect to the multivariate analyses on the stakeholder adaptive capacities
(SACs), the selection of SACs was based on factors that were reported in the literature as
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being important for sustainable development—that is, the classic Bruntland definition of
sustainable development.  Should other definitions of sustainability be adopted for other
studies, then different SACs would need to be considered.  As previously mentioned, it
remains to be expected that there would likely be some overlap among any combination
of selected SACs. 
This study compares the results on the relative importance given by each of the 23
countries to a combination of SACs to the national performance on sustainable
development of each country, based on an aggregation of four indices that I adopted from
the literature.  These indices provide data on the 23 countries and were appropriate within
the context of this study.  My attempt to make this comparison as such was necessary,
because there is as yet no sustainable development indicator which is universally
accepted, although much work to accomplish this is currently being carried out at the
international level.  Therefore, although the results of the comparison must take this
uncertainty into account, I consider that the approach is reasonable to get a general sense
of the influence of SACs for sustainable development based on the results of the SAC
multivariate analyses and country contextual information     
The main limitation of the study, however, is that it answers only part of the overall
question.  The study has as its purpose the 'how' of policy development, that is,
networking capacities appear to be the main driving force of within the suggested chaotic
pattern of system development.  This study, as designed, could not answer why
networking capacity is likely more important that other SACs, for instance, leaning by
managers. 
314
The metaphor that Morgan (1998) uses to conclude his book on images of
organization is the automating networking, or self-organization capacity of termites.  This
capacity emerges without planning, without any control or direction or implementation
plan, and seemingly without any learning.  Yet with actions that are incremental and
seemingly opportunistic, termites achieve impressive feats every time.  Now I am not
suggesting that, when faced with a complex problem, we should ask ourselves what
would a termite do—because, after all, they are pretty low on the evolutionary scale. 
Instead, I suggest that more study on the respective value of evolution through
networking  or through leaning is needed.
7.3 Generalization of Main Findings
Because of the above reasons and because the main findings of the study is coherent
with the literature and contextual information, the findings may be considered valid if
considered exploratory as was intended.  Nevertheless, in view of the exploratory nature
of the study,  a few of the findings would benefit from further investigation. 
Recommendations for further work are presented in Chapter 9.  
The approach to identifying key stakeholder adaptive capacities and the use of
adaptive management grounded in complexity principles could be applied to other
environmental problems.  Many of the findings generated by the study are general enough
to be applied by researchers or managers to other complex social-environmental
problems, particularly ones under globalization (Young et al., 2006) whether in the same
countries and other countries, whether with sustainable development as the management
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end-goal or with any other goal in mind.  Other environmental problems may include
climate change, water management, and desert management.  Other management goals
could be as diverse as sustainable political relations, security and peace goals, pressing
health needs, spiritual replenishment, and economic development.  
The study showed that the profile of the development of nuclear waste management
policies among countries, whether developed or developing, showed remarkable
convergence over time, indicating a process of globalization.  This is likely due to
collaborative learning among the countries within effective international government
organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Young et al. (2006)
suggest that by comparing concrete instances of the process of globalization in different
parts of the world, generalized insights may be achieved.
In any application, the first step is to determine the likelihood that the social-
environmental problem in question can be considered as ‘complex’, and not merely
complicated.  Second, appropriate SACs need to be selected.  Third, the selected SACs
can be used within an adaptive management program grounded in complexity theory. 
Ongoing monitoring is required to make any necessary adjustments to the program. 
 Yet, I suggest that some caution is necessary.  Carrying out field adaptive
management research or programs is expected to be costly if not properly grounded in
some strategic framework.  Such grounding provides a sound rationale for efforts and
available resources thereby leading to more effective budgeting in the near and long term. 
 Applying a strategic framework also provides a rationale for ongoing monitoring and
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adjustments.  With this in mind, adaptive management programs can be carried in
developing, as well as, developed countries.
Developing Countries: A Special Case?
The study examined nuclear waste management policies mainly within the context of
so-called developed countries with sustainable development as the management goal of
adaptive management programs.  A main finding of the study suggests that networking
—and, to a lesser extent, learning—stakeholder adaptive capacities are important within a
framework of sustainable development.  Both these types of SACs are often a challenge
to many developed countries, let alone to the developing world.
In some developing countries, these adaptive capacities may be neglected due to, for
example, a lack of funds and undue government control (Mohan & Aggarwal, 2009;
Darst & Dawson, 2008, 2005).  In this event, such countries could be more open to
transnational hazard material transfers, pollution havens, commodity chains, and global
environmental injustice (Darst and Dawson, 2008).  Indeed, developed countries have
been tempted to start megaprojects in eager developing countries (Bouzguenda et al.,
2007) to a not so happy conclusion.
More specifically, the production of electricity with nuclear energy is currently being
considered by many developing countries.  The development of nuclear energy policies,
let alone, nuclear waste management policies, is likely to turn into a big social-
environmental problem if not carried out responsibly.  Incompatible electricity grids and
the financial debt of many developing countries are not conducive to the application of
the nuclear energy option (Lowberr-Lewis, 2010; Pomper, 2010; Greenpeace, 2007). 
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Exceptions may include some of the larger still developing countries, for instance, Brazil,
China, and India (Woods, 2009). 
 Other developing countries, however, may be interested in the next generation of
small and medium modular reactors (Pomper, 2010; Woods, 2009).  If developing
countries adopt nuclear electricity generation, it becomes doubly important to find
effective ways to carry out these projects responsibly with sufficient resources (Pomper,
2010; Stoett, 2003).
The so-called nuclear renaissance will largely depend on whether developing
countries expand their existing nuclear energy program or embark on a new program for
the production of electricity or other peaceful uses such as nuclear water desalination
(Bouzguenda et al., 2007).  There is already much indication that certain developing
countries (including developing countries who are GNEP members or observers) are
interested in at least exploring whether the nuclear energy option would be appropriate to
complement their supply of electricity sources.  This was reconfirmed during an
international conference in March 2010 organized by President Sarkozy in Paris on
civilian access to nuclear energy. 
 The relationship between developing countries and the application of the sustainable
development of the nuclear energy option would be an interesting line of enquiry.  Indeed,
Stoett (2003) calls for more immediate studies focusing on the consequences of the
adoption of nuclear electricity generation by developing countries for several reasons.  He
cautions that the absence of strong democracies in many of these countries coupled with
centralized tendencies of nuclear energy technology may lead to the easier and rapid
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application of this option by some national governments that may or may not be
consistent with sustainable development.
Summary of Main Study Findings and Theoretical Application
The main general finding of the research is the suggestion that at least some social-
environmental problems do not develop completely randomly, but instead are likely to
develop following a chaotic pattern.  As such, a few key factors are likely to influence
system development.  Such factors can include stakeholder adaptive capacities that
mainly focus on networking activities, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, on learning
activities.  By optimizing these activities, managers may increase the performance of
adaptive management programs over the long term.  
We have seen that the findings on the development of nuclear waste management
policies can likely be generalized to other social-environmental system that may be
considered ‘complex’.  In the next chapter, I discuss how the study findings may be
applied by managers in many fields within their adaptive management program.  The
discussion therefore extends the findings to build theoretical applications.  The discussion
is grounded in theoretical complexity concepts described in the literature.  I have
attempted to organize these concepts systematically in order to build a suggested
comprehensive strategic framework for adaptive management.
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CHAPTER 8
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY GROUNDED IN COMPLEXITY
I limited the study to evaluating the characteristics of system evolution (time series of
policy events) and system drivers (multivariate analyses on the importance of SACs). 
This chapter extends the findings of the study.  It discusses a theoretical suggestion on
how to use findings to move from the specific example of the development of nuclear
waste management policies to the general case of complex environment problems.  It also
suggests a process for the ongoing implementation of adaptive management programs
grounded in complexity theory principles.
8.1 Management Theory for a Strategy Grounded in Complexity Principles
We have seen that many scholars examining the development of ‘complex’ systems
are interested in determining a handful of key system drivers.  If these drivers can be
identified, then scholars argue that managers can use them to optimize complexity,
thereby ‘steer’ the system.  Such steering toward a set management goal may also be
applied to avoid potential pathological states or 'traps' of the system.  In this section, I will
elaborate on the theory behind these suppositions as described in the literature.
8.1.1 Managing Systems by Gaging Complexity
When attempting to manage social-environmental systems, it is useful to note that,
although it has long been recognized in many fields of endeavor that complexity actually
makes a system more stable, too much complexity is as bad as too little.  There is a
characteristic curve of diminishing returns of investment in complexity and a tradeoff
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point to consider (Tainter, 2006).  This point does not represent the only equilibrium
point possible in a system.  Complex adaptive systems are far-from-equilibrium systems
that do not return to a same fixed stable state.  
The system is forever in a continuous flux of change, evolving over time.  Several
points may be present in a system either as a leverage point for adapting to change within
the system or for transforming the system into another one without disintegration.  These
points are said to be at the ‘edge of chaos’.  Many complex, co-evolving sub-systems seek
to maintain, through self-organization, a state of being at the edge of chaos by adjusting
their degree of coupling.  The greatest capacity of adaptation of a complex adaptive
system occurs at the edge of chaos, that is, where key system drivers are the most
sensitive, thereby, influential in responding to change (Merry, 1995).  When the system is
not at the ‘edge of chaos’, then the system can present, metaphorically speaking,
‘pathologies’ that can be identified and corrected.  
8.1.2 Diagnosing and Correcting Metaphoric Path Pathologies
In the same way that knowledge on system driving forces (motors) of development
may be useful in choosing strategies and tactics for adaptive management, so goes
knowledge on metaphoric system stalling, better known as ‘maladaptive consequences’
(Holling & Gunderson, 2002), or ‘path pathologies’ (e.g., Ven and Poole, 1995).  The
medical analogy of path pathology and diagnosis is one often found in the literature, and I
will make use of it here. 
Usually slow in emerging (Holling et al., 2002a), when maladaptive consequences
occur, there is a loss of adaptive capacity; hence, progress would demand larger and more
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expensive solutions (Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  In the same vein as Pettigrew’s
(1997) diagnostic cases, Heijden (2005) argues that managers would need to identify
intervening tactics to steer away from organizational pathologies.  Sterman (2001)
expresses the pathological concept as ‘policy resistance’.  The literatures suggest four
pathologies:  the Lock-in pathology, the Poverty pathology, the Rigidity pathology, and
the Anarchy pathology.
The Lock-in pathology or path-dependence has been extensively studied in many
disciplines including history (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995), economics (David, 2000;
Mahoney, 2000), politics (Greener, 2005; Pierson, 2004, 2000, 2000a), technology
(Carillo-Hermosilla, 2006; Rycroft & Kash, 2002), organization science (Burgelman,
2004; Crouch and Farrell, 2004), social and cultural studies (Yalcintas, 2006; Tilman,
2005), and environmental management (Allison & Hobbs, 2004).  Reinforcement of
increasing returns may produce a path that is coherent and stable, yet wrong; changing
paths is almost impossible (Roe, 1996).
The Poverty pathology results from a lack of building blocks or system components
due to variability constrained by external forces (Holling et al., 2002a).  Scholars express
the concept as cognitive inertia, competence trap, capability trap (Repenning & Sterman,
2004), leakiness of knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 2004), a paucity of technological,
reputational, structural and financial assets (Teece et al., 2004), and a lack of
organizational procedures and routines (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
The Rigidity pathology occurs when key components are inflexible and too tightly
coupled.  Scholars express the rigidity pathology (Holling et al., 2002a) as structural
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inertia, cultural inertia, ‘stickiness’ of knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 2004),
‘groupthink’ (Heijden, 2005) and ineffective collaborations or ‘collaboration creep’
(Eisenhardt & Galunic, 2004).  Levinthal and March (1993) suggest watching out for
competency traps.  Most large organizations are subject to long periods of structural and
strategic inertia (Christensen, 2002).  As a result, the organizational can be impotent in
times of crises (Staw et al., 1981).
Brock and Carpenter (2007) have noted rigidity pathologies or traps within the
development of environmental policies.  They argue that rigidity sets in when policy
analysts prescribe singular solutions to environmental problems based on adherence to a
specific model.  These solutions can be based on either a single institution, model, or
parameter estimate.  In this instance, Brock and Carpenter refer to ‘panacea’ traps.  They
recommend policy diversification through monitoring indicators of episodic change on
slow time scales, and developing coping measures (capacity building) to deal with
changes.
The Anarchy pathology occurs where there is no collective long-term vision
(Mitleton-Kelly, 2005; Collins & Porras, 2004; Black & Repenning, 2001; Sterman,
2001; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), no strategic or operational coherence (Heijden, 2005;
Baum & Amburgey, 2002), and no group cohesion (Flynn & Chatman, 2004).  It occurs
where there is superficial problem-solving (Bohn, 2000), loose organizational structures
(Baum & Amburgey, 2002), and multiple power or authority structures (Kezar, 2001).  As
a result, uncontrollable movements occur in unpredictable directions, sometimes called
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‘drift inertia’ or ‘goal drift’ (Pahner & Biggart, 2002) and require constant damage
control or firefighting.
As Table 17 shows, these pathologies result from the interplay between the two basic
dimensions of system complexity (Bar-Yam, 2007, 2007a; Perrow, 1986; Simon, 1962): 
1) distinction, or the number and extent of diversity or heterogeneity of components; and,
2) connectedness or extent of tightness of connections among components.
Table 17.  Metaphoric Path Pathologies of Complex Systems
COMPLEXITY
DIMENSIONS
Low Distinction Medium
Distinction
High Distinction
Low
Connectedness
Poverty Pathology Anarchy Pathology
Medium
Connectedness
Optimum
Complexity
High
Connectedness
Lock-in Pathology Rigidity Pathology
To date, few managers base their adaptive management program on any
comprehensive guiding strategic framework.  Several researchers and managers call for
the development and application of such frameworks.  Linkov et al. (2006) report that,
although adaptive management is recognized and even recommended by many state and
government agencies (in the U.S. and around the world), its application can vary widely,
and often, only specific elements of the approach are applied.
Examples of managers who have built guiding frameworks include North American
government departments and agencies (e.g., USDOI, 2007; Environment Canada, 2004;
324
U.S. Navy, 2003; USDOE, 2000) and European research institutes (e.g., Pahl-Wostl et
al., 2007; Brugge et al., 2005; Folke et al., 2002).  In addition, several international
organizations also call for the use of adaptive management and have provided guidance
for its application, e.g., the European Union, the World Wildlife Federation, and the
RAND Corporation for long-term policy analysis (Linkov et al., 2006).
Guidance offered by those organizations and others (e.g., Resilience Alliance, 2007) 
is usually in the form of general advice, questions or practical prescriptions. 
Nevertheless, Linkov et al. (2006) conclude that there is, as yet, no comprehensive
strategic frameworks that robustly operationalize the concept of adaptive management
into environmental practice based on complexity principles.
8.2 Suggested Strategic Framework for Adaptive Management
Scholars who favor adaptive management based on complexity science suggest that
some redirecting of a social-environmental system toward optimum complexity)and
away from pathologies)is possible with strategies that act on diversity and connections of
key system drivers (Allison & Hobbs, 2004; Holling et al., 2002; Mosekilde et al., 1988). 
Steering toward an optimum point may be done by increasing or decreasing heterogeneity
and/or tightening or loosening networks (Mendelsohn, 2006; Allison and Hobbs, 2004;
Perrings, 1998; Conesa, 1997; Perrow, 1986).  There is no one fixed optimum point
characterizing a system, because it may change depending on internal and external forces
that affect system evolution (Mosekilde et al., 1988).
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Young (2002) stresses that institutions generally cannot control ecosystem response to
human intervention: control was the basis for command-and-control management,
adaptive management is the new paradigm for complex systems.  Weick and Quinn
(1999) report that if change is considered to be constant and inevitable (as complex
theory implies), then strategic interventions must be continuously mindful of
organizational inertia.  Given this, environmental management is more than just reducing
path uncertainty: adapting to changes, including surprises, is equally important (Smith,
2004; Mitleton-Kelly, 2001; Stacey, 2001). 
 Researchers observe that, although command-and-control management sometimes
addresses the future through scenario-based planning or ongoing surveillance, unexpected
changes diminish the usefulness of those planning exercises (e.g., Peterson, 2007;
Heijden, 2005; Bazerman & Watkins, 2004).  Unpredictable surprises often require quick
responses; consequently, some scholars, most recently Taleb (2007), argue that building
broad adaptive capacity is now a much valued strategy, possibly considered more
beneficial than conventional scenario planning.  
The organization behavior literature is particularly a rich source of information on
change management strategies.  This is so because companies have long been interested
in long-term survival strategies, including building and maintaining adaptive capacity
(Lissack, 2001; Courtney et al., 1997).  From this academic business literature as well as
from the environmental management and complexity science literatures, I find an overall
management framework consisting of  two general categories of strategies with four
subcategories for dealing with change, as outlined in Table 18.
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Table 18.  General Strategies for Adaptive Management (AM)
1) Strategies for Reducing Path
Uncertainties
2) Strategies for Preparing for Surprises
1A Reducing uncertainties
along the reference path
with a clear enough
future, an exploitation
task (cf. passive AM) ;
and,
1B Searching for alternative
feasible paths, an
explorative task (cf. active
AM)
2A Preparing for predictable
but implausible changes
within various future
scenarios; and,
2B Preparing for unpredictable
changes or surprises where
true ambiguity exists about
the future.
Many researchers and managers have developed tactics under each of the four
strategies listed in Table A1.  Tactics under strategy 1A mostly involve trial and error
based on feedback from the development of a set path; mitigation or corrective actions
are applied on the set path.  This approach requires flexibility through the use of tactics to
modify the path or change its direction and is called passive adaptive management (Arvai
et al., 2006; Gregory et al., 2006).  Under Strategy 1B, experimentation and exploration
activities are actively carried out initially on one reference path in parallel to other paths. 
Information gained from experimentation and exploration feed into a modified reference
path.  This approach is called active adaptive management, and most tactics use the
advantages of diversity for continuously exploring alternative paths (Warglien, 2002;
Young, 2002; Homer-Dixon, 2000; Walters, 1986). 
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 Tactics under strategy 2B involve ongoing monitoring of possible futures and
measures to cultivate mindfulness (Irons, 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Under strategy
2B, tactics can include measures to build social, financial, and human slack reserves (Tan
& Peng, 2003; Singh, 1986), or capital (Ostrom, 2000; Miner et al., 1990), or broad
adaptive capacities; this is analogous to the ‘insurance effects’ of diversity (Bosselman,
2002).  
By combining Table 17 on metaphoric pathologies within complex systems with
Table 18 on general strategies for adaptive management, we come up with a general
framework for strategies and tactics as outlined in Table 19.  Such a framework could
provide a platform for further study and discussion by scholars and managers.  Simon
(1993) reports that, in general, building and maintaining adaptive capacities present a
challenge to many organizations.  
Bosselman (2001) observes that the idea of preparing for surprises is not new, but he
reports that many organizations do not focus enough on this task, because they are
generally plagued by Gresham’s law: the pressures of everyday activities and of crises
drives out planning.  Moreover, Modis (1998) reports that many managers consider the
idea of continuously preparing for disaster as insulting and a waste of resources.  In view
of this sentiment, Modis recommends understanding the patterns of development to help
anticipate the next turning point with sufficient accuracy for ‘just-in-time’ management.  
Some researchers consider this wishful thinking and, instead, recommend that
continuous surveillance and mindfulness is a better strategy over the long term (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001).  Other researchers—notably, Simon (1993) and Bosselman (2001)—
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recommend that a  remedy for institutional challenges to implementing adaptive
management (AM) programs is to create a special organizational unit whose sole
responsibility is to handle various facets of AM strategic planning.  The unit could
continually evaluate and recommend changes in long-term planning goals and objectives
in light of changes whether from internal and external environments.
Table 19.  Framework for Strategies and Tactics for Adaptive Management
Grounded in Complexity Theory
COMPLEXITY
DIMENSIONS
Low Distinction Medium
Distinction
High Distinction
Low
Connectedness
Poverty Pathology 
(tactics for reducing
reference path uncertainty
through increasing
distinction and increasing
connectedness) 
Anarchy Pathology
(tactics for preparing for
surprises through decreasing
distinction and increasing
connectedness)
Medium
Connectedness
Optimum
Complexity
High
Connectedness
Lock-in Pathology
(tactics for preparing for
predictable changes
through increasing
distinction and decreasing
connectedness)
Rigidity Pathology
(tactics for reducing path
uncertainty with alternatives
through decreasing
connectedness and decreasing
distinction)
8.3 An Example: Applying the SFAM to Nuclear Waste Management
For systems that are likely complex, external factors may not be controllable by
managers.  However, managers may be able to respond with some confidence to internal
factors.  Applying a strategic framework for adaptive management (SFAM) enables the
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manager to verify the ‘health’ of the system for time to time, diagnose any pathologies,
and make corrections by ‘steering’ the system to optimum complexity.  
The purpose here is to give an example on how the addition of stakeholder adaptive
capacities by applying SFAM may be complementary to existing planning and monitoring
programs.  The purpose of this example is not to build a comprehensive adaptive
management program for nuclear waste disposal, but to suggest a few tactics under
SFAM.  Table 20 refers to SACs under Metaphor 3 (Networking - SAC2, SAC3, SAC5)
and Metaphor 1 (Learning - SAC1).  As we have seen, the SACs that were dominant for
the development of nuclear waste management policies given the goal of sustainable
development are SAC2 and SAC3; these are networking SACs.  And I am not prepared to
give up on another networking SAC5 just yet, but encourage more research on whether
the degree of formality of project collaboration has an impact on the reaching any
agreement and its sustainability.  Therefore the tactics under the SFAM will tend to use
networking SACs more so than other types of SACs.  SAC1, a leaning SAC, can be used,
but sparingly. 
The study findings also suggest that focusing two SACs at a time is likely to enhance
performance than focusing on only one or more than two SACs.  Table 20 represents
tactics that could be taken by a nuclear waste manager of a centralized interim storage
facility over time.  The example refers to four events in chronological order which can be
spread out over many years.
I)  In the beginning, before any construction takes place, the manager must learn about
potentially affected local communities.  The manager’s knowledge is poor and various
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routes to get the needed information need to be explored and established.  Both the
distinction and connectedness dimensions need to increase; overall complexity needs to
increase.  The approach on tactics is to increase networking (SAC2) and some learning
(SAC1).  Solution: a permanent surveillance citizen group was established and funded by
the manager. 
II)  After the facility is built, truck loads of waste are scheduled to be transported to
the facility from reactor sites across the country.  There are rumors that many independent
interested parties, such as local and national NGOs, mothers with their children, and
native groups are planning to block roads to stop the trucks.  There is a precedent for
public individuals and workers to get severely injured during such demonstrations
through traffic accidents.  In order to avoid these problems, the waste manager must pro-
actively network with interested parties and try to formally negotiate ways that
demonstrations can still occur but which decreases the probability of injuries.  There is a
sense that some order should counter the potential perils of an anarchic atmosphere.  The
manager needs to decrease the distinction by bringing independent parties to the same
table through networking (SAC2) and increase connectedness by building an  agreement
among parties (SAC5).  Solution: all parties agreed that trucks would not be blocked by
protestors who could voice their concerns on at numerous specific locations along the
route.  The manager committed to ensuring that local, regional, national, and international
camera news crews would film and broadcast the demonstrations. 
III)  Eight years later, the local university discovers that the facility was built on an
ancient native cemetery.  All individuals of the local native populations want the facility
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to be dismantled and the site restored to its initial condition.  The waste manager says this
is out of the question.  The manager needs to decrease the connectedness dimension by
first recognizing that all parties are not likely to  budge from their main goal, but perhaps
new ideas that would satisfy both goals could be explored.  Manager may block the local
native consensus by seeking advice from regional and national native groups for new
ideas for possible compromises, and thus increase distinction (SAC2).  This results in
new ideas that the manager provides the local native communities for them to decide
(SAC3). Solution: a park was built by the manager for recreational purposes for the native
community with a part of the park devoted to a quiet place with a permanent memorial. 
The opening ceremony for the park included a national native spiritual guide who
transferred the souls in the ancient cemetery to the park.  
IV)  After a decade of operating the site and having trucks bring in spent fuel waste
from national utilities, the waste manager is now seeking to expand the facility to receive
waste from other countries.  This is a technically feasible and safe activity but one that
present many social considerations.  The local community is up in arms and does not
want to be "the world radioactive dumping group".   The issue of stigma is now a great
public concern.  They have by now developed many great media and political
connections.   Although the manager is used to seeking technical advice from external
experts, this time social science advice is required (SAC2).   The manager agrees with the
recommendation of the social science consultants: 1) the manager proposes to also turn
the waste facility into an international business and research center for environmental
management and stewardship, the community would be a major shareholder (thereby
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turning stigma into prestige and decreasing distinction); 2) the manager would organize a
local referendum through an independent third party on this option and agree to abide by
the results in the case of rejection, but in the case of majority acceptance, attempt to
address any concerns of the minority (thereby possibly decreasing the need for
community media and political connections) (SAC3).  Solution: the results of referendum
indicated that the community agreed with the manager's new proposal on conditions that
mitigation measures be implemented to reduce vibrations and noise from the extra traffic
from international importation of waste.  The manager agreed by imposing extra
conditions on international imports, including special tires for trucks and mandatory low
speeds.
 The example relays only a few tactics that the manager will need to deploy within a
comprehensive ongoing strategic adaptive management program over the long term. 
Such a program can require the allocation of significant resources, either up front, or
sporadically at peak time of concerns.  Over the long term, however, the application of
such a framework will help to ensure project success.  Indeed, there has been many
instances in the past, as described in Chapter 1, that if the manager does not focus his
attention on such activities, then ultimately running the facility will cost more over the
long term or will fail altogether.
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Table 20.  Example of the Framework for Strategies and Tactics for Adaptive
Management Applied to Nuclear Waste Management (as described in the text)
COMPLEXITY
DIMENSIONS
Low Distinction Medium
Distinction
High Distinction
Low
Connectedness
Poverty Pathology     [I] 
(tactics for reducing path
uncertainty preparing for
changes through increasing
distinction and
connectedness) 
e,g, Managers do not know
enough about the
potentially affected local
communities around a
proposed interim storage
facility for nuclear fuel
waste. 
They could interact with the
communities within multiple
fora to know more about
their aspirations and
concerns.   (SAC2, SAC1)
Anarchy Pathology       [II]
(tactics for preparing for surprises through
decreasing distinction and increasing
connectedness)
e.g., Various interested parties are
organizing protests along a renewed waste
shipment transportation route.  Things may
get ugly and dangerous.  
Managers could invite the NGOs and other
public parties around the same table to
discuss how their voices can be heard and
follow-up actions safely conducted and
reach a written agreement.
(SAC2, SAC5)
Medium
Connectedness
Optimum
Complexity
High
Connectedness
Lock-in Pathology   [III]  
(tactics for preparing for
predictable changes through
increasing distinction and
decreasing connectedness)
e.g., Managers find out
long after a disposal facility
has been built, that it rests
on the remains of native
community's ancient
cemetery.  All individuals in
a  native community want
the facility shut down or
else.  The waste manager
says that shutting down the
facility is a non-starter. 
Managers and governments
could consult with various
native leaders at the local,
regional and national level
for advice on a compromise
solution.  
(SAC2, SAC3)
Rigidity Pathology       [IV]
(tactics for reducing reference path
uncertainty with alternatives through
decreasing connectedness and decreasing
distinction)
e.g., The waste manager is seeking to
expand the facility to receive waste from
other countries.  This is a safe and
technically feasible activity but one that
presents many social considerations.  The
community does not want to be the
dumping ground for the world.   Advice on
nuclear waste disposal is often provided by
the usual technical experts but this time
social science experts are required. 
The new way recommended is to reduce the
stigma and have the community make the
final decision and abide by it.
(SAC2, SAC3)
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 2007, Canada became the first country to legally and explicitly adopt the use of
adaptive management for the long-term management of its nuclear fuel waste.  Many
watchful eyes will monitor its progress, because adaptive management is an approach that
has been used with varying degrees of success.  This study has tried to answer what could
be done to ensure or improve the performance of adaptive management programs.
 Many scholars have analyzed this question, mainly through qualitative analysis. 
Although gaining insight through narrative can be highly useful, I wanted to explore
whether quantitative research could be devised so that more robust lines of inquiry could
lead to greater insights.  Indeed, the combination of qualitative and quantitative
information for analysing national policy documents led to the following findings, some
surprising.  In general, the selected system is likely to be complex in view of the likely
presence of chaotic developmental patterns in all countries (except for South Korea).  In
this case, one can then use a few key factors within a strategic adaptive management
framework grounded in complexity theory to reach management goals, including
outcomes and processes.
The time series suggest remarkable international convergence among the 23 countries;
but it is not (yet?) complete.  Although convergence was noted on the time series profiles,
the multivariate analyses show that some countries stood out by their unique combination
of the six stakeholder adaptive capacities.  The countries are Switzerland, Canada, China,
Brazil, and Argentina.  Notwithstanding the few windows of opportunity that have
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occurred in several countries caused by external factors—possibly reflected in high-
frequency peaks of policy events in the time series—the nuclear waste management
policy system development evolved relatively steadily and with surprising resilience.
Although the selected stakeholder adaptive capacities (SACs) were expected to
overlap somewhat, the analyses suggest a clear distinction between government oversight
and the rest of the SACs.  Government oversight, however, is not a distinguishing factor
for sustainable development.  The results on formal project collaboration indicate that
countries have not emphasized this capacity over other stakeholder adaptive capacities.  It
is unclear to date whether formal project collaboration is desirable (informal ways may be
more effective), or whether it is difficult to achieve and maintain. 
To explore the effectiveness of the SACs, qualitative aggregation of the four selected
quantitative indices for a set management goal—namely, sustainable development—was
applied.  This exercise provided greater insight on the influence of SACs used by
countries considering their general sustainable development performance.  It became
possible to consider whether the importance given to SACs was justified in view of the
actual influence of SACs on keeping the system on the path of sustainable development. 
Overall, it became obvious that the more influential SACs were those focusing on
networking activities, and to a lesser extent, on learning capacities.
Policy development within complex systems can appear to be a messy affair.  With
computer capabilities and new available software, qualitative and quantitative analyses
can feasibly be combined to produce greater insights and reveal hidden order.  The
findings of the study imply that there may be a manageable way of steering many
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environmental problems as complex social-environmental systems.  A comprehensive
strategic framework for adaptive management grounded in complexity is suggested. 
Strategies and tactics under this framework aim to ensure optimum complexity of the
system for maximum adaptability over the long term.
In conclusion, the study produced interesting insights, and its findings suggest that
there is likely a better way to manage complex environmental problems by improving the
performance of adaptive management programs.  Once managers identify key system
drivers, these drivers can be used to optimize system complexity under a strategy adaptive
management framework, lie the one suggested in this study, to maximize system
adaptation over the long term.  This management approach would enable managers to
'steer'  complex environmental problems toward a set goal.
Recommendations for Future Research
 In addition to the findings, the study has also raised more questions that could be the
objects of future research. The study raised various questions, some specific to the
development of nuclear waste management policies, some others referring generally to
the management of other complex environmental problems.  I outline my
recommendations for future research under four groupings: 1) research that repeats the
same study design but for developing countries; 2) research that extends the study
findings to their application within adaptive management programs; 3) research that
focuses deeper into a single case; and, 4) research that fills current gaps on certain
adaptive capacities.
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1) Repetition for Generalization
The application of the research design could focus on smaller, poorer (Lower Middle
Income World Bank Classification) developing countries who are currently considering
embarking on, or expanding their nuclear energy program, as indicated in the CIGI
Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States (CIGI, 2010).  Of these states, a selection for
study could consider the following four criteria: 1) they seem serious about using nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes only; 2) their electricity grid can be feasibly adjusted to
accommodate this form of energy (Alger, 2009); 3) they are members of the IAEA and
GNEP; and, 4) they are contracting parties of the Joint Convention. 
Based on these criteria, examples of such countries possibly include the Phillippines,
Egypt, Morocco, and Mongolia.  Nuclear waste policy documents could be studied in the
same manner as the study, and it would be interesting to study the importance given to
sustainable development by these emerging nuclear energy states
2) Extension through Application
Future work could build, with the use of identified key system drivers, a
comprehensive adaptive management programs based of the suggested strategic
framework grounded in complexity principles.  To do so, researchers could build
partnerships with managers to monitor the effectiveness of these programs over the long
term with a view to making improvements either to the strategic framework as a whole or
to the development of innovative tactics.  This work could be applied to other social-
environmental problems and other management goals; for instance, desert management
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for spiritual renewal, park management for the conservation of one species, or water
management for interstate political cooperation.   
3) Single-Case Study
A more thorough qualitative history of South Korea is needed to explain the apparent
randomness of its results contrary to the other 22 countries which show signs of the
presence of chaotic patterns of development.  Recently, South Korea has shown
aggressive and rapid expansion of its nuclear technology exports.  Whether this expansion
is a sign of orderly progression based on a good business plan (Hyun-cheol, 2010), or, of
another too large and rapid period of growth with ensuing negative consequences is not
yet clear.  For instance, Areva (a French competitor) has claimed that to win contracts
around the world, South Korea is lowering the costs of its nuclear exports at the expense
of safety measures (Lauvergeon, 2010). 
4) Adaptive Capacity Research
Research is needed on three forms of project collaboration: negotiation, mediation,
and dialogue.  The goal would be to explore whether the sustainability of project
collaboration among stakeholders is affected by the degree of formality.
Many scholars are studying the concept of corporate social responsibility because its
positive and negative impacts are still uncertain, and as a consequence of this uncertainty, 
there is ongoing controversy on the concept.  On the one hand, some scholars object to
the term ‘responsibility’ or even ‘good corporate citizenship’, because the term implies a
duty or an obligation that is unduly imposed.  On the other hand, some scholars prefer the
concept of 'social virtuous ethics' that combines the voluntary development of goodwill
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among all stakeholders and ongoing efforts to develop best practices.  The disadvantages
of this new 'ethic' approach to social responsibility, however, have not yet been
thoroughly researched.  More research therefore needs to be carried out on this adaptive
capacity, especially given that the study findings point to the likely important influence of
this capacity for sustainable development.
And lastly, as raised in Chapter 7, the study, as designed, could not answer why
networking was of primal importance for system evolution within the context of this
study.  This is a much broader question that requires more research on the respective
value of evolution through networking and evolution through other capacities, for
instance, learning.
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APPENDIX 1
CONTRACTING PARTIES OF THE JOINT CONVENTION ON THE SAFETY OF
SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT AND ON THE SAFETY OF
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 
 (January 2010 - 42 signatories; * indicates that the  State has at least one operating nuclear power plant)
Country Signature Instrument Date of Deposit Entry into Force
*Argentina 19th Dec 1997 ratification 14th  Nov 2000 18th  Jun 2001
Australia 13th  Nov 1998 ratification 5th  Aug 2003 3rd  Nov 2003
Austria 17th  Sep 1998 ratification 13rd  Jun  2001 11th  Sep 2001
Belarus 13th  Oct 1999 ratification 26th  Nov  2002 24th  Feb 2003
*Belgium 8th  Dec 1997 ratification 5th  Sep 2002 4th  Dec 2002
*Brazil 31st Oct 1997 ratification 17th  Feb  2006 17th  Feb 2006
*Bulgaria 22nd  Sep 1998 ratification 21st  Jun 2000 18th  Jun 2001
*Canada 7th  May 1998 ratification 7th  May  1998 18th  Jun 2001
*China accession 13th  Sep  2006 12th  Dec 2006
Croatia 9th Apr 1998 ratification 10th  May  1999 18th  Jun 2001
Cyprus accession 21st  Oct  2009 19th  Jan 2010
*Czech Republic 30th Sep 1997 approval 25th  Mar  1999 18th  Jun 2001
Denmark 9th Feb 1998 acceptance 3rd  Sep  1999 18th  Jun 2001
Estonia 5th  Jan 2001 ratification 3rd  Feb  2006 18th  Jun 2001
*Finland 2nd Oct 1997 acceptance 10th  Feb  2000 18th  Jun 2001
*France 29th Sep 1997 approval 27th  Apr 2000 18th  Jun 2001
Georgia accession 22nd  Jul  2009 20th  Oct 2009
*Germany 1st Oct 1997 ratification 13th  Oct  1998 18th  Jun 2001
Greece 9th  Feb 1998 ratification 18th  Jul 2000 18th  Jun 2001
*Hungary 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 2nd  Jun  1998 18th  Jun 2001
Iceland accession 27th  Jan  2006 27th  Apr 2006
Indonesia 6th  Oct 1997
Ireland 1st Oct 1997 ratification 20th  Mar  2001 18th  Jun 2001
Italy 26th  Jan 1998 ratification 8th  Feb  2006 8th Feb 2006
*Japan accession 26th  Aug  2003 24th  Nov 2003
*Kazakhstan 29th  Sep 1997
*Korea, Republic 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 16th  Sep 2002 15th  Dec 2002
Country Signature Instrument Date of Deposit Entry into Force
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Kyrgyzstan accession 18th  Dec  2006 18th  Mar 2007
Latvia 27th  Mar 2000 acceptance 27th  Mar 27  2000 18th  Jun 2001
Lebanon 30th  Sep 1997
*Lithuania 30th  Sep 1997 ratification 16th  Mar  2004 14th  Jun 2004
Luxemburg 1st  Oct 1997 ratification 21st  Aug  2001 19th  Nov 2001
Morocco 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 23rd  Jul  1999 18th  Jun 2001
*Netherlands 10th  Mar 1999 acceptance 26th  Apr  2000 18th  Jun 2001
Nigeria accession 4th  Apr 2007 3th  Jul 2007
Norway 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 12th  Jan  1998 18th  Jun 2001
Peru 4th  Jun 1998
Philippines 10th  Mar 1998
Poland 3rd Oct 1997 ratification 5th May 2000 18th  Jun 2001
Portugal accession 15th  May  2009 13th  Aug 2009
*Romania 30th Sep 1997 ratification 6th  Sep  1999 18th  Jun 2001
*Russian Federation 27th  Jan 1999 ratification 19th  Jan  2006 19th  Apr 2006
Senegal accession 24th  Dec  2008 24th  Mar 2009
*Slovakia 30th  Sep 1997 ratification 6th Oct  1998 18th  Jun 2001
*Slovenia 29th Sep 1997 ratification 25th  Feb  1999 18th  Jun 2001
*South Africa accession 15th  Nov  2006 13th  Feb 2007
*Spain 30th  Jun 1998 ratification 11th  May  1999 18th  Jun 2001
*Sweden 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 29th  Jul  1999 18th  Jun 2001
*Switzerland 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 5th  Apr 2000 18th  Jun 2001
Tajjikistan accession 12th  Dec 2007 11th  Mar 2008
 Macedonia accession 31st  Dec  2009 31st  Mar 2010
*Ukraine 29 Sep 1997 ratification 24th Jul  2000 18th  Jun 2001
United Arab Emirates accession 31st Jul, 2009 29th  Oct 2009
*United Kingdom 29th  Sep 1997 ratification 12 Mar 2001 18th  Jun 2001
*United States 20th  Sep 1997 ratification 15th  Apr, 2003 14th  Jul 2003
Uruguay accession 28th  Dec, 2005 28th  Mar 2006
Uzbekistan accession 19th  Jan  2009 19th  Apr 2009
EURATOM accession 4th Oct  2005 2th  Jan 2006
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APPENDIX 2
BACKGROUNDER ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF EACH OF
THE 23 SELECTED COUNTRIES
Brief background information on the nuclear power and waste programs is provided
for the countries selected for the study.  Selected countries are those who are contracting
parties of the IAEA Joint Convention and who operate at least one commercial nuclear
reactor.  The following sources of information were used for the compilation of the
backgrounders:
 C Information on nuclear power programs and nuclear waste programs has been
taken from the World Nuclear Association (WNA, 2009b), the NEA (2008b), the
IAEA (2009b), Hogselius (2009), and Cooke (2009); and USNWTRB (2009).  A
section is also included on key nuclear defense policies taken from Pike (2009),
Cooke (2009), and Zoellner (2008); 
C Country contextual information starting after the Second World War is taken from
the USCIA (2009);
C The Time Lines and Turning Points Appendix in a special issue of the Journal of
Risk Research, 12 (7-8): 1025-1032 (for Canada, France, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).
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ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Argentina has 2 nuclear reactors generating nearly 10% of its electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear reactor began operating in 1974.
• New nuclear energy policy in 2006.
• There are plans for further nuclear developments by 2015.
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• The National Atomic Energy Commission was created in 1950.
• No plans for reprocessing (though an experimental facility was run in the early 1970s
at Ezeiza); a reprocessing policy may be adopted later.
• The National Atomic Energy Commission was given responsibility for waste disposal
in  late 1990s.  
• Spent fuel is stored at each nuclear power plant.
• No final decision on a site for a deep geological repository; a site must be located by
2030 and operational by 2060.  
Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• In the 1950s, national desire to build nuclear weapons and an ongoing suspected
weapons program.
• Historical collaboration with Germany on weapons program (who was restricted to
build weapons in their own country).
Country
Context
• After WWII, Peronist populism with military interventions was followed by a military
junta in 1976.
• Democracy returned in 1983 (although not without ongoing challenges).
• Severe economic crises in 2001-2002 that led to violent public protest.
• Government type:  republic (federation, 23 provinces).
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KINGDOM OF BELGIUM
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Belgium has 7 nuclear reactors generating more than 50% of its electricity from
nuclear energy.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1974.
• There has been little government support for nuclear, but this is changing.  
• Development in 1922 of a radium mine by Union Minière.
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• Domestic and international reprocessing for 12 OECD countries from 1957-74 at
Mol.  Thereafter, contracts with the French and the U.K; now only with the French.
• In the late 1970s, Belgium signed a first contract with France for reprocessing.
• A separate government management agency for waste, ONDRAF/NIRAS, was
created in  1980.
• In 1980-84 the Hades underground research laboratory was constructed 222 m in the
Boom clay.
• In the early 1990s, continued reprocessing was debated in Parliament.
• In the mid-1990s, development of waste transportation policies.
• In 1998, in-country reprocessing was abandoned.
• In 2006, Strategic Environmental Assessment Law on Radioactive Waste
• No decision yet on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (wait-and-see strategy).
• The construction of a proposed deep geological repository should begin by 2025,
could be operational in 2040.
• Repository research is underway and focuses on the clays at Mol.  
• Belgium is preparing a ‘Waste Management Plan’, the aim of which is to establish
the basis for a societal dialogue in order to define the alternative or additional
options for the long-term management of radioactive waste.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Uranium mining in the Belgian Congo as far back as 1915 for radium.
• Uranium mining rush as of 1942 for uranium for WWII and the Cold War.
• Through the Atoms for Peace program after WWII, a European reprocessing facility
was built at the MOL center with the assistance of the US (in reconnaissance of the
Belgian Congo uranium).
Country
Context
• Tensions between the Dutch-speaking Flemings of the north and the French-speaking
Walloons of the south leading to recent constitutional changes.
• Government type:  federal parliamentary democracy under a constitutional
monarchy.
     (constitutional amendments in 1993 created the federal state, 3 regions)
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FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Brazil has 2 nuclear reactors generating 4% of its electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power plant began in 1982.
• Its nuclear power program is expanding (addition of 8 GWe by 2060).
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• Most fuel cycle activities were developed but not reprocessing.
• Waiting for international consensus on reprocessing and disposal (wait-and-see
strategy).
• Used fuel is stored at Angra NPP pending formulation of policy on reprocessing.  
• In 1987, a misused radioactive cobalt source in Goiania lead to a massive radioactive
waste exercise.
• As a consequence of the Goiania incident, safety assessments, mitigation measures
and new regulations were developed.
• In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some nuclear fuel research waste was returned to
the United States.
• Research is focused on interim long-term storage.  
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• In the 1950s, historical desire for nuclear weapons and ongoing suspected program
• Historical collaboration with Germany (who was restricted to build weapons in their
own country)
• In 2004, dispute with the IAEA over the building of a uranium enrichment facility
Country
Context
• Populist government from 1930 to the mid-1950s.
• Military governments until 1985.
• After 1985, return to civilian rule.
• Government type:  federal republic (federation, 26 states).
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CANADA
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks 
Nuclear Power
Program
• About 16% of Canada’s electricity comes from nuclear power (18 reactors), using
indigenous technology (mostly in Ontario).
• Development of radium and uranium mining activities in the early 1930s.
• In 1952, on-site nuclear research reactor accident at the Chalk River Nuclear
Laboratories.  
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1971.
• New nuclear capacity is proposed in three provinces (Ontario, New Brunswick and
Alberta).
Nuclear Waste
Program 
• In 1977, out of various disposal options, the report from the Hare inquiry
recommends deep geological disposal.
• In 1981, the federal/Ontario governments decide that approval on a concept is
required before siting.
• In 1989, the Seaborn inquiry was initiated; its report in 1998 supports DGR on
technical grounds but more work is required on social considerations.  The
government agrees with the Seaborn recommendations.
• In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the management of radioactive received intense
public scrutiny.
• In 2002, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) was set up under
the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act by the three nuclear utilities.
• In June 2007, the federal government accepted the NWMO’s proposal for adaptive
phased management for nuclear waste disposal, i.e., interim storage and geological
repository deep in the Canadian Shield (direct disposal).
• After public consultation, the NWMO issued a 5-year plan for adaptive
management.
• In Q3 2008, the NWMO expects to enter a dialogue with Canadians on the
development of a site selection process in 2009 or early 2010.
• The initiation of the process to find an informed and willing host community will
not likely start before the end of  2009.
• The earliest in-service date of the repository is 2035.
• Canada is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
•  Research on reprocessing in the 1940s and 1950s.
• After WWII, in 1955, it renounced any undertaking on a nuclear weapons
development program.
• In 1975, India tests a nuclear weapon - part of the technology to build it was
derived from a Canadian nuclear reactor sold to India; diplomatic relations between
India and Canada were affected.
• Instrumental in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Country
Context
• Diverse energy resources.
• Constitutional Amendments of 1982 added Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
• Government type:  a parliamentary democracy, and a federation (10 provinces).
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PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• About 2.5 % of its electricity comes from nuclear power but this is expected to
increase to 15 % by 2020.
• Use of radioactivity for medical purposes since the 1930s.
• Historically, China was more interested in using nuclear energy to build nuclear
weapons than to produce electricity - that changed in the early 1990s when the
country started to ramp up industrial development for a growing population and
international concerns about climate change.
• China’s first commercial nuclear power reactors began operations in 1994.
• Mainland China has 11 nuclear power plants in commercial operation, 7 under
construction, and 10 more about to start construction.
• China has some uranium reserves and an agreement with Mongolia.  In May 2006,
China signed a uranium contract with Australia to feed its new commercial nuclear
reactors.
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• In the early 1980s, safety regulations were developed and construction of a low level
radioactive waste management facility began.
• In 1987, China announced that it could reprocess its commercial waste (no
commercial operational facility yet).
• The early 1990s saw a new wave of safety regulations.
• Construction of a central interim storage facility began in 1994.
• In 2003, Law on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution.
• China has a reprocessing pilot plant that is currently operating at Lanzhou (2010).
• Other R&D is more focused on long-term storage rather than on a deep geological
repository (DGR); nevertheless, the siting of a DGR should be completed by 2020
and operational by 2050.
• Commercial reprocessing facilities are either being constructed (e.g., the one under
construction by Areva is scheduled to be operational by 2025) or in the planning
stages.
• Resulting high-level waste will be placed into a future deep geological repository.
• Site selection is focused on 6 locations and will be completed by 2020.
• An underground laboratory will then operate for 20 years and disposal is anticipated
from 2050.  
• China is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• From 1955 to 1960, it still did not have adequate delivery systems for a nuclear
weapons program of its own.
• During the Cold War, alignment with the Soviet Union to build China’s first atomic
weapon.
• Sino-Soviet relations were broken apart in 1960.
• In 1964, China carries its first nuclear weapons test at the Lop Nur site in the western
desert province of Sinkiang.
Country
Context
• After WWII, Mao Zedong establishes an autocratic socialist system.
• After 1978, Deng Xiaoping focuses on market-oriented economic development.
• By 2000, economic output had quadrupled.
• Government type:  communist state, unitary government.
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CZECH REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear Power
Program
• The Czech Republic has 6 nuclear reactors generating 30% of its electricity.
• Uranium mining since the 1930s.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1985.
• Government commitment to the future of nuclear energy is strong.
Nuclear Waste
Program 
• In 1942, construction of a surface repository for the disposal of low level
radioactive waste produced by research activities.
• Planned to return of nuclear spent fuel to the Soviet Union without waste return 
• In 1992, the Czech Republic started considering its own DGR.
• After the fall of the Soviet Union, and by 1993, the government decided to end the
now expensive practice of exporting SNF to Russia.
• After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic had to take back SNF from
Slovakia.
•  SNF generated during the Soviet Union era, such returns ended in the late 1990s.
• In the early 1990s, a new wave of regulations under the existing mining act to
cover DGR aspects.
• In 1997, a new Atomic Act was passed that required, inter alia, the formation of a
specialized nuclear waste authority, namely, RAWRA (Radioactive Waste
Repository Authority).  From 1997 to 2003, a path was set toward waste disposal,
including restarting site characterization processes for a DGR and siting exercises.
• In 2005, faced with surprisingly vehement public opposition, the government
announced a five-year moratorium on the project.  
• No decision yet on reprocessing; adoption of a wait-and-see strategy.
• If a decision on direct disposal is adopted, then a site should be located by 2015
and operational by 2050-65.
• Used fuel is currently stored at each nuclear power plant.
• Recent progress on LILRW facilities.
• Agreement with the Russian federation on uranium mine waste clean-up.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Provided uranium from the St-Joachimsthal mines for the WWII atomic bomb
program.
• 1945:  Signed agreement with Stalin on uranium supplies.
• 1948:  the Soviet Union takes control over the Joachimsthal uranium mining
operations.  
Country
Context
• After WWII, a truncated Czechoslovakia fell within the Soviet sphere of influence
• In 1968 (Prague Spring), Soviet invasion squashing liberation from Communist
rule to establish ‘socialism with a human face’.
• With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, velvet revolution.
• In 1993:  independence and velvet divorce into two national components:  the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.
• The Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999, and the European Union in 2004.
• Government type:  a parliamentary democracy, 13 regions.
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REPUBLIC OF FINLAND
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks
Nuclear Power
Program
• Finland has 4 reactors providing 27% of its electricity.
• Some uranium mining in since the 1930s (safety regulations developed in the
1950s)
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1977.
• A fifth reactor was approved by the government in 2002, on economic, energy
security and environmental grounds.  The reactor is now under construction by
AREVA with an initial start-up date of 2012.  This schedule, however, is 2 years
behind and the work is well over the planned budget.  
• A sixth NPP unit is being considered.
Nuclear Waste
Program 
• Nuclear Energy Act and amendments (1987, 1988, 1994, 2003, 2008); the 1987
Nuclear Energy Act had a final directive on geological direct disposal.
• A separate agency, Posiva Oy, was set up in 1995 as Finland’s joint-venture
company for the management of final disposal.
• VVER spent nuclear fuel exported to the Soviet Union (Russia) ends in 1996.
• Provisions for nuclear waste disposal are well advanced.
• The method of DGR and its location was decided by the government’s and
announced in its 2001 decision-in-principle.
• Exploratory construction is underway on a deep geological repository at Eurajoki 
some 500 m down in igneous rock.
• This project had strong community support, and the city Council voted 20:7.
• Posiva Oy expects to submit an application for a construction license in 2012, with
a view to operation from 2020.
• No reprocessing but may be open to it later.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• No significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear weapons
program or participation in the Soviet program.
Country
Context
• During WWII, it was able to successfully defend its freedom and resist invasions by
the Soviet Union
• Since then, the Finns made a remarkable transformation from a farm/forest
economy to a diversified modern industrial economy.  
• A member of the European economy since 1995.
• Deep financial crisis in 1991 with rapid recovery peaking in 1997 (Honkapohja,
2009).
• Finland was the only Nordic state to join the Euro system at its initiation in 1999.
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).   
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FRENCH REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks 
Nuclear Power
Program
• France now derives over 75% of its electricity from nuclear energy with 59 reactors.
• In 1945, research reactor Zoe went operational.
• Creation of EDF in 1969 managing nuclear energy program based on the US PWR
nuclear reactor.
• In early 1970s, key decision to have a high-technology tool at each stage of the
nuclear fuel cycle.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1974.
• All of its commercial nuclear reactors were connected to the grid between 1978 and
2006.
• France has developed its own nuclear technology which is also a major export.
• Initial uranium from its colonies of Gabon and Niger.
Nuclear Waste
Program 
• In 1951, establishment of the CEA
• Since 1960, France conducts research on alternate ways to treat and dispose of
nuclear waste.  
• Since 1967, reprocessing at La Hague
• Approval in 1976 to build the SuperPhoenix (SP)  (burner).
• In 1979, creation of ANDRA as a government unit within  CEA and public protest
over SP.
• In 1986, the Super Phoenix was connected to the grid.
• Since 1988, reprocessing at Marcoule nuclear research centre. By 1989, reprocessing
was judged as uneconomical.  Closure of the SuperPhoenix breeder.
• In the late 1980s and 1990s, public opposition stopped DGR siting investigations.  
• In the early 1990s, development of the basic law on nuclear waste management.
• In 1991, new waste law (‘la loi Battaille’) to research three disposal alternatives over
a period of 15 years.  (Under an amendment, ANDRA was given more separate
powers in 1997).
• In 1993, creation of new Office d’évaluation et des choix scientifiques et
technologiques (similar to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (Barthes,
2009).  
• In 1994, new siting investigations at three sites; in 1998, one site is chosen for
further study (Bure), but public opposition persists.
• In 1996, the Government decided to permanently shut down the Super Phoenix.
• In the early 2000s, development of a nuclear waste finance legislation.  
• In 2006, the Planning Act of June 28, 2006 Concerning the Sustainable Management
of Radioactive Materials and Waste:  research and siting exercises, DGR solution to
be implemented by 2015.  
• In 2006, Act on the Transparency and Security the Nuclear Field.
• In 2009, new designation of  'zones of interest' for a DGR.
• A mandatory public debate will be carried out in 2012-2013; final site selection will
occur after that public consultation.
• A license application for a reversible geological repository must be reviewed by
2015, for commissioning in 2025 and operation in 2040.
• France is a member of GNEP.
FRENCH REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks 
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Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Even before WWII, France had a significant nuclear research program.
• Part of the USA/UK/Franc  triumvirate effort to build the WWII atomic bomb. 
Collaboration ended in mistrust.  Split of the triumvirate in 1946.
• Historical defeat in Indochina pushed France in developing a nuclear weapons
program.
• De Gaulle supported the development of a nuclear weapons program in 1944 and
1958.
• In 1951, reprocessing at Marcoule for military purposes
• In 1960, first test of a nuclear weapon in the desert of its Algerian colony.
Country
Context
• Since 1958, it has constructed a hybrid presidential-parliamentarian governing
system.
• In 1999, it introduced with Germany, a common currency for the Europe, the Euro.
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).
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REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear Power
Program
• Hungary has 4 nuclear reactors generating more than 30% of its electricity.
• Development of uranium mine in the late 1950s.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1982.  
Nuclear Waste
Program
• Export of spent nuclear fuel to Russia ends in the late 1990s.  
• A direct disposal policy is currently under development.
• No reprocessing but open to it later; adoption of a wait-and-see strategy.
• Some spent fuel sent back to Russia as of the early 1990s.
• In 1997, a separate government agency, PURAM (Public Agency for Radioactive
Waste Management) was set up.
• In 2004, Hungary signs an agreement with Russia to return its SNF to Russia.
• Recent progress on LILRW facilities.
• On-site storage awaiting decision on long-term strategy.
• Hungary is a GNEP member.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• No significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear weapons program
or participation in the Soviet program.  
Country
Context
• The country fell under Communist rule following WWII.  
• In 1956, a public revolt met with a massive Soviet military intervention.
• In 1968, Hungary began liberalizing its economy (‘Goulash’ Communism).
• First multi-party election in 1990 
• Joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004
• Government type:  parliamentary democracy (unitary government).
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JAPAN
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• With 53 nuclear reactors, Japan obtains 30% of its electricity from nuclear energy;
this is expected to increase to 40% by 2017.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1966.
• Japan needs to import some 80% of its energy requirements.
• In the late 1990s and 2000s, a series of earthquakes possibly affected nuclear reactor
operations raised much public concerns but with no off-site consequences.
• Criticality accident in 1999 at a nuclear fuel fabrication facility; as one result, quality
assurance programs were strengthened.
• Much research on advanced thermal reactors (‘burners including breeders’).
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• In 1956, a government decision was made to maximize the utilization of imported
uranium.
• Pilot-scale reprocessing plan since 1977 at Tokaimura (still operational); export to
France and the U.K.  while awaiting maturity of domestic reprocessing program;
spent fuel shipments to Europe finished in 2001.
• In 1964, Japan initiated a burner program.
• A more advanced ‘Pluthermal’ breeder program began in 1994.
• In May 2000, Parliament passed the Law on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive
Waste which mandates deep geological disposal.  
• NUMO (Nuclear Waste Management Organization) was set up in October 2000 to
manage the waste program on behalf of the government by Disposal of Radioactive
Waste Act.  
• NUMO started open solicitation of volunteer municipalities in 2002.
• In mid-2007, a supplementary waste bill was passed which says that final disposal is
the most important issue in ‘steadily’ carried out nuclear policy.  
• New reprocessing plant operational commissioned in 2005, running in 2009.
• More investigation of a reduced number of sites will be carried out in 2012.
• A site is expected to be available for operation in 2035.
• Central interim storage facility is in operation.
• Japan is a GNEP member.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• In the late 1930s, Japanese academics are interested in nuclear fusion.
• U.S. deployment of atomic fission bombs over Japan in 1945.
• In the 1950s, exploration of the Korean peninsula for uranium mining.
• When the breeder program was terminated, Japan sent its used fuel abroad for
reprocessing.
Country
Context
• After WWII, staunch ally of the United States.
• Government type:  a parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy
(unitary government).
• Economy experienced a major slowdown starting in the 1990s following three
decades of un precedented growth but it still remains a major economic power.
• Due to a small landmass, the country is relatively poor in natural resources.
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Some 20 reactors provide almost 40% of South Korea’s electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1978.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• In the 1970s, with withdrawal of American troops, South Korea began being
interested in nuclear weapons (Kang & Feiveson, 2001).  Died down since then. 
Could be resurrected if North Korea starts up weapons program.
• Since the 1970s, intermittently interested in reprocessing (Kang & Feiveson, 2001). 
Now, more of  a wait-and-see strategy for the nuclear fuel cycle.
• But like Japan it may reprocess; or in the event of reunification (Kang & Feiveson,
2001).
• 1982 new nuclear energy act.
• 1986 amendment to the nuclear energy act for radioactive waste but no final decision
on direct disposal, with interest in further waste treatment (DUPIC process).
• Started in the mid-2000s, siting exercises are ongoing for a possible deep geological
repository.
• Government decides in 2008 to locate a national low level and intermediary
radioactive waste facility at the Wolsong Nuclear Environment Centre.
• In 2008, siting criteria for spent fuel interim storage facilities.
• In 2009, an independent government agency, KRMC (Korea Radioactive Waste
Management Corporation) was set up for waste management.
• Building knowledge on the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
• Construction of a centralized interim storage facility by 2016.
• Korea is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Historically desired a nuclear weapons program.
• Instead, it built strategic relationships with the Western countries to protect the
southern Korean peninsula from potentially hostile neighbors.  
Country
Context
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).
• Korea regained its independence from Japan after WWII.
• After WWII, the Republic of Korea was set up in the south of the Korean Peninsula
while a communist-style government was set up in the North (DPRK).  
• Korean war:  1950-1953:  South Korea supported by the U.S.; North Korea supported
by the Soviet Union and China.
• After Korean War, rapid economic growth of South Korea.
• 1993:  First civilian president after 32 years of military rule.
• Continued strain relations between North Korea and South Korea.  
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LITHUANIA
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Lithuania has one nuclear reactor generating almost 70% of its electricity, but it was
shut down in 2004 as a condition to enter the European Union.
• Its first commercial nuclear power plant began operating in 1983.
• Plans for a new nuclear energy program involving export from neighboring countries.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• In 1964, the low level radioactive waste management facility (in Maisiagala) went
operational and received research waste.  
• In the late 1990s and early 2000s, development of the basic waste legislation.
• A new interim spent fuel storage facility is being built.
• Transfer of spent nuclear fuel to Russia without waste return ends in the late 1990s.
• In 1999, a separate law on Radioactive Waste Management
• In 2001, creation of RATA, the Radioactive Waste Management Agency.  
• Some reprocessing (Russian contracts) but no decision yet on the back-end of the
nuclear fuel cycle; adoption of a wait-and-see strategy
• Ongoing modeling studies on the safety of a proposed deep geological repository
• Lithuania is a member of GNEP.
Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• No significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear weapons program or
participation in the Soviet program.
Country
Context
• The country was annexed to the USSR in 1940.
• On March 11, 1990, Lithuania became the first of the Soviet Republics to declare its
independence (but this was not recognized by Moscow until the abortive coup in
September 1991).
• The last Russian troops withdrew in 1993.
• It joined NATO and the European Union in 2004.
• Government type:  parliamentary democracy (unitary government).
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KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• The country has 1 nuclear reactor generating about 4% of its electricity.  A large new
unit is proposed.
• In 1970, the Netherlands along with Germany and Britain establish the Uranium
Enrichment Company or URENCO.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1973.
• Since then, a previous ban on nuclear has been reversed.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• A separate government agency, COVRA (Central Organization for Radioactive
Waste)  was established in 1982.
• In the mid-1990s, establishment of a long-term interim storage for nuclear waste.
•  By 2016, the government must decide on a long-term strategy for nuclear waste;
currently adopting a wait-and-see strategy.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• A.  Q.  Khan, an engineer with the Dutch arm of URENCO spied for Pakistan and
eventually headed the Pakistani secret nuclear weapons program.  
• By 1984, Pakistan was supposedly in a position to detonate a nuclear device (based on
a supposed test of a Pakistani device on Chinese territory).
• In 1987, a Pakistani-born Canadian was arrested for spying for Pakistan.
• In 1997, the Pakistani government formally announced that it has nuclear weapons
and testing one in 1998.  Thus the Pakistani weapons were developed with the known
or unknown aid of the Dutch, the Canadians, the Americans and the Chinese.  The
Nuclear Suppliers Group had been established in 1975 after India detonated its first
nuclear device in order to inhibit nuclear proliferation efforts through the transfer of
nuclear technology.
Country
Context
• Occupation by Germany in WWII.
• Major exporter of agricultural products.
• Government type:  constitutional monarchy (unitary government).
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ROMANIA 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear Power
Program
• Romania has 2 nuclear reactors generating almost 20% of the electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1996.  Its second
started in May 2007.
• Plans are well advanced for completing two more reactor units.
Nuclear Waste
Program
• In 1950, set-up of a storage facility for research waste.
• In 1990, construction of a new storage facility at a future nuclear power plant.
• In the late 1990s, establishment of a siting program for a DGR (direct disposal).
• The government has decided on a “no reprocessing” policy.
• Preliminary investigations are underway regarding a deep geological repository.
• New siting exercise for a  DGR is set to start in 2010.
• Romania is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense Policies
• No significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear weapons
program or participation in the Soviet program.
Country Context • Post-war Soviet occupation led to the formation of a communist state in 1947.
• Decades-long rule of the dictator Ceausescu, who took power in 1965; he was
overthrown and executed in 1989.
• Communists swept from power in 1996.
• Romani joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007.
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Nuclear power currently produced 16 % of Russia electricity.
• As part of the nuclear energy renaissance, it wants to increase this percentage to 23% by
2020 including floating nuclear power reactors.  Russia has 31 nuclear power plants in
operation.
• Research reactor produces electricity in 1954.
• Russia’s first commercial nuclear power plant began in 1963.
• It is actively seeking international connections for all parts of its nuclear fuel cycle.
Nuclear
Waste
Program  
• High-level radioactive waste accident in the Ural Mountains at Kystym in 1958.
• Reprocessing VVER spent nuclear fuel since 1977.  No reprocessing of RBMK SNF.
• The reprocessing facility, RT-1, became operational in 1977.  RT-2 began construction
in 1985, still not complete.
•  Basic waste legislation in the mid-1990s followed by more legislative direction in the
early 2000s.
• In 1999, RT-1 adds an interim storage facility.
• With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Russian Federation has to offer take back
of SNF in ex-satellite countries on a commercial basis.  
• Only a small amount is being reprocessed with relatively old technology at Mayak; most
of  fuel waste remains stored at reactor sites
• In 2001, President Putin signed into law a bill permitting the import of foreign spent
nuclear fuel for indefinite storage, and possibly final disposal on Russian territory.  
• In 2003 Krasnokamens (7000 km east of Moscow) was recommended as the location of
a major spent fuel repository (possibly as an international repository).
• An intense research program on the deep geological repository concept is underway.
• A new central storage interim is being constructed which is scheduled for completion in
2010.
• No waste permanent repository is yet available though site investigations are proceeding
on granite rock on the Kola Peninsula.  
• Draft law that will, inter alia, create a new government organization dedicated to spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management by 2010.
• Russia is a member of GNEP.
Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• In 1943, a Soviet scientist sounds the alarm about a U.S. atom bomb.
• Military reprocessing from 1948 to late 1960s at Mayak.
• For its nuclear weapons program during the Cold War, Russia used uranium from mines
in the Ural mountains, Czechoslovakia (St-Joachimsthal), Mongolia, and East Germany
(Wismut).
• It established its enriched uranium facility at Tomsk in Siberia.
• In 1949, Stalin detonates a nuclear device in Kazakhstan called Joe-1.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
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Country
Context 
• Stalin ruled between 1928-1953.
• The Soviet economy and society stagnated until General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
(1985-1991) introduced ‘glasnost’ (doctrine of government transparency) and
‘perestroika' (bureaucratic reform and restructuring) in an attempt to modernize
communism.  But this introduction inadvertently led to a public coup in December 1991. 
This created the state of Russia and 14 other independent republics.
• As of 2000, centralized semi-authoritarian state steered by former President Putin.
• Prudent management of energy wealth by former President Putin (2000-2008).
• Government type:  Federation (46 oblasts).
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SLOVAK REPUBLIC
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Slovakia has five nuclear reactors generating 50% of its electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1972.
• Older nuclear reactors were shut down as a condition of entry into the EU (2004).
• Government commitment to nuclear energy is strong and there are plans to acquire to
further reactors in addition to modernizing existing ones.
Nuclear
Waste
Program 
• In the early 1990s, export to the Soviet Union of spent nuclear fuel without waste
return.
• In the late 1990s, some spent fuel sent to the Czech Republic.
• In the late 1990s, export of SNF to Russia ends.  
• In 1998, establishment of the basic waste legislation and operation of a low level
radioactive waste management facility.  
• Spent fuel are now stored at the reactor sites and at an interim storage facility.
• In 1991, creation of the Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO).
• A long-term centralized storage nuclear waste DGR is being planned which could
accept waste from other countries with a small nuclear energy programs.  Recent
license application for the centralize facility.
• Some site selection exercises for an underground high-level waste repository has
commenced.
• No reprocessing but all options for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is currently
under study; adoption of a wait-and-see strategy.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• See the Czech Republic.  
Country
Context
• (see the Czech Republic).
• Independent state in 1993.
• Slovakia joined both NATO and the European Union in 2004, and the Euro area in
1999.
• Government type:  Parliamentary democracy (unitary government).
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REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks 
Nuclear Power
Program
• Slovenia has shared a nuclear power reactor with Croatia since 1981.
• Nuclear power produced from one reactor supplied 42% of the country’s
electricity
• It has further capacity under consideration.
Nuclear Waste
Program
• In 1991, the Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (ARAO) was created.  
• In 1996, basic waste legislation was developed for direct disposal or possibly for
export.
• In 1999, the Government established ARAO, a separate government organization
dedicated to nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste management.
• In 2006, Establishment of the National Program on Radioactive Waste and Spent
Furl Management (2006-2015).
• Siting studies for a DGR have begun.
• No reprocessing, but it remains open to reprocessing in the future; a related policy
statement is expected in 2020; currently, a wait-and-see strategy is adopted.
• Slovenia is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense Policies
• No significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear weapons
program or participation in the Soviet program.  
Country
Contextual
Information
• Formerly part of Yugoslavia.
• After WWII, Slovenia became a republic of the renewed Yugoslavia, which
through communism, distanced itself from Moscow rule.  Slovens succeeded in
separating from the Serbian majority and established its independence in 1991
after a short 10-day war.  
• Historical ties to Western Europe, a strong economy and a stable democracy have
assisted Slovenia’s transformation to a modern state.  
• Slovenia acceded to both NATO and the European Union in 2004.
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear Power
Program
• South Africa has two nuclear reactors generating 5 % of its electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1984.
• Government commitment to nuclear energy is strong but financial constraints
apply.
Nuclear Waste
Program 
• In the mid-1990s, establishment of a low level radioactive waste management
facility.
• In the late 1990s, establishment of main nuclear waste legislation.
• Spent fuel is stored at a central storage facility at Koeberg.
• No reprocessing, but the reprocessing option is now being considered.
• No decision yet on permanent disposal; interim storage.
• Has adopted a wait-and-see approach.
Key Nuclear
Defense Policies
• South Africa was a research reactor recipient within the Atoms for Peace program
established by the USA after WWII.
• It secretly collaborated with Germany during the Cold War in developing a
nuclear weapons program.  By 1976, South Africa was suspected as having a
nuclear weapons program.
• It also assisted Israel in helping it test its nuclear device in the South Atlantic in
1979.
• Because of its significant uranium reserves, it was a member of the Uranium Club
(or cartel).
• After the end of the Apartheid regime, in 1993, the government officially
announced that the country would dismantle its nuclear weapons program.  The
IAEA confirmed the dismantlement.  
Country
Contextual
Information
• In 1948, the Boers (British and Afrikaners) established a policy of apartheid:  the
separate development of races.
• First multiracial elections in 1994 brought a clear end to apartheid and ushered in
black majority rule under the African National Congress (ANC).
• New Constitution in 1996; Mandela passes on leadership to Mbeki in 1997
(Fedderke and Simking (2006).
• Ongoing infighting within ANC.
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).
363
KINGDOM OF SWEDEN 
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks on Current Status
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Sweden derives 50% of its electricity from nuclear energy with 10 nuclear reactors.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1972.
• In 1980 national referendum on the future of nuclear power:  results allowed
completion of actual program with planned phase out thereafter.
• In 2008, Sweden reconsidered its previous policy on phasing out nuclear energy and
now allows refurbishing plants as well as new build proposals.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• In 1972, Sweden actively developed waste management policies by forming the SKB
composed of utilities to operate a final disposal repository.  Start of geological
investigations in 1980.
• In the mid-1970s, the domestic reprocessing program was abandoned.
• In 1977, introduction of Nuclear Power Stipulation Act including nuclear fuel waste
management reuirements; reprocessing was banned at home but some contracts with
the U.K. were maintained up to 1982.
• Central interim storage for low level radioactive waste at an underwater underground
rock cavern at Oskarshamn.
• In 1984, introduction of the Act on Nuclear Activities that approved, inter alia, the
DGR concept.
• In 1985, KASAM was established as an independent review committee of SKB’s work.
• In 1992, development of the concept of voluntarism and local acceptance by
communities of any DGR.
• In the 1990s, development of bilateral cooperation with Eastern and Central European
countries for reporting incidents involving waste.
• In the 1990s, development of amendments to basic waste act of 1984.
• In 2006, KASAM establishes new transparency project broadening consultations on
nuclear waste disposal.  
• Investigations at two sites (narrowed down from a dozen) ended in 2007.  A single site
was selected in June 2009, making it the second country to have selected a site for
DGR (Finland being the first).
• The application for a construction license is planned to be submitted to the authorities
im early 2010.
• Operation of the site as, at first, a spent fuel laboratory is not expected before 2020.
• No definite policy on reprocessing, some past shipments for reprocessing.
• Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Operated relatively small uranium mines as of 1942.
• After WWII, the Government officially announced its renunciation to establishing a
nuclear weapons program.
Country
Context
• Armed neutrality in WWII
• Longstanding capitalist system interlarded with substantial welfare elements were
challenged in the 1990s by high unemployment
• Economic downturn in 2000-2002 but fiscal discipline has allowed the country to
weather economic vagaries.
• Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, but the public rejected the introduction of
the Euro in 2003.
• Government type:  Constitutional monarchy.
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SWISS CONFEDERATION
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Switzerland has 5 nuclear reactors and derives 40% of its electricity from nuclear
energy.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1969.
• In 1990, a ten-year moratorium began on new plant construction.  This was reversed by
a national vote in 2003 which confirmed nuclear energy as part of the country’s mix of
electricity sources.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• NAGRA, an industry association established in 1972.
• The 2003 Nuclear Energy Act assigns responsibility for defining and leading the site
selection for a repository to the federal government.
• Establishment of requirements for interim long-term storage of spent fuel; NAGRA
proposed a demonstration project for a final repository; the Government approved the
proposal in 2006.
• Not firm on reprocessing, shipped spent fuel for reprocessing on occasion to France
and the United Kingdom.  But in 2006, a 10-year moratorium on shipments was set.
• In April 2008, the federal government approved the siting concept of a final repository
which defines the siting criteria and steps for implementation.
• As a first step, NAGRA will propose potential siting regions  based on safety-oriented
criteria defined by the regulator.  No operational site is expected before 2040.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• The Swiss has a long history of remaining neutral, and it does  not officially participate
in the development of any arms.
Country
Context
• Neutrality in WWII.
• Officially a member of the United Nations only in 2002.
• Government type:  Formally a confederation but similar in structure to a federal
republic (federation; 26 cantons).
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THE UKRAINE 
Nuclear
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• Ukraine has 15 nuclear reactors generating about 50% of its electricity.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1977.
• In 1986, major accident at Chernobyl.
• In 2004, it commissioned 2 large nuclear reactors.
• By 2010, 3 or 4 new power stations need to be situated.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• Om 1997, transfer to Russia without waste return and with return; interim storage.
• From 1998 to 2006:  implementation of the Chernobyl Shelter Program, including
radioactive waste activities.
• Direct disposal policy but reprocessing under consideration.
• No final policy on the nuclear fuel cycle; adoption of a wait-and-see strategy.
• Some preliminary investigations on possible sites for a deep geological repository.
• Some waste is sent back to Russia for storage or reprocessing.
• Central Spent Fuel Storage Project to be built by a US company (Holtec) by 2010.
• From 2011, high-level waste from reprocessing Ukranian spent fuel will be returned
from Russia to the Ukraine and will go to the central storage facility.
• Ukraine is a member of GNEP.
Key Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Some uranium mining in the Ukraine for the Soviet Cold War effort.
• As of independence, no significant activity related to the building of a national nuclear
weapons program.
• Soviet republic, but acquired independence in 1991; since then, ongoing political
instability.
• Government type:  republic (unitary government).
366
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN ISLAND
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• The U.K.  derives 20% of its electricity from nuclear energy with 19 reactors.
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1956.
• Windscale accident in 1958.  
• In 1970, together with the Dutch and the Germans, it forms URENCO (uranium
enrichment facility).
• In 1972, European Community Act of Radioactive Shipments (spearheaded by the
U.K.).
• Major new program for commercial nuclear power announced in 1973.  
• In 1976 the Flowers report suggests the banning of reprocessing and burning.  It also
calls for no new nuclear power until the nuclear waste disposal issue is resolved.  The
Government disagrees.
• In 1990, privatization efforts of the nuclear energy fails.  Privatization efforts were
reestablished in the mid-1990s.  In 1996, most of the Government assets were sold to
British Energy at low cost.
• In 2008, the Government endorses nuclear new builds.
• Old nuclear power plants will be phased out by 2023 and new-generation plants are
expected to be on-line by 2017.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• In the late 1950s, national dumping of solid nuclear waste in the North Atlantic.
• From 1956:  Magnox Reprocessing at Windscale/Sellafield 
• In 1963, introduction of Radioactive Substances Act.
• Since the announcement in 1973 of plans for new nuclear power, public opposition
includes nuclear waste management solution.
• Since 1980, reprocessing at Dounreay.
• In 1981, the government decides to postpone decision on nuclear waste management for
50 years.  
• Creation of Nirex in 1985.
• Since 1990, THORP reprocessing 
• At the end of the 1990s, new package of radiation safety regulations.
• In 1993, amended Radioactive Substances Act.
• In 1999, the House of Lords recommends a fresh approach to radioactive waste
management based on public involvement.  In 2001, the Government adopts this
recommendation.  
• In 2003, an independent review committee is established by the government (CoRWM);
in October 2006, the Government adopts its recommendations on geological disposal,
long-term interim storage, and a partnership/voluntarism approach to siting.
• Creation of Nuclear Decommissioning Agency (NDA) in 2004, replacing Nirex.
• In April 2007, the NDA established the Radioactive Waste Management Directorate
(RWMD) to eventually implement nuclear waste disposal.  
• In June 2007, a public consultation exercise was launched on siting criteria for a
geological repository.
• In June 2008, the UK government issued its nuclear waste management plan and
Communities are invited to participate in the repository siting process.
• In 2009, continuation of process for expressions of interest for a DGR.
• RWMD does not expect to open a site before 2040 (with expected site closure in 2100).
• The UK is a member of GNEP.
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN ISLAND
Nuclear
Program 
General Remarks
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Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Tested its first nuclear device off the coast of Australia with its permission in 1952.
• In 1955, the philosopher Bertrand Russell and the scientist Joseph Rotblat establish the
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs calling for calling for an end to the
arm race.  
• In 1958, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is formed.
Country
Context
• Government type:  Constitutional monarchy and Commonwealth realm (unitary
government).
• Previous wealth depleted in WWII followed by successful rebuilding.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Nuclear 
Program
General Remarks
Nuclear
Power
Program
• The U.S.  derives 20% of its electricity from nuclear energy (over 100 reactors).
• Initial major sources of uranium from the Colorado Plateau and the Belgian Congo.
• Uranium Enrichment Plant established in Kentucky in 1952 (It will soon be shut down
and a new facility up river in Piketon, Ohio, will be constructed).
• Its first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1960.
• In 1979, accident at Three Mile Island NPP in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
• Since mid-2007, there have been 17 licence applications for 26 new nuclear reactors.
• The industry envisages substantial new nuclear capacity by 2020.
Nuclear
Waste
Program
• In the 1950s, the National Academy of Sciences recommends disposal in salt formations;
investigations into salt mines in Kansas are initiated but fail in 1972 due to state and
public opposition.  
• In 1964-72, West Valley reprocessing; Barnswell under construction never completed;
the Carter Administration bans reprocessing and burning in 1977.  Ten years later,
Reagan lifts this ban.
• From 1975 to 1982 investigations at various sites meet with public resistance.  
• In 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed, including investigation of potential
sites in the U.S.  for a DGR and the creation of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management (OCRWM).
• An amendment in 1987 targeted Yucca Mountain at the sole site to be further
investigated.
• The site was to open in 2010, but due to delays, the current estimate in 2021 (with closure
in 2133).  Delays are mostly due to litigation activities involving the state of Nevada.
• In the mid-2000s, public concerns revolved around the issue of transportation of nuclear
waste.
• In 2002, the Bush Administration approves Yucca Mountain subject to NRC licensing.
• In 2006 - 2008: DOE proposes legislation to increase the quantity cap of waste into
Yucca Mountain. DOE submitted a licence application in June 2008 to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission who has 3 years to review the submission.
• The new Obama Administration instructed a revision of current plans for a deep
geological repository at Yucca Mountain.  DOE announces the creation of a Blue Ribbon
panel to review the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
• NRC is confident that a repository (not necessarily at Yucca Mountain) will be available
50 to 60 years after reactor operating licence expires.  
• No reprocessing at the moment although some reprocessing activities in the past.  There
is a move to reestablish a reprocessing policy in the near future.  
• In 2006, the Bush Administration initialed the Global Nuclear Energy  Partnership
(GNEP); the U.S. continues to lead this program but it is now being turned into a bona
fide international program.
• Under GNEP, a demonstration plant for reprocessing is planned for operation in 2011
possibly in Illinois (this plan is now being reconsidered).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Nuclear 
Program
General Remarks
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Key
Nuclear
Defense
Policies
• Detonated atomic bombs over Japan in 1945; established Atoms for Peace international
program in 1957; the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
• Transfer nuclear technology to India (which tests a nuclear device in 1974 - Smiling
Buddha).  
• In 1974, the U.S.  is instrumental in establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group.  
• In 1978, the U.S. along with the other 4 members of the nuclear weapons club signed the
United Nations nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
• In 1991, U.S.-Russian START-1 on disarmaments.  In 1993, START-2 signed but
ratified in 2000.
• Renewed interest in proliferation of nuclear materials for rogue states.  
Country
Context
• Victories of both WWI and WWII and Cold War (1991):  most powerful world nation.
• Government type:  constitution-based federal republic (federation; 50 states).
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APPENDIX 3
CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Content analysis (CA) was initially defined as a method enabling the researcher to
systematically identify main properties of a text, to describe and make inferences about
text messages (Krippendorff, 2004; Holsti, 1969).  Although it was in use at the
beginning of the 20  century in the field of mass communications, CA began to be usedth
in earnest during World War II when it emerged as a distinctive descriptive technique of
propaganda materials and mass communication (White & Marsh, 2006; Morgan, 1993). 
In the late 1960s, researchers began using computer-assisted CA to make inferences from
textual data.  Contemporary CA is empirically grounded, exploratory in process, and
predictive or inferential in intent (Krippendorff, 2004).  CA is particularly useful for
looking at statistical trends over long periods of time from archival sources to reveal
aspects of change not easily detected by other methods (e.g., historical analysis,
interviews, surveys) (Bengston & Xu, 1995).
McTavish and Pirro (1990) report that CA is used in many disciplines for three
objectives: descriptive or explanatory studies, hypothesis evaluating, and exploratory
inquiries, especially where questions are complex, uncharted and changing.  CA has been
used in many disciplines, for example, anthropology, library and information science,
management, political science, public administration, psychology and sociology,
literature, history, and linguistic (White & Marsh, 2006; Diefenbach, 2001).  Austin et al. 
(2003) report disciplines where content analysis is used in more than 20% of
publications: advertising (64%), sociology (50%), psychology (39%), mass
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communication (28%), gender studies (20%) and public policy (20%).  They predict that
with the advent of more powerful and user-friendly software, the use of CA is likely to
increase in noncommercial disciplines, such as public policy.
The use of frequencies as a main activity of content analysis to make inferences from
the text is based in part on the assumption that frequency is a function of intensity.  That
is, the more an author uses a word the more important it is (Diefenbach, 2006) and the
relationship between the strength of  concern and relative word or category frequency is
positively linear.  There are challenges to the validity of this assumption (cf., special
circumstances, e.g., style peculiarities) if frequency is used as a sole index for inference
(Diefenbach, 2001; Namenwirth & Weber, 1987).  However, accompanied by the
researcher's general knowledge of the field of study and theoretical grounding, computer-
assisted CA is now generally recognized as a reliable and valid method and is called to be
increasingly applied (Diefenbach, 2001).
Computer-assisted CA is a method that allows for greater ease in transforming
qualitative information into quantitative data.  Once quantitative data is derived,
statistical tests can be applied.  Quantitative CA makes no a priori assumptions on a text,
and computerization assists in the development of lists of categories emerging from the
frequency of words, space measurements, or time counts.  The use of computers makes
quantitative CA quick and is often very reliable for straightforward questions.  
Qualitative CA seeks to add further meaning to the analyses by either examining a
priori keywords, keywords-in-context (KWIC), or by counting words or keywords that
cooccur reliably with other words or keywords (co-occurrences).  The development of
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keyword lists involves a reiterative process: the initial list of keywords is derived from an
automatic count and categorization of words, related documents and/or expert
vocabulary; then one or more pilot-tests are carried out until at least 80% of the
parameters are correctly identified (Bengston & Xu, 1995).  The use of co-occurrences,
for example, linking subjects-objects with adjectives, verbs or adverbs, may assign value
beyond emphasis (word count).  In general, word co-occurrences reflect types of mental
models as argued by Carley (Evans, 1996).  
Value can be attributed in several ways:
• A negative/positive/neutral gradient (Andsager & Powers, 1999; Bengston & Xu,
1995);
• A passive/active gradient (Evans, 1996);
• A pro-con-neutral value (Pennings & Keman, 2002; Budge, 2001); 
• Relative strengths such as in Likert scales (Evans, 1996; Bengston & Xu, 1995;
McTavish & Pirro, 1990); 
• Themes such as a left-right scale to add meaning to political positions (Laver &
Garry, 2000);
• Phasic functions based on existing theories or conceptual metaphors of
development (Namenwirth & Weber, 1987; Strodthoff et al., 1985; Namenwirth,
1973); and,
• Any other value derived from the experience or knowledge of the researcher
(White & Marsh, 2006).
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Two types of content analysis can be qualified as ‘conceptual’ or ‘relational’. 
Conceptual analysis can be thought of as establishing the existence and frequency of
concepts (or frames, or metaphors, or perspectives, or variables).  Relational analysis
pushes, when appropriate, conceptual analysis is determining further meanings including
positive and negative emotional values, ideologies, attitudes, mental models, etc (CSU,
2008).
Qualitative CA is more exploratory than quantitative CA.  The researcher carries out
iterative readings of the whole text to seek patterns based on the common meaning of
words.  The researcher approaches the data, reaches an understanding of its essential parts
and formulates a conception of its meaning in terms of a larger context, perhaps a theory
(White & Marsh, 2006; Stemler, 2001).  Whereas quantitative CA is deductive—its
objective being to test theories, not to develop them—and uses no a priori coding
schemes, qualitative CA is inductive and theories can emerge during analysis (Popping,
2000).  
In Popping’s chapter ‘Text Analysis: What and Why?’, he notes that analytical tests
of CA are either descriptive or inferential.  Descriptions include word and category counts
and difference tests, the ‘what’.  Inferences include variance, paired correlations and
multiple clustering:  the ‘why’.  Austin et al. (2003) report the analytical profile of studies
from 1977 to 2002 in various disciplines using content analysis:  frequency counts (80%),
difference tests (47%) and inferred relationships (between 10 and 20% of which the ratios
of specific statistical analyses are ANOVA- 19%, regression - 17%, correlation - 14% and
factor analysis - 11%).
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CA Software
Lowe (2003), Popping (2000), and Alexa and Zuel (1999) have made some minimal
comparison of software packages, and I have summarized the results of these
comparisons in Table 1.  I have also added to Table 1 information from other sources,
namely, software websites and single software reviews (Johnson, 2007; Macer, 2005). 
Because software development progresses quickly, advantages and disadvantages of
versions may differ.
375
Table 1.  Comparison Among Content Analysis Software Packages 
SOFTWARE NVIVO 8
(previously
Nud*ist)
SAS
Enterprise
Miner
SPSS Text
Mining for
Clementine
CATPAC QDA
Miner/WordStat/
SimStat
Author QSR Software,
La Trobe
University 
North Carolina SPSS Inc. 
Chicago
Galileo
Company,
NY 
Provalis Research,
Montreal
Type qualitative quantitative quantitative quantitative qual.  and quant.
Text Import
and
Management
in-depth
interviews,
open-ended
surveys, 
government
reports/
historical
documents
unstructured
data, text
parsing,
annotation
capabilities
open-ended
surveys, large
document
collections/
structured and
unstructured
text, PDF, etc, 
text parsing
open-ended
surveys, medium-
sized documents/
unstructured and
structured, PDF,
etc.  
medium-
sized
documents/
any text
open-ended surveys,
small and large
collections of
documents/ read
PDF, etc.,
annotation
capability
Exports for
Statistics
to SPSS
(apparently
easy?) 
self-contained self-contained self-
contained, 
self contained 
Coding and
Categories
interactive or 
automatic; co-
occurrence
capabilities,
KWIC
automatic or 
interactive, 
dictionaries,
synonyms,
lemmixation, 
co-occurrence
automatic,
interactive, use of
a trivial word list;
a user dictionary,
list of synonyms,
co-occurrence 
automatic
only;  no
flexibility to
build own 
dictionaries,
co-
occurrence
capabilities
automatic and
interactive, pre-set
and  researcher
dictionaries, use of a
trivial word list, co-
occurrence
capabilities, KWIC
Cost (single
personal user)
$240 student
$595 academia
? ? $50 student
$295
academ.  
for the three
software programs
(academia):  $995
Main
Advantages
meaningful
process
good for
quantitative
analysis
good for
quantitative
analysis
good for
quick 
impressions
on texts
good for both
quantitative and
qualitative CA;
mostly good graphic
options
Main
Disadvantages
no internal
statistical
inference
capabilities
(but the
database can 
be linked to
SPSS)
no KWIC, may
not be
meaningful,
heavily reliable
on keyword
lists
no KWIC, may
not be
meaningful,
heavily reliable
on the  keyword
lists.
not flexible
for more in-
depth studies
costly if the three
software programs
have to be
purchased, questions
on time series trend
graphics.
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APPENDIX 4
POLICY EVENT FREQUENCY DATABASE AND TIME SERIES 
FOR EACH OF THE SELECTED COUNTRIES
• FRQ is the number of policy events per year;
• The lower horizontal dotted line represents the mean of the series; 
• The upper dotted line is the upper level of the 95% confidence level of the mean; 
• The left vertical full line represents the first year of operation of the first
commercial nuclear reactor;
•  The right full line represents the year of the entry into force of the Joint
Convention, 2001;
• The lower curve is the exponential smoothing curve at alpha= 0.5); and,
• The y axis represents the number of years or graph year (GY), not the calendar
year or the real year (RY).
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ARGENTINA TIME SERIES DATABASE: 
FRQ GY RY
3 1 1950
1 2 1951
0 3 1952
0 4 1953
2 5 1954
0 6 1955
1 7 1956
0 8 1957
1 9 1958
0 10 1959
0 11 1960
0 12 1961
0 13 1962
0 14 1963
2 15 1964
0 16 1965
0 17 1966
0 18 1967
0 19 1968
4 20 1969
2 21 1970
1 22 1971
2 23 1972
3 24 1973
2 25 1974
0 26 1975
1 27 1976
3 28 1977
2 29 1978
0 30 1979
5 31 1980
6 32 1981
4 33 1982
1 34 1983
2 35 1984
0 36 1985
6 37 1986
1 38 1987
4 39 1988
378
6 40 1989
4 41 1990
9 42 1991
6 43 1992
9 44 1993
5 45 1994
6 46 1995
10 47 1996
25 48 1997
14 49 1998
4 50 1999
22 51 2000
13 52 2001
2 53 2002
23 54 2003
15 55 2004
16 56 2005
15 57 2006
58 58 2007
12 59 2008
3 60 2009
0 61 2010
0 62 2011
0 63 2012
0 64 2013
0 65 2014
2 66 2015
0 67 2016
0 68 2017
0 69 2018
0 70 2019
1 71 2020
0 72 2021
0 73 2022
1 74 2023
0 75 2025
379
380
BELGIUM TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1922
0 2 1923
0 3 1924
0 4 1925
0 5 1926
0 6 1927
0 7 1928
0 8 1929
0 9 1930
0 10 1931
0 11 1932
0 12 1933
0 13 1934
0 14 1935
0 15 1936
0 16 1937
3 17 1938
0 18 1939
0 19 1940
0 20 1941
0 21 1942
0 22 1943
0 23 1944
0 24 1945
0 25 1946
0 26 1947
0 27 1948
0 28 1949
3 29 1950
0 30 1951
0 31 1952
1 32 1953
0 33 1954
0 34 1955
1 35 1956
0 36 1957
2 37 1958
0 38 1959
0 39 1960
1 40 1961
381
0 41 1962
10 42 1963
0 43 1964
0 44 1965
1 45 1966
0 46 1967
0 47 1968
0 48 1969
1 49 1970
0 50 1971
1 51 1972
0 52 1973
1 53 1974
2 54 1975
1 55 1976
0 56 1977
2 57 1978
1 58 1979
8 59 1980
5 60 1981
0 61 1982
2 62 1983
1 63 1984
9 64 1985
8 65 1986
2 66 1987
5 67 1988
5 68 1989
5 69 1990
19 70 1991
4 71 1992
10 72 1993
15 73 1994
3 74 1995
8 75 1996
20 76 1997
12 77 1998
16 78 1999
19 79 2000
82 80 2001
21 81 2002
43 82 2003
8 83 2004
12 84 2005
382
51 85 2006
39 86 2007
38 87 2008
9 88 2009
10 89 2010
0 90 2011
4 91 2012
3 92 2013
2 93 2014
2 94 2015
4 95 2016
0 96 2017
0 97 2018
1 98 2019
2 99 2020
0 100 2021
0 101 2022
0 102 2023
0 103 2024
1 104 2025
383
384
BRAZIL TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
6 1 1956
2 2 1957
0 3 1958
0 4 1959
4 5 1960
0 6 1961
1 7 1962
0 8 1963
1 9 1964
2 10 1965
0 11 1966
0 12 1967
0 13 1968
0 14 1969
1 15 1970
0 16 1971
1 17 1972
0 18 1973
2 19 1974
3 20 1975
1 21 1976
1 22 1977
0 23 1978
1 24 1979
7 25 1980
8 26 1981
6 27 1982
1 28 1983
2 29 1984
3 30 1985
6 31 1986
6 32 1987
10 33 1988
9 34 1989
2 35 1990
3 36 1991
6 37 1992
5 38 1993
3 39 1994
385
10 40 1995
14 41 1996
22 42 1997
20 43 1998
16 44 1999
15 45 2000
11 46 2001
16 47 2002
10 48 2003
7 49 2004
14 50 2005
21 51 2006
36 52 2007
24 53 2008
3 54 2009
1 55 2010
1 56 2011
1 57 2012
0 58 2013
1 59 2014
3 60 2015
0 61 2016
0 62 2017
0 63 2018
0 64 2019
0 65 2020
0 66 2021
0 67 2022
0 68 2023
0 69 2024
0 70 2025
386
387
CANADA TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ PY RY
1 1 1932
0 2 1933
0 3 1934
0 4 1935
0 5 1936
0 6 1937
0 7 1938
0 8 1939
2 9 1940
0 10 1941
2 11 1942
1 12 1943
1 13 1944
0 14 1945
5 15 1946
2 16 1947
2 17 1948
2 18 1949
1 19 1950
0 20 1951
6 21 1952
4 22 1953
2 23 1954
6 24 1955
5 25 1956
6 26 1957
4 27 1958
3 28 1959
3 29 1960
0 30 1961
4 31 1962
6 32 1963
4 33 1964
1 34 1965
0 35 1966
1 36 1967
2 37 1968
0 38 1969
1 39 1970
388
2 40 1971
5 41 1972
1 42 1973
1 43 1974
2 44 1975
4 45 1976
4 46 1977
3 47 1978
2 48 1979
3 49 1980
2 50 1981
14 51 1982
8 52 1983
11 53 1984
6 54 1985
5 55 1986
13 56 1987
7 57 1988
4 58 1989
7 59 1990
6 60 1991
7 61 1992
3 62 1993
1 63 1994
5 64 1995
16 65 1996
5 66 1997
11 67 1998
4 68 1999
13 69 2000
14 70 2001
21 71 2002
20 72 2003
25 73 2004
37 74 2005
54 75 2006
120 76 2007
45 77 2008
10 78 2009
6 79 2010
4 80 2011
2 81 2012
0 82 2013
0 83 2014
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0 84 2015
1 85 2016
0 86 2017
2 87 2018
0 88 2019
0 89 2020
0 90 2021
0 91 2022
0 92 2023
2 93 2024
1 94 2025
390
391
CHINA TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ    GY RY
1 1 1930
0 2 1931
0 3 1932
0 4 1933
0 5 1934
0 6 1935
0 7 1936
0 8 1937
0 9 1938
0 10 1939
0 11 1940
0 12 1941
0 13 1942
0 14 1943
0 15 1944
0 16 1945
0 17 1946
0 18 1947
0 19 1948
0 20 1949
1 21 1950
0 22 1951
0 23 1952
0 24 1953
0 25 1954
0 26 1955
0 27 1956
0 28 1957
1 29 1958
0 30 1959
4 31 1960
0 32 1961
1 33 1962
0 34 1963
2 35 1964
0 36 1965
0 37 1966
0 38 1967
0 39 1968
0 40 1969
392
1 41 1970
0 42 1971
0 43 1972
0 44 1973
1 45 1974
0 46 1975
0 47 1976
0 48 1977
1 49 1978
2 50 1979
4 51 1980
0 52 1981
0 53 1982
1 54 1983
4 55 1984
3 56 1985
16 57 1986
14 58 1987
19 59 1988
37 60 1989
18 61 1990
25 62 1991
18 63 1992
33 64 1993
8 65 1994
22 66 1995
11 67 1996
12 68 1997
25 69 1998
6 70 1999
11 71 2000
3 72 2001
37 73 2002
13 74 2003
38 75 2004
32 76 2005
53 77 2006
4 78 2007
0 79 2008
0 80 2009
0 81 2010
0 82 2011
0 83 2012
0 84 2013
393
0 85 2014
0 86 2015
0 87 2016
0 88 2017
0 89 2018
0 90 2019
0 91 2020
394
395
CZECH TIME-SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1942
1 2 1943
1 3 1944
0 4 1945
0 5 1946
0 6 1947
0 7 1948
0 8 1949
1 9 1950
0 10 1951
0 11 1952
0 12 1953
0 13 1954
0 14 1955
0 15 1956
2 16 1957
0 17 1958
5 18 1959
0 19 1960
2 20 1961
1 21 1962
1 22 1963
9 23 1964
2 24 1965
0 25 1966
1 26 1967
1 27 1968
2 28 1969
0 29 1970
0 30 1971
2 31 1972
0 32 1973
2 33 1974
0 34 1975
3 35 1976
0 36 1977
0 37 1978
1 38 1979
1 39 1980
2 40 1981
396
0 41 1982
0 42 1983
4 43 1984
0 44 1985
0 45 1986
2 46 1987
17 47 1988
2 48 1989
7 49 1990
14 50 1991
11 51 1992
1 52 1993
9 53 1994
26 54 1995
11 55 1996
49 56 1997
17 57 1998
18 58 1999
31 59 2000
36 60 2001
72 61 2002
34 62 2003
17 63 2004
73 64 2005
66 65 2006
83 66 2007
14 67 2008
1 68 2009
2 69 2010
0 70 2011
1 71 2012
0 72 2013
0 73 2014
0 74 2015
0 75 2016
0 76 2017
0 77 2018
0 78 2019
0 79 2020
0 80 2021
0 81 2022
0 82 2023
0 83 2024
0 84 2025
397
398
FINLAND TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1957
0 2 1958
0 3 1959
1 4 1960
2 5 1961
1 6 1962
0 7 1963
0 8 1964
0 9 1965
0 10 1966
0 11 1967
0 12 1968
0 13 1969
1 14 1970
0 15 1971
3 16 1972
0 17 1973
0 18 1974
0 19 1975
0 20 1976
1 21 1977
1 22 1978
0 23 1979
2 24 1980
2 25 1981
1 26 1982
10 27 1983
1 28 1984
0 29 1985
4 30 1986
4 31 1987
7 32 1988
0 33 1989
4 34 1990
35 35 1991
8 36 1992
2 37 1993
9 38 1994
1 39 1995
399
7 40 1996
6 41 1997
14 42 1998
27 43 1999
17 44 2000
14 45 2001
6 46 2002
23 47 2003
17 48 2004
35 49 2005
39 50 2006
78 51 2007
30 52 2008
7 53 2009
3 54 2010
2 55 2011
11 56 2012
2 57 2013
2 58 2014
0 59 2015
1 60 2016
0 61 2017
1 62 2018
0 63 2019
3 64 2020
0 65 2021
0 66 2022
1 67 2023
0 68 2024
0 69 2025
400
401
FRANCE TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
2 1 1945
0 2 1946
0 3 1947
1 4 1948
0 5 1949
0 6 1950
0 7 1951
1 8 1952
1 9 1953
0 10 1954
0 11 1955
0 12 1956
1 13 1957
1 14 1958
2 15 1959
2 16 1960
5 17 1961
0 18 1962
6 19 1963
3 20 1964
5 21 1965
5 22 1966
7 23 1967
3 24 1968
8 25 1969
2 26 1970
3 27 1971
2 28 1972
5 29 1973
2 30 1974
7 31 1975
3 32 1976
3 33 1977
7 34 1978
5 35 1979
5 36 1980
3 37 1981
8 38 1982
4 39 1983
402
22 40 1984
10 41 1985
4 42 1986
3 43 1987
2 44 1988
4 45 1989
11 46 1990
17 47 1991
16 48 1992
1 49 1993
12 50 1994
11 51 1995
9 52 1996
21 53 1997
6 54 1998
31 55 1999
19 56 2000
25 57 2001
24 58 2002
32 59 2003
25 60 2004
42 61 2005
167 62 2006
162 63 2007
32 64 2008
14 65 2009
9 66 2010
2 67 2011
3 68 2012
3 69 2013
1 70 2014
6 71 2015
0 72 2016
2 73 2017
1 74 2018
3 75 2019
4 76 2020
0 77 2021
0 78 2022
0 79 2023
0 80 2024
5 81 2025
403
404
HUNGARY TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1957
0 2 1958
0 3 1959
2 4 1960
0 5 1961
0 6 1962
1 7 1963
0 8 1964
0 9 1965
1 10 1966
0 11 1967
1 12 1968
0 13 1969
1 14 1970
0 15 1971
0 16 1972
0 17 1973
1 18 1974
0 19 1975
3 20 1976
0 21 1977
1 22 1978
3 23 1979
3 24 1980
0 25 1981
2 26 1982
1 27 1983
2 28 1984
0 29 1985
3 30 1986
8 31 1987
0 32 1988
7 33 1989
6 34 1990
5 35 1991
5 36 1992
6 37 1993
4 38 1994
4 39 1995
405
14 40 1996
27 41 1997
21 42 1998
9 43 1999
12 44 2000
18 45 2001
17 46 2002
26 47 2003
24 48 2004
28 49 2005
20 50 2006
42 51 2007
21 52 2008
1 53 2009
2 54 2010
1 55 2011
1 56 2012
0 57 2013
0 58 2014
0 59 2015
0 60 2016
5 61 2017
0 62 2018
0 63 2019
0 64 2020
0 65 2021
0 66 2022
1 67 2023
0 68 2024
0 69 2025
406
407
JAPAN TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
2 1 1956
1 2 1957
2 3 1958
0 4 1959
1 5 1960
2 6 1961
2 7 1962
1 8 1963
0 9 1964
0 10 1965
1 11 1966
0 12 1967
0 13 1968
2 14 1969
0 15 1970
0 16 1971
2 17 1972
0 18 1973
1 19 1974
1 20 1975
1 21 1976
0 22 1977
3 23 1978
1 24 1979
0 25 1980
0 26 1981
0 27 1982
0 28 1983
1 29 1984
3 30 1985
1 31 1986
0 32 1987
0 33 1988
0 34 1989
0 35 1990
0 36 1991
5 37 1992
3 38 1993
0 39 1994
408
4 40 1995
3 41 1996
3 42 1997
5 43 1998
9 44 1999
11 45 2000
15 46 2001
6 47 2002
18 48 2003
16 49 2004
31 50 2005
37 51 2006
52 52 2007
39 53 2008
2 54 2009
2 55 2010
2 56 2011
0 57 2012
2 58 2013
0 59 2014
0 60 2015
0 61 2016
0 62 2017
1 63 2018
0 64 2019
0 65 2020
0 66 2021
0 67 2022
0 68 2023
0 69 2024
0 70 2025
409
410
KOREA TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
2 1 1978
1 2 1979
0 3 1980
1 4 1981
2 5 1982
2 6 1983
0 7 1984
1 8 1985
2 9 1986
1 10 1987
2 11 1988
3 12 1989
3 13 1990
2 14 1991
1 15 1992
3 16 1993
4 17 1994
4 18 1995
8 19 1996
5 20 1997
14 21 1998
1 22 1999
1 23 2000
4 24 2001
6 25 2002
4 26 2003
10 27 2004
15 28 2005
10 29 2006
33 30 2007
105 31 2008
4 32 2009
0 33 2010
1 34 2011
0 35 2012
0 36 2013
0 37 2014
0 38 2015
3 39 2016
411
0 40 2017
0 41 2018
0 42 2019
1 43 2020
0 44 2021
0 45 2022
0 46 2023
0 47 2024
1 48 2025
412
413
LITHUANIA TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ    GY RY
2 1 1964
0 2 1965
0 3 1966
0 4 1967
0 5 1968
0 6 1969
0 7 1970
0 8 1971
0 9 1972
1 10 1973
0 11 1974
0 12 1975
0 13 1976
0 14 1977
0 15 1978
0 16 1979
0 17 1980
0 18 1981
0 19 1982
2 20 1983
0 21 1984
0 22 1985
0 23 1986
8 24 1987
5 25 1988
8 26 1989
3 27 1990
5 28 1991
6 29 1992
6 30 1993
4 31 1994
3 32 1995
7 33 1996
4 34 1997
3 35 1998
20 36 1999
26 37 2000
31 38 2001
19 39 2002
414
16 40 2003
12 41 2004
28 42 2005
26 43 2006
43 44 2007
31 45 2008
3 46 2009
5 47 2010
7 48 2011
0 49 2012
1 50 2013
0 51 2014
1 52 2015
0 53 2016
0 54 2017
0 55 2018
0 56 2019
0 57 2020
0 58 2021
0 59 2022
0 60 2023
0 61 2024
0 62 2025
415
416
THE NETHERLANDS TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1963
0 2 1964
0 3 1965
0 4 1966
0 5 1967
0 6 1968
1 7 1969
1 8 1970
0 9 1971
0 10 1972
5 11 1973
4 12 1974
4 13 1975
4 14 1976
4 15 1977
4 16 1978
5 17 1979
4 18 1980
4 19 1981
4 20 1982
4 21 1983
7 22 1984
7 23 1985
6 24 1986
5 25 1987
5 26 1988
5 27 1989
4 28 1990
4 29 1991
10 30 1992
11 31 1993
7 32 1994
9 33 1995
7 34 1996
11 35 1997
6 36 1998
13 37 1999
11 38 2000
12 39 2001
417
16 40 2002
22 41 2003
17 42 2004
22 43 2005
31 44 2006
26 45 2007
12 46 2008
5 47 2009
0 48 2010
0 49 2011
0 50 2012
1 51 2013
1 52 2014
7 53 2015
0 54 2016
0 55 2017
0 56 2018
0 57 2019
0 58 2020
0 59 2021
0 60 2022
1 61 2023
0 62 2024
0 63 2025
418
419
ROMANIA TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1950
0 2 1951
1 3 1952
0 4 1953
0 5 1954
0 6 1955
0 7 1956
2 8 1957
0 9 1958
0 10 1959
0 11 1960
0 12 1961
0 13 1962
0 14 1963
0 15 1964
0 16 1965
0 17 1966
0 18 1967
0 19 1968
0 20 1969
1 21 1970
0 22 1971
0 23 1972
0 24 1973
0 25 1974
4 26 1975
0 27 1976
1 28 1977
3 29 1978
0 30 1979
1 31 1980
0 32 1981
0 33 1982
0 34 1983
1 35 1984
2 36 1985
1 37 1986
0 38 1987
0 39 1988
420
0 40 1989
3 41 1990
0 42 1991
4 43 1992
9 44 1993
3 45 1994
3 46 1995
32 47 1996
5 48 1997
2 49 1998
4 50 1999
8 51 2000
11 52 2001
26 53 2002
37 54 2003
12 55 2004
34 56 2005
24 57 2006
46 58 2007
8 59 2008
1 60 2009
1 61 2010
1 62 2011
0 63 2012
0 64 2013
2 65 2014
0 66 2015
0 67 2016
0 68 2017
0 69 2018
0 70 2019
0 71 2020
0 72 2021
0 73 2022
0 74 2023
0 75 2024
0 76 2025
421
422
RUSSIA TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1965
0 2 1966
0 3 1967
0 4 1968
0 5 1969
0 6 1970
0 7 1971
0 8 1972
0 9 1973
0 10 1974
0 11 1975
1 12 1976
2 13 1977
0 14 1978
0 15 1979
0 16 1980
2 17 1981
2 18 1982
0 19 1983
1 20 1984
1 21 1985
5 22 1986
2 23 1987
2 24 1988
4 25 1989
3 26 1990
1 27 1991
7 28 1992
7 29 1993
5 30 1994
14 31 1995
15 32 1996
23 33 1997
4 34 1998
10 35 1999
43 36 2000
18 37 2001
17 38 2002
14 39 2003
423
16 40 2004
13 41 2005
23 42 2006
40 43 2007
56 44 2008
7 45 2009
15 46 2010
1 47 2011
3 48 2012
0 49 2013
0 50 2014
10 51 2015
0 52 2016
0 53 2017
0 54 2018
0 55 2019
0 56 2020
0 57 2021
0 58 2022
0 59 2023
0 60 2024
1 61 2025
424
425
SLOVAKIA TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ GY RY
3 1 1977
4 2 1978
2 3 1979
5 4 1980
1 5 1981
2 6 1982
2 7 1983
3 8 1984
2 9 1985
1 10 1986
10 11 1987
1 12 1988
2 13 1989
6 14 1990
4 15 1991
2 16 1992
19 17 1993
16 18 1994
14 19 1995
11 20 1996
33 21 1997
36 22 1998
30 23 1999
41 24 2000
30 25 2001
27 26 2002
52 27 2003
20 28 2004
95 29 2005
72 30 2006
11 31 2007
5 32 2008
1 33 2009
0 34 2010
0 35 2011
0 36 2012
1 37 2013
0 38 2014
0 39 2015
426
0 40 2016
0 41 2017
0 42 2018
0 43 2019
0 44 2020
0 45 2021
0 46 2022
0 47 2023
0 48 2024
427
428
SLOVENIA TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
2 1 1960
0 2 1961
0 3 1962
1 4 1963
2 5 1964
0 6 1965
2 7 1966
0 8 1967
0 9 1968
0 10 1969
0 11 1970
0 12 1971
0 13 1972
0 14 1973
1 15 1974
0 16 1975
1 17 1976
0 18 1977
0 19 1978
0 20 1979
1 21 1980
2 22 1981
3 23 1982
1 24 1983
7 25 1984
2 26 1985
5 27 1986
1 28 1987
2 29 1988
2 30 1989
5 31 1990
9 32 1991
5 33 1992
3 34 1993
2 35 1994
4 36 1995
8 37 1996
6 38 1997
4 39 1998
429
29 40 1999
24 41 2000
19 42 2001
112 43 2002
31 44 2003
49 45 2004
50 46 2005
71 47 2006
121 48 2007
27 49 2008
3 50 2009
4 51 2010
0 52 2011
1 53 2012
3 54 2013
1 55 2014
7 56 2015
4 57 2016
0 58 2017
0 59 2018
2 60 2019
2 61 2020
0 62 2021
0 63 2022
5 64 2023
1 65 2024
0 66 2025
430
431
SOUTH AFRICA TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY PY
1 1 1948
0 2 1949
0 3 1950
0 4 1951
0 5 1952
0 6 1953
0 7 1954
0 8 1955
0 9 1956
0 10 1957
0 11 1958
0 12 1959
0 13 1960
0 14 1961
0 15 1962
1 16 1963
1 17 1964
1 18 1965
0 19 1966
0 20 1967
0 21 1968
0 22 1969
2 23 1970
0 24 1971
0 25 1972
5 26 1973
0 27 1974
0 28 1975
1 29 1976
1 30 1977
0 31 1978
0 32 1979
1 33 1980
0 34 1981
2 35 1982
0 36 1983
3 37 1984
1 38 1985
2 39 1986
432
1 40 1987
2 41 1988
2 42 1989
0 43 1990
2 44 1991
1 45 1992
10 46 1993
0 47 1994
1 48 1995
3 49 1996
3 50 1997
6 51 1998
15 52 1999
4 53 2000
3 54 2001
4 55 2002
2 56 2003
7 57 2004
4 58 2005
11 59 2006
14 60 2007
7 61 2008
0 62 2009
2 63 2010
0 64 2011
0 65 2012
0 66 2013
0 67 2014
0 68 2015
0 69 2016
0 70 2017
0 71 2018
0 72 2019
0 73 2020
0 74 2021
0 75 2022
0 76 2023
0 77 2024
0 78 2025
433
434
SWEDEN TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1945
0 2 1946
0 3 1947
0 4 1948
0 5 1949
1 6 1950
0 7 1951
0 8 1952
0 9 1953
1 10 1954
0 11 1955
0 12 1956
0 13 1957
2 14 1958
2 15 1959
2 16 1960
0 17 1961
1 18 1962
1 19 1963
2 20 1964
1 21 1965
0 22 1966
0 23 1967
4 24 1968
3 25 1969
11 26 1970
1 27 1971
1 28 1972
1 29 1973
2 30 1974
5 31 1975
1 32 1976
3 33 1977
2 34 1978
1 35 1979
8 36 1980
8 37 1981
3 38 1982
8 39 1983
435
14 40 1984
12 41 1985
4 42 1986
2 43 1987
17 44 1988
2 45 1989
7 46 1990
2 47 1991
12 48 1992
0 49 1993
0 50 1994
3 51 1995
7 52 1996
6 53 1997
38 54 1998
6 55 1999
37 56 2000
15 57 2001
24 58 2002
20 59 2003
70 60 2004
36 61 2005
60 62 2006
104 63 2007
64 64 2008
9 65 2009
7 66 2010
3 67 2011
4 68 2012
4 69 2013
0 70 2014
0 71 2015
0 72 2016
2 73 2017
0 74 2018
2 75 2019
10 76 2020
0 78 2021
0 79 2022
0 80 2023
0 81 2024
0 82 2025
436
437
SWITZERLAND TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1950
0 2 1951
0 3 1952
0 4 1953
0 5 1954
0 6 1955
0 7 1956
1 8 1957
0 9 1958
3 10 1959
1 11 1960
0 12 1961
0 13 1962
0 14 1963
0 15 1964
0 16 1965
0 17 1966
0 18 1967
0 19 1968
4 20 1969
1 21 1970
0 22 1971
0 23 1972
0 24 1973
0 25 1974
0 26 1975
1 27 1976
0 28 1977
0 29 1978
0 30 1979
3 31 1980
0 32 1981
1 33 1982
2 34 1983
1 35 1984
3 36 1985
2 37 1986
2 38 1987
1 39 1988
438
1 40 1989
5 41 1990
5 42 1991
3 43 1992
4 44 1993
6 45 1994
5 46 1995
1 47 1996
2 48 1997
0 49 1998
1 50 1999
3 51 2000
9 52 2001
10 53 2002
18 54 2003
18 55 2004
5 56 2005
8 57 2006
25 58 2007
22 59 2008
5 60 2009
1 61 2010
0 62 2011
1 63 2012
0 64 2013
0 65 2014
0 66 2015
0 67 2016
0 68 2017
0 69 2018
0 70 2019
0 71 2020
0 72 2021
1 73 2022
0 74 2023
0 75 2024
1 76 2025
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UKRAINE TIME SERIES DATABASE  
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1949
0 2 1950
2 3 1951
0 4 1952
0 5 1953
3 6 1954
0 7 1955
1 8 1956
0 9 1957
0 10 1958
1 11 1959
1 12 1960
2 13 1961
3 14 1962
0 15 1963
1 16 1964
1 17 1965
0 18 1966
0 19 1967
2 20 1968
1 21 1969
0 22 1970
0 23 1971
0 24 1972
0 25 1973
1 26 1974
0 27 1975
0 28 1976
0 29 1977
0 30 1978
2 31 1979
1 32 1980
3 33 1981
4 34 1982
2 35 1983
2 36 1984
0 37 1985
10 38 1986
7 39 1987
441
1 40 1988
3 41 1989
3 42 1990
3 43 1991
1 44 1992
2 45 1993
3 46 1994
2 47 1995
2 48 1996
7 49 1997
1 50 1998
3 51 1999
12 52 2000
19 53 2001
16 54 2002
41 55 2003
17 56 2004
45 57 2005
47 58 2006
57 59 2007
58 60 2008
9 61 2009
8 62 2010
3 63 2011
9 64 2012
3 65 2013
1 66 2014
0 67 2015
0 68 2016
3 69 2017
0 70 2018
0 71 2019
0 72 2020
0 73 2021
2 74 2022
0 75 2023
0 76 2024
1 77 2025
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UNITED KINGDOM TIME SERIES DATABASE 
FRQ GY PY
1 1 1948
0 2 1949
0 3 1950
0 4 1951
0 0 1952
0 6 1953
0 7 1954
0 8 1955
0 9 1956
0 10 1957
0 11 1958
5 12 1959
5 13 1960
0 14 1961
0 15 1962
0 16 1963
1 17 1964
12 18 1965
0 19 1966
0 20 1967
0 21 1968
1 22 1969
1 23 1970
2 24 1971
6 25 1972
3 26 1973
7 27 1974
0 28 1975
1 29 1976
2 30 1977
3 31 1978
2 32 1979
0 33 1980
0 34 1981
3 35 1982
1 36 1983
0 37 1984
0 38 1985
3 39 1986
444
1 40 1987
4 41 1988
1 42 1989
7 43 1990
1 44 1991
14 45 1992
15 46 1993
2 47 1994
11 48 1995
3 49 1996
5 50 1997
3 51 1998
16 52 1999
21 53 2000
15 54 2001
14 55 2002
14 56 2003
34 57 2004
29 58 2005
81 59 2006
85 60 2007
78 61 2008
9 62 2009
5 63 2010
10 64 2011
3 65 2012
1 66 2013
0 67 2014
2 68 2015
1 69 2016
0 70 2017
0 71 2018
0 72 2019
4 73 2020
0 74 2021
0 75 2022
0 76 2023
0 77 2024
0 78 2025
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UNITED STATES TIME SERIES DATABASE
FRQ GY RY
1 1 1928
0 2 1929
0 3 1930
0 4 1931
0 5 1932
0 6 1933
0 7 1934
0 8 1935
0 9 1936
0 10 1937
0 11 1938
0 12 1939
0 13 1940
0 14 1941
0 15 1942
0 16 1943
1 17 1944
0 18 1945
1 19 1946
0 20 1947
0 21 1948
0 22 1949
0 23 1950
0 24 1951
0 25 1952
0 26 1953
10 27 1954
0 28 1955
0 29 1956
1 30 1957
0 31 1958
2 32 1959
2 33 1960
1 34 1961
0 35 1962
0 36 1963
2 37 1964
0 38 1965
2 39 1966
447
0 40 1967
0 41 1968
4 42 1969
7 43 1970
0 44 1971
7 45 1972
1 46 1973
7 47 1974
3 48 1975
3 49 1976
8 50 1977
13 51 1978
2 52 1979
8 53 1980
6 54 1981
10 55 1982
4 56 1983
4 57 1984
13 58 1985
5 59 1986
9 60 1987
9 61 1988
8 62 1989
8 63 1990
8 64 1991
15 65 1992
8 66 1993
5 67 1994
13 68 1995
10 69 1996
9 70 1997
8 71 1998
10 72 1999
12 73 2000
22 74 2001
31 75 2002
24 76 2003
23 77 2004
37 78 2005
50 79 2006
79 80 2007
76 81 2008
33 82 2009
20 83 2010
448
7 84 2011
4 85 2012
4 86 2013
0 87 2014
0 88 2015
1 89 2016
2 90 2017
1 91 2018
3 92 2019
1 93 2020
0 94 2021
0 95 2022
1 96 2023
0 97 2024
0 98 2025
449
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APPENDIX 5
CORRELOGRAM AND AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR EACH COUNTRY'S TIME 
Legend for Correlogram
Lag Autocorrelation analysis calculates the correlation
between a point and a certain number of neighboring
points (a time interval ‘lag’ number)
corr.: Autocorrelation coefficient
S.E.: Standard error
P: Probability:  lower than 5% (0.05) the null
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation at and
beyond a given lag is rejected (in other words,
below 0.05 there is significance)
The space between the two vertical dotted line 
is the area where the autocorrelation coefficients 
are considered to be zero.
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ARGENTINA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS 
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .453   .115   .000                   .    *****.****           
     2    .348   .137   .013                   .    *****.**             
     3    .374   .148   .014                  .     ******.*             
     4    .351   .161   .032                  .     ******.*             
     5    .134   .170   .434                 .      ****   .             
     6    .226   .172   .193                 .      ****** .             
     7    .281   .176   .114                 .      *******.             
     8    .118   .182   .516                 .      ***    .             
     9    .138   .183   .453                 .      ****   .             
    10    .198   .184   .287                 .     *****  .             
    11    .051   .187   .784                 .     **     .             
    12   -.027   .187   .887                    **      .             
    13   -.091   .187   .629                 .***      .             
    14   -.057   .188   .762                 .  **      .             
    15   -.089   .188   .638                  ***      .             
    16   -.080   .188   .671                  ***      .             
    17   -.118   .189   .533                  ***      .             
    18   -.100   .190   .599                  ***      .             
    19   -.102   .191   .593                 .***      .             
    20   -.124   .191   .521                .  ***       .            
    21   -.107   .192   .579                .  ***       .            
    22   -.127   .193   .514                ****       .            
    23   -.098   .194   .617                .  ***       .            
    24   -.111   .195   .570                .  ***       .            
    25   -.083   .196   .673                .  ***       .            
    26   -.060   .196   .761                .   **       .            
    27   -.061   .197   .757                .   **       .            
    28   -.099   .197   .617                .  ***       .            
    29   -.098   .197   .620                .  ***       .            
    30   -.090   .198   .652                .  ***       .            
VALID CASES:  75     MISSING CASES:  0
452
BELGIUM TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS  
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .540   .098   .000                    .   ****.*******         
     2    .552   .123   .000                   .    *****.******         
     3    .385   .145   .009                  .     ******.**            
     4    .392   .155   .013                  .     ******.**            
     5    .502   .164   .003                  .     ******.****          
     6    .401   .178   .026                 .      *******.*            
     7    .381   .187   .043                 .      *******.*            
     8    .194   .194   .320                .       *****   .            
     9    .189   .196   .337                .       *****   .            
    10    .155   .198   .434                .       ****    .            
    11    .068   .199   .734                .       **      .            
    12    .075   .199   .709                .       **      .            
    13    .038   .199   .851                .       **      .            
    14   -.001   .199   .996                        *      .            
    15    .035   .199   .859                .     **      .            
    16    .001   .199   .995                .       *       .            
    17   -.023   .199   .910                .       *       .            
    18   -.048   .199   .809                .     **       .            
    19   -.064   .199   .748                .     **       .            
    20   -.042   .200   .832                .     **       .            
    21   -.024   .200   .903                .       *       .            
    22   -.045   .200   .822                .     **       .            
    23   -.048   .200   .809                .     **       .            
    24   -.090   .200   .654                    ***       .            
    25   -.046   .200   .819               .      **       .            
    26   -.040   .200   .843               .      **       .            
    27   -.040   .201   .843               .      **       .            
    28   -.039   .201   .846               .      **       .            
    29   -.062   .201   .759               .      **       .            
    30   -.064   .201   .753               .      **       .            
VALID CASES:  104     MISSING CASES:  0
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BRAZIL TIME SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .800   .120   .000                   .    *****.***********    
     2    .531   .180   .004                 .      *******.****         
     3    .370   .202   .070                .       ********.            
     4    .322   .211   .132                .       ******* .            
     5    .333   .218   .131               .        ******** .           
     6    .293   .225   .198               .        *******  .           
     7    .294   .230   .207               .        *******  .           
     8    .312   .236   .190               .        *******  .           
     9    .300   .242   .218               .        *******  .           
    10    .253   .247   .308              .         ******    .          
    11    .121   .251   .631              .         ***       .          
    12   -.029   .251   .907                      **         .          
    13   -.135   .251   .593              .   ****         .          
    14   -.178   .252   .484              .  *****         .          
    15   -.181   .254   .479              .  *****         .          
    16   -.199   .256   .441              .  *****         .          
    17   -.209   .258   .420              .  *****         .          
    18   -.163   .261   .534              .   ****         .          
    19   -.123   .262   .640              .     ***         .          
    20   -.145   .263   .584              .   ****         .          
    21   -.185   .264   .487              .  *****         .          
    22   -.227   .266   .397              ******         .          
    23   -.259   .269   .339             .******          .         
    24   -.243   .272   .375             .******          .         
    25   -.191   .275   .491             .  *****          .         
    26   -.145   .277   .602             .    ****          .         
    27   -.161   .278   .566             .    ****          .         
    28   -.209   .280   .457             .  *****          .         
    29   -.236   .282   .404              ******          .         
    30   -.220   .285   .443             .  *****          .         
VALID CASES:  70     MISSING CASES:  0
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CANADA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .685   .103   .000                    .   ****.**********      
     2    .433   .144   .003                  .     ******.***           
     3    .286   .157   .072                  .     ******.              
     4    .206   .162   .208                  .     ***** .              
     5    .154   .165   .354                  .     ****  .              
     6    .079   .167   .635                 .      ***    .             
     7    .025   .167   .880                 .      **     .             
     8   -.022   .167   .896                 .      *      .             
     9   -.012   .167   .943                 .      *      .             
    10   -.032   .167   .847                 .     **      .             
    11   -.010   .167   .954                 .      *      .             
    12   -.066   .167   .696                 .     **      .             
    13   -.101   .167   .546                 .    ***      .             
    14   -.090   .168   .594                 .    ***      .             
    15   -.073   .169   .666                 .     **      .             
    16   -.066   .169   .697                 .     **      .             
    17   -.060   .169   .724                 .     **      .             
    18   -.048   .169   .776                 .     **      .             
    19   -.001   .170   .994                 .      *      .             
    20    .039   .170   .820                 .      **     .             
    21    .011   .170   .947                 .      *      .             
    22    .015   .170   .931                 .      *      .             
    23    .037   .170   .826                 .      **     .             
    24    .037   .170   .830                 .      **     .             
    25    .039   .170   .820                 .      **     .             
    26   -.014   .170   .932                 .      *      .             
    27   -.034   .170   .843                 .     **      .             
    28   -.034   .170   .840                 .     **      .             
    29   -.034   .170   .842                 .     **      .             
    30   -.028   .170   .871                 .     **      .             
VALID CASES:  94     MISSING CASES:  0
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CHINA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .612   .105   .000                    .   ****.********        
     2    .670   .139   .000                   .    *****.********       
     3    .425   .170   .014                 .      *******.**           
     4    .484   .182   .009                 .      *******.***          
     5    .269   .195   .172                .       ******  .            
     6    .273   .199   .174                .       ******  .            
     7    .276   .203   .179                .       ******* .            
     8    .216   .208   .301                .       *****   .            
     9    .278   .210   .188                .       ******* .            
    10    .146   .214   .497                .       ****    .            
    11    .233   .215   .282                .       ******  .            
    12    .136   .218   .535               .        ****     .           
    13    .252   .219   .252               .        ******   .           
    14    .127   .222   .570               .        ****     .           
    15    .170   .223   .446               .        ****     .           
    16    .134   .224   .551               .        ****     .           
    17    .123   .225   .585               .        ***      .           
    18    .026   .226   .910               .        **       .           
    19   -.042   .226   .852               .       **        .           
    20   -.082   .226   .719               .     ***        .           
    21   -.156   .226   .493               .   ****        .           
    22   -.155   .227   .498               .   ****        .           
    23   -.165   .229   .472               .   ****        .           
    24   -.157   .230   .495               .   ****        .           
    25   -.152   .231   .511               .   ****        .           
    26   -.133   .232   .568               .   ****        .           
    27   -.146   .233   .534               .   ****        .           
    28   -.136   .234   .563               .   ****        .           
    29   -.128   .235   .586               .   ****        .           
    30   -.127   .236   .590               .   ****        .           
VALID CASES:  91     MISSING CASES:  0
456
CZECH TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .691   .109   .000                    .   ****.**********      
     2    .562   .153   .000                  .     ******.*****         
     3    .469   .176   .009                 .      *******.**           
     4    .447   .190   .021                 .      *******.**           
     5    .504   .202   .015                .       ********.**          
     6    .286   .216   .190                .       ******* .            
     7    .198   .221   .373               .        *****    .           
     8    .163   .223   .466               .        ****     .           
     9    .114   .224   .614               .        ***      .           
    10    .141   .225   .532               .        ****     .           
    11    .020   .226   .930               .        *        .           
    12   -.032   .226   .886               .      **        .           
    13   -.090   .226   .692               .    ***        .           
    14   -.091   .227   .689               .    ***        .           
    15   -.104   .227   .649               .    ***        .           
    16   -.135   .228   .553               .  ****        .           
    17   -.143   .229   .535               .  ****        .           
    18   -.159   .230   .491               .  ****        .           
    19   -.137   .231   .554               .  ****        .           
    20   -.167   .232   .474               .  ****        .           
    21   -.145   .233   .536               .  ****        .           
    22   -.149   .234   .527               .  ****        .           
    23   -.132   .236   .576               .  ****        .           
    24   -.118   .236   .618               .    ***        .           
    25   -.111   .237   .640               .    ***        .           
    26   -.095   .238   .692               .    ***        .           
    27   -.097   .238   .684               .    ***        .           
    28   -.094   .239   .693               .    ***        .           
    29   -.082   .239   .733               .    ***        .           
    30   -.079   .239   .742               .    ***        .           
VALID CASES:  84     MISSING CASES:  0
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FINLAND TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS   
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .642   .120   .000                   .    *****.********       
     2    .441   .163   .008                  .     ******.***           
     3    .287   .179   .113                 .      *******.             
     4    .239   .186   .202                 .      ****** .             
     5    .205   .190   .286                 .      *****  .             
     6    .170   .193   .381                .       ****    .            
     7    .204   .195   .299                .       *****   .            
     8    .237   .198   .236                .       ******  .            
     9    .097   .203   .635                .       ***     .            
    10   -.042   .203   .836                .    **       .            
    11   -.060   .203   .769                .    **       .            
    12   -.072   .204   .726                .    **       .            
    13   -.036   .204   .861                .    **       .            
    14   -.048   .204   .815                .    **       .            
    15   -.027   .204   .897                .    **       .            
    16    .064   .204   .757                .       **      .            
    17   -.094   .205   .646                .   ***       .            
    18   -.167   .205   .418                .  ****       .            
    19   -.117   .207   .573                .   ***       .            
    20   -.107   .208   .609                .   ***       .            
    21   -.088   .209   .675                .   ***       .            
    22   -.119   .209   .571                .   ***       .            
    23   -.121   .210   .566                .   ***       .            
    24   -.086   .211   .684                .   ***       .            
    25   -.123   .212   .563                .   ***       .            
    26   -.130   .213   .544                .  ****       .            
    27   -.120   .214   .577                .   ***       .            
    28   -.131   .215   .545                .  ****       .            
    29   -.114   .216   .599                .   ***       .            
    30   -.129   .217   .555               .  ****        .           
VALID CASES:  69     MISSING CASES:  0
458
FRANCE TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .671   .111   .000                    .   ****.*********       
     2    .289   .153   .063                  .     ******.              
     3    .189   .160   .241                  .     ***** .              
     4    .144   .163   .379                  .     ****  .              
     5    .101   .164   .539                  .     ***   .              
     6    .082   .165   .619                  .     ***   .              
     7    .080   .165   .631                  .     ***   .              
     8    .043   .166   .796                 .      **     .             
     9    .005   .166   .976                 .      *      .             
    10   -.011   .166   .948                 .      *      .             
    11   -.038   .166   .821                 .     **      .             
    12   -.038   .166   .818                 .     **      .             
    13   -.057   .166   .731                 .     **      .             
    14   -.062   .166   .709                 .     **      .             
    15   -.032   .167   .849                 .     **      .             
    16   -.051   .167   .761                 .     **      .             
    17   -.083   .167   .620                 .    ***      .             
    18   -.095   .168   .571                 .    ***      .             
    19   -.070   .168   .678                 .     **      .             
    20   -.051   .169   .763                 .     **      .             
    21   -.021   .169   .903                 .      *      .             
    22    .020   .169   .908                 .      *      .             
    23    .012   .169   .944                 .      *      .             
    24   -.022   .169   .898                 .      *      .             
    25   -.028   .169   .867                 .     **      .             
    26   -.036   .169   .832                 .     **      .             
    27   -.034   .169   .842                 .     **      .             
    28   -.026   .169   .877                 .     **      .             
    29   -.034   .169   .839                 .     **      .             
    30   -.041   .169   .809                 .     **      .             
VALID CASES:  81     MISSING CASES:  0
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HUNGARY TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .783   .120   .000                   .    *****.***********    
     2    .634   .180   .001                 .      *******.******       
     3    .561   .210   .009                .       ********.***         
     4    .501   .230   .033               .        *********.*          
     5    .402   .246   .106              .         ********* .          
     6    .336   .255   .192              .         ********  .          
     7    .278   .261   .291              .         *******   .          
     8    .185   .266   .489              .         *****     .          
     9    .180   .267   .504              .         *****     .          
    10    .196   .269   .468             .          *****      .         
    11    .052   .271   .848             .          **         .         
    12   -.097   .271   .722             .        ***          .         
    13   -.147   .272   .591             .       ****          .         
    14   -.141   .273   .608             .       ****          .         
    15   -.179   .274   .515             .      *****          .         
    16   -.191   .276   .491             .      *****          .         
    17   -.218   .278   .435             .      *****          .         
    18   -.207   .280   .462             .      *****          .         
    19   -.220   .282   .439             .      *****          .         
    20   -.197   .285   .491             .      *****          .         
    21   -.193   .287   .504             .      *****          .         
    22   -.229   .289   .431             .     ******          .         
    23   -.206   .291   .482             .      *****          .         
    24   -.195   .293   .509            .       *****           .        
    25   -.183   .295   .538            .       *****           .        
    26   -.184   .297   .536            .       *****           .        
    27   -.170   .299   .571            .        ****           .        
    28   -.159   .300   .598            .        ****           .        
    29   -.156   .301   .605            .        ****           .        
    30   -.155   .302   .611            .        ****           .        
VALID CASES:  69     MISSING CASES:  0
460
JAPAN TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .813   .120   .000                   .    *****.***********    
     2    .589   .182   .002                 .      *******.*****        
     3    .396   .208   .061                .       ********.            
     4    .265   .218   .229               .        ******   .           
     5    .191   .223   .394               .        *****    .           
     6    .141   .225   .533               .        ****     .           
     7    .111   .226   .624               .        ***      .           
     8    .036   .227   .874               .        **       .           
     9   -.038   .227   .866               .     **        .           
    10   -.079   .227   .728               .  ***        .           
    11   -.103   .228   .652               .  ***        .           
    12   -.117   .228   .610               .  ***        .           
    13   -.131   .229   .569                ****        .           
    14   -.145   .230   .532                ****        .           
    15   -.142   .231   .542               .****        .           
    16   -.171   .233   .464                ****        .           
    17   -.200   .234   .396              *****        .           
    18   -.175   .237   .463                ****        .           
    19   -.143   .239   .550                ****        .           
    20   -.112   .240   .643               .  ***        .           
    21   -.085   .241   .726               .  ***        .           
    22   -.071   .241   .769               .    **        .           
    23   -.066   .241   .787               .    **        .           
    24   -.086   .242   .724               .  ***        .           
    25   -.079   .242   .746               .  ***        .           
    26   -.071   .242   .770              .     **         .          
    27   -.059   .243   .808              .     **         .          
    28   -.053   .243   .828              .     **         .          
    29   -.042   .243   .864              .     **         .          
    30   -.051   .243   .835              .     **         .          
VALID CASES:  70     MISSING CASES:  0
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KOREA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .294   .144   .047                  .     ******.              
     2    .062   .156   .695                  .     **    .              
     3    .084   .157   .595                  .     ***   .              
     4    .014   .158   .929                  .     *     .              
     5   -.047   .158   .769                  .   **     .              
     6   -.034   .158   .831                  .   **     .              
     7   -.053   .158   .741                  .   **     .              
     8   -.056   .159   .724                  .   **     .              
     9   -.050   .159   .753                  .   **     .              
    10    .030   .159   .853                  .     **    .              
    11   -.044   .159   .782                  .   **     .              
    12   -.027   .160   .865                  .   **     .              
    13   -.074   .160   .645                  .   **     .              
    14   -.083   .161   .606                  .  ***     .              
    15   -.096   .161   .553                  .  ***     .              
    16   -.115   .163   .481                  .  ***     .              
    17   -.099   .164   .551                  .  ***     .              
    18   -.046   .166   .783                  .   **     .              
    19   -.036   .166   .829                  .   **     .              
    20   -.043   .166   .796                 .    **      .             
    21   -.044   .166   .795                 .    **      .             
    22   -.033   .166   .842                 .    **      .             
    23   -.045   .167   .789                 .    **      .             
    24   -.049   .167   .771                 .    **      .             
    25   -.031   .167   .853                 .    **      .             
    26   -.033   .167   .845                 .    **      .             
    27   -.041   .167   .809                 .    **      .             
    28   -.039   .168   .817                 .    **      .             
    29   -.025   .168   .884                 .      *      .             
    30   -.004   .168   .979                 .      *      .             
VALID CASES:  48     MISSING CASES:  0
462
LITHUANIA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .802   .127   .000                   .    *****.***********    
     2    .611   .192   .002                .       ********.****        
     3    .469   .221   .038               .        *********.           
     4    .406   .237   .091               .        *********.           
     5    .391   .248   .119              .         ********* .          
     6    .393   .257   .132              .         ********* .          
     7    .298   .267   .269              .         *******   .          
     8    .165   .272   .546             .          ****       .         
     9    .014   .274   .958             .          *          .         
    10   -.071   .274   .796             .       **          .         
    11   -.086   .274   .755             .     ***          .         
    12   -.099   .275   .719             .     ***          .         
    13   -.148   .275   .593             .   ****          .         
    14   -.155   .276   .578             .   ****          .         
    15   -.192   .278   .492             .  *****          .         
    16   -.206   .280   .464             .  *****          .         
    17   -.236   .282   .407             ******          .         
    18   -.197   .286   .493               *****          .         
    19   -.187   .288   .519             .  *****          .         
    20   -.198   .290   .497             .  *****          .         
    21   -.222   .292   .451             .  *****          .         
    22   -.248   .295   .403            .******           .        
    23   -.241   .298   .422            .******           .        
    24   -.219   .301   .470            .  *****           .        
    25   -.204   .304   .505            .  *****           .        
    26   -.184   .306   .550            .  *****           .        
    27   -.166   .308   .591            .    ****           .        
    28   -.161   .309   .603            .    ****           .        
    29   -.163   .310   .601            .    ****           .        
    30   -.157   .312   .617            .    ****           .        
VALID CASES:  62     MISSING CASES:  0
463
THE NETHERLANDS TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS    
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .857   .126   .000                   .    *****.************   
     2    .699   .198   .001                .       ********.******      
     3    .558   .234   .020               .        *********.**         
     4    .434   .254   .093              .         **********.          
     5    .286   .266   .285              .         *******   .          
     6    .213   .270   .434             .          *****      .         
     7    .157   .273   .568             .          ****       .         
     8    .119   .274   .667             .          ***        .         
     9    .063   .275   .820             .          **         .         
    10    .005   .276   .987             .          *          .         
    11   -.037   .276   .892             .       **          .         
    12   -.072   .276   .795             .       **          .         
    13   -.109   .276   .693             .     ***          .         
    14   -.148   .277   .593             .   ****          .         
    15   -.214   .278   .445             .  *****          .         
    16   -.262   .280   .354             ******          .         
    17   -.292   .284   .309           *******          .         
    18   -.268   .289   .357             ******          .         
    19   -.236   .293   .423             ******          .         
    20   -.186   .296   .532               *****           .        
    21   -.167   .298   .577            .    ****           .        
    22   -.141   .299   .638            .    ****           .        
    23   -.137   .300   .649            .    ****           .        
    24   -.152   .301   .615            .     ****           .        
    25   -.164   .303   .589            .     ****           .        
    26   -.149   .304   .625            .     ****           .        
    27   -.141   .305   .645            .     ****           .        
    28   -.148   .306   .629            .     ****           .        
    29   -.146   .307   .638            .     ****           .        
    30   -.141   .308   .649            .     ****           .        
VALID CASES:  63     MISSING CASES:  0
464
ROMANIA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .583   .115   .000                    .   ****.********        
     2    .538   .149   .001                  .     ******.*****         
     3    .405   .172   .022                 .      *******.*            
     4    .395   .184   .035                 .      *******.*            
     5    .251   .195   .203                .       ******  .            
     6    .183   .199   .361                .       *****   .            
     7    .162   .202   .423                .       ****    .            
     8    .014   .203   .945                .       *       .            
     9    .102   .203   .619                .       ***     .            
    10    .069   .204   .736                .       **      .            
    11    .133   .204   .516                .       ****    .            
    12   -.043   .205   .834                .    **       .            
    13   -.093   .206   .651                .  ***       .            
    14   -.104   .206   .616                .  ***       .            
    15   -.133   .207   .521                 ****       .            
    16   -.175   .208   .404                .****       .            
    17   -.166   .210   .432                .****       .            
    18   -.154   .212   .470                .****       .            
    19   -.158   .213   .462                .****       .            
    20   -.149   .215   .490                .****       .            
    21   -.105   .216   .628                .  ***       .            
    22   -.116   .217   .595                .  ***       .            
    23   -.103   .217   .638               .   ***        .           
    24   -.094   .218   .669               .   ***        .           
    25   -.077   .219   .726               .   ***        .           
    26   -.078   .219   .724               .   ***        .           
    27   -.063   .219   .775               .     **        .           
    28   -.063   .220   .774               .     **        .           
    29   -.069   .220   .754               .     **        .           
    30   -.052   .220   .812               .     **        .           
VALID CASES:  76     MISSING CASES:  0
465
RUSSIA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS   
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .604   .128   .000                   .    *****.*******        
     2    .462   .168   .008                 .      *******.**           
     3    .389   .188   .043                 .      *******.*            
     4    .345   .201   .091                .       ********.            
     5    .295   .210   .165                .       ******* .            
     6    .262   .217   .231               .        ******   .           
     7    .360   .222   .110               .        ******** .           
     8    .323   .232   .169               .        *******  .           
     9    .037   .239   .879               .        **       .           
    10    .050   .239   .834               .       **       .           
    11    .069   .239   .774               .       **       .           
    12   -.044   .239   .855               .     **        .           
    13   -.086   .240   .720               .   ***        .           
    14   -.159   .240   .510               .  ****        .           
    15   -.147   .242   .547               .  ****        .           
    16   -.238   .243   .332             ******         .          
    17   -.282   .247   .257           *******         .          
    18   -.202   .252   .427              .*****         .          
    19   -.200   .255   .435              .*****         .          
    20   -.203   .257   .433              .*****         .          
    21   -.213   .260   .416              .*****         .          
    22   -.204   .263   .442              .*****         .          
    23   -.216   .265   .420              .*****         .          
    24   -.217   .268   .422             .  *****          .         
    25   -.209   .271   .444             .  *****          .         
    26   -.171   .274   .534             .   ****          .         
    27   -.182   .276   .511             .  *****          .         
    28   -.187   .278   .502             .  *****          .         
    29   -.164   .280   .559             .   ****          .         
    30   -.154   .281   .585             .    ****          .         
VALID CASES:  61     MISSING CASES:  0
466
SLOVAKIA TIME SERIES  PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .648   .144   .000                  .     ******.*******       
     2    .488   .196   .016                .       ********.**          
     3    .432   .220   .055               .        *********.           
     4    .284   .237   .236               .        *******  .           
     5    .283   .244   .251              .         *******   .          
     6    .217   .250   .391              .         *****     .          
     7    .134   .254   .600              .         ****      .          
     8    .087   .256   .736              .         ***       .          
     9   -.061   .256   .812              .       **         .          
    10   -.140   .257   .587              .  ****         .          
    11   -.183   .258   .482              .*****         .          
    12   -.191   .261   .469               *****         .          
    13   -.259   .264   .331             ******         .          
    14   -.332   .269   .223         ********          .         
    15   -.333   .278   .236         ********          .         
    16   -.343   .286   .236         ********          .         
    17   -.370   .294   .215         ********           .        
    18   -.328   .304   .286         ********           .        
    19   -.292   .311   .352           *******           .        
    20   -.256   .317   .422             ******           .        
    21   -.232   .321   .473           .  ******            .       
    22   -.191   .324   .559           .   *****            .       
    23   -.164   .327   .618           .     ****            .       
    24   -.141   .328   .669           .     ****            .       
    25   -.092   .330   .782           .       ***            .       
    26   -.068   .330   .838           .         **            .       
    27   -.029   .331   .930           .         **            .       
    28   -.004   .331   .989           .           *            .       
    29    .037   .331   .912           .            **           .       
    30    .072   .331   .829           .            **           .       
VALID CASES:  48     MISSING CASES:  0
467
SLOVENIA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .582   .123   .000                   .    *****.*******        
     2    .484   .159   .003                  .     ******.****          
     3    .427   .180   .021                 .      *******.**           
     4    .316   .195   .109                .       ******* .            
     5    .390   .203   .058                .       ********.            
     6    .121   .214   .574                .       ***     .            
     7    .039   .215   .858                .       **      .            
     8    .026   .215   .906                .       **      .            
     9   -.069   .215   .749                .      **       .            
    10   -.091   .215   .674                .     ***       .            
    11   -.082   .216   .704                .     ***       .            
    12   -.114   .216   .600                .     ***       .            
    13   -.111   .217   .610               .      ***        .           
    14   -.125   .218   .570               .      ***        .           
    15   -.131   .219   .553               .     ****        .           
    16   -.107   .220   .630               .      ***        .           
    17   -.138   .221   .535               .     ****        .           
    18   -.139   .222   .533               .     ****        .           
    19   -.132   .224   .558               .     ****        .           
    20   -.111   .225   .624               .      ***        .           
    21   -.087   .226   .700               .      ***        .           
    22   -.095   .226   .675               .      ***        .           
    23   -.089   .227   .695               .      ***        .           
    24   -.075   .227   .743               .       **        .           
    25   -.077   .228   .738               .      ***        .           
    26   -.076   .228   .739               .      ***        .           
    27   -.078   .229   .733               .      ***        .           
    28   -.081   .229   .724               .      ***        .           
    29   -.085   .229   .714               .      ***        .           
    30   -.084   .230   .716               .      ***        .           
VALID CASES:  66     MISSING CASES:  0
468
SOUTH AFRICA TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .516   .113   .000                    .   ****.******          
     2    .367   .140   .011                   .    *****.**             
     3    .298   .152   .053                  .     ******.              
     4    .194   .159   .227                  .     ***** .              
     5    .222   .162   .175                  .     ***** .              
     6    .308   .166   .067                 .      *******.             
     7    .276   .173   .116                 .      *******.             
     8    .311   .179   .086                 .      *******.             
     9    .206   .186   .269                 .      *****  .             
    10   -.007   .189   .971                 .      *      .             
    11    .070   .189   .713                 .      **     .             
    12   -.091   .189   .630                 .  ***      .             
    13   -.008   .189   .966                 .      *      .             
    14    .004   .189   .985                 .      *      .             
    15   -.044   .189   .816                 .   **      .             
    16   -.159   .190   .406                 ****      .             
    17   -.142   .191   .460                 ****      .             
    18   -.158   .193   .414                .  ****       .            
    19   -.128   .194   .513                .  ****       .            
    20   -.065   .195   .739                .     **       .            
    21   -.141   .196   .472                .  ****       .            
    22   -.089   .197   .651                .   ***       .            
    23   -.080   .197   .687                .   ***       .            
    24   -.128   .198   .518                .  ****       .            
    25   -.124   .199   .535                .   ***       .            
    26   -.052   .200   .794                .     **       .            
    27   -.119   .200   .553                .   ***       .            
    28   -.094   .201   .641                .   ***       .            
    29   -.070   .202   .731                .     **       .            
    30   -.093   .202   .646                .   ***       .            
VALID CASES:  78     MISSING CASES:  0
469
SWEDEN TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS   
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+-----+
     1    .678   .111   .000                    .   ****.**********      
     2    .547   .154   .001                  .     ******.*****         
     3    .440   .176   .015                 .      *******.**           
     4    .359   .189   .062                 .      *******.             
     5    .161   .198   .419                .       ****    .            
     6    .201   .199   .316                .       *****   .            
     7    .119   .202   .555                .       ***     .            
     8    .087   .203   .668                .       ***     .            
     9    .036   .203   .860                .       **      .            
    10   -.005   .203   .982                .      *       .            
    11   -.115   .203   .573                .  ***       .            
    12   -.072   .204   .724                .    **       .            
    13   -.102   .204   .619                .  ***       .            
    14   -.103   .205   .616                .  ***       .            
    15   -.090   .205   .662                .  ***       .            
    16   -.066   .206   .749                .    **       .            
    17   -.113   .206   .585                .  ***       .            
    18   -.085   .207   .684                .  ***       .            
    19   -.027   .207   .896                .    **       .            
    20   -.010   .207   .961                .      *       .            
    21   -.042   .207   .840                .    **       .            
    22    .009   .208   .965                .      *       .            
    23    .015   .208   .942                .      *       .            
    24   -.010   .208   .962                .      *       .            
    25   -.044   .208   .831                .    **       .            
    26   -.037   .208   .859                .    **       .            
    27   -.040   .208   .849                .    **       .            
    28   -.042   .208   .840                .    **       .            
    29   -.063   .208   .764                .    **       .            
    30   -.053   .208   .801                .    **       .            
VALID CASES:  81     MISSING CASES:  0
470
SWITZERLAND TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS    
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .719   .115   .000                    .   ****.**********      
     2    .399   .164   .017                  .     ******.**            
     3    .389   .176   .030                 .      *******.*            
     4    .418   .187   .028                 .      *******.*            
     5    .292   .199   .146                .       ******* .            
     6    .157   .204   .444                .       ****    .            
     7    .058   .206   .777                .       **      .            
     8   -.026   .206   .899                .    **       .            
     9   -.041   .206   .842                .    **       .            
    10   -.032   .206   .876                .   **       .            
    11   -.040   .206   .846                .   **       .            
    12   -.021   .207   .919                .     *       .            
    13    .021   .207   .920                .     *       .            
    14   -.006   .207   .975                .     *       .            
    15   -.069   .207   .740                .   **       .            
    16   -.071   .207   .731                .   **       .            
    17   -.048   .207   .819                .   **       .            
    18   -.062   .207   .766                .   **       .            
    19   -.094   .208   .651                .  ***       .            
    20   -.100   .208   .632                .  ***       .            
    21   -.062   .209   .767                .   **       .            
    22   -.059   .209   .780                .   **       .            
    23   -.055   .209   .795                .   **       .            
    24   -.057   .209   .788                .   **       .            
    25   -.075   .210   .723                .   **       .            
    26   -.095   .210   .652                .  ***       .            
    27   -.086   .211   .683                .  ***       .            
    28   -.096   .211   .652                .  ***       .            
    29   -.139   .212   .512                ****       .            
    30   -.138   .213   .519                ****       .            
VALID CASES:  76     MISSING CASES:  0
471
UKRAINE TIME-SERIES PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .783   .114   .000                    .   ****.************    
     2    .683   .170   .000                 .      *******.*******      
     3    .513   .203   .013                .       ********.**          
     4    .391   .219   .078               .        *********.           
     5    .339   .228   .141               .        ******** .           
     6    .168   .234   .474               .        ****     .           
     7    .083   .236   .725               .        ***      .           
     8   -.022   .236   .926               .        *        .           
     9   -.060   .236   .800               .     **        .           
    10   -.087   .236   .715               .  ***        .           
    11   -.097   .237   .683               .  ***        .           
    12   -.128   .237   .590                ****        .           
    13   -.140   .238   .558                ****        .           
    14   -.119   .239   .621               .  ***        .           
    15   -.129   .240   .594               .****        .           
    16   -.119   .241   .622               .  ***        .           
    17   -.105   .242   .664               .  ***        .           
    18   -.096   .242   .692               .  ***        .           
    19   -.050   .243   .837              .     **         .          
    20   -.038   .243   .877              .     **         .          
    21   -.007   .243   .978              .       *         .          
    22   -.026   .243   .916              .     **         .          
    23   -.049   .243   .840              .     **         .          
    24   -.038   .243   .877              .     **         .          
    25   -.037   .243   .880              .     **         .          
    26   -.035   .243   .886              .      **         .          
    27   -.058   .243   .811              .      **         .          
    28   -.073   .243   .766              .      **         .          
    29   -.079   .244   .748              .    ***         .          
    30   -.090   .244   .714              .    ***         .          
VALID CASES:  77     MISSING CASES:  0
472
UNITED KINGDOM TIME-SERIES  PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS 
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .770   .113   .000                    .   ****.***********     
     2    .541   .167   .002                 .      *******.****         
     3    .307   .189   .107                 .      *******.             
     4    .232   .195   .238                .       ******  .            
     5    .146   .198   .463                .       ****    .            
     6    .111   .200   .579                .       ***     .            
     7    .108   .201   .590                .       ***     .            
     8    .043   .201   .831                .       **      .            
     9   -.017   .201   .934                .       *       .            
    10   -.082   .201   .686                .  ***       .            
    11   -.058   .202   .773                .    **       .            
    12   -.052   .202   .798                .    **       .            
    13   -.035   .202   .864                .    **       .            
    14   -.031   .202   .879                .    **       .            
    15   -.055   .202   .788                .    **       .            
    16   -.087   .203   .670                .  ***       .            
    17   -.139   .203   .496                .****       .            
    18   -.101   .204   .623                .  ***       .            
    19   -.099   .205   .631                .  ***       .            
    20   -.077   .205   .710                .  ***       .            
    21   -.078   .206   .707                .  ***       .            
    22   -.079   .206   .704                .  ***       .            
    23   -.080   .207   .699                .  ***       .            
    24   -.078   .207   .706                .  ***       .            
    25   -.063   .207   .760                .    **       .            
    26   -.062   .208   .766                .    **       .            
    27   -.049   .208   .814                .    **       .            
    28   -.040   .208   .848                .    **       .            
    29   -.046   .208   .825                .    **       .            
    30   -.039   .208   .850                .    **       .            
VALID CASES:  78     MISSING CASES:  0
473
UNITED STATES TIME-SERIES  PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS  
    Lag   corr.   S.E.    P    -1       -0.5        0        0.5        +1
                                +––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––+––––-+
     1    .863   .101   .000                    .   ****.*************   
     2    .680   .159   .000                  .     ******.********      
     3    .519   .187   .006                 .      *******.***          
     4    .399   .201   .050                .       ********.            
     5    .336   .209   .111                .       ********.            
     6    .262   .214   .224                .       ******  .            
     7    .171   .218   .433               .        ****     .           
     8    .099   .219   .653               .        ***      .           
     9    .053   .219   .811               .        **       .           
    10    .048   .220   .828               .        **       .           
    11    .032   .220   .883               .        **       .           
    12    .020   .220   .927               .        *        .           
    13    .002   .220   .994               .        *        .           
    14   -.015   .220   .945               .        *        .           
    15   -.002   .220   .993               .        *        .           
    16   -.009   .220   .966               .        *        .           
    17   -.020   .220   .929               .        *        .           
    18   -.001   .220   .997               .        *        .           
    19    .007   .220   .974               .        *        .           
    20    .026   .220   .905               .      **       .           
    21    .025   .220   .909               .      **       .           
    22    .022   .220   .921               .        *        .           
    23    .025   .220   .909               .      **       .           
    24    .017   .220   .939               .        *        .           
    25    .020   .220   .927               .        *        .           
    26    .018   .220   .934               .        *        .           
    27    .014   .220   .951               .        *        .           
    28    .012   .220   .957               .        *        .           
    29    .004   .220   .985               .        *        .           
    30    .007   .220   .974               .        *        .           
VALID CASES:  98     MISSING CASES:  0
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APPENDIX 6
VOCABULARY LIST FOR EACH OF 
THE SIX STAKEHOLDER ADAPTIVE CAPACITIES
Vocabulary List - SAC Learning
ACADEMIC 
ACCREDITATION 
ACCREDITED 
ADAPT 
ADAPTATION 
ADJUST 
ADJUSTMENT 
ALTER 
ALTERATION 
ALTERNATE 
ALTERNATIVE 
ANALYZE 
ANALYSIS 
ANALYTICAL 
ANALYZE 
APTITUDE 
CAPABILITY 
CAPABLE 
CERTIFICATE 
CHALLENGE 
CHECK 
CLARIFY 
COMPETENCE 
CONFERENCE 
CONTEMPLATE 
CORRECT 
CORRECTION 
CORRECTIVE 
CREDIBLE 
DIFFICULTY 
DISCOVER 
DISCOVERY 
DIVERSIFY 
DIVERSITY 
ENHANCE 
ENHANCEMENT 
EVOLUTION 
EVOLVE 
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EXAM 
EXAMINATION 
EXAMINE 
EXCELLENCE 
EXPERIENCE 
EXPERIMENT 
EXPERIMENTAL 
EXPERT 
EXPERTISE 
EXPLORATION 
FEEDBACK 
FELLOWSHIP 
IMPROVE 
IMPROVEMENT
INNOVATION 
KNOWLEDGE 
LABORATORY 
LEARN 
LESSON 
MASTER 
MODELING 
MODERN 
MODERNISATION 
MODERNIZATION 
MODIFICATION 
MODIFY 
POSTGRADUATE 
PROGRESSIVE 
QUALIFICATION 
QUALITY_ASSURANCE 
REASSESS 
REASSESSMENT 
REDEVELOPMENT 
RELIABILITY 
RELIABLE 
RESEARCH 
RETRAIN 
REVISE 
SCIENCE 
SCIENTIFIC 
SCIENTIST 
SEMINAR 
SIMULATE 
SIMULATOR 
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SKILL 
SOLUTION 
SPECIALIST 
SPECIALIZE 
STEPWISE 
STRENGHTEN 
STRIVE 
STUDY 
TECHNOLOGY 
TESTING 
THEORETICAL 
THEORY 
TRAINING 
TRANSMUTATION 
TRIAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
UNDERSTAND 
UNFORSEEN 
UNIVERSITY 
UPGRADE 
VALIDATE 
VALIDATION 
VALIDITY 
VOCATIONAL 
WORKSHOP 
Vocabulary List - SAC2 Manager Responsibility
ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACCOUNTABLE 
ADHERE 
ADHERENCE 
ALLOCATE
ALLOCATION 
BUDGET 
BUSINESS 
CAPTURE 
COMMERCIAL 
COMMERCIALLY 
CORPORATE 
CORPORATION 
COST 
CULTURE 
CUSTOMER 
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DEMONSTRATE 
DISCLOSURE 
DOCUMENTATION 
DUTIES 
ECONOMIC 
ECONOMY 
ELECTRICITY 
EMPLOYEE 
EMPLOYMENT 
EXPENSE 
FEE 
FINANCIALLY 
FINANCE 
FINANCIAL 
FISCAL 
FULFIL 
FULFILL 
FULFILLMENT 
FULFILMENT 
FUND 
GUARANTEE 
HIRE 
INCOME 
INDUSTRY 
INSURANCE 
INVEST 
INVESTMENT 
JOB 
JUSTIFICATION 
JUSTIFY 
LABOR 
LABOUR 
LEADERSHIP 
LEGACY 
MAINTENANCE 
MANPOWER 
MARKET 
MISSION 
OBSERVANCE 
OPENNESS 
OUTREACH 
PERSONNEL 
POWER 
RECORD 
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RECORDKEEPING 
RECRUIT 
RECRUITMENT 
REORGANIZATION 
REORGANIZATIONAL 
RESTRUCTURE 
REVENUE 
STAFF 
STRATEGIC 
STRATEGY 
TRACEABILITY 
TRANSPARENCY 
TRANSPARENT 
WORKER 
WORKFORCE 
WORKPLACE 
Vocabulary List - SAC3 Public Participation
CANDIDATE 
CITIZEN 
CLEANUP 
COMMUNICATE 
COMMUNICATION 
COMMUNITY 
COMPENSATE 
COMPENSATION 
COMPENSATORY 
CONFIDENCE 
CONSENSUS 
CONSTITUENT 
CULTURAL 
CUSTODIAL 
DEBATE 
DELIBERATE 
DEMOCRATIC 
DIALOGUE 
DISCUSS 
DISCUSSION 
DWELLING 
ECOLOGICAL 
ECOLOGY 
EDUCATION 
EDUCATIONAL 
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EIA 
EMPOWER 
ENGAGE 
ENGAGEMENT 
ENVIRONMENT 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENVIRONNMENTALLY 
ETHIC 
ETHICAL 
EXPECTATION 
FACILITATE 
FAMILY 
FARM 
FAUNA 
FISH 
FISHERY 
FOODSTUFF 
FOOTPRINT 
FOREST 
HEAR 
HEARD 
HEARING 
HOUSE 
INFORM 
INFORMATION 
INTERNET 
INTERVENER 
INTERVENOR 
JUSTICE 
LOCAL 
LOCALITY 
LOCALLY 
LOCATE 
MEDIATOR 
MENTAL 
NGOS 
OFFSITE 
PARTICIPANT 
PARTICIPATE 
PARTICIPATION 
PATHWAY 
PEOPLE 
PERSON 
PERSONAL 
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PERSONALITY 
POLITICAL 
POLLUTION 
POPULATED 
POPULATION 
PREJUDICE 
PROPERTY 
PSYCHOSOCIAL 
PUBLIC 
RAIN 
RAINFALL 
RAINWATER 
REFERENDUM 
RESIDENCE 
RESIDENT 
RESIDENTIAL 
RURAL 
SCHOOL 
SITING 
SOCIAL 
SOCIETAL 
SOCIETY 
SOCIO 
STAKEHOLDER 
STEWARDSHIP 
SUSTAINABILITY 
SUSTAINABLE 
TRUST 
URBAN 
VILLAGE 
VOTE 
WEB 
WEBSITE 
WELFARE 
WOMEN 
Vocabulary List - SAC4 Government Oversight
ACCEPTABILITY 
ACCEPTABLE 
ACCEPTANCE 
ACCEPTED 
ACCORDANCE 
ACT 
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ADVICE 
ADVISE 
ADVISORY 
ALLOWABLE 
ALLOWANCE 
AMEND 
AMENDMENT 
ANNOUNCE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
APPOINT 
APPOINTMENT 
APPRAISAL 
APPROVAL 
APPROVE 
AUDIT 
AUTHORISATION 
AUTHORISE 
AUTHORITY 
AUTHORIZATION 
AUTHORIZE 
BOARD 
BODY 
CERTIFICATE 
CERTIFICATION 
CERTIFY 
CHECK 
COMMAND 
COMPULSORY 
CONTROL 
COURT 
DECISION 
DECLARATION 
DECREE 
DIRECT 
DIRECTIVE 
ENACT 
ENACTMENT 
ENFORCE 
ENFORCEMENT 
ENSURE 
EVALUATE 
EXAMINATION 
FORCE 
GOVERN 
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GOVERNANCE 
GOVERNMENT 
GRANT 
GUIDANCE 
GUIDE 
GUIDELINE 
IMPOSE 
IMPRISONMENT 
INQUIRY 
INSPECT 
INSPECTION 
INSPECTOR 
INSTRUCT 
INSTRUCTION 
INVESTIGATE 
INVESTIGATION 
JUDGE 
JUDGMENT
JUGEMENT 
LAW 
LEGAL 
LEGALLY 
LEGISLATE 
LEGISLATION 
LICENCE 
LICENSE 
LIMIT 
MANDATORY 
OBLIGATE 
OBLIGATION 
OBLIGATORY 
OBLIGE 
ORDER 
OVERSEE 
OVERSIGHT 
PENAL 
PENALTY 
PERMISSIBLE 
PERMIT 
POLICE 
PRESCRIBE 
PROHIBITION 
PUNISH 
REGULATE 
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REGULATION 
REGULATORY 
REQUIRE 
REQUIREMENT 
RESTRICTION 
RULE 
SANCTION
STANDARD 
STATEMENT 
STATUTE 
STATUTORY 
STIPULATE 
STIPULATION 
STRICT 
STRINGENT 
SUPERVISATION 
SUPERVISE 
SUPERVISION 
SUPERVISORY 
VERIFICATION 
VERIFY 
Vocabulary List - SAC5 Project Collaboration
ACCORD 
AGREE 
AGREEMENT 
ASSIST 
ASSISTANCE 
ASSOCIATION 
BILATERAL 
COLLABORATION 
COMMITMENT 
CONSENT 
CONSIGNEE 
CONSORTIUM 
CONSULT 
CONSULTANCY 
CONSULTANT 
CONSULTATION 
CONTRIBUTE 
CONTRIBUTION 
CONTRIBUTOR 
COOPERATE 
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COOPERATION 
COOPERATIVE 
COORDINATE 
COORDINATION 
COORDINATOR 
COUNTY 
DISTRICT 
ENCOURAGE 
EXCHANGE 
FACILITATE 
FEEDBACK 
FOREIGN 
FORMALIZE 
FOSTER 
GNEP 
HARMONISE 
HARMONIZATION 
HARMONIZE 
IAEA 
INCENTIVE 
INTERACT 
INTERACTION 
INTERDEPENDENCY 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
INTERNATIONAL 
INTERNATIONALLY 
INTERREGIONAL 
JOINTLY 
JURISDICTION 
LIAISON 
MAYOR 
MEMORANDUM 
MERGER 
MOU 
MULTILATERAL 
MUNICIPAL 
MUNICIPALITY 
MUTUAL 
MUTUALLY 
NEA 
NEIGHBORING 
NEIGHBOURING 
NETWORK 
OSART 
485
PARTNER 
PARTNERSHIP 
PROVINCIAL 
REGION 
REGIONAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
ROLE 
SHARE 
SIGNATORY 
TERRITORIAL 
TERRITORY 
TOWN 
TRANSBOUNDARY 
TREATY 
VISIT 
WANO 
WORLD 
WORLDWIDE 
Vocabulary List - SAC6 Emergency Preparedness
ACCIDENT 
ACCIDENTAL 
ALARM 
ALERT 
ANTICIPATE 
AWARE 
CHERNOBYL 
CONTINGENCY 
COUNTERMEASURE 
CRASH 
CRISIS 
CRITICALITY 
DAMAGE 
DANGER 
DANGEROUS 
DISASTER 
DRILL 
EARTHQUAKE 
EMERGENCY 
ENDANGER 
EVACUATE 
EVACUATION 
EVENT 
486
EXERCISE 
EXPLOSION 
FIRE 
FLOOD 
FORECAST 
FORESEABLE 
FORESEE 
FUTURE 
GUARD 
HARM 
HARMFUL 
HAZARD 
HAZARDOUS 
HOSPITAL 
INCIDENT 
INES 
INSURANCE 
IODINE 
LANDSLIDE 
LIABILITY 
LIABLE 
LIGHTNING 
LOCA 
MONITOR 
NONPROLIFERATION 
OUTAGE 
POLICE 
PRECAUTION 
PRECAUTIONARY 
PREDICT 
PREDICTABLE 
PREDICTION 
PREVENT 
PREVENTIVE 
PROACTIVE 
PROLIFERATION 
PROTOCOL 
REDUNDANCY 
RESCUE 
RISK 
SABOTAGE 
SAFEGUARD 
SCENARIO 
SECURE 
487
SECURITY 
SEISMIC 
SHUTDOWN 
SPILL 
SURVEILLANCE 
TARGET 
TERRORISM 
TERRORIST 
THEFT 
THREAT 
TRAFFIC 
WATCH 
WEAPON 
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